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CC 04-01-2026 Item No. 3 Housing Development Linda Vista Drive _Written Communications(2)
CC 4-01-2026 #3 Linda Vista / Evulich Project Written Communications From:Neil Park-McClintick To:City Clerk; City Council Subject:Approve Agenda Item 3, 51-unit Townhome Housing Application Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 3:53:14 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Mayor, Council, and Staff, My name is Neil. I grew up in Cupertino and lived there as a young adult, recently leaving due to a lack of housing options and opportunities for joy and community for young adults like myself. My family still lives there, and I genuinely care about the future of the city. I am also a supporter of Cupertino for All and their efforts. My hopes lie in a future where I can trust that Cupertino will be well run as a city, and do its part to solve the housing crisis, while also opening its doors to future families and young adults. I am writing in support of the proposed Linda Vista project of 51 townhomes at Evulich Court. I am writing with the assumption that our leadership truly understands the desperate need for more homes in Cupertino and throughout the Bay Area. If that need does not resonate with you, then at the very least, you recognize the state’s mandate for which we are heavily lagging! I currently live in San Jose, where I now live in a primarily townhome neighborhood. It’s aesthetically very pleasing—moreso than the surrounding single family neighborhoods. And when I’m in my neighborhood, I see so many children and young families that I honestly forget that there’s a declining birth rate and shortage of youth throughout the county—many of these young parents and kids live in those town homes! This project is within walking distance of major schools facing heavy enrollment decline. Cupertino is a family-centric city, known for its storied schools; those schools need more students. Townhomes often attract young families, many of which households would be able to get their kids to neighboring schools without a car due to the short distance. Thus, while this isn’t a transit rich neighborhood, traffic congestion could be limited by the convenience of proximity. Still, to further enhance a sense of community and limit driving, please support the applicant’s request for access to the Linda Vista Trail. That would provide meaningful access to trails, Blackberry Farm, and the Blackberry Preserve—all hallmarks of Cupertino’s recreational culture. Finally, with regard to the elements (mainly fire), the project would include the installation of a new fire hydrant on Linda Vista Drive adjacent to the project frontage north of Evulich Court and two new fire hydrants on Evulich Court. Within the agenda packet, there is additional fire department approval. If the belief is that dense housing is more susceptible to fire, we should also recognize that this project is much lower DU/acre than the maximum density under our housing element (20 vs 35). Thanks for reading this, and please support the Evulich court project. From:Jennifer Griffin To:City Clerk Cc:grenna5000@yahoo.com; City Council Subject:Fwd: No Net Loss Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 3:50:06 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear City Clerk: Please consider the following as public input for Item 3 or Oral Communications for the April 1, 2026 City Council meeting. Thank you. -------- Original Message -------- Subject: No Net Loss Makes No Sense From: Jennifer Griffin <grenna5000@yahoo.com> Sent: Wednesday, April 1, 2026, 3:47 PM To: citycouncil@cupertino.org,cityclerk@cupertino.org CC: grenna5000@yahoo.com Dear City Council: (Please consider this as public input for the Cupertino City Council meeting on April 1, 2026. I'm not sure if this is for Item 3 since it is talking about No Net Loss or for Oral Communications). I am very concerned about the city having to apply a topic from HCD called No Net Loss. I heard the concept explained in a previous meeting, but I don't think the concept has any merit at all. It sounds like some sort of plan to say the city must surrender more land for housing when we already have too much land tied up in housing because of the over-inflated RHNA numbers. I have heard about the bad statistics used to get the RHNA numbers in the first place and I just don't think the No Net Loss stuff holds a lot of credibility. We have tremendous amounts of retail being lost in the city because of the housing bills, and now we are being hammered by HCD over a further propagation of error called No Net Loss. Error gets worse when you propagate it such as RHNA is doing and now HCD says we have to drag the error further down the road because of No Net Loss. The public is really tired of HCD and their make-believe. No Net Loss is bad statistics and we need To have the state come in with actual statisticians who can tell us that No Net Loss is true. I gave up believing when I saw how bad the RHNA creation method was. There was no method. Thank you. Best regards, Jennifer Griffin From:Gauri Dwivedi To:City Council; City Clerk Subject:Evulich CT Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 3:00:23 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. I am against construction of summer hill homes on Evulich court due to fire hazard. There are three school nearby and these roads are already blocked during weekdays. More homes/traffic would be a safety hazard Gauri Dwivedi Chadwick place Sent from my iPhone From:Ying Dillaha To:Kitty Moore; Liang Chao; J.R. Fruen; Sheila Mohan; R "Ray" Wang Cc:City Council; City Clerk Subject:Vehicle to road ratio at 2? Why did the city suppresse this info? Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 2:58:36 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear City Clerk, Please include this as a part of the official records for today's city council meeting. --- Dear Cupertino City Council Members: I appreciate that the City has studied the vehicle-to-road capacity ratio for fire evacuation. However, this raises an important question: why has this information not been more clearly presented and discussed as part of this decision? This data goes directly to the issue of public safety—especially in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone —and it deserves full transparency and consideration. I urge you to vote NO on the SHH project as currently proposed. This is not a rejection of housing, but a call to pause and do this right. Please give fire evacuation the attention it deserves: identify the risks, implement the necessary mitigations, and then approve a plan that ensures public safety for both current and future residents. Respectfully, Ying Sosic 11137 Linda Vista Drive Cupertino, CA 95014 From:Yvonne Strom To:City Council Cc:City Clerk Subject:Agenda item 3. Support for Townhome project on Evulich Court Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 11:59:34 AM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. For Special City Council meeting on April 1, 2026 Dear Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor, and Councilmembers, The award-winning schools in Cupertino are the main reason people move here. My children attended those schools, and now their beloved Regnart Elementary school is closed due to low enrollment. What happened? Fewer and fewer families could afford to live in our neighborhood. Today the City Council has a chance to reverse this trend by approving the Townhome project on Evulich Court (Linda Vista Drive.) Townhomes are an important type of housing for first time homeowners because they are less expensive than traditional single family homes. This project would provide homes for 51 households in a location that is within walking distance of Lincoln Elementary, Kennedy Middle, and Monta Vista High School. Please approve this essential housing project for the future of Cupertino, Yvonne Thorstenson 28 year Cupertino resident From:Margaret Butko To:City Council; City Clerk Subject:Evulich Court project support Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 9:19:29 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Greetings, I am a home-owner in Cupertino and a parent of 2 children in CUSDK8 schools, including Kennedy Middle School. I would like to express my support for the Evulich Court project. The project will guarantee that we continue to have housing for young families like ours in our neighborhood, keeping children and working families in our neighborhood and schools. I would also like to express my support for the pedestrian connection between this project and the Linda Vista Trail to continue to promote safe routes to school. Both of my children walk to their neighborhood schools, and anything we can do to increase the safety of their routes to school should be top priority for the council. Thank you for your consideration! Margaret From:Tania Chen To:Public Comments; City Attorney"s Office; City Council; City Clerk Subject:Public Comment – Recusal Request for April 1 Council Vote (Linda Vista Drive Development) Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 7:13:24 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Mayor and Members of the City Council, I request that this comment be included in the official administrative record for the April 1, 2026, City Council meeting. I respectfully request that Councilmember Sheila Mohan recuse herself from participation in the April 1, 2026 vote on the Linda Vista Drive development at 10857–10887 Linda Vista Drive. This request is based solely on applicable law and the public record. Under California Government Code §87100 and FPPC Regulation 18702.2(a)(8), a public official must disqualify themselves if a decision will have a material financial effect on real property in which they hold an interest. Properties within 500–1,000 feet require recusal if the decision materially affects value, development potential, or neighborhood conditions, including traffic and fire risk. The standard is direction-neutral and does not depend on whether the impact is positive or negative. Councilmember Mohan’s residence is approximately 959 feet from the project site, placing it within this range. The public record demonstrates material impacts within this radius, including: (1) evacuation constraints on McClellan Road, where analysis indicates demand exceeding capacity and evacuation times significantly above safe thresholds; (2) increased fire risk and reduced defensible space associated with project scale and setback reductions under AB 130; and (3) material changes to neighborhood density, traffic, and character—factors explicitly recognized under FPPC regulations. Because the property falls within 500–1,000 feet, recusal is required unless there is clear and convincing evidence that no material effect exists. Based on the current record, that standard cannot be met. This determination is independent of voting intent and is based on the existence of a material financial interest. I respectfully request that Councilmember Mohan recuse herself from deliberation and voting on this matter, that this email be included in the public record, and that the City Attorney provide a formal opinion on this issue prior to the hearing. Sincerely, Tania Cupertino resident From:louise saadati To:City Council; City Clerk Subject:Evulich Court -Item 3 for 4/1/26 Special City Council Meeting Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 3:04:29 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Please include this email in the Written Communications for Evulich Court -Item 3 for 4/1/26 Special City Council Meeting. Dear Mayor Moore, Vice-Mayor Chaio and Councilmembers: Please vote and act on April 1 to support the 51 townhomes discussed as Evulich Court -Item 3 for the 4/1/26 Special City Council Meeting. We desperately need the housing units including its below market townhomes to meet the HCD requirements we have with its short 180 day deadline. We don’t want to suffer from Builders’ Remedy again. We need to allow these townhomes to be built which will increase our housing especially in the more affordable range for young people, teachers and firemen and regular working people. This will help revitalise Cupertino with younger residents. Our Cupertino population is getting smaller and older. We also desperately need more students to fill our schools. Some of the schools have recently closed including our former beloved and nationally recognised Regnart Elementary School. The new residents at Evulich would help fill the surrounding elementary, middle and high schools. The Townhomes can easily access the surrounding area and amenities including Linda Vista Trail and Park. The Summerhill Developers have already asked about building access to the trail. This will help build connectivity throughout Cupertino. Some residents have expressed fear over every housing project. Fear can be overblown with any change. But we can progress our city and deal logistically and positively with any challenges to grow into a positive vibrant community and city. Please vote yes to support Evulich Court Project on April 1, 2026. Please vote to support this housing to meet our HCD deadline. Thank you for your service. Louise Saadati 40 year resident of Cupertino From:Connie Cunningham To:City Council; City Clerk Subject:2026-4-1 CC Agenda Item 3, 51-unit Townhome Housing Application Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 2:28:48 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Please add this to Written Communications Agenda Item 3 Subject: Consider a Tentative Map, Architectural and Site Approval, and Tree Removal Permit for the construction of a 51-unit townhome condominium development with 10 BMR purchase homes on Housing Element Priority Housing Sites 25 through 28. The project utilizes Senate Bill 330 and provisions of State Density Bonus law. Dear Mayor Moore, Vice-mayor, Councilmembers, City Manager, and City Attorney: I strongly support this application for 51 new homes in a wonderful location for school children from elementary through high school. My children attended these excellent schools. I know that the new families will deeply appreciate being part of this neighborhood and schools. Cupertino needs more homes of all types. These townhomes that include Below-Market Rate purchase homes is an excellent step towards meeting Cupertino’s Housing Element goals. Since this application is on Housing Element Priority Housing Sites 25-28, it has had much consideration over a few years. This development is near a local high school, middle school and elementary school. It is also near other city amenities. Of special interest is the applicant’s request for access to the Linda Vista Trail. That would be an amazing access to trails, Blackberry Farm, and the Blackberry Preserve. Blackberry Preserve is a gem that Cupertino has set-aside for nurturing nature’s plants and animals as well as nurturing the human spirit. I urge City Council to approve this SummerHill Townhome project on April 1, 2026. Sincerely , Connie Cunningham 38 year resident Housing Commission, speaking for myself only From:Michael Mar To:City Council; City Clerk Subject:Comment regarding Evulich Court, agenda item 3 Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 2:28:32 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Hi, I was made aware of the Evulich Court townhome project. As a long term resident of Cupertino, I wanted to make a statement in support of the project. While I support higher density homes in Cupertino, I feel that townhome projects have struck a good balance for those who prefer lower density housing for our city. We are all aware that housing has been an unfilled need for our city for many years now. And I hope the city council can show its support for what looks to be a good project for the community. As someone who lives in a Cupertino condo, I’d like to stress that starter homes like condos and townhomes are very much appreciated in our city. Many of my neighbors are looking for more townhome development that they can move into. The fact that Evulich Courth is such a well located project to our great elementary schools and pedestrian trails makes it an even easier project to support. I hope to see the council support the project. Thank you, Michael Mar From:Cupertino ForAll To:City Council Cc:City Clerk Subject:Agenda Item 3. Urging Approval of 51 unit Townhome project in Cupertino Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 2:02:40 PM Attachments:image.png CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. For Agenda Item 3 in the Special City Council Meeting on April 1, 2026. _____________________ Dear Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor, and Councilmembers, Subject: Support for SummerHill Townhomes on Linda Vista Drive (Evulich Court) Cupertino For All is a local group of volunteers that advocates for sustainability, equity, and inclusive housing in our city. We have seen the plans for the SummerHill townhomes on Linda Vista Drive and we fully support the project for the following reasons. 1. The project is proposed for Priority Housing Sites 25-28 that are included in Cupertino's state-mandated Housing Element. The applicant has chosen to build at the lowest density allowed in the Housing Element. Alternatively the site could be built to 4-5 stories. 2. Townhomes are an important type of starter home and Cupertino needs this type of housing for families that overwise could not afford to live in the area. 3. New students in this west-side neighborhood would be very welcome at the nearby schools that are facing declining enrollment, namely Lincoln Elementary, Kennedy Middle School, and Monta Vista High School. 4. The location is conveniently close to Linda Vista Park and McClellan Ranch, and is walkable to all the local schools. The applicant is willing to create a trail connection for easy access to Linda Vista Trail that would benefit the whole neighborhood. 5. The project would add over 50 new households to enrich our community. We urge the City Council to approve the SummerHill Townhome project - Item 3 on the City Council Agenda for April 1, 2026. Sincerely, Cupertino For All Board of Directors From:Tiff To:City Council; City Clerk Subject:Townhomes at Evulich Court Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 1:46:32 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Sir: The Evulich Court project is a state-mandated Housing Element site. Please build more units For Cupertino resident. I am a Cupertino senior resident living in Cupertino over 30 years but but I am no longer afford to live in the current apartment over $4000 per month. Please build more high density housing For Cupertino resident!!! I support for the Evulich Ct. important project!!! Cupertino resident, Susan Sung 3/31/2026 From:J Shearin To:City Council; Cupertino City Manager"s Office; City Clerk Subject:City Council meeting | Evulich Court | April 1, 2026 Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 1:45:30 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Mayor Moore and City Councilmembers, As this agenda item was postponed, I’d like to again encourage you to approve this development, including the access to the Linda Vista Trail that the developer has in the plan. As a former Parks and Recreation Commissioner, I know that our residents prioritize access to trails. Our own Parks and Recreation Master Plan from 2020 states that 80% of residents "favored adding trails and pathways.” Thank you for your consideration of this matter. Sincerely, Jennifer Shearin Cupertino resident Please include this email as part of the public record. From:John G To:City Council; City Clerk Subject:4/1/26 Council Special Mtg, Evulich Court, Item 12, 3rd Action Item: Support Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 1:37:07 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Mayor Chao and Councilmembers, I support the Evulich project. Following are a few points in favor of the project: Cupertino needs this project to provide BMR and starter housing for families Helps to meet the Housing Element requirements for Cupertino I also support approving a pedestrian connection between the project and adjacent Linda Vista Trail. Please approve this project and do everything possible to make sure it moves forward. Best Regards John Geis Cupertino Resident jgeis4401@gmail.com From:V Lentfer To:Public Comments; City Council; City Clerk Cc:Jim Lentfer; R "Ray" Wang Subject:REJECT the Evulich project and require a full, transparent CEQA review Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 1:11:12 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Mayor Moore, and City Council Members: I live near the proposed 51-townhome development on Evulich Court. I’d like to make three key points. First, when the city considered rezoning Evulich court, notification was deficient in so many ways! On September 6, 2024, I personally attended (with neighbors) a meeting with City Manager Pamela Wu and then-Mayor Sheila Mohan to deliver a petition signed by 745 residents. What happened after that? Nothing. It was never acknowledged and never placed on the City Council agenda until frustrated neighbors got Kitty Moore involved. Is this how the city listens to the 745 residents most affected? What happened to “transparent Cupertino”? The city dropped the ball many times. They didn’t mail legal notices to residents even within 300 feet of the project! Every signer expressed shock and concern about both this proposal and the rezoning. This parcel had been zoned R1 for single-family homes for over 60 years, reflecting the character of our neighborhood, until it was rezoned in July 2024 without notifying nearby residents. Second, I believe Councilmember Sheila Mohan has a conflict of interest and must recuse herself from voting on this project. Cupertino City Council members are generally required to recuse themselves if they live within 1,000 feet of a project site, as this creates a presumptive financial conflict under California law. According to mapping software (MapDeveloper.com), the distance between the Evulich site at 10887 Linda Vista Drive and Councilmember Mohan’s residence on Santa Teresa Drive is approximately 959 feet. Based on this, I urge adherence to the California Fair Political Practices Commission rules and request her recusal. Third, this development will significantly worsen an already unsafe evacuation situation. You don’t get a redo on this site. Its development will be part of our neighborhood forever. We have serious, unresolved concerns about fire safety that have not been adequately addressed. The density and design introduce new risks in a very high fire hazard zone. It is also important to note that the Planning Commission’s approval is fundamentally flawed. AFTER voting FOR the Evulich project on 2/24/26, Planning Commission Chair Tracy Kosolcharoen stated that their recommendation was made without the Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment prepared by Fehr & Peers in September 2025. In her public letter earlier this month, she wrote: “Last week, a representative from the same environmental consulting firm that did the Evulich AB 130 exemption stated to over 100 planning commissioners that developments in very high fire hazard zones should not be exempt from CEQA via AB 130.” Therefore, this project must not be exempt from CEQA. Safety must be a non-negotiable priority for our city. Who will be held accountable if something goes wrong? We recommend that you REJECT the Evulich project and require a full, transparent CEQA review. Thank you for your time. Veronica Lentfer, Cupertino resident From:Debbie Timmers To:Public Comments; City Council; City Clerk Subject:Special Meeting Open Session- April 1, 2026 - Evulich Court Townhome Development (Agenda Item 3) Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 11:27:24 AM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao and Esteemed Councilmembers: I am writing to express my strong support for the proposed Evulich Court project. Cupertino continues to fall short of meeting its state-mandated housing goals, and projects like this are an important step toward addressing that gap. By providing townhomes, this Housing Element development creates a more attainable path to homeownership in a city where single-family homes are out of reach for many residents. Recent reports indicate that an average income of over $400,000 is needed to purchase a single-family home in the Bay Area (KTVU article), a figure that continues to rise. If we want our moderate-income residents to remain in the community they love, we must support opportunities like this. The location of this site near several schools also makes it especially well-suited for families. As a grandparent of children in these schools, I have seen firsthand the impact of declining enrollments. My grandsons regularly say goodbye to friends whose families can no longer afford to stay in Cupertino. These are exceptional schools, and it is deeply concerning to see their enrollments shrink. We have already lost schools in our area (e.g., Regnart, San José Unified), and I would hate to see that trend continue. I also strongly support including a pedestrian connection between the project and the adjacent Linda Vista Trail. This connection would provide safe and convenient access to nearby community amenities such as McClellan Ranch and local recreational facilities, enhancing both the livability of the development and the surrounding neighborhood. Evulich Court represents a thoughtful and balanced approach to addressing Cupertino’s housing needs while supporting our schools and community infrastructure. I urge you to approve this project. Sincerely, Debbie Timmers From:Rhoda Fry To:Public Comments Cc:City Clerk; City Attorney"s Office; City Council; Cupertino City Manager"s Office Subject:4/1/2026 Agenda #3 Linda Vista Project is subject to CEQA - fails AB130 earthquake test per State Map Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 9:10:33 AM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear City Council, Regarding Linda Vista Project is subject to CEQA - fails AB130 earthquake test per State map AB130 text: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml? bill_id=202520260AB130 Summerhill’s law firm, Cox Castle, discusses AB130 and states (with emphasis added): The project site must also meet certain SB 35 site requirements; i.e., the site must not be (i) in certain areas of the coastal zone, (ii) on prime farmland, (iii) in wetlands, (iv) in a high fire severity zone, (v) on a hazardous waste site listed on the so-called Cortese list, (vi) in a designated earthquake zone, (vii) in special flood hazard area, (viii) in a designated conservation area, or (ix) on protected habitat. source: https://www.coxcastle.com/publication- governor-signs-bill-enacting-an-important-new-ceqa-exemption-for-infill-residential-and- mixed-use-projects AB130 states: “Within a delineated earthquake fault zone as determined by the State Geologist in any official maps published by the State Geologist” Here is an official map that is published by the State Geologist called the Fault Activity Map of California. https://maps.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/fam// Evulich is in the middle of an earthquake fault zone as shown below (Evulich Ct. is in the search box and in the orange area) Note that the Monta (Monte) Vista fault is a thrust fault is far more dangerous to homes than a conventional fault. Multiple sources indicate that it is capable of a 6.9M – 7.1M earthquake. Please also consider that our water mains in this area are brittle (and have a recent history of failing without ground movement) – if there’s an earthquake, we should plan on access to water failing – this will cause fire sprinklers to be inoperable and further complicate evacuation. Note: the developer’s Geotech refers to the State’s Alquist Priolo map, which is woefully out of date and it has been the intent of the State to update the Alquist Priolo maps for the Monta Vista, Sargent, and Berrocal faults. Nevertheless, the law says “any official maps published by the State Geologist” and this one shows the property squarely within a fault zone. Furthermore, Summerhill’s consultant, Powers, stated at the Planning Commissioners Academy that a project in a very high fire hazard severity zone (or other hazards) should automatically be subject to CEQA. This statement is confirmed by AB130 forms from multiple cities where multiple hazards cannot be exempted from CEQA. Here are two examples: 1. City of Santa Clara: Is the development located on a property that contains prime farmland, wetlands, a high fire hazard severity zone, a delineated earthquake fault zone, a flood plain, a floodway, a community conservation plan area, a habitat for protected species, or that is under a conservation easement? (CA Govt. Code Section 65912.121(g).) If yes, the development is not eligible for a statutory exemption under AB 130. https://www.santaclaraca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/88826 2. City of Saratoga: § 21080.66(a)(6) The project satisfies the requirements specified in paragraph (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 65913.4 of the Government Code. The development is not located on a site that is any of the following: ☐ (1) Coastal Zone ☐ (2) Prime Farmland or Farmland of Statewide Importance ☐ (3) Wetlands ☐ (4) Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone ☐ (5) Hazardous Waste Sites ☐ (6) Earthquake Fault Zone ☐ (7) Special Flood Hazard Area ☐ (8) Regulatory Floodway ☐ (9) Conservation Lands in a Natural Community Conservation Plan ☐ (10) Habitat for Protected Species☐ (11) Conservation Easement https://www.saratoga.