22. Ord. No. 07-1999 For sale signs in cars
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY
2041 0 Town Center Lane, Suite 210
Cupertino, CA 95014-3255
Telephone: (408) 777-3403
FAX: (408) 777-3401
CITY OF
CUPEI\TINO
Charles T. Kilian, City Attorney
Eileen H. Murray, Assistant City Attorney
March 8, 2007
Honorable Mayor and City Council Members
City of Cupertino
10300 Torre Avenue
Cupertino, CA 95014
RE: Revision of the Cupertino Municipal Code
Dear Mayor and Council Members,
The attached opinion issued by the United States District Court, Central District of
California makes the finding that a Los Angeles Municipal Code section prohibiting a "For
Sale" sign on a car parked on a public street impermissibly infringes on the Plaintiff's First
Amendment rights of free speech as it applies to commercial speech. The court found that "a
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate
that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree." Edenfieldv. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993). The City of Los Angeles failed to meet their
burden to demonstrate that the restriction advanced a substantial government interest that
could not be met in a less burdensome manner.
Cupertino has a similar restriction in the Municipal Code that mayor may not be an
infringement of free speech. While the attached opinion is from the Central District Court and
may not be dispositive in a local federal court, it would assuredly be persuasive. Based on
this and our analysis of the benefit versus the burden of such an ordinance, our office
recommends that the pertinent section be repealed.
We are happy to answer any questions you may have.
Sincerely,
~ S<< J pluM
Eileen H. Murray
Assistant City Attorney
Cc: City Manager
Captain Terry Calderone
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United States District Court, Central District
of California
Recently Issued Opinions and Orders
Subject: Case Number:
Opinions and Orders CV 00-5860 AHM
of Previous Years (MANx)
Title:
Edward Burkow v. City of Los
Angeles - Order Granting
Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction
Date Posted:
10/17/2000
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
v.
) Case No. CV 00-5860 AHM (MANx)
)
) Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for
) Preliminary Injunction
)
)
)
)
Edward Burkow,
Plaintiff,
City of Los Angeles,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Edward Burkow wants to advertise his car for sale by placing a "For Sale" sign in the
window and leaving it there, even while the car is parked on a public street. Los Angeles
Municipal Code ("LAMC") ~ 80.75 prohibits him from doing so. On May 31, 2000, Plaintiff
filed this action against Defendant City of Los Angeles seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. He claims that ~ 80.75 impermissibly infringes on his rights under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the California
Constitution. Before the Court is his Motion for Preliminary Injunction ("Motion") seeking to
enjoin Defendant from enforcing LAMC ~ 80.75.
The Court has reviewed the papers submitted and the file in this case, and considered
oral argument of counsel. The Court grants Plaintiff's Motion because Defendant has failed
to satisfy its burden to justify ~ 80.75's restriction on commercial speech under each of the
elements in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 23, 1999, Edward Burkow parked his car on Willoughby Street in the
City of Los Angeles. Burkow Dec. ~ 2. He placed two 8 1/2 by 11 inch "For Sale" signs in the
windows of the car, thereby saving the expense of running a classified newspaper
advertisement. Burkow Dec. ~~ 2-3. The City of Los Angeles cited Burkow for violation of
LAMC ~ 80.75.1 Burkow Dec. Exh. 3. Burkow paid a $35 fine and unsuccessfully contested
the citation before an administrative hearing examiner and later in Los Angeles Municipal
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Court. Burkow Dec. ~~ 5-7. Burkow, believing that the most effective and least expensive
means to advertise his car is to park it on the street with a "For Sale" sign, has not yet sold
his car. Burkow Dec. ~ 8.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards For Issuing A Preliminary Injunction
A plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction upon showing "either (1) a
combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or (2)
the existence of serious questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships tips
sharply in his favor." Sardi's Restaurant Corp. v. Sardie, 755 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 1985)
(citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1984)).
These standards are not two distinct tests, but rather are "the opposite ends of a single
continuum in which the required showing of harm varies inversely with the required showing
of meritoriousness." Rodeo Collection, Ltd v. West Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir.
1987) (internal quotations omitted).