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/6237/AB-130-checklist-1-27-26-web? bidId= Please follow the AB130 law like our neighboring cities do and deem the proposed Linda Vista project subject to CEQA. Respectfully, Rhoda Fry From:N. Sheng-Ming Egan To:City Council; City Clerk Subject:For the April 1st hearing - Writing in support of the Evulich Court housing project Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 8:46:59 AM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear City Council, I hope you're well. I'm briefly writing in support of the approval and construction of the Evulich Court townhome housing project, and asking that you consider allowing its construction. It seems like it'd be a great opportunity to build more homes for young families, and lines up with the needs of our Housing Element. Thank you, and take care. -- Nicholas Egan (408) 482 7337 From:Nama Orama To:City Council; City Clerk Subject:Concerns on Linda Vista building project Date:Monday, March 30, 2026 10:20:20 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. To City council, As a Cupertino resident I would like to raise an issue as I live in the Linda Vista neighborhood and came across an article : https://sanjosespotlight.com/yan-cupertino-needs-to-review-fire-safety-study-for-linda-vista- housing/ I understand that the fire hazard is being overlooked and since we live near school area that gets congested, it will lead to disastrous situation like we saw in recent LA fires. I would like to reevaluate the project, there are no townhomes in this neighborhood and adding 50+ units will make it unsafe. I would like to immediately stop this with additional review by fire safety officials. Thanks, Nama O Rama From:Kriti Garg To:City Council; City Clerk; Public Comments Subject:Public Comment - Agenda Item #3 - April 1, 2026 Date:Monday, March 30, 2026 10:14:10 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Cupertino City Council, I grew up in Cupertino, attending the nearby Monta Vista High School. My parents frequently take their evening walks along Stevens Creek Trail, my husband plays golf at Deep Cliff Golf Course nearby, and I enjoy taking my friends' kids to Linda Vista Park and McClellan Ranch. I would be so incredibly thrilled to see 51 more families enjoy the wonderful activities, spaces, and education that Cupertino has to offer. As such, I urge you to approve the Evulich Court project. Supporting the building of new homes and creating the opportunity for more people to move into Cupertino only enables these amenities, schools, and local businesses to thrive. This is especially critical at this time given the recent closure of Regnart Elementary School due to low enrollment. It is a logical and unfortunate reality that school closures will continue to happen without attainable home ownership and rental opportunities for young families. Supporting townhomes at Evulich Court is a way to inch towards a better Cupertino. Best, Kriti Garg From:Dan Marshall To:City Council; City Clerk Subject:Please vote yes regarding the Townhome Development at Evulich Court Date:Monday, March 30, 2026 8:17:43 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. City Council Members, I am writing to you to request that you vote YES to the Evulich Court proposal. I have lived at 10827 Linda Vista Dr, Cupertino, CA 95014 for more than 30 years. There are 2 houses between our house and Evulich Court so I will be significantly impacted by its development. The reason I ask you to vote yes is that I anticipate that the per family cost of the proposed high density development will be significantly lower than the surrounding housing. We need housing that young families, teachers, fire fighters, city workers etc can afford. We need more children in the exceptional local schools. Thank you for representing me, and thank you for serving on the Council. I am sure that it is not easy. Dan Marshall 408-859-6628 From:TSY Chuang To:Public Comments; City Clerk; City Council Subject:Public Comment: Vote NO on SummerHill Linda Vista on April 1 Council Meeting Date:Monday, March 30, 2026 4:47:31 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao, and City Councilmembers, I am writing to urge you to vote NO on the SummerHill Homes 51-unit townhome project at 10857 Linda Vista Drive at your April 1, 2026 meeting. I respectfully request that this letter be included in the official public record for the April 1, 2026 City Council meeting. The record before you does not support approval. The evacuation question was never resolved. The Applicant's stated justification is contradicted by its own emails. The AB 130 CEQA exemption has not been properly established. And multiple mandatory legal obligations under the Subdivision Map Act and Board of Forestry regulations remain unmet. I. THE FEHR AND PEERS DATA — THE CITY'S OWN FINDINGS The City commissioned Fehr and Peers to study evacuation in this neighborhood. Their October 2025 findings are unambiguous: • Evacuation demand on key corridors serving the tri-school Linda Vista area already exceeds 200% of roadway capacity under wildfire conditions — before a single new home is added. • The neighborhood has severely limited egress routes, compounded by proximity to Lincoln Elementary, Kennedy Middle, and Monta Vista High Schools, which add substantial daytime population and vehicle demand to already congested roads. • Independent engineering analysis by resident and civil engineer DerChang Kau estimates it would take 93 minutes for Linda Vista residents to reach safety in a fast-moving wildfire. The survivable evacuation window is approximately 30 minutes — a gap of more than one hour. • Civil engineer and resident Mark Fantozzi has noted that all infrastructure in this neighborhood — roads, water, sewer — was originally designed for single-family homes. Adding 51 townhomes and approximately 100+ vehicles increases demand on that infrastructure roughly fivefold. This study was never presented or discussed at the February 24, 2026 Planning Commission hearing, despite the City having held it for nearly five months. II. THE SUPPRESSED EVACUATION STUDY: THE DOCUMENTED TIMELINE • June 26, 2025: City Planner Emi Sugiyama emailed SummerHill's Steve Bull and Austin Lin asking whether "evacuation egress during a potential fire-related emergency" was included in Hexagon Transportation's scope — confirming the City recognized evacuation as a key metric for this project. • October 10, 2025: SummerHill VP Steve Bull emailed Ms. Sugiyama requesting criteria for an evacuation route study. His email confirmed SummerHill had just met with Fehr and Peers the prior week about this specific site, and that the traffic report submitted that day did not yet include evacuation analysis. The Applicant was actively moving toward commissioning the study. • October 16, 2025: Ms. Sugiyama told the Applicant that under AB 130, the City was no longer requiring an evacuation study to address fire safety under CEQA, and that if the Applicant voluntarily provided one, the City would impose no criteria and conduct no peer review. This response shut down a study the Applicant was in the process of commissioning. • February 12, 2026: SummerHill's attorneys (Cox Castle) claimed in a letter to the Planning Commission that evacuation had been resolved through the April 2025 HAA consistency review — six full months before Bull emailed asking for evacuation study criteria. A developer does not meet with Fehr and Peers about a site-specific evacuation study in October 2025 if it believed that question was settled in April 2025. The Applicant's own emails make the Cox Castle account impossible. The justification offered to the Planning Commission was constructed after evacuation became a threat to the project's approval — not before. III. THE AUSTIN LIN REPLY DOES NOT ESTABLISH AB 130 ELIGIBILITY On March 17, 2026, SummerHill's Austin Lin emailed Ms. Sugiyama citing Government Code §65913.4(a)(6)(D) to argue the project qualifies for the AB 130 exemption despite being in a VHFHSZ. His argument relies on the statute's exception for sites that have "adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development." He asserted: "we have adopted the necessary mitigation measures required to maintain our qualification for AB 130, which have been reviewed and agreed upon by the Fire Department." This argument fails for three critical reasons: 1. THE EXCEPTION REQUIRES PROOF, NOT ASSERTION. The §65913.4(a)(6)(D) exception demands documented adoption of fire hazard mitigation measures that actually mitigate the hazard giving rise to the disqualification. Mr. Lin's email is a self-serving assertion with no supporting technical analysis in the record. The Saratoga AB 130 checklist that Mr. Lin himself attached confirms that applicants must provide sufficient documentation to demonstrate compliance — checking a box is not sufficient. No such documentation has been entered into the record for this project. 2. BUILDING STANDARDS DO NOT ADDRESS EVACUATION CAPACITY. Even if SummerHill's proposed building-level fire features — noncombustible materials, enhanced sprinklers, ignition-resistant construction — satisfy existing building code standards, those measures address the fire safety of the structures themselves. They do nothing to increase the evacuation capacity of Linda Vista Drive, McClellan Road, or any other egress corridor. The City's own Fehr and Peers study found those corridors are already at 200%+ capacity. Building sprinklers do not widen roads. The disqualifying hazard is evacuation gridlock, and no mitigation measure addressing that hazard has been identified, adopted, or peer- reviewed. 3. THE FIRE DEPARTMENT DISCLAIMER IS NOT CODE COMPLIANCE. The Santa Clara County Fire Department's review of building-level features carries an explicit disclaimer that it does not constitute approval of code compliance. The City's Building Official has not signed the Alternative Means and Methods Request (AMMR) that reduces required fire setbacks from 30 feet to as little as 10 feet on two property lines. That AMMR was not included in the Planning Commission agenda packet and has never been evaluated for its impact on surrounding single-family homes. Mr. Lin's claim that fire mitigation measures have been "reviewed and agreed upon by the Fire Department" overstates what the Fire Department's review actually covers. IV. THE INDEPENDENT LEGAL OBLIGATIONS THAT REMAIN UNMET Even if AB 130 applied — which it does not, for the reasons above — the following independent legal obligations have never been addressed: 1. SUBDIVISION MAP ACT — GOV. CODE §66474 The Subdivision Map Act requires the City to make affirmative findings that the proposed subdivision will not cause serious public health or safety problems before a tentative map can be approved. This obligation exists entirely outside CEQA. AB 130 does not amend it. HAA deemed consistency does not satisfy it. That finding has never been made for this project. 2. BOARD OF FORESTRY FIRE SAFE REGULATIONS — 14 CCR §1270.01 / §1276.01 Parcels in a VHFHSZ are subject to mandatory 30-foot setback requirements under California Board of Forestry Fire Safe Regulations. SummerHill's AMMR seeks to reduce those setbacks to 10 feet on the northern and southern property lines and 20 feet on the western wildland-urban interface boundary. No technical analysis in the record demonstrates that a 10-foot setback provides equivalent protection — not for the project, and not for the surrounding single-family homes that would face increased fire exposure. The City's Building Official has not approved the AMMR. It was not in the Planning Commission packet. 3. SB 99 / AB 747 — SAFETY ELEMENT EVACUATION ROUTE OBLIGATIONS SB 99 and AB 747 require local governments to identify and analyze evacuation routes when siting housing in fire hazard areas. Cupertino's own Housing Element acknowledges these obligations. The City's Fehr and Peers study confirms those routes already operate at 200%+ capacity. No evacuation route findings have been entered into the record for this project. V. WHAT THE COUNCIL MUST DO The Council now has before it: • The City's own Fehr and Peers evacuation study showing 200%+ corridor overload — never presented to the Planning Commission • The October 2025 email exchange proving SummerHill was actively pursuing an evacuation study before City staff shut it down • The Cox Castle February 2026 letter offering an April 2025 clearance story that is directly contradicted by SummerHill's own October 2025 conduct • Austin Lin's March 17, 2026 letter asserting AB 130 eligibility on the basis of building- level fire features that do not address evacuation capacity • An unsigned AMMR reducing fire setbacks to 10 feet, with no technical validation in the record • No affirmative public health and safety finding under the Subdivision Map Act §66474 The Subdivision Map Act requires that affirmative finding before this map can be approved. It has never been made. The AB 130 exemption has not been properly established for a VHFHSZ site. The October emails and the Cox Castle letter cannot be read together and produce approval. Please vote NO on April 1 and require that all mandatory safety findings be properly made before this project moves forward. Respectfully, TY Chuang Resident of Linda Vista neighborhood From:Kitty Moore To:City Clerk; Lauren Sapudar Subject:Written Communications Item 3 Summerhill/Evulich Ct. Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 3:59:52 PM Attachments:image.png image.png image.png image.png Fire Access Evulich - Combined Plan Set-2.pdf Pages from standard-details-updated-august-27-2025.pdf D-1 Specification for Driveways, Turnarounds and Turnouts Serving Up to Two (2) Single Family Parcels 07.28.2025.pdf Dear City Clerk, Please provide the following and attachments for Written Communications for Item 3, Summerhill/Evulich Ct. The third attachment is design standards for up to two homes. SA N T A C L A R A C O U N T Y F I R E T R U C K SANTA CLARA COUNTY FIRE TRUCK LI N D A V I S T A D R I V E (P U B L I C R O A D ) EVULICH CT.(PUBLIC ROAD) A S T R E E T D S T R E E T E S T R E E T C S T R E E T B S T R E E T BLDG 6 BLDG 1 BLDG 2 BLDG 3 BLDG 4 BLDG 5 BLDG 7 BLDG 8 BLDG 9 BLDG 10 10857 LINDA VISTA DRIVE Cupertino, CA January 12, 2026 3000 Executive Parkway, Suite 450 San Ramon, Ca 94583 650-857-0122 GRAPHIC SCALE 1" = 20' 0'40'20'10'20'0' PRELIMINARY FIRE ACCESS PLAN C6.0 LEGEND: NOTE SANTA CLARA COUNTY FIRE TRUCK BUILDING FIRE FLOW: 1,875 GPM · · · This is for up to two single family homes: Whereas this would be for a larger development: Kitty Moore Mayor City Council KMoore@cupertino.gov (408) 777-1389 SD&S D-1/bh/07.28.2025 Driveways, Turnarounds, and Turnouts 1 of 8 STANDARD DETAILS & SPECIFICATIONS Spec No D-1 Review Date Revis. Date 03.11.25 03.11.25 SUBJECT: Driveways, Turnarounds, and Turnouts Serving Eff. Date 07.10.08 Up to Two (2) Single Family Parcels Approved By HRE Page _ 1__ of _ 8__ SCOPE This standard is applicable to access roads and driveways serving up to two (2) single family parcels where any portion of the protected structure(s) is in excess of 200 feet from the centerline of a public or private roadway (measured by an approved route around the exterior of the building). Specifications contained in this Standard apply to all properties located within unincorporated Santa Clara County and the incorporated city/town service areas of the Santa Clara County Fire Department. AUTHORITY California Fire Code (CFC) and applicable Municipal/Town/County Codes and standards. DEFINITIONS Access Road: A vehicular access roadway serving three (3) or move developed parcels of land. Driveway: A vehicular access roadway serving no more than two (2) single family parcels. Ranchlands: Designated as “AR” by the County Planning Department per the Santa Clara County Zoning Ordinance. Turnaround: A clear, unobstructed driving surface which allows for a safe change of direction for emergency equipment. Turnout: A widening in a roadway or driveway to allow vehicles to pass. State Responsibility Area (SRA): The State Responsibility Areas of Santa Clara County lie within the emergency response area of California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection which are subject to the requirements set forth under Title 14 of California Code of Regulations. [REF: Public Resources Code §4290]. SD&S D-1/bh/07.28.2025 Driveways, Turnarounds, and Turnouts 2 of 8 Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ): Areas designated by the State Fire Marshal as having the highest fire hazard which are subject to the requirements set forth under Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations. [REF: Public Resources Code §4290]. REQUIREMENTS These are minimum SCCFD standards. Should these standards conflict with any other local, state, or federal requirement, the most restrictive shall apply. I. Time & Penalties A. The minimum requirements of this standard shall be met prior to commencement of wood framing in order to provide adequate emergency service response during construction. A stop-work order may be placed on construction projects found not in compliance by SCCFD. II. State Response Area A. Properties located within the State Response Area are subject to concurrent review by CAL FIRE to enforce regulations set forth under Public Resources Code §4290. III. Easements A. Where access roads, driveways, turnarounds, and/or turnouts are located on, or pass through, adjacent parcels they shall be recorded by way of an emergency vehicle access easement (EVAE), emergency vehicle ingress egress easement (EVIEE), or other appropriate easement. New easements shall be recorder prior to project final. IV. Fire Safety Setbacks A. Unless specifically permitted by other regulations, all permitted structures, including Accessory Dwelling Units (ADU’s), shall be provided with a minimum four (4) feet setback from lot lines, as measured from nearest wall, eave, overhang, or other projection to the lot line. V. Driveways and Access Roads A. Width of Driving Surface SD&S D-1/bh/07.28.2025 Driveways, Turnarounds, and Turnouts 3 of 8 1. Driveway width shall provide a minimum drivable surface of 12 feet, exclusive of shoulders. a. State Responsibility Area (SRA) excluding Ranchlands (AR) and VHFHSV: Driveway width shall provide a minimum drivable surface of 10 feet, with 14 feet unobstructed horizontal clearance in accordance with PRC 4290. 2. Access roads shall provide an unobstructed width not less than 20 feet for engines, exclusive of shoulders, and 26 feet for aerial fire apparatus, exclusive of shoulders. a. Unincorporated areas where roads serve residential lots subject to single- site development, a minimum width of 18 feet with a 3-foot shoulder on each side is allowed. Roads shall comply with County Standards SD-1, Private Road, SD-2, Private Access Road (Hillside Conditions), or SD-3, Private Access Road (Non-Hillside Conditions). NOTE: shoulders shall be capable of supporting full loading and shall be drivable in all weather conditions. Greater widths may be required by the SCCFD to provide adequate emergency access. B. Vertical Clearance 1. Driveways and Access Roads a. The vertical clearance shall be a minimum of 13 feet 6 inches, in accordance with California Fire Code § 503.2.1 C. Grade 1. Maximum grade shall not exceed 15%. The SCCFD may permit grades up to a maximum of 20% with approved mitigation measures if no other method is practical and when approved by the Fire Code official. In no case shall each section greater than 15% gradient exceed 300 feet in length. There shall be a minimum 100 feet length of 15% or less gradient between each 300-foot section. NOTE: See surface requirements in item II.G, below. a. State Responsibility Area (SRA) excluding Ranchlands (AR): Maximum grade shall not exceed 16%. D. Turning Radius for Curves 1. Driveways SD&S D-1/bh/07.28.2025 Driveways, Turnarounds, and Turnouts 4 of 8 a. The minimum inside turning radius shall be 20 feet and the outside turning radius shall be 40 feet, as measured from the edge of the approved surface. 2. Access Roads a. The minimum inside turning radius shall be 30 feet and the outside turning radius shall be 50 feet, as measured from the edge of the approved surface. i. State Responsibility Area (SRA) excluding Ranchlands (AR): No roadway shall have a horizontal inside radius of curvature of less than 50 feet, and an additional surface width of 4 feet shall be added to curves of 50-100 feet radius; 2 feet to those from 100-200 feet. E. Turnouts 1. Driveways a. Driveways in excess of 500 feet shall be provided with passing turnouts at no more than 500-foot intervals. Turnouts shall be 10 feet wide by 30 feet long with a minimum 25-foot taper on each end. i. State Responsibility Area (SRA) excluding Ranchlands (AR): Driveways exceeding 150 feet in length, but less than 800 feet in length, shall provide a turnout near the midpoint of the driveway. Where the driveway exceeds 800 feet, turnouts shall be provided no more than 400 feet apart. Turnouts shall be a minimum of 10 feet wide and 30 feet long, with a minimum 25-foot taper on each end. F. Turnarounds 1. Driveways and Access Roads a. An approved fire apparatus turnaround is required for all dead-end access roads and driveways in excess of 150 feet. [Ref: CFC 503.2.5]. All turnarounds shall have a maximum slope of 5% in any direction. Placement of any architectural feature within a turnaround is not permitted. b. All turnarounds shall be provided an approved metal, all weather sign or other approved notices or markings that shall include the words “NO PARKING – FIRE DEPARTMENT TURNAROUND”. Turnarounds located on parcels shall be provided with a sign at the entrance to the parcel that shall include the words “FIRE DEPARTMENT TURNAROUND ON SITE”. SD&S D-1/bh/07.28.2025 Driveways, Turnarounds, and Turnouts 5 of 8 G. Surface 1. Driveways a. The driveway surface shall be designed and maintained to support a 75,000-pound fire apparatus, designed per the latest edition of Caltrans Standard. On grades up to 15%, the surface shall provide all-weather driving capability, including sufficient drainage and surface course consistent with good engineering practices. Grades in excess of 15% may be approved by the Fire Code Official on a case-by-case basis through an Alternate Means and Methods request. 2. Access Road a. The access road surface shall be designed and maintained to support 75,000-pound fire apparatus, designed for the latest edition of CalTrans Standard, and shall be engineered asphalt, concrete or other surface meeting local ordinance. 3. Alternate driveway surfaces such as “Turf Block,” pavers, or other materials may be approved by the Fire Code Official on a case-by-case basis through an Alternate Means and Methods request. The boundary edges of the alternate material shall be delineated by concrete curbs, borders, posts, signs, or other means that clearly indicate the location and extent of the driving surface. H. Angle of Approach 1. Driveways a. The approach to a driveway shall be designed and constructed with a maximum 5% slope for a minimum of 20 feet. I. Bridges, Elevated Surfaces, and Culverts 1. All bridges shall be designed and maintained in accordance with AASHTO HB- 17. 2. All elevated surfaces and culverts shall be designed for a live load sufficient to carry the imposed load of a fire apparatus weighing at least 75,000 pounds. 3. Appropriate signage, including but not limited to weight or vertical clearance limitations or any special conditions, shall be provided. SD&S D-1/bh/07.28.2025 Driveways, Turnarounds, and Turnouts 6 of 8 J. Gates 1. Driveways and Access Roads a. All gates crossing driveways and access roads shall comply with SCCFD Standard Detail and Specification G-1, Installation of Security Gates, Chains, and Bollards for Access Roads and Driveways. i. State Response Area (SRA) excluding Ranchlands (AR): Gate entrances shall be at least two feet wider than the width of the traffic lane(s) serving the gate. All gates providing access from a road to a driveway shall be located at least 30 feet from the roadway and shall open to allow a vehicle to stop without obstructing traffic on that road. K. Secondary Access Roads 1. Access Roads a. Development of one or two-family dwellings where the number of dwelling units exceeds 30 shall be provided with two separate and approved fire apparatus access roads and shall meet the requirements listed under separation of access roads. Note, providing approved automatic fire sprinkler systems shall not reduce the number of required access roads. [REF: CFC, Appendix D]. b. More than one fire apparatus road shall be provided when it is determined by the Fire Code official that access by a single road might be impaired by vehicle congestion, condition of terrain, climatic conditions or other factors that could limit access. [REF: CFC §503.1.2]. c. Separation of Access Roads: Where two access roads are required they shall be placed a distance a part equal to not less than one half of the length of the maximum overall diagonal dimension of the property or area to be served, measure in a straight line between accesses (from centerline to centerline). [REF: CFC, Appendix D]. L. Dead End Roads 1. State Response Area (SRA) excluding Ranchlands (AR) and Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ): The maximum length of a dead-end road, including all dead-end roads accessed from that dead-end road, shall not exceed the following cumulative lengths, regardless of the number of parcels served: SD&S D-1/bh/07.28.2025 Driveways, Turnarounds, and Turnouts 7 of 8 a. Parcels zoned for less than one acres – 800 feet b. Parcels zoned for 1 acre to 4.99 acres – 1,320 feet c. Parcels zoned for 5 acres to 19.99 acres – 2,640 feet d. Parcels zoned for 20 acres or larger – 5,280 feet 2. All lengths shall be measured from the edge of the road surface at the intersection that begins the road to the end of the road surface at its farthest point. Where a dead-end road crosses areas of differing zoned parcel sizes requiring different length limits, the shortest allowable length shall apply. SD&S D-1/bh/07.28.2025 Driveways, Turnarounds, and Turnouts 8 of 8 Note: Turnaround slope shall not exceed 5% in any one direction. From:Lin, Austin To:Emi Sugiyama; City Clerk Cc:Ebrahimi, Kevin; Bull, Steve Subject:10857 Linda Vista Response to Neighbor Rebuttal to be included in Written Communications Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 3:48:41 PM Attachments:image001.png image002.png image003.png image004.png image005.png 10857 Linda VIsta Response to Neighbor Rebuttal 2026-3-30.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Hi Emi and City Clerk, Please see attached for the 10857 Linda Vista Response to Neighbor Rebuttal prepared by Hexagon to be included in Written Communications for the April 1, 2026 City Council hearing (Item #3). Thank you, Austin Lin, PE Development Manager SummerHill Homes Direct (510) 330-3064 | Mobile (408) 966-2278 | ✉️ alin@shhomes.com www.summerhillhomes.com 6101 Bollinger Canyon Road, Suite 425, San Ramon, CA 94583 Follow Us: All subject matter contained in this email is confidential and proprietary to SummerHill Homes LLC and should not be disclosed to any person not listed as an original recipient. SummerHill Homes LLC. All rights reserved. March 30, 2026 Mr. Kevin Ebrahimi SummerHill Homes 777 S. California Ave. Palo Alto, CA 94304 Re: Response to DerChang Rebuttal Dear Mr. Ebrahimi: Hexagon Transportation Consultants, Inc. completed an evacuation analysis for your Linda Vista project. We understand that our analysis was reviewed by one of the neighbors, Mr. DerChang, who has submitted a rebuttal letter. The key point in the rebuttal is the assertion that the evacuation study should focus on Linda Vista Drive and not consider the larger neighborhood. Hexagon disagrees with this assertion. Linda Vista Drive connects to Hyannisport Drive, Columbus Avenue, and Terrace Drive, which lead to Bubb Road, and also connects directly with McClellan Road. Thus, there are four roads for residents that might need to evacuate homes along Linda Vista Drive. As described in our analysis, the constraints for evacuating the area are Bubb Road and McClellan Road. In addition to the Hexagon evacuation analysis, Cupertino has an Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment by Fehr & Peers. This study also identifies Bubb Road and McClellan Road as the key evacuation routes. Your Linda Vista project would add 47 homes to an evacuation area with about 1,300 homes. The 3.6% increase in homes would result in a 3.6% increase in evacuation time. Sincerely, HEXAGON TRANSPORTATION CONSULTANTS, INC. Gary K. Black, AICP President From:Bull, Steve To:City Clerk; Emi Sugiyama; City Attorney"s Office Cc:Matt Larson; Ebrahimi, Kevin; Lin, Austin Subject:Linda Vista - Supplemental Information Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 3:33:03 PM Attachments:image001.png Linda Vista - Proposed COA for 2-story units -20260331.pdf 10857LindaVista_Evacuation_Analysis_2026-2-26 w Cover Email_20260317.pdf Letter to City of Cupertino - 4-1-26(19345502.1).pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear City Staff, City Clerk, and City Attorney: We’re writing to provide supplemental information regarding our application for the Linda Vista project (a.k.a. Evulich Court). We had previously submitted the Evacuation Analysis to the City in advance of the March 17, 2026 Hearing. Please find the following information attached: 1. 2-Story Units – Proposed Site Plan and Conditions of Approval 2. Evacuation Analysis – Analysis and Cover Email originally sent on March 17, 2026 3. Cox Castle Response Letter - dated April 1, 2026 Please let us know if you have any questions. Thank you, Steve Steven Bull Vice President of Development SummerHill Homes 6101 Bollinger Canyon Road, Suite 425, San Ramon, CA 94583 Mobile (510) 410-1188 sbull@shhomes.com / SummerHillHomes.com All subject matter contained in this email is confidential and proprietary to SummerHill Homes/SummerHill Apartment Communities and should not be disclosed to any person not listed as an original recipient. SummerHill Homes/ SummerHill Apartment Communities. All rights reserved. March 31, 2026 City of Cupertino Planning Department 10300 Torre Avenue Cupertino, CA 95014 Attn.: Emi Sugiyama Subject: 10857 Linda Vista Drive TM-2024-009, ASA-2024-015, TR-2024-044 Proposed Two-Story Units Dear Ms. Sugiyama, In response from feedback from the fenceline neighbors, the Applicant proposes to modify five (5) of the three-story units within the project to two-story units adjacent to the residential neighbors subject to the proposed Conditions of Approval below (underlined text denotes new language). The locations and resulting setbacks are shown on the attached Setback Exhibit. The Applicant intends to present this modification to the City Council at the April 1, 2026 Hearing and will also provide this information to the Councilmembers in advance of the Hearing. The proposed modifications to the Conditions of Approval to accommodate the two-story units are as follows: 14. DENSITY BONUS WAIVERS AND CONCESSIONS As allowed through the State Density Bonus law, the project is granted one concession and five six waivers as requested and indicated on the approved project plans as follows: …. (g) In implementing the Height Reduction pursuant to Condition of Approval 86, waiver for reduced street side and front setbacks as set forth in Condition of Approval 86. 86. (or number TBD) VOLUNTARY HEIGHT REDUCTION The Applicant will work in good faith with City staff and the Santa Clara County Fire Department to reduce the height of the five (5) three-story homes at the ends of Buildings 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 to two- stories and a maximum of 30’ in height with reduced setbacks, as shown on the attached exhibit (“Height Reduction”), provided the project is approved at the April 1, 2026 City Council Hearing and no appeal, legal action, claim, or other proceeding is filed challenging the validity of the project approvals. To accommodate the Height Reduction, the minimum setbacks for of Buildings 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 would be as follows: 10857 Linda Vista 2-Story Units – Condition of Approval March 31, 2026 Page 2 of 2 -2- 2026-03-31 • The minimum street side setback from the two-story homes from the Evulich Court right-of-way shall be (i) 2’-0 to porches and (ii) 3’-0” to the building mass. • The minimum front setback of the two-story homes shall be thirteen (13) feet from the Linda Vista Drive right-of-way. If the Applicant determines in good faith that the Height Reduction cannot be accomplished without a material adverse impact on the project, the Applicant will not implement the Height Reduction in its development project. The following reasons, without limitation, constitute good faith reasons for the Applicant to determine that the Height Reduction will have a material adverse impact on the project: inability to obtain all required permits and approvals for the Height Reduction; conflict of the Height Reduction with applicable laws, regulations, codes, or policies; delay of the project as a result of the Height Reduction; or modifications as a result of the Height Reduction that materially affect the size, placement, configuration, or footprints of the proposed homes in the project. If the City Council imposes a condition requiring the Applicant to construct a connection to an offsite- trail without providing in-lieu park fee credits, the Applicant will not implement the voluntary Height Reduction proposed in this Condition. Please contact me at sbull@shhomes.com or (510)410-1188 if you have any questions. Sincerely, SummerHill Homes LLC Steven Bull Vice President of Development Attached: Setback Exhibit Copy: City Clerk City Council D S T R E E T A S T R E E T B S T R E E T C S T R E E T E S T R E E T LI N D A V I S T A D R I V E (P U B L I C R O A D ) EVULICH COURT (PUBLIC ROAD) BLDG 6 BLDG 1 BLDG 2 BLDG 3 BLDG 4 BLDG 5 BLDG 7 BLDG 8 BLDG 9 BLDG 10 H:\3988-000\ACAD\EXHIBITS\XB-046_SITE PLAN_2-STORY_10 SETBACK.DWG SETBACK SITE PLAN 10857 LINDA VISTA DRIVE CITY OF CUPERTINO SANTA CLARA COUNTY CALIFORNIA SCALE: 1" = 20'DATE: MARCH 17, 2026 6040200 CIVIL ENGINEERS SURVEYORS PLANNERS SAN RAMON WWW.CBANDG.COM ROSEVILLE (925) 866-0322 (916) 788-4456 LEGEND ABBREVIATIONS From:Lin, Austin To:Emi Sugiyama Cc:Bull, Steve; Ebrahimi, Kevin Subject:10857 Linda Vista Drive - Informational Evacuation Analysis Submittal Date:Tuesday, March 17, 2026 1:49:55 PM Attachments:image001.png image002.png image003.png image004.png image005.png 10857LindaVista_Evacuation_Analysis_2026-2-26.pdf Re: 10857 Linda Vista Drive – Informational Evacuation Analysis Submittal Dear Emi: In advance of this evening’s hearing, the applicant is submitting the attached memorandum titled Evacuation Analysis for the Proposed Townhomes at 10857 Linda Vista Drive, prepared by Hexagon Transportation Consultants, Inc. This analysis is a voluntary, non-CEQA, informational assessment prepared at the request of the applicant for internal purposes to evaluate the project’s incremental contribution to evacuation conditions within the broader neighborhood context. We would like to clarify the context of this document and address recent public comments suggesting that an evacuation study was prepared and withheld. As reflected in the City’s staff report, the City of Cupertino does not have an adopted requirement or objective standard requiring a project-specific evacuation study, and no such study was required for this application. The project has been reviewed and found compliant with all applicable State fire safety requirements for development within a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone. During the course of community outreach, a neighbor submitted an independent evacuation analysis raising questions about evacuation conditions in the area. In order to better understand the assumptions and conclusions presented in that analysis, and for our own internal planning purposes, the applicant voluntarily requested that the traffic consultant who prepared the project traffic analysis conduct a technical evaluation of evacuation conditions. This evaluation was prepared for internal informational purposes only and to assist the applicant team in understanding the issues raised in light of community concerns. At the time of earlier meetings referenced by some commenters, this analysis had not yet been finalized, and no report was submitted to the City nor Fire Department because it was not required as part of the application. The attached memorandum was subsequently completed on February 26, 2026. The findings of the analysis indicate that the project represents a small share of overall evacuation demand and would result in a minimal increase in estimated evacuation time, approximately two minutes, when compared to existing conditions. Although not required, the applicant is providing this memorandum at this time in the interest of transparency. Sincerely, Austin Lin, PE Development Manager SummerHill Homes Direct (510) 330-3064 | Mobile (408) 966-2278 | ✉️ alin@shhomes.com www.summerhillhomes.com 6101 Bollinger Canyon Road, Suite 425, San Ramon, CA 94583 Follow Us: All subject matter contained in this email is confidential and proprietary to SummerHill Homes LLC and should not be disclosed to any person not listed as an original recipient. SummerHill Homes LLC. All rights reserved. Memorandum Date: February 26, 2026 To: Mr. Steve Bull, Summerhill Homes From: Shu hao (Ollie) Zhou, T.E. Huy Tran, T.E. Subject: Evacuation Analysis for the Proposed Townhomes at 10857 Linda Vista Drive in Cupertino, CA Introduction Hexagon Transportation Consultants, Inc. has completed an evacuation analysis for the proposed townhomes located at 10857 Linda Vista Drive in Cupertino, California. The project would demolish four existing single-family homes on-site and construct 51 townhomes, resulting in a net increase of 47 residential units. Figure 1 illustrates the project site location in relation to the surrounding roadway network. The purpose of this memorandum is to assess whether the proposed project may affect emergency evacuation conditions in the surrounding hillside neighborhood during a hypothetical wildfire event. Scope of the Study This evacuation evaluation is a non-CEQA technical assessment prepared to address community concerns regarding the proposed project’s potential effects on emergency evacuation operations in the Cupertino foothills. The analysis is not required by the City of Cupertino and is intended to provide an informational review of how the project would integrate with existing neighborhood circulation and evacuation routes during a hypothetical wildfire event. The study defines a reasonable evacuation area based on proximity to the project site and the most likely travel paths connecting the neighborhood to the surrounding collector, arterial, and freeway roadway networks. The evaluation focuses on the project’s contribution to overall evacuation demand and evacuation time within this area during an emergency wildfire evacuation. Background (Housing Element Environmental Assessment) Wildfire hazards, emergency access, and evacuation planning were evaluated by the City of Cupertino as part of the 2023-2031 Housing Element Environmental Assessment (EA). The Housing Element EA concluded that implementation of the Housing Element would not substantially impair an adopted emergency response plan or emergency evacuation plan. 10857 Linda Vista Drive Evacuation Analysis February 26, 2026 P a g e | 2 Figure 1 Project Site Location, Evacuation Area, Routes, and Critical Intersection i s t i n g e s i d e n t i a l n i t s i s t i n g e s i d e n t i a l n i t s = Project Site Location = Bubb Rd/McClellan Rd Intersection = Evacuation Route = Evacuation Area Rainbow DrRainbow Dr McClellan RdMcClellan Rd Bubb Rd Bubb Rd Stevens Creek BlvdStevens Creek Blvd F o o t h il l B l v d F o o t h il l B l v d Stevens Creek Stevens Creek Terrace DrTerrace Dr 10857 Linda Vista Drive Evacuation Analysis February 26, 2026 P a g e | 3 Study Limitations This memorandum provides a high-level evaluation of potential evacuation circulation conditions under a hypothetical wildfire scenario. No detailed traffic modeling or fire behavior simulations were conducted. Instead, this analysis qualitatively assesses the project’s relative contribution to overall evacuation demand based on available data, reasonable assumptions, and expected evacuation behavior. Evacuation Scenario This evaluation assumes a hypothetical wildfire scenario, presumed to be coming from the Cupertino foothills. There are many different types of emergencies that could require evacuation, and there are other emergencies that could require shelter in place. The wildfire scenario is picked as one of the common emergencies experienced in California requiring evacuations. It is expected that residents would be receiving their emergency evacuation orders from AlertSCC, Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA), City of Cupertino website and social media channels, or other sources. • AlertSCC: Santa Clara County’s official emergency alert system that provides notifications via text message, email, and voice call. • Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA): A federal alert system that automatically sends notifications to all cell phones within the affected geographic area. • City of Cupertino Website and Social Media Channels: The City supplements official alerts with real-time updates on its website and verified social media platforms. Evacuation Routes and Area The City of Cupertino has identified Foothill Boulevard, Stevens Creek Boulevard, McClellan Road, and Bubb Road as evacuation routes serving the project area, per the City of Cupertino Housing Element Environmental Impact Report (EIR). Per the City’s General Plan Mobility Chapter, Foothill Boulevard and Stevens Creek Boulevard are designated arterial roadways, while McClellan Road and Bubb Road are designated major collectors that provide connections between local neighborhoods and the regional roadway system. In the project vicinity, evacuation traffic is generally expected to access the regional roadway system via one of three routes, depending on location: the Bubb Road/McClellan Road signalized intersection, the Foothill Boulevard/Stevens Creek Boulevard signalized intersection, or Rainbow Drive. For the evacuation area that includes the project site, as shown in Figure 1, residents would most likely evacuate via the Bubb Road/McClellan Road signalized intersection. Therefore, this intersection was identified as the sole critical evacuation outlet evaluated in this analysis. Residents located along Foothill Boulevard, west of Stevens Creek (the creek) and south of Stevens Creek Boulevard, would evacuate via the Foothill Boulevard/Stevens Creek Boulevard signalized intersection. Residents located south of Terrace Drive were assumed to evacuate via Rainbow Drive. Neither of these areas would utilize the Bubb Road/McClellan Road signalized intersection; therefore, these areas were excluded from the project evacuation area. Based on these routing assumptions, the evacuation area was defined to include the homes and neighborhoods most likely to evacuate via the Bubb Road/McClellan Road signalized intersection during a wildfire evacuation (see Figure 1). The evacuation area includes the project site and adjacent 10857 Linda Vista Drive Evacuation Analysis February 26, 2026 P a g e | 4 residential neighborhoods and is generally bounded by Almaden Avenue to the north, the Union Pacific Railroad tracks to the east, Terrace Drive to the south, and Stevens Creek (the creek) to the west. The defined evacuation area contains 1,324 existing residential units (see Figure 1) and is predominantly residential in land use. A worst-case scenario in terms of evacuation traffic generation would occur when all the residents are at home instead of at work/school or other activities during the day. Therefore, the effect of the other land uses such as school, fitness clubs, and small commercial uses are not considered as part of this analysis. Project Contribution The proposed project consists of 47 net additional residential units located within an evacuation area containing 1,324 e isting residential units. Therefore the project’s share of total evacuation demand represents approximately 3.6% of the overall evacuation traffic expected to use these routes. It should be noted that not everyone would evacuate at the exact same time, and the duration can sometimes span over the course of hours. Therefore, given this minimal increase, the project would not significantly affect evacuation traffic volumes or conditions for this evacuation area when compared to existing conditions. Evacuation Time Analysis Evacuation times were estimated using a planning-level, capacity-based approach that evaluates traffic flow through the critical Bubb Road/McClellan Road signalized intersection serving the evacuation area. Under Existing conditions, evacuation demand is estimated at approximately 2,648 vehicles, based on an assumption of 2.0 evacuation vehicles per household. Under Existing Plus Project conditions, the proposed project would add approximately 94 evacuation vehicles, resulting in a total evacuation demand of approximately 2,742 vehicles. Evacuation capacity was estimated using a conservative saturation flow rate of 900 vehicles per hour per lane at the critical signalized intersection identified above. Under emergency operations, outbound traffic in the evacuation area would use the eastbound left-turn, eastbound through, and northbound through lanes at the Bubb Road/McClellan Road intersection. These three lanes would provide a combined evacuation capacity of approximately 2,700 vehicles per hour (vph). Based on the estimated evacuation demand and available capacity, evacuation time is approximately 59 minutes under Existing conditions and would increase to approximately 61 minutes under Existing Plus Project conditions (see Table 1). This represents an increase of approximately two minutes and would not significantly affect evacuation operations when compared to existing conditions. Sensitivity Analysis A sensitivity analysis was conducted to compare evacuation demand and evacuation times for the proposed project with a theoretical residential development consistent with existing R-1 zoning. Under a theoretical R-1 zoning scenario, the project site would include 11 residential units within an evacuation area containing 1,324 existing residential units, representing approximately 0.8% of total evacuation demand. As discussed above, the proposed project represents approximately 3.6% of total evacuation demand within the defined evacuation area. The difference in evacuation demand between the two scenarios is minimal. 10857 Linda Vista Drive Evacuation Analysis February 26, 2026 P a g e | 5 Table 1 Estimated Evacuation Times for the Evacuation Area For evacuation time, the R-1 zoning scenario would generate approximately 22 evacuation vehicles, which, when added to the existing evacuation demand of approximately 2,648 vehicles, would result in a total evacuation demand of approximately 2,670 vehicles. When evaluated against an evacuation capacity of approximately 2,700 vehicles per hour, the estimated evacuation time would be the same as existing conditions at approximately 59 minutes. As discussed above, the proposed project would result in an estimated evacuation time of approximately 61 minutes under Existing Plus Project conditions. The difference in evacuation time between the two scenarios would be minimal. Overall, differences in evacuation demand and evacuation times between the proposed project and the theoretical R-1 zoning scenario are minimal, and evacuation conditions would be generally comparable under both scenarios. Fire Prevention Features The proposed project includes fire access and protection features consistent with the requirements of the City of Cupertino and the Santa Clara County Fire Department. The site layout extends Linda Vista Drive to provide internal circulation for the 51 townhomes and incorporates the following fire safety design elements: • Emergency vehicle access that meets all applicable turning radius, width, and grade requirements. • A Fire Department-approved hammerhead turnaround at the end of the private street. • Driveway and street designs that comply with California Fire Code standards for slope and emergency response clearance. The proposed street network satisfies the City’s emergency access requirements and the hammerhead turnaround design has been reviewed and approved by the Fire Department. Since the project is identified as being located in a Local Responsibility Area (LRA) Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone, the project will be compliant with the requirements of California Residential Code Section R337, Materials and Methods for Exterior Wildfire Exposure to enhance the buildings’ fire-resistance and reduce wildfire vulnerability. In addition, the project will also provide defensible spaces in accordance with Cal Fire Defensible Space Guidelines and Recommendations. Estimated Total Vehicles per Total Evacuation Evacuation Scenario Households Household 1 Vehicles Capacity (vph) 2 Time (mins) Existing 1,324 2.0 2,648 2,700 59 Proposed Project (Net)47 2.0 94 ---- Existing Plus Project 1,371 2.0 2,742 2,700 61 Notes: 1 Based on the City of Seaside Evacuation Study dated December 12, 2022 prepared by Hexagon and Rancho Cucamonga Evacuation Assessment dated October 26, 2021 prepared by Fehr & Peers. 2 Assumes 900 vehicles per hour per lane for for one eastbound left-turn lane, one eastbound through lane, and one northbound through lane at the Bubb Road/McClellan Road signalized intersection. 10857 Linda Vista Drive Evacuation Analysis February 26, 2026 P a g e | 6 Conclusion This evacuation evaluation is informational and does not constitute a formal CEQA analysis. The proposed project consists of adding 47 net residential units within an evacuation area containing 1,324 existing residential units. Project residents would use the same evacuation routes as surrounding neighborhoods, primarily McClellan Road and Bubb Road, which provide access to the critical Bubb Road/McClellan Road signalized intersection. The results of this evacuation analysis for a wildfire indicate the following: • The proposed project represents approximately 3.6% of the total evacuation traffic expected to use these routes. Given this minimal increase, the project would not significantly affect evacuation traffic volumes or conditions for this evacuation area when compared to existing conditions. • The evacuation time analysis indicates that the proposed project would increase overall evacuation time for the evacuation area by approximately two minutes compared to Existing conditions. This minimal increase would not significantly affect evacuation operations at the identified critical signalized intersection. • The proposed project and a theoretical R-1 zoning scenario would result in similar evacuation demand and evacuation times, with only a minor incremental change in evacuation operations under either scenario. 107942\19311643v6www.coxcastle.com Los Angeles | Orange County | San Francisco Cox, Castle & Nicholson LLP 50 California Street, Suite 3200 San Francisco, California 94111-4710 P: 415.262.5100 F: 415.262.5199 Margo N. Bradish 415.262.5101 mbradish@coxcastle.com File No. 107942 April 1, 2026 VIA E-MAIL City Council City of Cupertino City Hall 10300 Torre Avenue Cupertino, CA 95014-3255 Re:10857, 10867, 10877, and 10887 Linda Vista Drive Townhome Project Approval Honorable Council Members: At its February 24, 2026, hearing, the Planning Commission of the City of Cupertino (“City”) recommended that the City Council approve SummerHill Homes’ (“SummerHill”) proposed housing development project (“Project”) at 10857, 10867, and 10877 Linda Vista Drive (“Property”). At its March 17, 2026,meeting,the City Council continued the scheduled hearing on the Project until April 1, 2026, without substantive discussion. On March 30, 2026, the Department of Housing and Community Development (“HCD”) issued a Letter of Support and Technical Assistance with regard to the Project (“HCD Support Letter”). (See attached Exhibit A.) We write to encourage the City Council to approve the Project at its April 1, 2026, hearing, in accordance with the City’s obligations under the Housing Accountability Act (“HAA”), the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), and the Permit Streamlining Act (“PSA”).Please see our February 12, 2026, letter to Planning staff addressing these obligations (“February Letter”). (See attached Exhibit B.) This letter responds to (i)the March 16, 2026, letter from an attorney on behalf of a resident (“Attorney Letter”) asserting noncompliance of the Project with CEQA and the Subdivision Map Act (“Map Act”)and (ii)the March 27, 2026, letter from resident Vikram Saxena alleging factual discrepancies regarding CEQA compliance (“Saxena Letter”). As described below, the record before you demonstrates that (i) the Project is eligible for the AB 130 CEQA statutory exemption for infill housing projects; and (ii) the Project is consistent with the Map Act. As noted in our February Letter, the City Council lacks a legal basis to disapprove the Project,and the City faces potentially substantial financial penalties should it do so. Pursuant to recently enacted AB 712, disapproval of the Project in violation of state housing laws would expose the City to fines of a minimum of $10,000 per unit (with enhanced penalties in the event of bad faith or prior noncompliance) and payment of Summerhill’s attorneys’ fees. We City Council April 1, 2026 Page 2 107942\19311643v6 encourage the City Council to approve the Project as proposed in accordance with applicable law. 1.Background The Project is located within a newly designated Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (“VHFHSZ”)and therefore is subject to Public Resource Code Section 4290 and the State Minimum Fire Safe Regulations (14 C.C.R §§ 1270 et seq.) (“Fire Safe Regulations”), in addition to the generally applicable fire safety requirements of the California Building Code (“Building Code”).The Project is located in a local responsibility area (“LRA”) and therefore Public Resources Code Section 51182 is applicable to the Project (whereas Public Resources Code Section 4291 is applicable to buildings in state responsibility areas). SummerHill applied to the Santa Clara County Fire Department (“Fire Department”) for a reduction of the 30-foot setback requirement of the Fire Safe Regulations adopted pursuant to Public Resource Code Section 4290 (“Alternative Means”), including submission of a justification for the request. (See attached Exhibit C.)After review in accordance with the Fire Safe Regulations, on January 1, 2026, the Fire Department issued comments stating that the Alternative Means “is APPROVED.”(See attached Exhibit C.)On January 27, 2026, the Fire Department issued comments on the Project stating, “Plans are APPROVED with conditions.” (See attached Exhibit D.)With regard to the Alternative Means, the Fire Department found that “non-conforming setbacks are mitigated through a combination of increased fire separation distance requirements and modified sprinkler systems.” (See attached Exhibit D, Plan Review Comment 1.)The conditions also include requirements for standard items routinely reviewed at the building permit and inspection stage, such as requirements for a “Final Fire Protection Plan”, turnaround installation, sprinkler installation, fire flow, rescue openings, fire access road specifications, fire lane identification, address identification, etc. These imposition of these conditions in no way affects the validity of the approval. 