II. General Principles Relating to Commercial Speech
The following analysis applies federal constitutional law because both sides focus on
those principles and neither side suggests there is any difference between those standards
and the judicial interpretation of Article I, Section 2 of the California Constitution.
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court announced a four-part test to analyze the
validity of governmental restrictions on commercial speech:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four_part analysis has developed. [1] At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. [2] Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine [3] whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and [4] whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.
447 U.S. at 566. Furthermore, the government bears the burden of proof: "As the party
seeking to regulate commercial speech, the City has the burden of affirmatively establishing
that the ordinance meets each of [the Central Hudson] elements." Desert Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing
grant of summary judgment for the defendant city because, among other reasons, the city,
whose ordinance lacked any statement of purpose concerning aesthetics and safety, failed
to "provide any evidence that it had an interest in safety and aesthetics or that the [sign]
ordinance furthered those interests"). "This burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in
fact alleviate them to a material degree." Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993).
III. Application to This Case: Whether Plaintiff Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits
A. Whether The First Amendment Protects This Speech
Defendant contends that the ordinance is a valid restriction on commercial speech
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under Central Hudson. Defendant does not challenge Plaintiff's standing to bring either a
facial or "as applied" challenge. Nor does it contend that ~ 80.75 is a valid time, place or
manner restriction on speech.
On its face, and as Defendant concedes, LAMC ~ 80.75 restricts speech that is
commercial, by prohibiting the advertising, offering, selling or renting of "any bicycle or any
vehicle which is subject to regulation under the California Vehicle Code from or upon any
public or private property which is not the place of business of a bicycle retailer or duly
licensed vehicle dealer."z See LAMC ~ 80.75(a). "For commercial speech to come within [the
First Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading." Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. There is no allegation that Burkow's proposed sale was either
misleading or inherently unlawful. Thus, his expression is protected by the First
Amendment.
B. Whether The Asserted Governmental Interests Are Substantial
"Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial." [d.
Defendant must present "evidence that it had an interest in safety and aesthetics," or some
other substantial governmental interest. See Desert Outdoor Advertising, 103 F.3d at 819.
Defendant does not rebut Plaintiff's contention that the ordinance lacks any statement of
purpose on its face or in its legislative history. See Motion at 4. Instead, Defendant offers
several post hoc rationales for the ordinance --- supported by defense counsel's argument
rather than evidence.] Counsel asserts that the ordinance: (1) preserves safety by reducing
distractions that are likely to cause traffic accidents, (2) promotes the flow of traffic and
access to businesses by discouraging would-be automobile sellers from parking on the
busiest streets, (3) protects public streets from blight and (4) discourages trafficking in
stolen vehicles and other unlicensed automobile dealers. See Opp. at 2-7.
"Unlike rationaLbasis review, the Central Hudson standard does not permit us to
supplant the precise interests put forward by the [government] with other suppositions.
Neither will we turn away if it appears that the stated interests are not the actual interests
served by the restriction." Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 768 (internal citations omitted). Ordinarily
in First Amendment cases "[t]he relevant governmental interest is determined by objective
indicators as taken from the face of the statute, the effect of the statute, comparison to
prior law, facts surrounding enactment of the statute, the stated purpose, and the record of
proceedings." City of Las Vegas v. Foley, 747 F.2d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1984). These are all
absent here. Nevertheless, because the City invokes traffic safety, public access, aesthetic
and other interests, and solely for purposes of ruling on this Motion, the Court will assume
at this early stage of the proceedings that at trial Defendant would be able to introduce
evidence supporting its counsel's contentions.4 In any event, there is no question that (and
Plaintiff concedes that) the proffered safety and aesthetic interests are traditional
"substantial governmental interests." See Desert Outdoor Advertising, 103 F.3d at 819.
c. Whether The Ordinance Directly Advances The Asserted Governmental
Interests
"If [the expression is protected by the First Amendment and the asserted
governmental interest is substantial], we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
In Edenfield, the plaintiff successfully challenged a ban on solicitation by accountants
as an impermissible infringement on commercial speech. See 507 U.S. at 777. The
government "assert[ed] an interest in protecting consumers from fraud or overreaching by
CPA's. . . and maintain[ing] both the fact and appearance of CPA independence in auditing
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a business and attesting to its financial statements." [d. at 768. Though it recognized that
the asserted interests were substantial, the Supreme Court held that the ban on solicitation
was invalid, reasoning:
The Board has not demonstrated that, as applied in the business context, the ban on
CPA solicitation advances its asserted interests in any direct and material way. It
presents no studies that suggest personal solicitation of prospective business clients
by CPA's creates the dangers of fraud, overreaching, or compromised independence
that the Board claims to fear. The record does not disclose any anecdotal evidence,
either from Florida or another State, that validates the Board's suppositions. . . . Not
even Fane's own conduct suggests that the Board's concerns are justified. The only
suggestion that a ban on solicitation might help prevent fraud and overreaching or
preserve CPA independence is the affidavit of Louis Dooner, which contains nothing
more than a series of conclusory statements that add little if anything to the Board's
original statement of its justifications.
[d. at 771 (internal citations omitted).
Here, Defendant attempts to show with a rhetorical question unsupported by any
evidence that LAMC 9 80.75 in fact alleviates the suggested harms:
How materially the regulation advances and supports the government interest may be
answered this way: it is difficult to assess the magnitude of the problems sought to be
addressed, but we know that historically that [sic] these problems were serious
enough to warrant restrictive legislation. Additionally "material" is an inexact term.
For example, would the prevention of one serious accident per year materially
advance the government interest? City urges this answer is yes.
Opp. at 9.
Although the Court finds that Defendant has proffered at least two substantial
governmental interests n_ safety and aesthetics --- to justify LAMC 9 80.75, the Court is
unwilling to accept similar "speculation or conjecture" on how this ordinance "directly
advances the governmental interest asserted."s See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71. Like the
defendant in Edenfield, the City has presented no studies or even anecdotal evidence, and
"[n]ot even [Plaintiff]'s own conduct suggests that [Defendant]'s concerns are justified."
See id. at 771. Instead of demonstrating how "the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them," Defendant employs circular reasoning to suggest that
the mere act of passing the ordinance is evidence that there were "serious" problems. See
id.; Opp. at 9. This is inadequate.
D. Whether the Ordinance Is Reasonably Tailored To Serve A Substantial
Interest
"[L]aws restricting commercial speech, unlike laws burdening other forms of protected
expression, need only be tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substantial state
interest in order to survive First Amendment scrutiny." Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767. "[I]f
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there are numerous and obvious less_burdensome alternatives to the restriction on
commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit'
between ends and means is reasonable." City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410, 418 n.13 (1993) (invalidating city ordinance that banned news racks dispensing
commercial handbills because they were "no more harmful than the permitted newsracks,
and have only a minimal impact on the overall number of newsracks on the city's
sidewalks").
Defendant claims that "the restriction is narrowly tailored to situations where the
traveling motorist is distracted by a small sign in a parked car." Opp. at 9. The Court
disagrees. First, only vehicle "For Sale" signs are prohibited; all other signs are permitted on
parked cars, although they could be even more distracting to passing motorists. For
example, under LAMC ~ 80.75, commercial advertisements on cars could offer anything for
sale, such as ads depicting jewelry, drugs or sexually explicit magazines, except the car on
which the sign is mounted. In short, ~ 80.75 does not "fit" the proffered safety concerns.
See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 418.
Next, the distinction in LAMC ~ 80.75(b) between signs in parked cars and signs in
moving cars fails not only to be narrowly tailored but also to be rationally related to safety
objectives. The Court cannot fathom how a sign in a parked car is more dangerous than the
same sign in a moving car; indeed, there is a greater likelihood that a passing motorist will
avert his eyes to read a sign posted in a moving vehicle. In contrast, if a driver wishes to
read a sign in a parked vehicle, and if road conditions permit, he can slow down or stop or
even back up.
Next, contrary to Defendant's contention, the ordinance is not reasonably tailored to
"situations where the traveling motorist is distracted by a small sign in a parked car"
because it applies to "For Sale" signs without regard to the size of the sign or its visibility
from the road.