2.The Project Qualifies for the AB 130 CEQA Exemption. a. AB 130 CEQA Exemption Requirements for VHFHSZ Public Resources Code Section 21080.66 (codified as Section 59 of AB 130) (“AB 130 CEQA Exemption”) includes site-specific criteria applicable to sites seeking to use the AB 130 CEQA Exemption, including, among other things, satisfying the requirements of Government Code Section 65913.4(a)(6). As applicable to the Project, Section 65913.4(a)(6)(D) provides that the AB 130 CEQA Exemption generally does not apply to sites that are “Within a very high fire hazard severity zone, as determined by the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection pursuant to Section 51178, or within the state responsibility area, as defined in Section 4102 of the Public Resources Code.” This exclusion, however, does not apply if certain conditions are met. Specifically, the AB 130 CEQA Exemption provides the following regarding the exclusion: City Council April 1, 2026 Page 3 107942\19311643v6 This subparagraph [i.e., the exclusion] does not apply to sites that have adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development, including, but not limited to, standards established under all of the following or their successor provisions: (i) Section 4291 of the Public Resources Code or Section 51182, as applicable. (ii) Section 4290 of the Public Resources Code. (iii) Chapter 7A of the California Building Code (Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations).” (Gov. Code § 65913.4(a)(6)(D) (emphasis added).) Importantly, this exception to the general exclusion provides that the exclusion does not apply to sites “that have adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards,” with the balance of the text being explanatory of this general requirement. Notably, the listed standards apply as a matter of law to all projects in VHFHSZ, regardless of the use of AB 130. As part of the standard permit review process for all projects in VHFHSZ, building and fire staff routinely verify compliance with these requirements as a prerequisite to the issuance of building permits and inspection approvals. Projects in VHFHSZ cannot receive building permits or inspection approvals until the applicable requirements are met. In accordance with CEQA case law, cities routinely rely on a project’s compliance with applicable law as a manner of demonstrating compliance with CEQA. (See Tracy First v City of Tracy (2009) 177 CA4th 912.)While SummerHill has substantially advanced its demonstration of compliance with the code requirements noted by AB 130 ahead of the required permit process to be responsive to community concerns,the obligation to comply with these laws,as confirmed at the permit stage, is itself sufficient to demonstrate CEQA compliance.Thus, the HCD Support Letter concludes, “For purposes of entitling AB-130 eligible projects, the City should assume compliance with local building codes. Whether the project is indeed code compliant should be determined at the post-entitlement phase. This prevents the entitlement review process from becoming bogged down in technical details that are strictly governed by other laws.” (HCD Support Letter, emphasis added.)While a code compliance determination is not required to establish AB 130 eligibility at the entitlement stage, the compliance of the Project with applicable code requirements nonetheless is addressed below for informational purposes. b.The Project Will Comply with Section 51182 of the Public Resources Code. Public Resources Code Sections 4291 and 51182 address “defensible space” surrounding structures based on the combustibility of materials surrounding the structure, but generally not beyond the property line. As noted above, based on its location in an LRA, Section 51182 is applicable to the Project. City Council April 1, 2026 Page 4 107942\19311643v6 Section 51182 requires a defensible space of 100 feet from each side and from the front and rear of the structure, but not beyond the property line except as specified in the statute, and specified maintenance. (See Pub. Res. Code § 51182(a)(1)(A).) Section 51182 states, “The amount of fuel modification necessary shall consider the flammability of the structure as affected by building material, building standards, location, and type of vegetation.” (Id.) The Project will comply with Section 51182, and compliance will be verified through the standard building permit plan check and inspection processes, as is done for every project in a VHFHSZ. For example, Section 701A.5 of the California Building Code requires that, “Prior to building permit final approval, the property shall be in compliance with the vegetation management requirements prescribed in California Fire Code Section 4906, including California Public Resources Code 4291 or California Government Code Section 51182.” Similarly, Sections 4907.2 and 4907.3 of the California Fire Code require: Land designated in ordinance by local agencies as a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone pursuant to Government Code Section 51179 are required to maintain the required defensible space. Vegetation and fuels around all buildings and structures shall be maintained and spaced at all times in accordance with the following laws and regulations. Should a conflict of any requirements occur, the most restrictive requirement shall prevail: 1) Public Resources Code, Section 4291. 2) California Code of Regulations, Title 14, Division 1.5, Chapter 7, Subchapter 3, Article 3, Section 1299. 3) California Government Code, Section 51182. 4) California Code of Regulations, Title 19, Division 1, Chapter 7, Subchapter 1, Section 3.07. 5) The requirements of Chapter 49 and the Defensible Space and Fuel Modification Standards as issued and approved by the Fire Code Official. As noted in the HCD Support Letter, “For purposes of entitling AB-130 eligible projects, the City should assume compliance with local building codes. Whether the project is indeed code compliant should be determined at the post-entitlement phase.” c.The Project Complies with Section 4290 of the Public Resources Code. Public Resources Code Section 4290 requires the adoption of regulations implementing minimum fire safety standards related to defensible space in VHFHSZ, which are included in the Fire Safe Regulations. The Fire Safe Regulations provide as follows: a)All parcels shall provide a minimum thirty (30) foot setback for all Buildings from all property lines and/or the center of a Road, except as provided for in subsection (b). (b)A reduction in the minimum setback shall be based upon practical reasons, which may include but are not limited to, parcel dimensions or size, topographic limitations, Development density requirements or other Development patterns that promote low- carbon emission outcomes; sensitive habitat; or other site constraints, and shall provide City Council April 1, 2026 Page 5 107942\19311643v6 for an alternative method to reduce Structure-to-Structure ignition by incorporating features such as, but not limited to: (1)non-combustible block walls or fences; or (2)non-combustible material extending five (5) feet horizontally from the furthest extent of the Building; or (3)hardscape landscaping; or (4)a reduction of exposed windows on the side of the Structure with a less than thirty (30) foot setback; or (5)the most protective requirements in the California Building Code, California Code of Regulations Title 24,Part 2, Chapter 7A, as required by the Local Jurisdiction. (14 C.C.R.§ 1276.01 (emphasis added).) In other words, compliance with Public Resources Code Section 4290 and Section 1276.01 of the Fire Safe Regulations can be established through either a 30-foot setback or a reduced setback combined with alternative methods. As expressly permitted, the Project complies with Public Resources Code Section 4290 and Section 1276.01 of the Fire Safe Regulations through the second express option, a reduced setback for a portion of the Project combined with alternative methods to reduce structure-to- structure ignition, including added fire sprinklers and one-hour fire ratings of certain exterior walls and covered porches.Any suggestion by the Attorney Letter or Saxena Letter that this use of a reduced setback combined with alternative methods defeats compliance with Public Resources Code Section 4290 is inconsistent with the express regulatory provisions. i.The Fire Safe Regulations Authorize Use of Alternative Means. Section 1270.07(a) of the Fire Safe Regulations confirms that exceptions to the Fire Safe Regulations may be approved by the Fire Department where the alternative means have the “same practical effect” as the regulations. Section 1270.07(a) states: Upon request by the applicant, an Exception to standards within this Subchapter may be allowed by the Inspection entity in accordance with 14 CCR § 1270.06 (Inspections) where the Exceptions provide the Same Practical Effect as these regulations towards providing Defensible Space. Exceptions granted by the Local Jurisdiction listed in 14 CCR § 1270.06, shall be made on a case-by-case basis only. 14 C.C.R. §1270.07(a). The Fire Safe Regulations define an exception as “An alternative to the specified standard requested by the applicant that may be necessary due to health, safety, environmental conditions, physical site limitations or other limiting conditions, such as recorded historical sites, that provides mitigation of the problem.” (14 C.C.R. §1270.01(j)(emphasis added).) City Council April 1, 2026 Page 6 107942\19311643v6 The Fire Department followed this process in approving the Alternative Means. Based on an analysis of the Project site and the Alternative Means, “County Fire staff determined that these measures provide appropriate alternative methods to reduce the risk of structure-to- structure ignition, and County Fire approved the Same Practical Effect exception request for the Application.” (Fire Department Memorandum to the Cupertino City Officials from Santa Clara Hector Estrada, Assistant Fire Chief, Re: Housing Development –Linda Vista Drive (emphasis added) (see attached Exhibit E).) In addition, “County Fire staff determined that the exception request provided appropriate access for emergency wildland fire equipment and safe civilian evacuation and that the exception request included fuel modification sufficient for civilian and firefighter safety.” (Id. (emphasis added).) As noted above, SummerHill substantially advanced its demonstration of compliance with the code requirements noted by AB 130 ahead of the required building permit process to be responsive to community concerns. Based on this accelerated process, the Fire Department already has approved the Alternative Means requested for the Project. (See attached Exhibit C.). Contrary to the assertion of the Attorney Letter and Saxena Letter, the use of Alternative Means is not a “shortcut” or an “avoidance” of code compliance. Instead, Alternative Means are a site-specific fire protection program authorized by the Fire Safe Regulations and approved by the Fire Department as having the “Same Practical Effect” as the Fire Safe Regulations. In other words, Alternative Means are an approved method of establishing code compliance. ii.Use of Alternative Methods Does Not Affect the Applicability of the AB 130 CEQA Exemption. Alternative Means falls squarely within the statutory language of Section 65913.4(a)(6)(D), as referenced in the AB 130 CEQA Exemption.The Attorney Letter and Saxena Letter fail to recognize that the Project received approval of the exact type of site- specific fire mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards contemplated by Section 65913.4(a)(6)(D). The Attorney Letter and Saxena Letter curiously attempt to suggest that Alternative Means expressly authorized by the Fire Safe Regulations to establish code compliance somehow do not constitute code compliance under AB 130 CEQA Exemption.The Attorney Letter provides no support for its assertion that an approved methodology for establishing code compliance for the purpose of the code does not establish code compliance for purposes of the AB 130 CEQA Exemption. Nothing in the AB 130 CEQA Exemption states or even implies such a distinction. d. The Project Will Comply with Chapter 7A of the Building Code Chapter 7A of the Building Code, “Materials and Construction Methods for Exterior Wildlife Exposure,” establishes minimum standards for building materials, systems, and assemblies used in the exterior design and construction of new buildings in the Wildland Urban City Council April 1, 2026 Page 7 107942\19311643v6 Interface, including requirements for ignition resistant construction, roofing, vents, exterior covering, exterior windows, skylights, and doors, decking, and accessory structures. As a matter of standard plan check practice, the building official must confirm that project plans comply with the requirements of Chapter 7A prior to issuance of a building permit. Specifically, Building Code Section 701A.4 requires that the “local building official shall, prior to construction, provide the owner or applicant a certification that the building as proposed to be built complies with all applicable state and local building standards, including those for materials and construction methods for wildfire exposure as described in [Chapter 7]. Similarly, as a matter of standard inspection practice, the building official must confirm that the project is constructed in compliance with the requirements of Chapter 7A. Specifically, Building Code Section 701A.4 requires that the “local building official shall, upon completion of construction, provide the owner or applicant with a copy of the final inspection report that demonstrates the building was constructed in compliance with all applicable state and local building standards, including those for materials and construction methods for wildfire exposure as described in [Chapter 7].” The foregoing requirements will ensure compliance with Chapter 7A, which is sufficient to demonstrate compliance with AB 130 with regard to Chapter 7A. As noted in the HCD Support Letter, “For purposes of entitling AB-130 eligible projects, the City should assume compliance with local building codes. Whether the project is indeed code compliant should be determined at the post-entitlement phase.” 3.The Project is Consistent with the Map Act. a.The Project is Consistent with Applicable, Objective Public Health and Safety Standards. The Project is entitled to the protection of the Housing Accountability Act (“HAA”), including the prohibition on disapproval of a housing development project that complies with “with applicable,objective general plan, zoning, and subdivision standards and criteria, including design review standards, in effect at the time that the application was deemed complete.” (Government Code § 65589.5(j)(1) (emphasis added).) The HAA provides an exception to this prohibition if a preponderance of evidence demonstrates that the project would have “a specific, adverse impact upon the public health or safety,” defined as a “a significant, quantifiable, direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, identified written public health or safety standards, policies, or conditions as they existed on the date the application was deemed complete.” (Id.) For purposes of the HAA, “objective” means “involving no personal or subjective judgment by a public official and being uniformly verifiable by reference to an external and uniform benchmark or criterion available and knowable by both the development applicant or proponent and the public official.(Id. § 65589.5(h)(9).) The Map Act identifies findings requiring disapproval of a project, as opposed to findings required for approval. (Government Code § 66474.). In other words, the City must deny a map if City Council April 1, 2026 Page 8 107942\19311643v6 substantial evidence supports one of the findings for disapproval. The Map Act finding requiring disapproval of a project where “the design of the subdivision or type of improvements is likely to cause serious public health problems,”is not an objective standard as defined by the HAA, in that it involves subjective judgment and is not verifiable by reference to any external and uniform benchmark. In their review of the Project, neither the City nor the Fire Department have identified any applicable, objective standards related to public health and safety with which the Project would not comply. As such,the City cannot deny the Project tenative map based on this Map Act finding. The Attorney letter incorrectly asserts that the Map Act requires the City to make findings pursuant to Government Code Section 66474.02. This provision of the Map Act applies only to counties and therefore is inapplicable to the City. b.There is Not Substantial Evidence that the Project Would Cause Serious Public Health Problems. The draft resolution prepared by staff for approval of the Project tentative map includes a finding that “[t]he proposed subdivision design and improvements will not cause serious public health problems.” The Attorney Letter improperly asserts that the Project will result in “serious public health problems”with the meaning of the Map Act because it would lead to additional evacuation time.The Map Act, however, does not establish any objective standards regarding evacuation time. Further,as detailed in our February Letter, in their review of the Project, neither the City nor the Fire Department have identified any applicable, objective standards related to evacuation routes. The Fire Department, however, has found that the Alternative Means “provided appropriate access for emergency wildland fire equipment and safe civilian evacuation and that the exception request included fuel modification sufficient for civilian and firefighter safety.” (See attached Exhibit E.) As such, there is not substantial evidence in the record that the Project would have “serious public health problems”that would justify disapproval under the HAA. Further, there is not substantial evidence in the record that the Project would have a significant impact on emergency evacuation times. The Attorney Letter does not identify substantial evidence that would support a finding under Government Code Section 66474(f). Instead, the Attorney Letter makes several unsupported and factually incorrect assumptions regarding the roadway network to justify a conclusory statement that the Project would create an additional hour of evacuation time.Examples of the inaccuracies in the assumptions include both the extent of the applicable network and the volume that can be accommodated on the roadway. While an evacuation study is not required, and there are no applicable objective standards for such a study, SummerHill voluntarily requested that the transportation consultant for the Project prepare an evacuation analysis for non-CEQA, internal review purposes.As explained in Hexagon Transportation Consultants’ February 26, 2026, Evacuation Analysis for the Proposed Townhomes at 10857 Linda Vista Drive in Cupertino, CA (“Hexagon Analysis”), the Project is City Council April 1, 2026 Page 9 107942\19311643v6 anticipated to add only 3.6 percent of overall evacuation traffic on expected evacuation routes in a hypothetical wildfire scenario. The Hexagon Analysis concludes, “given this minimal increase, the project would not significantly affect traffic evacuation volumes or conditions for the evacuation area when compared to existing conditions.” (Emphasis added.) The Hexagon Analysis further concludes that the Project would add approximately two minutes to evacuation times under existing conditions, which “would not significantly affect evacuation operations when compared to existing conditions.” (Emphasis added.) These minor changes do not rise to the level of a “serious public health problem” caused by the Project for purposes of the Map Act. * * * In summary, the record before you demonstrates that (i) the Project is eligible for the AB 130 CEQA statutory exemption for infill housing projects; and (ii) the Project is consistent with the Map Act, both notwithstanding the use of Alternative Means as expressly authorized by the Fire Safe Regulations to achieve compliance with the code. As noted in our February Letter, the City Council lacks a legal basis to disapprove the Project,and the City faces potentially substantial financial penalties, including AB 712 fines and attorneys’ fees,should it do so. We encourage the City Council to approve the Project as proposed,in accordance with applicable law. Sincerely, Cox, Castle & Nicholson LLP Margo N. Bradish Partner MNB Attachments City Council April 1, 2026 107942\19311643v5 Exhibit A HCD Support Letter STATE OF CALIFORNIA - BUSINESS, CONSUMER SERVICES AND HOUSING AGENCY GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIVISION OF HOUSING POLICY DEVELOPMENT 651 Bannon Street, Suite 400, Sacramento, CA 95811 (916) 263-2911 / FAX (916) 263-7453 www.hcd.ca.gov March 30, 2026 Ben Fu, Community Development Director Cupertino City Hall 10300 Torre Avenue Cupertino, CA 95014 Dear Ben Fu: RE: City of Cupertino – 10857 Linda Vista Drive – Letter Support and Technical Assistance The California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) understands that on April 1, 2026, the City Council of the City of Cupertino will consider a Tentative Map, Architectural and Site Approval, and Tree Removal Permit for the construction of a housing development project that includes moderate income affordable units (Project) on a 2.53-acre site located at 10857 Linda Vista Drive (APNs: 356-06-001, -002, -003, and - 004). The purpose of this letter is to assist the City with its decision making by providing technical assistance related to the Housing Accountability Act (HAA) and State No Net Loss Law. Background HCD understands that the Project is proposing 51 for-sale townhome units, including 10 units deed restricted for moderate income households. The Project is located within the R-3/TH (Multiple-Family Residential, Townhome) zoning district and the Residential – Medium High Density General Plan Land Use Designation. The Project is utilizing the State Density Bonus Law (SDBL)1 to utilize five waivers and one concession from applicable standards of the General Plan and Zoning Code. HCD additionally understands that the Project is consistent with the General Plan,2 Zoning,3 and state and local regulations applicable to Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones (VHFHSZ).4 On February 24, 2026, the City’s Planning Commission voted to recommend the City Council approve the Project.5 1 Gov. Code, § 65915, subd. (b)(1)(D). 2 City of Cupertino February 24, 2026, Planning Commission Hearing Staff Report on 10857 Linda Vista Drive, page 2. 3 Ibid. See page 3. 4 Ibid. See page 9: “The Santa Clara County Fire Department has found that the project has demonstrated consistency with these requirements.” 5 City of Cupertino February 24, 2026, Planning Commission Hearing Minutes. Ben Fu, Community Development Director Page 2 Analysis Housing Accountability Act The Project meets the definition of a “housing development project” under the HAA.6 The Project may only be disapproved or approved at a lower density if the City makes written findings, supported by a preponderance of evidence on the record, that (1) a specific, adverse impact upon the public health or safety would result from the project and (2) mitigation of the adverse impact is not possible.7 Specific, adverse, impact means a significant, quantifiable, direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, identified written public health or safety standards, policies, or conditions.8 “Objective” means, “involving no personal or subjective judgment by a public official and being uniformly verifiable by reference to an external and uniform benchmark or criterion available and knowable by both the development applicant or proponent and the public official.”9 Additionally, the Legislature has clarified that these impacts are intended to arise “infrequently.”10 Housing Element No Net Loss Law No Net Loss Law requires that a jurisdiction ensure there is development opportunity remaining throughout the planning period to accommodate the jurisdiction’s Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA). Because the approval of the Project would result in capacity becoming inadequate to accommodate the RHNA, the City will have up to 180 days from the approval to identify or rezone “sufficient additional, adequate, and available sites” to accommodate the remaining RHNA.11 HCD understands that the Project site consists of four contiguous lots listed in the City’s 6th Cycle Housing Element and the approval of the project may trigger a No Net Loss Law obligation for the City in the moderate income and lower-income categories. In the Planning Commission Staff Report for the Project, the City has stated that, while it “is unable to identify additional sites to accommodate its RHNA concurrently with this project’s approval, it is working toward being compliant with State law in a timely manner. 12” HCD reminds the City that Housing Element No Net Loss Law specifically provides that the City may not disapprove a housing project on the basis that approval of the development would trigger the identification or zoning of additional adequate sites to accommodate the remaining RHNA.13 6 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (h)(2). 7 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j)(1). 8 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j)(1)(A). 9 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (h)(9). 10 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (a)(3). 11 Gov. Code, § 65863., subd. (c)(2). 12 City of Cupertino February 24, 2026, Planning Commission Hearing Staff Report on 10857 Linda Vista Drive, page 18. 13 See HCD’s October 2, 2019 No Net Loss Law Memo, page 1, available at: https://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housing-element/housing-element- memos/docs/sb-166-final.pdf. Ben Fu, Community Development Director Page 3 Conclusion For purposes of entitling AB 130-eligible projects, the City should assume compliance with local building codes. Whether the project is indeed code compliant should be determined at the post-entitlement phase. This prevents the entitlement review process from becoming bogged down in technical details that are strictly governed by other laws. HCD informs the City that AB 712 (Government Code Section 65914.2.) went into effect on January 1, 2026. Among other things, the new law increases penalties that a court may impose on a local government if the local government was advised in writing prior to the commencement of a lawsuit brought by the Attorney General or HCD that the local government’s decision, action, or inaction would represent a violation of specified housing laws. HCD hopes this technical assistance is helpful. HCD has enforcement authority over the HAA and Housing Element Law, among other state housing laws. Accordingly, HCD may review local government actions to determine consistency with these laws. Pursuant to Government Code section 65585, subdivision (j), if HCD finds that a jurisdiction’s actions do not comply with state law, HCD may notify the California Office of the Attorney General. HCD remains committed to supporting the City of Cupertino in facilitating housing at all income levels and hopes the City finds this clarification helpful. If you have questions or need additional information, please contact Brandon Yung at Brandon.Yung@hcd.ca.gov. Sincerely, Melinda Coy Housing Accountability Unit Chief City Council April 1, 2026 107942\19311643v5 Exhibit B February Letter Ih) COX CASTLE 107942\19229684v6 www.coxcastle.com Los Angeles | Orange County | San Francisco Cox, Castle & Nicholson LLP 50 California Street, Suite 3200 San Francisco, California 94111-4710 P: 415.262.5100 F: 415.262.5199 Margo N. Bradish 415.262.5101 mbradish@coxcastle.com File No. 107942 February 12, 2026 Emi Sugiyama, Senior Planner Luke Connolly, Assistant Director Community Development Department City of Cupertino City Hall 10300 Torre Avenue Cupertino, CA 95014-3255 Re: 10857, 10867, 10877, and 10887 Linda Vista Drive Townhome Project Approval Dear Ms. Sugiyama and Mr. Connolly: At its February 24, 2026, hearing, the Planning Commission of the City of Cupertino (“City”) will consider SummerHill Homes’ (“SummerHill”) proposed housing development project (“Project”) at 10857, 10867, and 10877 Linda Vista Drive (“Property”). We write to encourage the Planning Commission to timely recommend that the City Council approve the Project no later than April 4, 2026, in accordance with the City’s obligations under the Housing Accountability Act (“HAA”), the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), and the Permit Streamlining Act (“PSA”). The City’s Sixth Cycle Housing Element (“Housing Element”) Site Inventory lists the parcels that comprise the Property as Priority Housing Sites. SummerHill proposes to redevelop the Property with a new 51-unit townhome-style condominium community (including 10 units affordable to moderate income households). The proposed Project density is within the allowable density pursuant to the City’s General Plan and Zoning Code. SummerHill submitted a preliminary application pursuant to SB 330 for the Project on October 9, 2024, and a formal application for the Project on December 13, 2024, seeking approval of Architectural and Site Approval (File # ASA-2024-015), a Tentative Map (File # TM-2024-009), and a Tree Removal Permit (File # TR-2024-044), including waivers under the State Density Bonus Law. The City determined the formal application complete on March 19, 2025. Housing Accountability Act – Consistency Review Timeline Once an application is deemed complete, the HAA requires a local agency to notify the applicant, with supporting documentation and reasons, if the local agency considers the project Planning Commission February 12, 2026 Page 2 107942\19229684v6 to be “inconsistent, not in compliance, or not in conformity” with applicable standards. (Gov. Code § 65589.5(j)(2)(a).) For projects of 150 units or fewer, the HAA consistency review period expires 30 days after the housing development project application is determined to be complete. (Gov. Code § 65589.5(j)(2)(A).) If the local agency fails to provide the required documentation within the deadline, the housing development project is deemed consistent, compliant, and in conformity. The consistency review period for the Project expired on April 18, 2025. On April 18, 2025, the City submitted comments to SummerHill asserting inconsistencies with regard to certain “standard City requirements” as well as comments from the Fire Department and the Department of Public Works. Notably, the City did not make any comments asserting any inconsistencies with regard to evacuation routes at that time. As of that time, the Project was deemed consistent with standards for which inconsistencies were not identified and documented (including with regard to evacuation routes). Subsequently, the Fire Department confirmed that the Project complies with applicable Fire Code requirements with incorporation of required methods pursuant to the approved Application for Use of Alternate Materials, Methods of Construction, or Modification of Code for the Project. These methods include requirements for non-combustible landscaping material within defined areas, wildfire protective measures in accordance with the California Building Code, added sprinklers within defined areas, and stricter fire separation distances within defined areas. All of these methods have been incorporated into the Project plans. Concurrently with resolution of the Fire Department Comments, SummerHill worked with Public Works to address Public Works Department comments on the Project traffic study. On January 28, 2026, City staff confirmed that the Public Works and the Fire Department reviews were complete with no additional comments. On February 10, 2026, City staff notified SummerHill that staff had completed consistency review in accordance with the HAA. California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) As amended by AB 130, CEQA establishes a statutory exemption for housing development projects meeting listed conditions (e.g., site size of not more than 20 acres, infill location, consistency with applicable general plan and zoning, satisfaction of minimum density, and satisfaction of certain site criteria) that complete a specified tribal consultation process. (Pub. Res. Code § 21080.66.) On September 12, 2025, SummerHill formally notified the City of the eligibility of the Project for this exemption. On January 4, 2026, after complying with the statutory requirements, the City completed the tribal consultation process. The AB 130 site criteria include requirements that sites within a very fire hazard severity zone be subject to mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development, including standards established under Public Resources Code Sections 4290 and 4291 and Chapter 7A of the Building Code. (Pub. Res. Code Planning Commission February 12, 2026 Page 3 107942\19229684v6 § 21080.66(a)(6); Gov. Code § 65913.4(a)(6)(D).) As part of the AB 130 process, the Fire Department confirmed that the Project complies with those standards. Permit Streamlining Act – Project Approval Timeline The PSA requires CEQA lead agencies to make a decision to approve or disapprove housing development projects within specified timelines (as well as imposing strict limitations on disapproval, discussed below). As amended by AB 130 and AB 158, the PSA requires a city make a decision on a housing development project that is exempt from CEQA pursuant to the AB 130 infill exemption within 30 days after the later of (a) the conclusion of the AB 130 infill exemption tribal consultation process or (b) the expiration of the HAA consistency review period. (Gov. Code § 65950(a)(7).) The PSA permits the applicant and the lead agency to mutually agree to one extension of not more than 90 days. (Gov. Code §§ 65950(b), 65957.) Failure of the lead agency to make a decision on the project within these time periods results in deemed approval of the project. (Gov. Code §§ 65957, 65956(b).) As applied to the Project, the City would have been required to make a decision on the Project by February 3, 2026, which is the date that was 30 days after the conclusion of the AB 130 tribal consultation process on January 4, 2026 (because tribal consultation concluded later than the expiration of the consistency review period on April 18, 2025). On February 2, 2026, however, the City and SummerHill agreed to a one-time 60-day extension, making April 4, 2026, the new deadline for the City to make a decision the Project. The City’s failure to make a decision on the Project by April 4, 2026, would result in the Project being deemed approved. Housing Accountability Act Prohibition on Disapproval or Density Reduction The HAA prohibits local agencies from disapproving or rendering infeasible a housing development project at the density permitted on the site and proposed by the applicant, absent certain narrow findings. (Gov. Code § 65589.5.) The HAA broadly defines “disapproval” to include not only a final vote to disapprove entitlements, but also, for example, failure to act within applicable timelines, including PSA timelines, and failure to make a CEQA exemption determination. (Gov. Code § 65589.5(h)(6).) When a housing development project meets applicable, objective standards, the HAA prohibits a local agency from disapproving or reducing the density of the project absent findings, based on the preponderance of evidence, that the project would have “a specific, adverse impact upon the public health or safety” absent such disapproval or lower density, and that there is no feasible method to avoid or mitigate that impact other than disapproval or a reduction density. (Gov. Code § 65589.5(j)(1).) The HAA defines a “specific, adverse impact” as “a significant, quantifiable, direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, identified written public health Planning Commission February 12, 2026 Page 4 107942\19229684v6 or safety standards, policies, or conditions as they existed on the date the application was deemed complete.” (Id.) We understand that some members of the public have raised concerns about emergency evacuation in the Project vicinity. As noted above, with incorporation of required methods pursuant to the approved Application for Use of Alternate Materials, Methods of Construction, or Modification of Code, the Fire Department confirmed that the Project complies with applicable Fire Code and AB 130 very high fire hazard severity area standards. Notably, in its review of the Project, the City has not identified any designated evacuation routes or other “objective, identified written public health or safety standards, policies, or conditions” related to evacuation routes. As such, there is not evidence that the Project would have “a specific adverse impact public on health and safety” as defined in the HAA with regard to evacuation routes. The HAA therefore prohibits the City from disapproving or a reducing the Project density based on concerns about evacuation routes. Remedies for Improper Disapproval The HAA gives courts broad power to compel local agencies to comply with housing laws, in some cases including directing local agencies to approve housing development projects. (See Gov. Code § 65589.5(k).) In addition, the HAA authorizes courts to impose fines on local agencies that act in bad faith and/or fail to comply with court orders compelling compliance with housing laws and/or. (Id.) Effective January 1, 2026, AB 712 additionally creates substantial financial consequences for local agencies found by a court to have violated state housing laws. First, the agency must pay the applicant’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. (Gov. Code § 65914.2(b)(1).) Second, the agency is subject to fines under certain circumstances. If the Attorney General or the State Department of Housing and Community Development (“HCD”) warns the agency before litigation is filed that the agency’s actions would violate state housing law and the applicant gives notice before filing litigation, the court must impose a minimum fine of $10,000 per housing unit. (Gov. Code §§ 65914.2(b)(2)(A)(i); 65589.5).) Penalties are enhanced by a factor of five in jurisdictions with prior violations of the same law. (Gov. Code §§ 65914.2(b)(2)(A)(ii); 65589.5).) * * * City staff has determined that the Project application is complete and that the Project is statutorily exempt from CEQA and has completed its consistency review. The PSA requires the City to make a decision on the Project by April 4, 2025, and failure to do so would result in a deemed approval. Because the Project is consistent with objective standards and would not have “a specific, adverse impact upon the public health or safety,” the HAA prohibits the City from disapproving or reducing the density of the Project. Violation of any of these housing laws would expose the City to substantial financial consequences pursuant to AB 712. Margo SSradish Planning Commission February 12, 2026 Page 5 107942\19229684v6 We respectfully request that the Planning Commission, at its February 24, 2026, hearing, recommend that the City Council approve the Project on or before April 4, 2026, in accordance with applicable housing laws. Sincerely, Cox, Castle & Nicholson LLP Margo Bradish MNB CC: Floy Andrews, City Attorney Steve Bull, SummerHill Homes Austin Lin, SummerHill Homes City Council April 1, 2026 107942\19311643v5 Exhibit C Alternative Means Application & Approval D S T R E E T A S T R E E T B S T R E E T C S T R E E T E S T R E E T LI N D A V I S T A D R I V E (P U B L I C R O A D ) EVULICH COURT(PUBLIC ROAD) BLDG 6 BLDG 1 BLDG 2 BLDG 3 BLDG 4 BLDG 5 BLDG 7 BLDG 8 BLDG 9 BLDG 10 H:\3988-000\ACAD\EXHIBITS\XB-033_SETBACK SITE PLAN.DWG SETBACK SITE PLAN 10857 LINDA VISTA DRIVE CITY OF CUPERTINO SANTA CLARA COUNTY CALIFORNIA SCALE: 1" = 20'DATE: SEPTEMBER 15, 2025 6040200 CIVIL ENGINEERS SURVEYORS PLANNERS SAN RAMON WWW.CBANDG.COM ROSEVILLE (925) 866-0322 (916) 788-4456 LEGEND ABBREVIATIONS 38 1 . 0 7 8 10857 Linda Vista Drive Cupertino, CA September 15, 2025 3000 Executive Parkway, Suite 450 San Ramon, Ca 94583 650-857-0122 PROJECT DATA A08 WILDFIRE PROTECTION CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS BEING LOCATED IN A LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY AREA (LRA) VERY HIGH FIRE HAZARD SEVERITY ZONE. THE PROJECT SHALL BE CONSTRUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF CALIFORNIA RESIDENTIAL CODE SECTION R337, MATERIALS AND METHODS FOR EXTERIOR WILDFIRE EXPOSURE , AS FOLLOWS: 1. EXTERIOR WINDOWS AND EXTERIOR DOORS WITH GLAZING EXTERIOR WINDOWS AND EXTERIOR DOORS WITH GLAZING, SHALL BE CONSTRUCTED OF MULTI-PANE GLAZING WITH A MINIMUM OF ONE TEMPERED PANE. (C.R.C. R337.8.2.1) 2. EXTERIOR DOORS SHALL MEET ONE OF THE FOLLOWING (C.R.C. R337.8.3): A. THE EXTERIOR SURFACE OR CLADDING SHALL BE OF NON-COMBUSTIBLE OR IGNITION-RESISTANT MATERIAL. B. SHALL HAVE A FIRE-RESISTANCE RATING OF NOT LESS THAN 20 MIN. WHEN TESTED ACCORDING TO NFPA 252. SHALL BE TESTED TO MEET THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF SFM STANDARD 12-7A-1. 3. GARAGE DOORS SHALL RESIST THE INTRUSION OF EMBERS FROM ENTERING BY PREVENTING GAPS BETWEEN DOORS AND DOOR OPENINGS, AT HTE BOTTOM, SIDES, AND TOPS OF DOORS, FROM EXCEEDING 1/8". gAPS BETWEEN DOORS AND DOOR OPENINGS SHALL BE CONTROLLED BY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING METHODS: A. WEATHER STRIPPING PRODUCTS MADE OF MATERIALS THAT: (A) HAVE BEEN TESTED FOR TENSILE STRENGTH IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM D638 AFTER EXPOSURE TO ASTM G155 FOR A PERIOD OF 2,000 HOURS, WHERE THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE DIFFERENCE IN TENSILE STRENGTH VALUES BETWEEN EXPOSED AND NONEXPOSED SAMPLES DO NOT EXCEED 10% AND (B) EXHIBIT A V-2 OR BETTER FLAMMABILITY RATING WHEN TESTED TO UL 94. B. DOOR OVERLAPS ONTO JAMBS AND HEADERS. C. GARAGE DOOR JAMBS AND HEADERS COVERED WITH METAL FLASHING 4. VENTS SHALL RESIST BUILDING IGNITION FROM THE INTRUSION OF BURNING EMBERS AND FLAME THROUGH THE VENTILATION OPENINGS WITH THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS (C.R.C. R337.6) A. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE OPENINGS THEREIN SHALL BE A MIN. OF 1/16TH INCH AND SHALL NOT EXCEED 1/8TH INCH. B. THE MATERIALS SHALL BE INCOMBUSTIBLE C. THE MATERIALS USED SHALL BE CORROSION RESISTANT. 5. THE EXTERIOR WALL COVERING OR WALL ASSEMBLY SHALL COMPLY WITH ONE OF THE FOLLOWING C.R.C. R337.7.3: A. NONCOMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL. B. IGNITION- RESISTANT MATERIAL. C. SAWN LUMBER OR GLUE-LAMINATED WOOD WITH THE SMALLEST MINIMUM NOMINAL DIMENSION OF 4". SAWN OR GLUE-LAMINATED PLANKS SPLINED, TONGUE-AND-GROOVE, OR SET CLOSE TOGETHER AND WELL SPIKED. D. LOG WALL CONSTRUCTION. E. WALL ASSEMBLIES THAT HAVE BEEN TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TEST PROCEDURES FOR A 10-MINUTE DIRECT FLAME CONTACT EXPOSURE TEST SET FORTH IN ASTM E2707 WITH THE CONDITIONS OF ACCEPTANCE SHOWN IN SECTION R337.7.3.1. F. WALL ASSEMBLIES THAT MEET THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS CRITERIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TEST PROCEDURES FOR A 10-MINUTE DIRECT FLAME CONTACT EXPOSURE TEST SET FORTH IN SFM STANDARD 12-7A-1. EXCEPTIONS: ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SHALL BE DEEMED TO MEET THE ASSEMBLY PERFORMANCE CRITERIA AND INTENT OF THIS SECTION: A. ONE LAYER OF 5/8" TYPE X GYPSUM SHEATHING APPLIED BEHIND THE EXTERIOR COVERING OR CLADDING ON THE EXTERIOR SIDE OF THE FRAMING. B. THE EXTERIOR PORTION OF A 1-HOUR FIRE RESISTIVE EXTERIOR WALL ASSEMBLY DESIGNED FOR EXTERIOR FIRE EXPOSURE INCLUDING ASSEMBLIES USING GYPSUM PANEL AND SHEATHING PRODUCTS LISTED IN THE GYPSUM ASSOCIATION FIRE RESISTIVE FIRE DESIGN MANUAL. 6. DECKING SURFACES SHALL COMPLY WITH C.R.C. R337.9.3. THE WALKING SURFACE MATERIAL OF DECKS, PORCHES, BALCONY AND STAIRS SHALL BE CONSTRUCTED WITH ONE OF THE FOLLOWING MATERIALS: A. MATERIAL THAT COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION R337.9.4 WHEN TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BOTH ASTM E2632 AND ASTM E2726. B. IGNITION-RESISTANT MATERIAL THAT COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION R337.4.3 WHEN TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM E84 OR UL 723. C. MATERIAL THAT COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH SFM STANDARD 12-7A-4 AND SFM STANDARD 12-7A-5. D. EXTERIOR FIRE RETARDANT TREATED WOOD. E. NONCOMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL. F. ANY MATERIAL THAT COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF SFM STANDARD 12-7A-4A WHEN ATTACHED EXTERIOR WALL COVERING IS ALSO COMPOSED OF NONCOMBUSTIBLE OR IGNITION-RESISTANT MATERIAL. EXCEPTION: WALL MATERIAL MAY BE OF ANY MATERIAL THAT OTHERWISE COMPLIES WITH THIS CHAPTER WHEN THE DECKING SURFACE MATERIAL COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS ASTM E84 WITH A CLASS B FLAME SPREAD RATING. G. AY MATERIAL THAT COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION R337.9.5 WHEN TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM E2632 AND WHEN ATTACHED EXTERIOR WALL COVERING IS ALSO COMPOSED OF ONLY NONCOMBUSTIBLE OR IGNITION-RESISTANT MATERIALS. EXCEPTION: WALL MATERIAL SHALL BE PERMITTED TO BE OF ANY MATERIAL THAT OTHERWISE COMPLIES WITH THIS CHAPTER WHEN THE DECKING SURFACE MATERIAL COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS ASTM E84 WITH A CLASS B FLAME SPREAD INDEX. City Council April 1, 2026 107942\19311643v5 Exhibit D Fire Department Project Plans Approval 1 FIRE PREVENTION PLAN REVIEW COMMENTS PROJECT INFO: PREPARED BY: FIRE DEPT PLAN REVIEW #: NAME/TITLE: CITY/COUNTY PROJECT #: EMAIL: LOCATION: DATE: PROJECT NAME: The scope of this project includes the following: Proposed new 10 building 51 unit multi-family residential subdivision. Plans Status: Plans are APPROVED with conditions. Plan Review Comments **1. PRC 4290: This project shall comply with PRC 4290 comments. Exception request to PRC 4290 approved. Non-conforming setbacks to be mitigated through a combination of increased fire separation distance requirements and modified sprinklers systems. See approved Exception Request. **2. Provide a "Final Fire Protection Plan" at time of building permit submittal. The plan shall identify mitigation measures to address the project's specific wildfire risk and shall include the information required in CFC section 4903.2.1 including plan for maintenance of defensible space, access roads, and fire protection equipment. [CFC section 4903] 3. Fire Department Turnaround: Fire Department Standard Details and Specifications A-1 / D-1. Turnaround A to be installed. See sheet C6.0. 4. Fire Sprinklers Required: Approved automatic sprinkler systems in new and existing buildings and structures shall be provided in the locations described in this Section or in Sections 903.2.1 through 903.2.18. 5. Fire Hydrants Required: Hydrant(s) required within 600 feet of all proposed budlings. -New hydrants are shown on sheet C6. Hydrants shall be installed prior to combustible construction and the minimum fire flow shall be met. -Hydrant authorization shall be approved by San Jose Water. 251740 TM-2024-009 / ASA-2024-015 / TR- 2024-044 Caleb Flanagan Caleb.flanagan@sccfd.org 10857 Linda Vista Dr 1/27/26 Multi-family subdivision 2 6. Required Fire Flow: The fire flow for this project is 1,375 GPM at 20 psi residual pressure since an automatic fire sprinkler system will be installed. Note: The minimum required number and spacing of the hydrants shall be in accordance with CFC Table C102.1. Fire flow detailed on sheet C6. -Hydraulic analysis provided confirming minimum fire flow. 7. Ground ladder / Emergency Rescue Openings Required: Ground-ladder rescue from second and third floor rooms shall be made possible for fire department operations. Climbing angle of seventy-five degrees shall be demonstrated on the plans and maintained. Landscaping shall not be allowed to interfere with the required access (CFC Sec. 503 and 1031 NFPA 1932 Sec. 5.1.8 through 5.1.9.2). -Shown on sheet A22. 8. Buildings and Facilities Access / Fire Access Roadway: The fire apparatus access road shall comply with the requirements of this section and shall extend to within 200 feet of all portions of the facility and all portions of the exterior walls of the first story of the building as measured by an approved route around the exterior of the building or facility. [CFC, Section 503.1.1 and SCCFD A1 Standard]. 9. Fire Lane Identification Required: The minimum clear width of fire department access roads shall be 20 feet. Fire apparatus access roads shall be designated and marked as a fire lane as set forth in Section 22500.1 of the California Vehicle Code. -Noted on sheet C6. 10. All construction sites must comply with applicable provisions of the CFC Chapter 33 and our Standard Detail and Specification S1-7. Provide appropriate notations on subsequent plan submittals, as appropriate to the project. CFC Chp. 33. 11. Address identification: New and existing buildings shall have approved address numbers, building numbers or approved building identification placed in a position that is plainly legible and visible from the street or road fronting the property. These numbers shall contrast with their background. Where required by the fire code official, address numbers shall be provided in additional approved locations to facilitate emergency response. Address numbers shall be Arabic numbers or alphabetical letters. Numbers shall be a minimum of 6 inches (101.6 mm) high with a minimum stroke width of 0.5 inch (12.7 mm). Address numbers shall be maintained CFC Sec. 505.1. This review shall not be construed to be an approval of a violation of the provisions of the California Fire Code or of other laws or regulations of the jurisdiction. A permit presuming to give authority to violate or cancel the provisions of the fire code or other such laws or regulations shall not be valid. Any addition to or alteration of approved construction documents shall be approved in advance. [CFC, Ch. 1, 105.3.6] City Council April 1, 2026 107942\19311643v5 Exhibit E Fire Department Memorandum Page 1 of 2 TO: Cupertino City Officials FROM: Hector Estrada, Assistant Fire Chief SUBJECT: Housing Development - Linda Vista Drive As requested by City Manager Kapoor and in response to the questions from the Cupertino City Council, this supplemental staff report provides a summary of the process that led to the Santa Clara County Fire Department’s plan review comments on the Architectural and Site Approval Permit Application for the proposed subdivision at 10857 Linda Vista Drive. Background The Santa Clara County Fire Department (“County Fire”) provides fire safety plan review comments for land development in the City of Cupertino. Specifically, County Fire reviews Architectural and Site Approval Permit Applications for compliance with applicable state and local fire safety requirements related to site design.1 County Fire staff then prepares plan review comments and presents them to City officials to support the City’s decision to approve or deny an Architectural and Site Approval Permit Application. Summary In January 2026, County Fire staff provided plan review comments on the Architectural and Site Approval Permit Application for the proposed residential subdivision at 10857 Linda Vista Drive (ASA-2024-015) (the “Project” and the “Application”). Because the Project is located in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone, it is subject to the State Minimum Fire Safe Regulations (“Fire Safe Regulations”) (14 C.C.R. §§ 1270, et seq.), in addition to generally applicable fire safety requirements in the California Building Standards Code.2 The Fire Safe Regulations include an exception request process that allows projects to move forward even if they cannot meet specific site-design criteria.3 Specifically, the Fire Safe Regulations allow for the approval of exception requests on a case-by-case basis if the exception provides “the Same Practical Effect as these regulations towards providing Defensible Space.” (14 C.C.R. § 1270.07.)4 The Application includes a Same Practical Effect exception request for the thirty-foot setbacks required by Section 1276.01 of the Fire Safe Regulations. The applicant proposed the following measures to support the exception request: (1) Non-combustible material extending five feet horizontally around the buildings. (2) Wildfire home hardening protective measures, including but not limited to a Class A roof, non-combustible exterior building material, protected eave vents, and double paned tempered glass. 1 At the building permit phase, County Fire reviews building permit applica:ons for compliance with addi:onal fire safety requirements, including those related to construc:on. 2 Public Resources Code Sec:on 4290 addresses the applicability of the Fire Safe Regula:ons in Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones. 3 The process and standards for approving Same Prac:cal Effect excep:on requests in the Fire Safe Regula:ons are dis:nct from the process and standards for approving for Alternate Materials and Methods Requests (AMMR) in the California Building Standards Code. 4 The Fire Safe Regula:ons define “Same Prac:cal Effect” as “an Excep:on or alterna:ve with the capability of applying accepted wildland fire suppression strategies and tac:cs, and provisions for fire fighter safety, including: (1) access for emergency wildland fire equipment, (2) safe civilian evacua:on, (3) signing that avoids delays in emergency equipment response, (4) available and accessible water to effec:vely aWack Wildfire or defend a Structure from Wildfire, and (5) fuel modifica:on sufficient for civilian and fire fighter safety.” (14 C.C.R. § 1270.01(aa).) Page 2 of 2 (3) Exterior fire sprinkler heads protecting covered porches and decks that are within thirty feet of the property line. (4) Fire resistance rated exterior elements within thirty feet of the property lines including: a. Exterior Walls - Fire resistance rated for one hour. b. Projections (portions of the building protruding beyond exterior walls) - Fire resistance rated for one hour. c. Penetrations (e.g., mechanical, electrical, plumbing services) - Protected to maintain fire resistance rated assemblies. Section 1276.01 of the Fire Safe Regulations provides guidance on exception requests related to the thirty-foot setback requirement: A reduction in the minimum setback shall be based upon practical reasons, which may include but are not limited to, parcel dimensions or size, topographic limitations, Development density requirements or other Development patterns that promote low- carbon emission outcomes; sensitive habitat; or other site constraints, and shall provide for an alternative method to reduce Structure-to-Structure ignition by incorporating features such as, but not limited to: (1) non-combustible block walls or fences; or (2) non-combustible material extending five (5) feet horizontally from the furthest extent of the Building; or (3) hardscape landscaping; or (4) a reduction of exposed windows on the side of the Structure with a less than thirty (30) foot setback; or (5) the most protective requirements in the California Building Code, California Code of Regulations Title 24, Part 2, Chapter 7A, as required by the Local Jurisdiction. (14 C.C.R. § 1276.01(b).) Based on our analysis of the site and the combined impact of the measures proposed in the exception request, County Fire staff determined that these measures provide appropriate alternative methods to reduce the risk of structure-to-structure ignition, and County Fire approved the Same Practical Effect exception request for the Application. The Project includes two of the five measures identified in Section 1276.01 as alternative methods to reduce the risk of structure-to-structure ignition and two additional measures: exterior sprinklers and increased fire resistive rated exterior elements. Analyzing these measures based on accepted wildland fire suppression strategies and tactics and provisions for firefighter safety, County Fire staff determined that the exception request provided appropriate access for emergency wildland fire equipment and safe civilian evacuation and that the exception request included fuel modification sufficient for civilian and firefighter safety. County Fire memorialized its approval of the exception request in its January 7 and January 27 plan review comments, which have been presented to the City Planning Commission and City Council. County Fire’s plan review comments also notified the applicant that they will need to submit a final fire protection plan, onsite fire hydrant design specifications, and a construction site safety plan as part of their building permit application. From:Kitty Moore To:City Clerk; Lauren Sapudar Subject:Written Communications Item 3 Evulich/Summerhill Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 3:17:59 PM Attachments:image.png image.png Circulation Plan A06 Private Walkway.pdf Fire Access Evulich - Combined Plan Set-2.pdf Vesting Tentative Evulich.pdf Dear City Clerk, Please include the following and attachments as written communications for Item 3: There is some confusion as to the Vesting Tentative Map Note 21: Evulich Ct. ROW is owned by the City of Cupertino. However, Note 21 and the Circulation Plan indicate that onsite streets are to be private and privately maintained with the Circulation Plan showing the sidewalk on City of Cupertino Public Right of Way as a private walkway. Thank you, Kitty Moore Kitty Moore Mayor City Council KMoore@cupertino.gov (408) 777-1389 From:Gauri Dwivedi To:City Council; City Clerk Subject:Evulich CT Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 3:00:23 PM CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. I am against construction of summer hill homes on Evulich court due to fire hazard. There are three school nearby and these roads are already blocked during weekdays. More homes/traffic would be a safety hazard Gauri Dwivedi Chadwick place Sent from my iPhone SA N T A C L A R A C O U N T Y F I R E T R U C K SANTA CLARA COUNTY FIRE TRUCK LI N D A V I S T A D R I V E (P U B L I C R O A D ) EVULICH CT.