As to the indisputably important "aesthetic" concerns, Defendant could minimize the
alleged harms with measures far short of outright prohibition. For example, extensive
parking regulations could permit owners to park their cars displaying "For Sale" signs
without impeding public access to limited-availability parking spaces; like all vehicles, the
vehicle with the "For Sale" sign could be permitted to remain in any given space only for a
fixed or limited period. Similarly, to prevent streets from becoming a "de facto used car lot,"
a seller could be precluded from parking more than one car with a "For Sale" sign on any
given street at any single time.
Furthermore, serious questions about the sufficiency of the advertising alternatives ---
i.e., opportunities to exercise the right to speak --- left open to Plaintiff remain. In Unmark
Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977), the Supreme Court
invalidated on First Amendment grounds an ordinance banning "For Sale" and "Sold" signs
on residential property. The ordinance was designed to stem what the township perceived
as the flight of white homeowners from a racially integrated community. The Supreme Court
noted:
The options to which sellers realistically are relegated --- primarily newspaper
advertising and listing with [] agents --- involve more cost and less autonomy than
'For Sale' signs. . . and may be less effective media for communicating the message
that is conveyed by a 'For sale' sign. . . . The alternatives, then, are far from
satisfactory .
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Id. (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff "believe[s] the least expensive and most effective method for [him] to
sell [his] car is to advertise the sale of [his] car by placing a 'For Sale' sign within the car
while it is parked on a street within the City of Los Angeles." Burkow Decl. ~ 8. Who is to
say he is wrong? Certainly, Defendant hasn't demonstrated that he is. A classified ad in a
newspaper does not as effectively advertise and describe the precise car that is for sale as
does a simple "For Sale" sign posted on the car. And yet a newspaper ad would cost more.6
Advertising the car for sale on a dealer's lot would involve even "more cost and less
autonomy." See Unmark, 431 U.S. at 93. For these reasons, then, the ordinance does not
leave "satisfactory" alternatives available to would-be sellers.
Based on all of the foregoing, Plaintiff has demonstrated probable success on the
merits.?
III. Whether Plaintiff Will Suffer Irreparable Harm
To determine whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the Court must consider the
possibility of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is not imposed. The City of Los
Angeles argues that Plaintiff cannot show the requisite irreparable harm because he has
alternative "ways to offer his car for sale at little or no cost to him." Opp. at 10. That
contention is debatable, particularly as to the costs. Moreover, Plaintiff is entitled to a
preliminary injunction because he has "demonstrated probable success on the merits of
[his] claim" that LAMC 9 80.75 impermissibly restricts protected speech. See S.O.c., Inc. v.
County ofC/ark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that a preliminary injunction
against an ordinance prohibiting "off-premises canvassing" should have been issued
because the plaintiff demonstrated probable success on the merits of its First Amendment
claim and noting that "[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury" (quoting E/rod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
373 (1976)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court orders as
follows:
1. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
2. By not later than October 26, 2000, Plaintiff shall submit a proposed injunction.
3. By not later than November 2, 2000, Defendant shall submit any objections to
Plaintiff's proposed injunction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: October 17, 2000
A. Howard Matz
United States District Judge
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I The full text ofLAMC ~ 80.75 is as follows:
(a) No person shall display for the purpose of sale or rent or shall rent, advertise or offer for sale or rent, or sell or rent any bicycle or any vehicle
which is subject to registration under the California Vehicle Code from or upon any public or private property which is not the place of business
of a bicycle retailer or a duly licensed vehicle dealer.
(b) The provisions of Subsection (a) hereof shall not apply to the registered owner of a vehicle or bicycle when displaying advertising, offering,
selling or renting such vehicle or bicycle upon property of which he is the owner, lessee or lawful occupant, nor when displaying, advertising or
offering such vehicle or bicycle for sale or rent while in the act of driving such vehicle or riding such bicycle.
2 Excepted from the advertising prohibition are (I) a registered vehicle owner who advertises "upon property of which he is the owner, lessee or lawful
occupant" and (2) advertising "while in the act of driving such vehicle. . ." See LAMC ~ 80. 75(b).
3 Defendant submitted no declarations or any other evidence.
4 What seems equally plausible, at the very least, is that the political forces behind this ordinance included used car dealers and other business or property-
owning interests that understandably would oppose would-be buyers and sellers of used cars using streets or other locations to set up the equivalent of an
"automobile swap meet."