(PUBLIC ROAD) A S T R E E T D S T R E E T E S T R E E T C S T R E E T B S T R E E T BLDG 6 BLDG 1 BLDG 2 BLDG 3 BLDG 4 BLDG 5 BLDG 7 BLDG 8 BLDG 9 BLDG 10 10857 LINDA VISTA DRIVE Cupertino, CA January 12, 2026 3000 Executive Parkway, Suite 450 San Ramon, Ca 94583 650-857-0122 GRAPHIC SCALE 1" = 20' 0'40'20'10'20'0' PRELIMINARY FIRE ACCESS PLAN C6.0 LEGEND: NOTE SANTA CLARA COUNTY FIRE TRUCK BUILDING FIRE FLOW: 1,875 GPM · · · LI N D A V I S T A D R I V E (P U B L I C R O A D ) EVULICH CT.(PUBLIC ROAD) LOT 6 LOT 1 LOT 2 LOT 3 LOT 4 LOT 5 LOT 7 LOT 8 LOT 9 LOT 10 PARCEL A PARCEL B PARCEL C PARCEL EPARCEL D 10857 LINDA VISTA DRIVE Cupertino, CA January 12, 2026 3000 Executive Parkway, Suite 450 San Ramon, Ca 94583 650-857-0122 GRAPHIC SCALE 1" = 30' 0'60'30'15'30'0' VESTING TENTATIVE MAP FOR CONDOMINIUM PURPOSES TM1.0 CONTACTS VICINITY MAP LEGEND GENERAL NOTES SHEET INDEX SHEET NO.DESCRIPTION SITE TRACT NO. _________ From:DerChang Kau To:City Clerk Cc:Alice Lin Subject:Presentation slides for April 1 City Council Meeting, Agenda #3. Evulich Ct. Project Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 2:31:37 PM Attachments:20260401 Wildfire Evac on City Council Hearing.pptx CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear City Clark , Attached is the presentation slide deck "220260401 Wildfire Evac on City Council Hearing.pptx”. The presentation slides will be used for oral comment to Agenda #3 of today’s City Council meeting. The presenters are DerChang Kau and 4 residents of Cupertino. Thank you DerChang Kau WILDFIRE EVACUATION IN VHFHSZ ON THE TOP OF ACTIVE FAULT 1. FROM ACKNOWLEDGING RISK TO AVOIDING RESPONSIBILITY 2. PROTECT THE PUBLIC. REJECT SUMMERHILL’S MISLEADING FICTION. 3. R3 ZONING ON LINDA VISTA CORRIDOR TRIGGERS WILDFIRE EVAC FAILURE . DerChang Kau and on behalf of many Cupertino Residents Prepared for Cupertino City Council Public Hearing, Apr 1, 2026 10350 Torre Avenue, Cupertino, CA Evulich Ct Fire Hazard Severity Zone maps Fault Activity Map of California Evulich Ct. Monta Vista- Shannon Fault Mw 6.5~7.1 CEQA Triggers The big Q: is there a 'specific, adverse impact on public safety' [1] – FROM ACKNOWLEDGING RISK TO AVOIDING RESPONSIBILITY How SummerHill Homes architects "Evacuation Fiction" at Evulich Ct Flawed metric erase neighbors from survival map Architect Fiction 02/26/25Exploit Loophole 10/16/25Baseline 03/24/25 Evulich Ct Designated Evulich Ct as VHFHSZ Acknowledgement 10/10/25 Bull acknowledges the need for an evac route assessment City provides “AB 130 Legal Hook” to bypass peer- reviewed safety scrutiny Ignore Warning 01/15/26 Good-faith meeting held. 90+ min evac risk data shared with SH leadership team Avoidance by Design – Structure Hardening for Evac Egress??? 03/17/26 Hughes clearly states code-compliant doesn’t imply eliminating all hazards and risks SUMMERHILL HOMES BUILT A NARRATIVE, NOT BUILT HOMES WITH A SAFETY PLAN What has happened to one of the most reputable developers in Bay Area [2] – EVACUATION FICTION VS. FACT SummerHill Funded Study – Hexagon Transportation Consultants, Inc. vs. City Commissioned Expert – Fehr & Peers Local – A typical school day afternoon pickup periods and short-term curbside parking severely reduce effective capacity 77 Pictures Taken @ 1:47pm March 17, 2026 Highway – Northbound Highway 85 traffic before Fremont Avenue exit on a Wednesday morning commute Courtesy of Karl Mondon/Bay Area News Group One Neighborhood, Two Completely Different Assessment A 200% capacity failure means vehicles are trapped in gridlock. The developer completely ignores the reality of the community. 8 Hexagon’s Claim (Developer) 2 min adder to 59 min baseline Fehr&Peers’ Reality (City) Catastrophic 2X of capacity Excluded Populations & Flawed Metrics 9 Hexagon (Developer)Fehr & Peers (City) Volume Capacity 2700 vph 570 vph Protect the Public. Reject the Fiction. Reject Developer-Funded Fiction Mandate Independent Expertise Prioritize Evacuation Survival 10 We cannot plan our survival based on a developer's spreadsheet that erases our children from the map. Demand data–driven safety today [3] – THE PHYSICS OF ENTRAPMENT & THE CONSEQUENCE OF WILDFIRE IN VHFHSZ Why R3 Zoning on Linda Vista Corridor Triggers a 93+ minutes Wildfire Evacuation Failure Two Methodologies, Two Vastly Different Consequences Hexagon Myth: Static Transportation Metric: Vehicle Miles Traveled Linda Vista Reality: Dynamic Transient Metric: Total Clearance Time 12 Capacity degrades to just 1/6 of ideal capacity. R3 density triggers a state change. Spine and Rib Power Failure, Smoke, Fire Engines, Force Merge Evulich Ct – The 30-Minute Survival Window Under Diablo wind conditions, fire spreads at 200 feet per minute. This means any spark within a 1.1-mile radius reaches Evulich Ct in 30 minutes or less Nearly the entire local Fire Hazard Severity Zone falls within this 30- minute strike distance 13 1.1miles/30min radius Any wildfire in this FHSZ will spread to Evulich Ct. in 30 minutes or less Non-Linear “Delay” subject to V/C 14 Traffic delay is not linear V/C < 1.0 : adding cars adds delay incrementally V/C > 1.0 : System oversaturation drives exponential delay Evulich Ct Evulich Ct Linda Vista Dr Linda Vista Dr The Entrapment Reality: ASET vs. RSET 15 Variable Current*Planned* Preparation 20 20 Clearance Time 6.5 73.5+ Evacuation time (RSET)26.5 93.5 Survival Window (ASET)30 30 THE GAP None 63.5 The proposed housing development triples the non-survivable windows. The last 10% of cars and anyone stuck behind them will not escape! *: in minutes 16 Courtesy of Keith Mizuguchi/KQED Courtesy of Aaron Samson via AP Foothill Corridor (local) Evacuation – Cumulative evacuation. Palisades Fire , Jan. 7, 2025 Arterial Evacuation – Palisades Fire, Jan. 7, 2025 Wildfire outruns an over-saturated evacuation – Lahaina wildfire, Aug 8, 2023 Courtesy of Office of Gov. Josh Green It’s more than just a NUMBER City Staff Report Page 8 – “The city does not have any adopted standard” Please don’t take the insult! It’s more than needing a legal hook to mandate such a study. It’s your moral obligation, your honesty, intellectual honesty and most of all, it’s your compassion, your love of the City. You are about making a decision with with Life-and-Death Consequences. You cannot ignore this! You cannot dismiss your own expert study from Fehr and Peers! Before approving it, you are required to conduct a full CEQA review and adopt a mitigation plan 17 THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION PLEASE VOTE NO 18 20 ..it happened Wildfire in Hills above Linda Vista Stevens Fire started Aug 30, 2007, 151 acres 3 days to contain. From:Liang Chao To:City Clerk Subject:Fw: Linda Vista - Supplemental Information Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 2:27:02 PM Attachments:image001.png Linda Vista - Q & A summary FINAL.pdf Please enter this into the written communication for the April 1 meeting. Liang Chao Vice Mayor City Council LChao@cupertino.gov 408-777-3192 From: Bull, Steve <SBull@shhomes.com> Sent: Wednesday, April 1, 2026 11:05 AM To: Liang Chao <lchao@cupertino.gov> Cc: Ebrahimi, Kevin <KEbrahimi@shhomes.com>; Lin, Austin <ALin@shhomes.com>; Matt Larson <matt@matt-larson.com> Subject: RE: Linda Vista - Supplemental Information CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Vice Mayor Chao – I meant to include the attached Question & Answer Summary, too. Thank you, Steve Steven Bull Vice President of Development SummerHill Homes 6101 Bollinger Canyon Road, Suite 425, San Ramon, CA 94583 Mobile (510) 410-1188 sbull@shhomes.com / SummerHillHomes.com All subject matter contained in this email is confidential and proprietary to SummerHill Homes/SummerHill Apartment Communities and should notbe disclosed to any person not listed as an original recipient. SummerHill Homes/ SummerHill Apartment Communities. All rights reserved. From: Bull, Steve Sent: Wednesday, April 1, 2026 10:44 AM To: lchao@cupertino.gov Cc: Ebrahimi, Kevin <KEbrahimi@shhomes.com>; Lin, Austin <ALin@shhomes.com>; Matt Larson <matt@matt-larson.com> Subject: FW: Linda Vista - Supplemental Information Dear Vice Mayor Chao: We’re writing to provide you with supplemental information regarding our application for the Linda Vista project (a.k.a. Evulich Court). We had previously submitted some of this information to Staff in advance of the March 17, 2026 Hearing. The information is included within the Written Comment section of the Staff Report package. To ensure that you are able to review the information, we’re also sending it directly to you. Please find the following information attached: 1. 2-Story Units – Proposed Site Plan and Conditions of Approval 2. Evacuation Analysis – Analysis and Cover Email sent on March 17, 2026 3. Cox Castle Response Letter - dated April 1, 2026 4. Fire Department memo – Included within March 30, 2026 Written Communications Please let us know if you have any questions. Thank you, Steve Steven Bull Vice President of Development SummerHill Homes 6101 Bollinger Canyon Road, Suite 425, San Ramon, CA 94583 Mobile (510) 410-1188 sbull@shhomes.com / SummerHillHomes.com All subject matter contained in this email is confidential and proprietary to SummerHill Homes/SummerHill Apartment Communities and should notbe disclosed to any person not listed as an original recipient. SummerHill Homes/ SummerHill Apartment Communities. All rights reserved. Linda Vista Project Questions & Answer Summary April 1, 2026 City Council Hearing The below summary is intended to respond to questions from the Councilmembers and community members. The responses to questions are organized as follows: Section 1: Fire Safety / Code Compliance Section 2: Evacuation / Emergency Access Section 3: AB130 / CEQA Exemption Section 4: Legal Standard (Housing Accountability Act (HAA) / Subdivision Map Act) Section 5: Miscellaneous Questions Exhibit 1: HCD Letter of Technical Assistance Section 1: Fire Safety / Code Compliance Question 1: Does the project comply with Fire Code requirements? Answer: Yes, the Santa Clara County Fire Department (SCCFD) reviewed the project and approved it with conditions. As part of its review, SCCFD confirmed compliance with the applicable Fire Code requirements and mitigation measures. The review also confirmed compliance with the requirements of new construction in a Very High Fire Hazard Zone including Public Resources Code Sections 4290 (PRC 4290) and 51182 (PRC 51182) and Chapter 7A of the Building Code. Public Resources Code Sections 4291 and 51182 address “defensible space” surrounding structures based on the combustibility of materials surrounding the structure, but generally not beyond the property line. Based on its location in a Local Responsibility Area (LRA), Section 51182 is applicable to the Project. Among other applicable Fire Safety measures, the review confirmed compliance for emergency vehicle access and turnaround, ground ladder access, fire flow and fire hydrant spacing, and eave heights. The review also included the approval of a reduction of the 30’ setback requirement in accordance with the regulations implementing PRC 4290 as further described in the response to Question #2. The conditions issued by the SCCFD will be complied with as part of the building permit review process. Question 2: Is the project unsafe due to a reduction of the 30’ setback required by PRC 4290 Linda Vista April 1, 2026 City Council Meeting Questions and Answers Page 2 of 9 -2- Answer: No, the SCCFD approved a reduction of the 30’ setback to the property line in accordance with the regulations implementing PRC 4290 and through an Alternative Materials and Methods request (AMMR). SCCFD confirmed that the design achieves an equivalent level of safety (same practical effect). PRC 4290 requires the adoption of fire safety regulations in Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones. Those regulations are in the California Code of Regulations Title 14, Division 1.5, Chapter 7, Subchapter 2, Article 5, Section 1276.01 – Building and Parcel Siting and Setbacks (Section 1276.01). Section (b) of Section 1276.01 expressly allows reductions of the 30’ setback due to practical reasons such as density and other site constraints if alternative measures to reduce Structure-to-Structure ignition are incorporated. Section (b) of Title 14 lists several potential (but not limited to) measures that can be incorporated as mitigation. SummerHill Homes applied for an AMMR to the Santa Clara County Fire Department to formally document a reduction of the setback from 30’ to 20’ at the western property line and from 30’ to 10’ at the northern and southern property lines. The AMMR application included added fire sprinklers, non-combustible landscape within 5’ of the homes, and increased fire rating of the exterior walls to mitigate the reduced setbacks. The Santa Clara County Fire Department reviewed and approved the AMMR. Please note that the AMMR was signed only by the Fire Department because the setback requirement it addresses is a Fire Code compliance item. The Building Department review will be conducted during the building permitting process to confirm the mitigation measures have been incorporated into the Construction Documents for the building construction. Question 3: Is the project subject to different standards compared to other projects? Answer: No, the project is not subject to different standards compared to other projects. Testimony from Fire Chief Brad Fox of the SCCFD during the February 17, 2026 Planning Commission Hearing explained that the SCCFD measures the requirements the same from project to project. Chief Fox explained that the standards for Aerial Access, Roadway Widths, Ladder Pads, Eave Heights, etc. are the same from project to project. In response to further questions from the Planning Commissioners, Linda Vista April 1, 2026 City Council Meeting Questions and Answers Page 3 of 9 -3- Chief Fox also explained that SCCFD has reviewed other projects within Very High Fire Hazard Zones (VHFHZ) within its jurisdiction and applied the requirements of PRC 4290 consistently. Section 2: Evacuation / Emergency Access Question 4: Does the project require a project-specific evacuation study? Answer: No, the City does not have a requirement for a project specific evacuation analysis and has not adopted objective standards governing evacuation safety. Evacuation is addressed at the General Plan / Housing Element level. The City does not have an Ordinance, Code, or Policy requiring Evacuation modeling for individual projects or establishing objective standards for evacuation safety. Therefore, evacuation safety cannot be used as a basis for denial or reduction in density of the project. SummerHill Homes did commission an Evacuation Analysis by Hexagon Transportation Consultants (Hexagon), which was submitted to the City on March 17, 2026. The Evacuation Analysis was prepared for internal purposes for SummerHill to understand the evacuation context of the project site. The Hexagon Evacuation Analysis noted that the residents of Linda Vista Drive have multiple egress routes from the neighborhood beyond the single route identified in a study submitted by an adjacent homeowner. The Hexagon Evacuation Analysis also noted that the number of homes within the proposed project would constitute approximately 3.6% of the total number of homes within the vicinity that use the same egress routes and that the potential impact to evacuation times could be increased by a similar 3.6% amount, which the Hexagon analysis estimated to be approximately 2 minutes. Question 5: Can the Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment prepared by Fehr & Peers commissioned by the City be used as a basis for denying the project? Answer: No, the City commissioned the Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment as part of its ongoing update of its General Plan Health & Safety Element. The City has not adopted the Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment or any objective evacuation standards. Section 1.2 of the Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment states that it is a Planning level analysis, should not be considered an evacuation plan, cannot guarantee the efficacy of information used in the assessment, cannot provide system adequacy guarantees, and there is no established standard methodology. Therefore, the Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment cannot be used as a basis for denial or reduction in density of the project. Linda Vista April 1, 2026 City Council Meeting Questions and Answers Page 4 of 9 -4- As an example, the Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment concludes that under certain scenarios, some of the potential evacuation routes in the City would be over capacity in a one-hour evacuation. However, the City does not have an objective standard establishing a one-hour (or any other time period) evacuation criterion. As an example, the capacity ratios of the roads would be further exceeded if a shorter duration such as 30 minutes was used as the evacuation criterion. Conversely, the potential evacuation routes could be determined to be below capacity if a longer duration such as 2 hours was used as the evacuation criterion. Question 6: Does the Fehr & Peers evacuation study constitute “substantial evidence” requiring denial under the Subdivision Map Act? Answer: No, the Fehr & Peers Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment does not constitute “substantial evidence” requiring denial under the Subdivision Map Act. The Subdivision Map Act requires denial of a subdivision where the design is likely to cause “serious public health problems.” The Fire Department’s approval of the AMMR, the testimony of Chief Fox, and the Hexagon Evacuation Analysis constitute substantial evidence that the project would not cause such problems. Section 1.2 of the Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment describes its limitations as a “Planning level” assessment that is not based upon any “established standard methodology” and cannot guarantee the efficacy of the information. The Assessment does not evaluate the Project’s impact nor does it establish a defined threshold for safety failure. The Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment assesses existing conditions and does not identify any health problems that would be caused by the project. The generalized analysis in the Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment does not constitute substantial evidence of a project-specific public health issue. Also see Answer to Question 12. Question 7: Why doesn’t the project include more than one egress route? Answer: The number of units within the project is below the SCCFD requirement that would trigger the need for a second egress route. Section IV.B of the SCCFD Standard Details for Fire Department Apparatus Access states that Multi- Family Residential Developments (R-1 & R-2 Occupancies) having more than 100 units shall be provided with two separate approved fire apparatus roads that comply with the requirements listed in this standard. The project includes 51 units. Question 8: Why is the width of Evulich Court reduced? Linda Vista April 1, 2026 City Council Meeting Questions and Answers Page 5 of 9 -5- Answer: The reduced width at the intersection is to provide a visual enhancement to the Linda Vista streetscape, to provide area to naturally treat the stormwater runoff from the public street pavement, and to improve the pedestrian experience on Linda Vista Drive by shortening the intersection crossing distance at Evulich Court. The pavement width of Evulich Court is reduced at the short segment adjacent to the intersection with Linda Vista Drive. A clear roadway width of 20’ is maintained through this segment in accordance with Section II.A of the SCCFD Standard Details for Fire Department Apparatus Access. The roadway width for the remainder of Evulich Court will be 36’ wide to accommodate a clear 20’ roadway and two 8’ parking lanes, one on each side. There will be no parking permitted at the 20’ roadway segment. The reduced width at the intersection is consistent with the City of Cupertino General Plan Goal M-3 and associated policies to support a safe pedestrian and bicycle network for people of all ages and abilities. Section 3: AB130 / CEQA Exemption Question 9: Is the project eligible for the AB130 CEQA Exemption if it’s located within a Very High Fire Hazard Zone? Answer: Yes, AB130 includes provisions for projects within Very High Fire Hazard Zones. Public Resources Code Section 21080.66 (codified as Section 59 of AB 130) (the “AB 130 CEQA Exemption“) includes a number of site-specific criteria applicable to sites seeking to use the AB 130 CEQA Exemption, including, among other things, satisfying the requirements of Government Code Section 65913.4(a)(6). As applicable to the Project, Section 65913.4(a)(6)(D) provides that the AB 130 CEQA Exemption generally does not apply to sites that are “Within a very high fire hazard severity zone, as determined by the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection pursuant to Section 51178, or within the state responsibility area, as defined in Section 4102 of the Public Resources Code.” This exclusion, however, does not apply if certain conditions are met. Specifically, the AB 130 CEQA Exemption provides the following regarding the exclusion: This subparagraph [i.e., the exclusion] does not apply to sites that have adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development, including, but not limited to, standards established under all of the following or their successor provisions: (i) Section 4291 of the Public Resources Code or Section 51182, as applicable. Linda Vista April 1, 2026 City Council Meeting Questions and Answers Page 6 of 9 -6- (ii) Section 4290 of the Public Resources Code. (iii) Chapter 7A of the California Building Code (Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations).” (Gov. Code § 65913.4(a)(6)(D) (emphasis added).) Importantly, this exception to the general exclusion provides that the exclusion does not apply to sites “that have adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards,” with the balance of the text being explanatory of this general requirement. Notably, the listed standards apply as a matter of law to all projects in VHFHSZ, regardless of the use of AB 130. As part of the standard building permit review process for all projects in VHFHSZ, building and fire staff routinely verify compliance with these requirements as a prerequisite to the issuance of building permits and inspection approvals. Projects in VHFHSZ cannot receive building permits or inspection approvals until the applicable requirements are met. In accordance with CEQA case law, cities routinely rely on a project’s compliance with applicable law as a manner of demonstrating compliance with CEQA. While SummerHill has substantially advanced its demonstration of compliance with the code requirements noted by AB 130 ahead of the required building permit process to be responsive to community concerns, the obligation to comply with these laws, as confirmed at the building permit stage, is itself sufficient to demonstrate CEQA compliance. The AB130 site criteria include requirements that sites within a Very High Fire Hazard severity zone be subject to mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development, including standards established under Public Resources Code (PRC) Sections 4290 and either 4291 or 51182 (regarding defensible space), and Chapter 7A of the Building Code (regarding materials and construction measures). (PRC Section 21080.66(a)(6); Government Code Section 65913.4(a)(6)(D)). As part of the AB130 process, SCCFD confirmed that the project complies with Section 4290. Compliance with Chapter 7A will be confirmed as part of the standard plan check and inspection process, and is a prerequisite to issuance of a building permit and inspection approval. Question 10: Do other jurisdictions allow projects in Very High Fire Hazard severity zones? Yes. Please see the attached Letter of Technical Assistance from the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) provided to the City of Jurupa Valley, California, which provides the same clarification as the response to Question 9 above. Section 4: Legal Standard (HAA / SMA) Question 11: Can the City deny the project based upon Health & Safety concerns? Linda Vista April 1, 2026 City Council Meeting Questions and Answers Page 7 of 9 -7- Answer: No, the City does not have a basis on which to deny the project. When a housing development project meets applicable, objective standards, the HAA prohibits a local agency from disapproving or reducing the density of the project absent findings based on the preponderance of evidence, that the project would have “a specific, adverse impact upon the public health or safety” absent such disapproval or lower density, and that there is no feasible method to avoid or mitigate that impact other than disapproval or a reduction density. (Government Code Section 65589.5(j)(1).) The HAA defines a “specific, adverse impact” as “a significant, quantifiable, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, identified written health or safety standards, policies, or conditions as they existing on the date the application was deemed complete.” (Id) City staff has determined that the Project application is complete and that the project is statutorily exempt from CEQA and has completed its consistency review. Because the Project is consistent with objective standards and would not have “a specific, adverse impact upon the public health or safety,” the HAA prohibits the City from disapproving or reducing the density of the Project. Violation of any of these housing laws would expose the City to substantial financial consequences pursuant to AB 712. Section 5: Miscellaneous Questions Question 12: Regarding “E – AB 130 CEQA Exemption Memo.pdf”, it recognizes that AB 130 exemption requires “Most of the project site is located within a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone”. Thus, the project does not qualify for AB 130 exemption unless the “sites that have adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development.” Where are the previously “adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards of state fire mitigation measures” to allow AB 130 exemption for this site?” Answer: The applicable codes are: • Section 4291 of the Public Resources Code or Section 51182, as applicable. • Section 4290 of the Public Resources Code. • Chapter 7A of the California Building Code (Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations) Though AB130 is not contingent upon it, the City has adopted these Codes with its adoptions of the California Building and Fire Codes as described within Sections 16.04.010 and 16.40.010 of the Cupertino Municipal Code. Question 13: All units of the project include 4-bedroom units “with individual units ranging in size from 2,356 square feet to 2,779 square feet.” Is there any requirement to mandate the large square footage per unit as this site? Or is it a design choice? Linda Vista April 1, 2026 City Council Meeting Questions and Answers Page 8 of 9 -8- Answer: As a clarification, the home sizes are as follows: • Plan 1 = 1,777 square feet of living space + 579 square foot garage • Plan 2 = 2,217 square feet of living space + 469 square foot garage • Plan 3 = 2,317 square feet of living space + 447 square foot garage The living space (or habitable space) is what is quoted as “sellable area” within the real estate industry. The existing homes surrounding the project are also measured in the same manner. Question 14: Is the Project ineligible for AB 130 because the City has not adopted a separate wildfire mitigation “framework” for VHFHSZ areas? Answer: No, AB130 does not include such a requirement. Question 15: Does the use of an Alternative Materials and Methods request (AMMR) mean the Project relies on discretionary approvals and therefore cannot qualify under AB130? Answer: No, the use of an AMMR does not mean the project cannot qualify under AB130. Alternative Means falls within the statutory language of Section 65913.4(a)(6)(D), as referenced in the AB 130 CEQA Exemption. There is no requirement in AB 130 that a project not require discretionary approvals. See Answers to Questions 2 and 9. Question 16: Why does the AMMR include an asterisk that allows windows to remain within the 30’ setback? Answer: In accordance with subsection (b) of Section 1276.01 and as discussed in the response to Question #2 above, SCCFD approved the AMMR because the proposed mitigation measures will provide the same practical effect as the 30’ setback. Please note the applicable California Residential Code (CRC) Table R302.1(2) allows unlimited windows to within 3’ of the property line. The building setback is 10’, therefore allowing windows. The alternative measures of the AMMR include design measure options for stricter separation requirements of Table R302.1(2) that would allow setbacks as small as 3’ or 0’ in the case of the walls, which are less than the 10’ setbacks provided by the project. Chief Brad Fox of SCCFD stated during the February 24, 2026 Planning Commission Hearing that in combination of active and passive fire protection measures and all of the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) requirements that the structures will be resilient to wildfire. Please note that the exterior windows will be constructed of multi-pane glazing with a minimum of one tempered pane in accordance with CRC Section R337.8.2.1 as required within a Very High Fire Hazard Zone. Linda Vista April 1, 2026 City Council Meeting Questions and Answers Page 9 of 9 -9- Question 17: Does the Fehr & Peers evacuation study become an “objective standard” simply because if was prepared by the City’s consultant? Answer: No, the Fehr & Peers study is neither objective nor a standard. Objective standards must involve subjective judgment and be based on a uniform, published criterion. The Fehr & Peers study reflects Fehr & Peer’s subjective judgment and is not based on uniform, public criterion regarding evacuation. . The Fehr & Peers Evacuation Capacity Assessment is informational and not adopted as a regulatory standard. Question 18: Can the City rely on an unpublished or unadopted standard to deny a project under the Housing Accountability Act (HAA)? Answer: No, the HAA requires the use of pre-existing, objective standards. The City may not apply new or ad hoc criteria, nor rely upon subjective studies not adopted as standards. Denial must be based upon uniform, objective criteria in effect at the time of the preliminary application. Exhibit 1 Letter of Technical Assistance California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) City of Jurupa Valley, California June 24, 2022 STATE OF CALIFORNIA - BUSINESS, CONSUMER SERVICES AND HOUSING AGENCY GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIVISION OF HOUSING POLICY DEVELOPMENT 2020 W. El Camino Avenue, Suite 500 Sacramento, CA 95833 (916) 263-2911 / FAX (916) 263-7453 www.hcd.ca.gov June 24, 2022 Jose Perez, Director Community Development Department 8930 Limonite Avenue Jurupa Valley, CA 92509 RE: Camino Terrace Apartments – Letter of Technical Assistance Dear Jose Perez: The California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) received a request for technical assistance regarding the Camino Terrace Apartments (Project). HCD is aware of a recent determination by the City of Jurupa Valley (City) that the Project does not qualify for the Streamlined Ministerial Approval Process created by Senate Bill (SB) 35 (Chapter 366, Statutes of 2017) and codified in Government Code section 65913.4. The purpose of this letter is to provide technical assistance related to the Streamlined Ministerial Approval Process. HCD recognizes the challenge of interpreting ever-changing housing and land-use laws and appreciates the opportunity to provide technical assistance that may lead to better housing outcomes for California, as well as the City. HCD’s Understanding of the Project HCD understands the Project is proposed to consist of 80 units with a mix of 20 one- bedroom units, 38 two-bedroom units and 22 three-bedroom units. The affordability levels will be between 30 percent and 60 percent of area median income (AMI) with an average of approximately 50 percent of AMI. To comply with the requirements of the California Debt Limit Allocation Committee (CDLAC) program and Multifamily Housing Program (MHP), most of the units will be at 30 percent of AMI. The Project will incorporate a community building with indoor common area spaces for the property management company and spaces for resident services and social interaction. The Project will also have appropriate outdoor common area spaces for passive and active recreation. An application under the Streamlined Ministerial Approval Process (SB 35 Application) was submitted for the Project on February 18, 2022. Statutory Exclusion of Sites within a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone Government Code section 65913.4, subdivision (a), is broken into paragraphs that describe the eligibility requirements for a project to qualify for Streamlined Ministerial Approval Processing. Paragraph (6) enumerates a list of site characteristics that would exclude a site from eligibility from Streamlined Ministerial Approval Processing, and subparagraph (D) identifies the exclusion based on location in a “very high fire hazard severity zone” (VHFHSZ). The exact language is: Jose Perez, Director Page 2 Within a very high fire hazard severity zone, as determined by the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection pursuant to Section 51178, or within a high or very high fire hazard severity zone as indicated on maps adopted by the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection pursuant to Section 4202 of the Public Resources Code. This subparagraph does not apply to sites excluded from the specified hazard zones by a local agency, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 51179, or sites that have adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development. (Gov. Code, § 65913.4, subd. (a)(6)(D); emphasis added.) HCD understands the City determined the Project did not qualify for the Streamlined Ministerial Approval Process based on its location in a VHFHSZ. However, subparagraph (D) does not apply to “sites that have adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development.” Applicable Building Standards and State Fire Mitigation Measures There are existing building standards and state fire mitigation measures applicable to this development. In consultation with the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE), HCD has confirmed that this project must conform with standards set forth in the Chapter 7A of the California Building Code (CBC), Chapter 49 of the California Fire Code (CFC), and the Minimum Fire Safe Regulations in the Public Resources Code Section 4290 (14 CCR 1270 et seq.). These codes have all been updated since the passage of SB 35 in 2017 to establish and/or strengthen development standards that govern residential development within Fire Hazard Severity Zones and Wildland-Urban Interface Fire Areas. Both CBC Chapter 7A and CFC Chapter 49 require compliance with the requirements for defensible space and building in wildfire prone areas of Government Code sections 51175 through 51189. Given the foregoing, the Project’s location in a VHFHSZ does not preclude the Project from eligibility for Streamlined Ministerial Approval Processing. Additionally, HCD is aware that a Fire Protection Plan has been prepared for the Project and will be submitted to the Riverside County Fire Department for review and approval to further ensure the Project meets all construction and infrastructure requirements resulting from a tailored fire risk assessment. HCD appreciates the opportunity to provide information regarding the eligibility of the Camino Terrace Apartments under Government Code section 65913.4. Please feel free to contact Alex Contreras, at alex.contreras@hcd.ca.gov, with any questions. Sincerely, Shannan West Housing Accountability Unit Chief From:Liang Chao To:City Clerk Subject:Fw: Linda Vista - Supplemental Information Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 2:27:00 PM Attachments:image001.png Linda Vista - Proposed COA for 2-story units -20260331.pdf 10857LindaVista_Evacuation_Analysis_2026-2-26 w Cover Email_20260317.pdf Letter to City of Cupertino - 4-1-26(19345502.1).pdf Fire Department Memo.pdf Please enter this into the written communication for the April 1 meeting. Liang Chao Mayor City Council LiangChao@cupertino.org 408-777-3192 From: Bull, Steve <SBull@shhomes.com> Sent: Wednesday, April 1, 2026 10:43 AM To: Liang Chao <lchao@cupertino.gov> Cc: Ebrahimi, Kevin <KEbrahimi@shhomes.com>; Lin, Austin <ALin@shhomes.com>; Matt Larson <matt@matt-larson.com> Subject: FW: Linda Vista - Supplemental Information CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Vice Mayor Chao: We’re writing to provide you with supplemental information regarding our application for the Linda Vista project (a.k.a. Evulich Court). We had previously submitted some of this information to Staff in advance of the March 17, 2026 Hearing. The information is included within the Written Comment section of the Staff Report package. To ensure that you are able to review the information, we’re also sending it directly to you. Please find the following information attached: 1. 2-Story Units – Proposed Site Plan and Conditions of Approval 2. Evacuation Analysis – Analysis and Cover Email sent on March 17, 2026 3. Cox Castle Response Letter - dated April 1, 2026 4. Fire Department memo – Included within March 30, 2026 Written Communications Please let us know if you have any questions. Thank you, Steve Steven Bull Vice President of Development SummerHill Homes 6101 Bollinger Canyon Road, Suite 425, San Ramon, CA 94583 Mobile (510) 410-1188 sbull@shhomes.com / SummerHillHomes.com All subject matter contained in this email is confidential and proprietary to SummerHill Homes/SummerHill Apartment Communities and should not be disclosed to any person not listed as an original recipient. SummerHill Homes/ SummerHill Apartment Communities. All rights reserved. Page 1 of 2 TO: Cupertino City Officials FROM: Hector Estrada, Assistant Fire Chief SUBJECT: Housing Development - Linda Vista Drive As requested by City Manager Kapoor and in response to the questions from the Cupertino City Council, this supplemental staff report provides a summary of the process that led to the Santa Clara County Fire Department’s plan review comments on the Architectural and Site Approval Permit Application for the proposed subdivision at 10857 Linda Vista Drive. Background The Santa Clara County Fire Department (“County Fire”) provides fire safety plan review comments for land development in the City of Cupertino. Specifically, County Fire reviews Architectural and Site Approval Permit Applications for compliance with applicable state and local fire safety requirements related to site design.1 County Fire staff then prepares plan review comments and presents them to City officials to support the City’s decision to approve or deny an Architectural and Site Approval Permit Application. Summary In January 2026, County Fire staff provided plan review comments on the Architectural and Site Approval Permit Application for the proposed residential subdivision at 10857 Linda Vista Drive (ASA-2024-015) (the “Project” and the “Application”). Because the Project is located in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone, it is subject to the State Minimum Fire Safe Regulations (“Fire Safe Regulations”) (14 C.C.R. §§ 1270, et seq.), in addition to generally applicable fire safety requirements in the California Building Standards Code.2 The Fire Safe Regulations include an exception request process that allows projects to move forward even if they cannot meet specific site-design criteria.3 Specifically, the Fire Safe Regulations allow for the approval of exception requests on a case-by-case basis if the exception provides “the Same Practical Effect as these regulations towards providing Defensible Space.” (14 C.C.R. § 1270.07.)4 The Application includes a Same Practical Effect exception request for the thirty-foot setbacks required by Section 1276.01 of the Fire Safe Regulations. The applicant proposed the following measures to support the exception request: (1) Non-combustible material extending five feet horizontally around the buildings. (2) Wildfire home hardening protective measures, including but not limited to a Class A roof, non-combustible exterior building material, protected eave vents, and double paned tempered glass. 1 At the building permit phase, County Fire reviews building permit applica:ons for compliance with addi:onal fire safety requirements, including those related to construc:on. 2 Public Resources Code Sec:on 4290 addresses the applicability of the Fire Safe Regula:ons in Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones. 3 The process and standards for approving Same Prac:cal Effect excep:on requests in the Fire Safe Regula:ons are dis:nct from the process and standards for approving for Alternate Materials and Methods Requests (AMMR) in the California Building Standards Code. 4 The Fire Safe Regula:ons define “Same Prac:cal Effect” as “an Excep:on or alterna:ve with the capability of applying accepted wildland fire suppression strategies and tac:cs, and provisions for fire fighter safety, including: (1) access for emergency wildland fire equipment, (2) safe civilian evacua:on, (3) signing that avoids delays in emergency equipment response, (4) available and accessible water to effec:vely aWack Wildfire or defend a Structure from Wildfire, and (5) fuel modifica:on sufficient for civilian and fire fighter safety.” (14 C.C.R. § 1270.01(aa).) Page 2 of 2 (3) Exterior fire sprinkler heads protecting covered porches and decks that are within thirty feet of the property line. (4) Fire resistance rated exterior elements within thirty feet of the property lines including: a. Exterior Walls - Fire resistance rated for one hour. b. Projections (portions of the building protruding beyond exterior walls) - Fire resistance rated for one hour. c. Penetrations (e.g., mechanical, electrical, plumbing services) - Protected to maintain fire resistance rated assemblies. Section 1276.01 of the Fire Safe Regulations provides guidance on exception requests related to the thirty-foot setback requirement: A reduction in the minimum setback shall be based upon practical reasons, which may include but are not limited to, parcel dimensions or size, topographic limitations, Development density requirements or other Development patterns that promote low- carbon emission outcomes; sensitive habitat; or other site constraints, and shall provide for an alternative method to reduce Structure-to-Structure ignition by incorporating features such as, but not limited to: (1) non-combustible block walls or fences; or (2) non-combustible material extending five (5) feet horizontally from the furthest extent of the Building; or (3) hardscape landscaping; or (4) a reduction of exposed windows on the side of the Structure with a less than thirty (30) foot setback; or (5) the most protective requirements in the California Building Code, California Code of Regulations Title 24, Part 2, Chapter 7A, as required by the Local Jurisdiction. (14 C.C.R. § 1276.01(b).) Based on our analysis of the site and the combined impact of the measures proposed in the exception request, County Fire staff determined that these measures provide appropriate alternative methods to reduce the risk of structure-to-structure ignition, and County Fire approved the Same Practical Effect exception request for the Application. The Project includes two of the five measures identified in Section 1276.01 as alternative methods to reduce the risk of structure-to-structure ignition and two additional measures: exterior sprinklers and increased fire resistive rated exterior elements. Analyzing these measures based on accepted wildland fire suppression strategies and tactics and provisions for firefighter safety, County Fire staff determined that the exception request provided appropriate access for emergency wildland fire equipment and safe civilian evacuation and that the exception request included fuel modification sufficient for civilian and firefighter safety. County Fire memorialized its approval of the exception request in its January 7 and January 27 plan review comments, which have been presented to the City Planning Commission and City Council. County Fire’s plan review comments also notified the applicant that they will need to submit a final fire protection plan, onsite fire hydrant design specifications, and a construction site safety plan as part of their building permit application. From:Liang Chao To:City Clerk Subject:Fw: HCD Letter of TA/Support Re: 10857 Linda Vista Drive, Cupertino HAU-3207 Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 2:26:18 PM Attachments:image001.png Cupertino-HAU-033026.pdf Please enter this into the written communication for the April 1 meeting. Liang Chao Vice Mayor City Council LChao@cupertino.gov 408-777-3192 From: Tina Kapoor <TinaK@cupertino.gov> Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2026 3:04 PM Cc: City Attorney's Office <CityAttorney@cupertino.gov>; Floy Andrews <fandrews@awattorneys.com>; Benjamin Fu <BenjaminF@cupertino.gov>; Luke Connolly <LukeC@cupertino.gov> Subject: Fwd: HCD Letter of TA/Support Re: 10857 Linda Vista Drive, Cupertino HAU-3207 Good afternoon, Mayor, Vice Mayor, and Councilmembers (bcc’d): I was just informed of a technical assistance letter from HCD that was sent to staff yesterday upon the request of the applicant. This is the second letter staff has received from HCD for the Evulich project. The “Letter of Support/Technical Assistance Letter” is attached to this email. Please let me know if you have any questions. Regards, Tina Begin forwarded message: Tina Kapoor City Manager City Manager's Office TinaK@cupertino.gov (408)777-7607 From: "Piu Ghosh (she/her)" <PiuG@cupertino.gov> Date: March 31, 2026 at 2:50:21 PM PDT To: Tina Kapoor <TinaK@cupertino.gov> Subject: Fwd: HCD Letter of TA/Support Re: 10857 Linda Vista Drive, Cupertino HAU-3207 Good afternoon, Tina Please see the email below and the attached letter sent to the City from HCD as “Letter of Support/TA”. It appears to be a first of its kind and was sent, per the HCD staff, at the applicant’s request. Regards Piu Piu Ghosh (she/her) Planning Manager Community Development PiuG@cupertino.gov (408) 777-3277 Begin forwarded message: From: "Piu Ghosh (she/her)" <PiuG@cupertino.gov> Date: March 30, 2026 at 3:38:00 PM PDT To: Benjamin Fu <BenjaminF@cupertino.gov> Subject: FW: HCD Letter of TA/Support Re: 10857 Linda Vista Drive, Cupertino HAU-3207 FYI.. Piu Ghosh (she/her) Planning Manager Community Development PiuG@cupertino.gov (408) 777-3277 From: Yung, Brandon@HCD <Brandon.Yung@hcd.ca.gov> Sent: Monday, March 30, 2026 3:34 PM To: Luke Connolly <lukec@cupertino.gov>; Emi Sugiyama <EmiS@cupertino.gov>; Piu Ghosh (she/her) <PiuG@cupertino.gov> Cc: Wilcox, Mindy@HCD <Mindy.Wilcox@hcd.ca.gov>; Heaton, Brian@HCD <Brian.Heaton@hcd.ca.gov>; Zisser, David@HCD <David.Zisser@hcd.ca.gov>; Coy, Melinda@HCD <Melinda.Coy@hcd.ca.gov> Subject: HCD Letter of TA/Support Re: 10857 Linda Vista Drive, Cupertino HAU-3207 CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Hello City of Cupertino staff, Please find attached a letter of support and technical assistance for the project located at 10857 Linda Vista Drive prepared prior to a public hearing for the project on Wednesday, April 1. HCD requests that you share this letter with relevant staff/the decision-making body in advance of the hearing. A hard letter will also be sent to your office. Please feel free to share any questions with me should they arise. Thank you, Brandon Yung Housing Policy Analyst Division of Housing Policy Development Housing Accountability Unit Phone: (916) 562-5948 Housing & Community Development 651 Bannon Street, Suite 400 Sacramento, CA 95811 From: Luke Connolly <lukec@cupertino.gov> Sent: Monday, March 23, 2026 12:11 PM To: Yung, Brandon@HCD <Brandon.Yung@hcd.ca.gov>; Emi Sugiyama <EmiS@cupertino.gov> Cc: Wilcox, Mindy@HCD <Mindy.Wilcox@hcd.ca.gov> Subject: RE: HCD request for meeting re: 10857 Linda Vista Drive, Cupertino Hello Brandon, If you have time this Thursday, 3/26, 1: 00 or later, that would work well. If you cannot make that time slot please let me know and I will see what other times are available. Look forward to talking with you. Luke Connolly Assistant Hello Brandon, If you have time this Thursday, 3/26, 1:00 or later, that would work well. If you cannot make that time slot please let me know and I will see what other times are available. Look forward to talking with you. Luke Connolly Assistant Director of Community Development Community Development LukeC@cupertino.gov (408)777-1275 [cupertino.org][facebook.com][twitter.com][youtube.com][nextdoor.com][instagram.com][linkedin.com] From: Yung, Brandon@HCD <Brandon.Yung@hcd.ca.gov> Sent: Friday, March 20, 2026 3:09 PM To: Emi Sugiyama <emis@cupertino.gov>; Luke Connolly <lukec@cupertino.gov> Cc: Wilcox, Mindy@HCD <Mindy.Wilcox@hcd.ca.gov> Subject: HCD request for meeting re: 10857 Linda Vista Drive, Cupertino CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Hello City of Cupertino staff, My name is Brandon Yung and I am a housing policy analyst with the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) Housing Accountability Unit. HCD recently received a request for a letter regarding a project located at 10857 Linda Vista Dr. prior to a public hearing on April 1. HCD would like to request a meeting with your team. If possible, please provide several schedule availabilities next week. I can then send a 30-minute Microsoft Teams meeting. Thank you, Brandon Yung Housing Policy Analyst Division of Housing Policy Development Housing Accountability Unit Phone: (916) 562-5948 Housing & Community Development 651 Bannon Street, Suite 400 Sacramento, CA 95811 <image001.png> STATE OF CALIFORNIA - BUSINESS, CONSUMER SERVICES AND HOUSING AGENCY GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIVISION OF HOUSING POLICY DEVELOPMENT 651 Bannon Street, Suite 400, Sacramento, CA 95811 (916) 263-2911 / FAX (916) 263-7453 www.hcd.ca.gov March 30, 2026 Ben Fu, Community Development Director Cupertino City Hall 10300 Torre Avenue Cupertino, CA 95014 Dear Ben Fu: RE: City of Cupertino – 10857 Linda Vista Drive – Letter Support and Technical Assistance The California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) understands that on April 1, 2026, the City Council of the City of Cupertino will consider a Tentative Map, Architectural and Site Approval, and Tree Removal Permit for the construction of a housing development project that includes moderate income affordable units (Project) on a 2.53-acre site located at 10857 Linda Vista Drive (APNs: 356-06-001, -002, -003, and - 004). The purpose of this letter is to assist the City with its decision making by providing technical assistance related to the Housing Accountability Act (HAA) and State No Net Loss Law. Background HCD understands that the Project is proposing 51 for-sale townhome units, including 10 units deed restricted for moderate income households. The Project is located within the R-3/TH (Multiple-Family Residential, Townhome) zoning district and the Residential – Medium High Density General Plan Land Use Designation. The Project is utilizing the State Density Bonus Law (SDBL)1 to utilize five waivers and one concession from applicable standards of the General Plan and Zoning Code. HCD additionally understands that the Project is consistent with the General Plan,2 Zoning,3 and state and local regulations applicable to Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones (VHFHSZ).4 On February 24, 2026, the City’s Planning Commission voted to recommend the City Council approve the Project.5 1 Gov. Code, § 65915, subd. (b)(1)(D). 2 City of Cupertino February 24, 2026, Planning Commission Hearing Staff Report on 10857 Linda Vista Drive, page 2. 3 Ibid. See page 3. 4 Ibid. See page 9: “The Santa Clara County Fire Department has found that the project has demonstrated consistency with these requirements.” 5 City of Cupertino February 24, 2026, Planning Commission Hearing Minutes. Ben Fu, Community Development Director Page 2 Analysis Housing Accountability Act The Project meets the definition of a “housing development project” under the HAA.6 The Project may only be disapproved or approved at a lower density if the City makes written findings, supported by a preponderance of evidence on the record, that (1) a specific, adverse impact upon the public health or safety would result from the project and (2) mitigation of the adverse impact is not possible.7 Specific, adverse, impact means a significant, quantifiable, direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, identified written public health or safety standards, policies, or conditions.8 “Objective” means, “involving no personal or subjective judgment by a public official and being uniformly verifiable by reference to an external and uniform benchmark or criterion available and knowable by both the development applicant or proponent and the public official.”9 Additionally, the Legislature has clarified that these impacts are intended to arise “infrequently.”10 Housing Element No Net Loss Law No Net Loss Law requires that a jurisdiction ensure there is development opportunity remaining throughout the planning period to accommodate the jurisdiction’s Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA). Because the approval of the Project would result in capacity becoming inadequate to accommodate the RHNA, the City will have up to 180 days from the approval to identify or rezone “sufficient additional, adequate, and available sites” to accommodate the remaining RHNA.11 HCD understands that the Project site consists of four contiguous lots listed in the City’s 6th Cycle Housing Element and the approval of the project may trigger a No Net Loss Law obligation for the City in the moderate income and lower-income categories. In the Planning Commission Staff Report for the Project, the City has stated that, while it “is unable to identify additional sites to accommodate its RHNA concurrently with this project’s approval, it is working toward being compliant with State law in a timely manner. 12” HCD reminds the City that Housing Element No Net Loss Law specifically provides that the City may not disapprove a housing project on the basis that approval of the development would trigger the identification or zoning of additional adequate sites to accommodate the remaining RHNA.13 6 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (h)(2). 7 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j)(1). 8 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j)(1)(A). 9 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (h)(9). 10 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (a)(3). 11 Gov. Code, § 65863., subd. (c)(2). 12 City of Cupertino February 24, 2026, Planning Commission Hearing Staff Report on 10857 Linda Vista Drive, page 18. 13 See HCD’s October 2, 2019 No Net Loss Law Memo, page 1, available at: https://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housing-element/housing-element- memos/docs/sb-166-final.pdf. Ben Fu, Community Development Director Page 3 Conclusion For purposes of entitling AB 130-eligible projects, the City should assume compliance with local building codes. Whether the project is indeed code compliant should be determined at the post-entitlement phase. This prevents the entitlement review process from becoming bogged down in technical details that are strictly governed by other laws. HCD informs the City that AB 712 (Government Code Section 65914.2.) went into effect on January 1, 2026. Among other things, the new law increases penalties that a court may impose on a local government if the local government was advised in writing prior to the commencement of a lawsuit brought by the Attorney General or HCD that the local government’s decision, action, or inaction would represent a violation of specified housing laws. HCD hopes this technical assistance is helpful. HCD has enforcement authority over the HAA and Housing Element Law, among other state housing laws. Accordingly, HCD may review local government actions to determine consistency with these laws. Pursuant to Government Code section 65585, subdivision (j), if HCD finds that a jurisdiction’s actions do not comply with state law, HCD may notify the California Office of the Attorney General. HCD remains committed to supporting the City of Cupertino in facilitating housing at all income levels and hopes the City finds this clarification helpful. If you have questions or need additional information, please contact Brandon Yung at Brandon.Yung@hcd.ca.gov. Sincerely, Melinda Coy Housing Accountability Unit Chief From:Lin, Austin To:Emi Sugiyama; City Clerk Cc:Ebrahimi, Kevin; Bull, Steve Subject:Jensen Hughes Letter and Statement of Qualifications for 4/1 City Council Written Communications Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 1:54:42 PM Attachments:image001.png image002.png image003.png image004.png image005.png Linda Vista - City Council Letter - 20260401.pdf LindaVista_JH_Quals.