5 See supra Part III.B for a list of harms proffered by Defendant.
6 Even if a photo of the car were published, it would have less persuasive power to a prospective buyer than the "real thing," because used car buyers are
wary enough to begin with and are not likely to be impressed by a picture.
7 Although the parties cited no cases discussing the constitutionality of "car for sale" restrictions, this Court notes that the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment -- finding a Milwaukee ordinance banning "For Sale" signs on vehicles parked on "any highway"
unconstitutional -- and stated that: "Because the restriction is disproportional and way beyond that necessary for the claimed interest of traffic safety, both
the statute and the ordinance are unconstitutional violations of Blondis', and for that matter, every motor vehicle owner's, limited constitutional
commercial free speech rights." CityofMi/waukee v. Blondis, 460 N.W.2d 815, 818 (1990).
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DRAFT
ORDINANCE NO. 07-1999
AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF CUPERTINO, AMENDING TITLE 11, SECTION
11.24.140 OF THE CUPERTINO MUNICIPAL CODE (PARKING FOR PURPOSES OF
SERVICING OR REP ARING REGARDING FOR-SALE SIGNS IN CARS) TO
CONFORM THE PROVISIONS OF THE CODE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF
CURRENT CASE LAW, AND CONFORM THE PROVISIONS OF THE CODE TO BE
CONSISTENT WITH PRESENT CITY PRACTICES
THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CUPERTINO DOES HEREBY ORDAIN that the
following section of the Cupertino Municipal Code shall be amended to read as follows:
Section 11.24. 140(A)(1)& (2) are hereby repealed.
Section 11.24.140(A) is hereby amended to read asfollows:
11.24.140
Parking for Purposes of Servicing or Repairing
A. No person shall park a vehicle upon any roadway or on any private property or private
roadway without the express written permission of the owner of such property, for the principal
purpose of servicing or repairing such vehicle, except when necessitated by an emergency.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
PUBLICATION CLAUSE:
The City Clerk shall cause this ordinance to be published at least once in a newspaper of
general circulation published and circulated in the City within 15 days after its adoption, in
accordance with Government code S 36933, shall certifY to the adoption of this ordinance and shall
cause this ordinance and her certification, together with proof of publication, to be entered in the
Book of Ordinances of the Council of this City.
This ordinance shall take effect and be in force thirty (30) days after its passage.
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Ordinance No. 07-1999
2
INTRODUCED at a regular meeting of the City Council of the City of Cupertino the
20th day of March 2007 and ENACTED at a regular meeting of the City Council of the City of
Cupertino the _ day of , 2007, by the following vote:
Vote:
Members of the City Council
Ayes:
Noes:
Absent:
Abstain:
ATTEST:
APPROVED:
City Clerk
Mayor
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29
Stopping, Standing and Parking-Public Streets
11.24.060
prohibition of parking at any of the places described in this
section, either by erecting and maintaining signs giving
notice, or by placing a curb marking consisting of red paint
upon the top and face of each curb. (Ord. 843, ~ 9.1, 1977)
11.24.070 Parking Space Markings.
The City Traffic Engineer is authorized to install and
maintain parking space markings to indicate parking spaces
adjacent to curbings where authorized parking is permitted.
When such parking space markings are placed in the
highway, subject to other and more restrictive limitations,
no vehicle shall be stopped, left standing or parked, other
than within a single space, unless the size or shape of such
vehicle makes compliance impossible. (Ord. 843, ~ 9.3,
1977)
11.24.080 Authority to Establish Loading Zones.
The City Traffic Engineer is authorized to determine
and to mark loading zones and passenger loading zones in
commercially zoned areas and elsewhere, either in front of
the entrance to any place of business, or in front of any hall
or place used for the purpose of public assembly. (Ord.
843, ~ 9.4, 1977)
11.24.090 Loading Zones-Marking.
Loading zones shall be indicated by a yellow paint line
upon the top and face of all curbs within such zones. (Ord.
843, ~ 9.5, 1977)
11.24.100 Passenger Loading Zones.
Passenger loading zones shall be indicated by a white
line stenciled with black letters "PASSENGER LOADING
ONLY" upon the top of all curbs within such zones. (Ord.
843, ~ 9.6, 1977)
11.24.110 Spaces Restricted to Handicapped
Persons.
The City Traffic Engineer is authorized to determine
and to mark parking spaces on public streets for the
exclusive use of vehicles which display a distinguishing
license plate or placard issued by the California Department
of Motor Vehicles to handicapped persons or to disabled
veterans pursuant to Sections 22511.5 and 9105 of the
California Vehicle Code. All parking spaces so designated
shall be identified by blue paint on the curb or edge of the
paved portion of the street adjacent to the space. In addition
to blue paint, the space may also be indicated by signs or
other suitable means. (Ord. 843, ~ 9.7, 1977)
11.24.120 Prohibited in Parkways.
No person shall stop, stand, or park a vehicle within
any parkway. (Ord. 843, ~ 5, 1977)
2006 S-7
11.24.130 Prohibited for More than Seventy-Two
Hours.
No person who owns or has in his possession, custody,
or control any vehicle or trailer shall park such vehicle or
trailer upon any public street or alley for more than a
consecutive period of seventy- two hours. (Ord. 843, ~ 6,
1977)
11.24.140 Parking for Purposes of Display,
Servicing, or Repairing.
A. No person shall park a vehicle upon any roadway
or on any private property or private roadway without the
express written permission of the owner of such property,
for the principal purpose of+-
<1. DisplayiJ;ig sJlcb vehi,.!p for ll:lJe" or~
,-*-,-&rvicing or repairing such vehicle, except when
necessitated by an emergency.
B. Violation of this provision shall constitute an
infraction, and shall subject the registered owner of such
vehicle to the penalties as prescribed by Chapter 1.12 of the
Cupertino Municipal Code. Each day the violation
continues constitutes a new offense. This section shall not
constitute the exclusive means of enforcement of vehicles or
parts thereof which have been stored, parked, placed, or
abandoned on public or private roadways and private
property within the City limits. (Ord. 1394, ~~ 1 (part), 2,
1986; Ord. 1380, ~~ I, 2, 3, 4, 1986; Ord. 843, ~ 8, 1977)
11.24.150 Parking Prohibited along Certain Streets.
No person shall stop, stand, or park any vehicle as
dermed in the Vehicle Code of California on any day on any
of the following streets or portions of streets within the City ,
as set out in Table 11.24.150. (Ord. 1968, 2005; Ord.
1859, 2000; Ord. 1857, (part), 2000; Ord. 1851, 2000;
Ord. 1840, (part), 1999; Ord. 1836, 1999; Ord. 1806,
1999; Ord. 1743, 1996; Ord. 1741, 1996; Ord. 1729, 1996;
Ord. 1727, 1996; Ord. 1724, (part), 1996; Ord. 1683,
(part), 1995; Ord. 1605, 1992; Ord. 1589, 1992; Ord.
1578, 1992; Ord. 1577, 1992; Ord. 1564, 1991; Ord. 1562,
1991; Ord. 1553, 1991; Ord. 1547, (part), 1991; Ord.
1521, 1990; Ord. 1467, 1988; Ord. 1455, 1988; Ord. 1454,
1988; Ord. 1446, 1988; Ord. 1439, 1988; Ord. 1428, 1987;
Ord. 1423, 1987; Ord. 1419, (part), 1987; Ord. 1409,
(part), 1987; Ord. 1405, (part), 1987; Ord. 1397, 1987;
Ord. 1395, 1986; Ord. 1390, (part), 1986; Ord. 1388,
1986; Ord. 1357, 1986; Ord. 1351, 1986; Ord. 1338, 1986;
Ord. 1325, 1985; Ord. 1304, 1985; Ord. 1302, 1985; Ord.
1189, (part), 1984; Ord. 1285, 1984; Ord. 1276, (part),
1984; Ord. 1266, 1984; Ord. 1245, (part), 1983; Ord.
1221, 1983; Ord. 1218, 1983; Ord. 1203, (part), 1982;
Ord. 1178, 1982; Ord. 1172, (part), 1982; Ord. 1170,
1982; Ord. 1156, 1982; Ord. 1152, (part), 1981; Ord.
.;>~-II