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Hi Emi & Cupertino City Clerk, We respectfully submit the attached letter and statement of qualifications from Jensen Hughes for inclusion in Written Communications for the April 1, 2026 City Council hearing (Item #3) regarding the Linda Vista project. Jensen Hughes has conducted a review of the plans and have determined that the project satisfies all applicable criteria for the AB 130 CEQA exemption. Thank you, Austin Lin, PE Development Manager SummerHill Homes Direct (510) 330-3064 | Mobile (408) 966-2278 | ✉️ alin@shhomes.com www.summerhillhomes.com 6101 Bollinger Canyon Road, Suite 425, San Ramon, CA 94583 Follow Us: All subject matter contained in this email is confidential and proprietary to SummerHill Homes LLC and should not be disclosed to any person not listed as an original recipient. SummerHill Homes LLC. All rights reserved. jensenhughes.com Copyright ©2026 Jensen Hughes, Inc. All Rights Reserved. T0123 April 1, 2026 Steve Bull SummerHill Homes 6101 Bollinger Canyon Road, Suite 425, San Ramon, CA 94583 RE: Plan Review – Fire Hazard Severity Zone Requirements 10857 Linda Vista Drive, Cupertino, CA 95014 Dear Steve: Jensen Hughes has reviewed the project application and associated plan set for the above-referenced development, located within a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VH FHSZ) in the Local Responsibility Area (LRA). Our review is based on the current combined plans (dated January 12, 2026) and ongoing coordination with the project team starting in August 2025. This evaluation is limited to code sections related to structural hardening and defensible space requirements for wildfire risk reduction, including CBC Chapter 7A and CFC Chapter 49, which details the defensible space regulations applicable to this property as required by Public Resources Code 4290. The project is required to comply with all applicable VH FHSZ regulations, including: + California Public Resources Code Sections 4290 and 4291 (as applicable) o Section 4290 directs the Board of Forestry and Fire Protection to adopt defensible space standards. o Section 4291 applies only to State Responsibility Areas (SRA) and is not applicable to this project. + California Government Code Section 51182 o Requires ongoing vegetation management and defensible space maintenance, including fuel modification zones around structures. + California Building Code Chapter 7A (as amended by the City of Cupertino and the Santa Clara County Fire Department) o Establishes minimum ignition-resistant construction standards for buildings in Wildland-Urban Interface areas, including requirements for roofing, vents, exterior walls, windows, and attachments to reduce ember intrusion and flame spread. + California Fire Code Chapter 49 (as amended by the City of Cupertino and the Santa Clara County Fire Department) o Establishes minimum defensible space, vegetation management, and wildfire risk reduction requirements, including fuel modification zones (Zone 0, 1, and 2). Based on our review and analysis, it is our professional opinion that: + The project qualifies for CEQA streamlining consistent with AB 130 for a site located within a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VH FHSZ) if all requirements for new construction in a VH FHSZ (see above) are confirmed during the building permit stage. + The Alternative Materials and Methods Request (AMMR) has been appropriately applied and approved to address reduced setbacks. + The project plans are consistent with applicable structural hardening provisions. Detailed compliance items (e.g., vents, roofing, exterior wall assemblies, windows, and decking) will be fully implemented and verified at the building permit stage in accordance with Chapter 7A of the California Building Code. 10857 Linda Vista Drive Fire Hazard Severity Zone Requirements Page 2 Copyright ©2026 Jensen Hughes, Inc. All Rights Reserved.T0123 This letter reflects our professional opinion based on the information provided and is intended to support the project’s consistency with applicable wildfire structural hardening regulations and CEQA streamlining provisions. Final compliance is subject to review and approval by the Authority Having Jurisdiction at the time of building permit. This review does not state or imply that the submittal is approved or disapproved by the City of Cupertino or Santa Clara County Fire Department. Information not presented in the submitted drawings or contained in the supporting materials are not part of this review. This review does not imply that compliance with relevant codes and standards eliminates all hazards and risks. Please refer to our attached company qualifications for additional information regarding our wildfire risk and fire protection expertise. Sincerely, Jensen Hughes B. Amelia Pludow, PhD Wildfire Risk Mitigation Consultant jensenhughes.com Jensen Hughes, Inc. 1000 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 250 Los Angeles, CA 90017 USA O: +1 213-412-1400 Copyright © 2025 Jensen Hughes, Inc. All Rights Reserved. T0125 Firm Qualifications Founded in 1980 as a corporation and headquartered in Columbia, Maryland, USA, Jensen Hughes is the global leader in fire engineering, consulting and technology services. We are dedicated to protecting what matters most through technical excellence. We are a global team of 1,700+ fire engineers, scientists, consultants, and wildfire practitioners dedicated to advancing the science of safety and risk management in over 100 countries and over 100 offices. Using the diverse backgrounds of our fire safety engineers, consultants and risk specialists dedicated to protecting people, properties, assets and operations, our firm has developed expertise in understanding the increasingly complex range of hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities due to wildland fires in the built environment, as well as in natural landscapes. The Jensen Hughes team has backgrounds in the following: Applicable Expertise + Experience + Wildfire Risk Mitigation + Wildfire Forensic Investigations + Wildfire Behavior Modelling + Community Wildfire Protection Planning + Fire Codes and Standards Committees + Fire Regulatory Compliance + Fire Engineering and Design + Fire Safety Inspections + Fire Hazard and Risk Assessments + Power Utility Fire Safety + Safety Management + Software Development and Deployment + Data Analytics and Machine Learning + Data Strategy Enhancements + Training and Technology + Emergency Management Our experience includes all phases of wildland/WUI fire risk management (prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery) and building and urban-scale fire safety design, analysis and management. Our experts have extensive boots-on-the-ground experience in wildland fire and urban firefighting and in-depth knowledge and skills to apply the latest fire science and engineering tools in wildfire behavior, vegetation management, structural hardening, and in the development of Fire Protection Plans, CWPPs and other Wildfire Mitigation Plans. Linda Vista Dr. – FHSZ Requirements 1BPL25001 Page 2 | March 26, 2026 | Rev. 0 Copyright ©2025 Jensen Hughes, Inc. All Rights Reserved.T0125 Our professionals have expert knowledge of fire safety codes and standards, with detailed knowledge of local, state and federal rules, regulations and guides related to wildfire safety, wildfire risk mitigation and emergency operations, including: + Disaster Mitigation Act (2000-present) + National Fire Plan (NFP) 2000 + Healthy Forest Restoration Act (HFRA) + State and Local Fire and Building Codes + Other relevant wildfire codes, standards, and legislation IWUI Code, IRC NFPA 1, 1140 ASTM Standards (e.g., E119, E108, E84) Utility wildfire safety (e.g., California PUC 8386, PUC 8389) Sample of relevant California codes and standards Public Resources Code Section 4290, 4291, 4102, 4125-4229, 4251-4255, 4290, 4292-4296 California wildfire legislation (e.g., SB 70, SB 167, SB 247, SB 901, AB 111, AB 1054, AB 3074) Chapter 7A, Chapter 49 + FEMA, NIST, IBHS, NFPA, APA, SFPE and other agencies and industry fire and wildfire publications + ANSI A300 Tree Care Operations: Standard Practices for Tree, Shrub, and Other Woody Plant Maintenance + Vegetation Management Planning Guide: Planning and Implementation for Developed Sites in USFS Region 2. Industry Leadership Our leadership is demonstrated by developing policy, supporting research, creating methods and then performing the necessary engineering evaluations. For more than 40 years, our team has supported the gathering and analysis of data and the research and development of new assessment methods and techniques through organizations such as State and Federal Agencies, Industry Consensus Standards committees, FEMA, NIST, and EPRI. This wealth of experience can help you meet your regulatory needs. We are also actively involved in developing and improving fire safety policies, codes & standards, risk-informed regulation through our extensive committee involvement across the State and at the national level, while also serving on behalf of our clients in designing, inspecting and/or enforcing those regulations on a daily basis. Our extensive involvement in technical committees and professional organizations demonstrates our commitment to advancing the fire safety industry. Involvements relative to wildfire risk include: + National Association of Fire Investigators (NAFI), Wildland Fire Investigation Committee + International Association for Fire Safety Science (IAFSS), Large Outdoor Fires and the Built Environment Working Group + NFPA 1140, Standard for Wildland Fire Protection + (Former) NFPA 1141, Standard for Fire Protection Infrastructure for Land Development in Wildland, Rural and Suburban Areas + (Former) NFPA 1142, Standard on Water Supplies for Suburban and Rural Fire Fighting Linda Vista Dr. – FHSZ Requirements 1BPL25001 Page 3 | March 26, 2026 | Rev. 0 Copyright ©2025 Jensen Hughes, Inc. All Rights Reserved.T0125 + International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Large Outdoor Fires and the Built Environment Working Group + Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) WUI Working Group + Southern California, Fire Prevention Officers, WUI Committee + (Former) NFPA 1144, Standard for Reducing Structure Ignition Hazards from Wildland Fire + NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, Chapter on Wildfire Investigations Project Experience Our team has completed multiple projects developing and auditing wildfire protection plans, comprehensive structure protection strategies, hazard and risk assessments, utility wildfire mitigation plans, CWPPs, wildfire evacuation studies and communication planning, multi-hazard evacuation assessments, vulnerability assessments and vegetation management strategies at different scales and levels of implementation for a range of clients. Our client list includes federal, state, and local agencies, national research labs, non-profits, electrical utilities, state-level utility wildfire regulators, private homeowners, large landowners, and commercial facilities. The following map provides a snapshot of this experience and related wildfire risk management consulting. From:David Yan To:City Council Cc:Public Comments; City Clerk Subject:Evulich Court - Letters of Concern Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 1:43:12 PM Attachments:April 4th Deadline at Evulich Borrowed from an Exemption That Was Never Earned.pdf PRC 4291_Not Complied With_03.30.2026.pdf Improper Upzoning_Evulich_03.30.2026.pdf Evulich Ct - Stated Basis for Omitting an Evacuation Study Contradicted.pdf Ferh and Peers needs to be Considered for Evulich Safety_03.25.2026.pdf LindaVista_Hexagon Evacuation Analysis Concerns_03.24.2026.pdf AB130_CEQA Exemption Threshold 1 not Met_03.21.2026.pdf Fire Chief Response vs Applicant Claims_03.31.2026.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Please enter this email and all the attached letters into the administrative record for Agenda # 3 of the April 1, 2026 City Council meeting. Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao and City Councilmembers, I have significant concerns about the Evulich Court project - safety wise, procedurally, legally and beyond. Attached are my letters of concern. Regards, David Outlook Evulich Cour t Does Not Clear the AB 130 CEQA Exemption Eligibility Threshold From David Yan <davidcyan@outlook.com> Date Sat 3/21/2026 10:51 AM To Cupertino City Council <citycouncil@cupertino.gov>; Cupertino City Attorney <cityattorney@cupertino.gov> Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao, City Councilmembers, and City Attorney, This letter addresses a single threshold question: whether this project is eligible for the AB 130 CEQA exemption. It is not. The project does not clear the eligibility threshold. If the exemption does not apply, full CEQA review is required. The analysis ends at that threshold. The question is not whether the project satisfies fire engineering requirements. The question is whether the statutory conditions for the exemption have been satisfied. The Fire Department ’s review addresses project-specific compliance. It does not establish the prior adoption of a wildfire mitigation framework applicable to development in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone. The Statute Public Resources Code section 21080.66 incorporates Government Code section 65913.4(a)(6) to define eligibility. Section 65913.4(a)(6)(D) is explicit: a project located within a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone is ineligible for the exemption. There is one narrow carveout. The exclusion does not apply only if the site has adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development. That carveout has two independent requirements. The measures must be adopted. And they must be pursuant to existing standards applicable to the development. Both must be satisfied. Neither is. The Site Is in a VHFHZ This is not disputed. The City confirms that the project has been evaluated under the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone designation. The Carveout Is Not Satisfied The staff report identifies the supposed “adopted fire hazard mitigation measures” as provisions contained in Title 16 of the Cupertino Municipal Code, including the Residential Code, Wildland-Urban Interface Code, and Fire Code. 3/21/26, 3:07 PM Sent Items - David Yan - Outlook https://outlook.live.com/mail/0/sentitems/id/AAkALgAAAAAAHYQDEapmEc2byACqAC%2FEWg0ASCBZoD2K1ESoeHPbAXBacAAI6elWcAAA 1/4 That answer does not satisfy the statute. If baseline building code adoption were sufficient, every jurisdiction would satisfy the carveout and the VHFHZ exclusion would have no effect. The exclusion would do no work. The City ’s position reduces the carveout to a restatement of existing law. The Legislature created the VHFHZ exclusion precisely because wildfire danger operates at the corridor and community scale, not the parcel scale. The statute therefore requires an adopted, preexisting mitigation framework, not project-specific judgments. Those provisions are baseline building and fire codes. They apply to all development in hazard areas. They are not a wildfire mitigation framework governing development in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone. The project does not rely on any adopted framework. It relies on a project-specific Alternative Materials, Methods, and Requirements (AMMR) and discretionary determinations regarding setback and “practical effect.” An AMMR presumes a framework. It does not establish one. The staff report does not identify any objective, pre-adopted standard governing these determinations. Instead, in response to questions regarding the basis for these approvals, the City states that Fire Department staff “will be present at the Council meeting and can respond at that time.” This is a case by case determination instead of an adopted standard. The wrong legal standard is being used to approve the project. A mitigation measure defined and approved during project review is not “adopted.” It is discretionary. There is a second and independent basis for this conclusion. The statute provides the carveout only where "the site has adopted fire hazard mitigation measures." In California land use law, "adopted" is a term of art referring to formal governmental action such as an ordinance, a general plan policy, a codified standard. It does not mean project level compliance approved through administrative review. The legislature's choice of "adopted" rather than "complies with" or "incorporates" is not accidental. Cupertino has adopted no city-wide fire hazard mitigation framework for development in Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones. A project specific AMMR approval is not adoption. It is a one time administrative exception. The carveout is not satisfied on this basis independently. The statute requires that mitigation be adopted before the project seeks to rely on the exemption. A project cannot satisfy the threshold by pointing to approvals it receives during its own review process. PRC 4290, PRC 4291, and Chapter 7A Operate Below This Threshold PRC sections 4290 and 4291 and Chapter 7A operate below the statutory threshold set by Government Code section 65913.4(a)(6)(D). Those provisions define the substantive fire safety requirements that apply to development. They govern how a project is built. They are the content of a mitigation framework. They are not the adoption of one. That threshold must be satisfied first. Only then do those standards come into play. 3/21/26, 3:07 PM Sent Items - David Yan - Outlook https://outlook.live.com/mail/0/sentitems/id/AAkALgAAAAAAHYQDEapmEc2byACqAC%2FEWg0ASCBZoD2K1ESoeHPbAXBacAAI6elWcAAA 2/4 This project reverses the statutory order. It points to compliance with, and deviations from, those standards as evidence that mitigation measures exist. That assumes the existence of an adopted framework that has not been established. The SB 330 Argument Does Not Cure Eligibility SB 330 and related vesting rights does not resolve the threshold issue. SB 330 vests against changes in local development standards. It does not freeze state level determinations of physical hazard conditions, including CAL FIRE’s designation of Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones. More importantly, AB 130 itself was enacted after vesting attached. A developer cannot invoke a later enacted statute to obtain CEQA immunity while rejecting the eligibility conditions written into that same statute. The statute must be applied as written or not at all. The Consequence The site is in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone. The City has not adopted a wildfire mitigation framework applicable to development in that zone. The project relies instead on baseline building codes and project-specific discretionary approvals. That fails Government Code section 65913.4(a)(6)(D). The AB 130 CEQA exemption does not apply. Sincerely, David Yan Cupertino Resident Linda Vista Neighborhood Appendix A: The Record Does Not Establish an Adopted Wildfire Mitigation Framework Government Code section 65913.4(a)(6)(D) permits an exception only where fire hazard mitigation measures have been adopted and are applicable to development. This is a threshold requirement. If it is not satisfied, the project is ineligible for the AB 130 CEQA exemption. The administrative record does not establish that such a framework has been adopted in Cupertino. The City’s supplemental staff report identifies the relevant “adopted fire hazard mitigation measures” as provisions contained in Title 16 of the Municipal Code, including the Residential Code, Wildland-Urban Interface Code, and Fire Code. The record does not identify: • any ordinance governing development in Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones • any overlay district or zoning framework specific to such areas 3/21/26, 3:07 PM Sent Items - David Yan - Outlook https://outlook.live.com/mail/0/sentitems/id/AAkALgAAAAAAHYQDEapmEc2byACqAC%2FEWg0ASCBZoD2K1ESoeHPbAXBacAAI6elWcAAA 3/4 • any codified mitigation program or development standard applicable across projects in those zones • any General Plan provision that establishes a binding, zone-specific wildfire mitigation framework for development approval Instead, the record shows that fire safety determinations for this project are made through project- specific review. The project seeks AMMR approval, discretionary setback/practical effect determinations without objective preadopted standards, and Fire Department testimony at the hearing proving case by case process, not an adopted VHFHZ framework. 3/21/26, 3:07 PM Sent Items - David Yan - Outlook https://outlook.live.com/mail/0/sentitems/id/AAkALgAAAAAAHYQDEapmEc2byACqAC%2FEWg0ASCBZoD2K1ESoeHPbAXBacAAI6elWcAAA 4/4 March 31, 2026 The April 4th Deadline at Evulich is Borrowed from an Exemption That Was Never Earned Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao, City Councilmembers: The Applicant has represented that the project will be deemed approved by April 4, 2026 if the city doesn’t approve. April 4th is a date. It is not a foregone conclusion. If it were, what is the purpose of the city council meeting on April 1st? And why is the Applicant even planning on showing up? The City has treated the Permit Streamlining Act (“PSA”) deadline as though it operates automatically and independently of whether this project actually qualifies for the statutory pathway that created it. It does not. A deemed approval deadline built on an AB 130 CEQA exemption that was never validly triggered is not a deadline at all. It is a legal fiction the applicant is asking this Council to treat as fact. The Council is not required to comply with a deadline that does not legally apply. It is required to make findings the record supports. Those are different obligations and conflating them is exactly what the applicant's counsel is counting on. The PSA Deadline Is Premised on a Valid AB 130 CEQA Exemption The Permit Streamlining Act's accelerated decision timeline under Government Code Section 65950(a)(7) for projects exempt from CEQA (AB 130) applies specifically to housing development projects that are exempt from CEQA pursuant to the AB 130 infill exemption. The operative phrase is "exempt from CEQA pursuant to the AB 130 infill exemption." If the AB 130 exemption is legally unavailable on this record, the project is not exempt from CEQA pursuant to AB 130. The PSA's accelerated timeline never validly commenced. The April 4th deadline Applicant cites is premised entirely on the legal validity of the AB 130 exemption. That premise is not established on this record. The AB 130 CEQA Exemption Is Legally Unavailable The AB 130 threshold eligibility letter submitted March 19, 2026 is referenced and establishes two independent grounds on which the AB130 CEQA exemption was never triggered: ● Cupertino has not adopted wildfire mitigation measures as a baseline applicable to development in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone in its municipal code, general plan, or any formally enacted local standard. Government Code Section 65913.4(a)(6)(D) conditions the AB 130 exemption on the site being subject to adopted fire hazard mitigation measures as that baseline. Project level fire code compliance does not substitute for an absent jurisdictional baseline. ● At least 1 of 3 fire code requirements were not signed off on by Fire. No analysis or documentation of PRC 4291 appears anywhere in the record. AB 130’s CEQA exemption requires compliance with PRC 4290, 4291 and 7A. The review of 4291 is not mentioned by Fire, the City’s Consultants, or the Applicant’s Consultants. Jensen Hughes, a Consultant to the Applicant confirmed in their own words that their scope was limited to PRC 4290 and Chapter 7A. A recent letter dated March 30, 2026 from Chief Estrada confirms similarly that PRC 4291 is absent from the record entirely. The AMMR granted pertains only to PRC 4290 as evidenced on multiple forms. Either ground independently renders the AB 130 exemption legally unavailable. The April 4, 2026 deadline built on that exemption did not validly commence. The Developer Cannot Have It Both Ways on SB 330 and AB 130 The developer cannot simultaneously invoke SB 330 vesting to avoid the VHFHSZ designation and invoke AB 130, a statute enacted more than a year after vesting attached, to claim complete CEQA immunity. If AB 130 applies, vesting does not freeze the VHFHSZ designation and the eligibility conditions written into AB 130 apply in full. The applicant cannot import the deadline while discarding the constraints that come with it. The Argument Inverts the Statute The Permit Streamlining Act was enacted to prevent cities from sitting on complete, compliant applications as a delay tactic. It was not enacted to compel approval of applications that do not satisfy the legal prerequisites for their claimed CEQA exemption. Using a statutory deadline as a threat to force approval of a noncompliant application is unwarranted. The Permit Streamlining Act gives applicants a remedy against cities that obstruct compliant projects. It does not give applicants a weapon to compel approval of projects that have not met the law's requirements. The Applicant’s and its advisors reference AB 712 financial penalties and a deemed approval deadline in the same letter. That combination directed at a municipality evaluating a project with documented life safety deficiencies, is precisely the kind of pressure the legislature did not intend and the Council should not reward. Even if the applicant were to assert a deemed approval, the City retains full enforcement authority. The City may refuse to issue grading, building, or occupancy permits; issue stop work orders; and seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Any reliance on an unlawful deemed approval is at the Applicant’s own risk. The City's Exposure Runs the Other Way The Council faces a straightforward choice. Approve on the basis of a PSA deadline premised on a CEQA exemption that was never validly triggered, over substantial evidence of evacuation failure and an incomplete fire safety record. Or deny on the basis of that same record, supported by Government Code Section 66474(f), which independently requires an affirmative safety finding this record cannot support. The deadline does not make that finding for the Council. Only the record does. And the record does not support approval. A denial supported by substantial evidence is legally defensible. By contrast, a deadline does not reduce the City's legal exposure. It increases it. If this Council approves because it believes April 4th leaves no choice, the administrative record will tell a different story. It will show the Council was informed in writing, before the vote, that the deadline was premised on a CEQA exemption that was never validly triggered. It will show the Council possessed the City's own evacuation study finding the corridor already failing at over 200% of capacity. It will show the Council was told the fire compliance record was incomplete and PRC 4291 was never analyzed. And the record will reflect that it was made with full knowledge of the safety evidence the Council chose to set aside. Regards, David Yan Linda Vista Neighborhood Resident March 29, 2026 Evulich Ct: Applicant's Stated Basis for Omitting an Evacuation Study Is Contradicted by the Record The Applicant claims it never commissioned an evacuation study because the City raised no evacuation objection during the HAA consistency review, which closed in April 2025. That story is contradicted by the record. On October 10, 2025, six months after that supposed clearance, the Applicant's VP of Development, Steve Bull emailed Cupertino Senior Planner Emi Sugiyama asking her to provide criteria for an evacuation route study by Monday. Bull's email notes the Applicant had met with Fehr and Peers the prior week and that the traffic report submitted that afternoon did not yet include the evacuation route analysis. The Applicant was actively working toward commissioning an evacuation study. The question was not closed. What the City Told the Applicant On October 16, 2025, Ms. Sugiyama responded. She told the Applicant that under AB 130, the City was no longer requiring an evacuation study to address fire safety concerns under CEQA. If the Applicant chose to provide one voluntarily, the City would not require it to meet any criteria and would not peer review it. The email exchange is reproduced below (read from bottom for initial email to top - response). That response shut down an evacuation study the Applicant was in the process of commissioning. Ms. Sugiyama knew the Applicant had just met with Fehr and Peers about this specific site. Why Ms. Sugiyama’s Answer Was Legally Incomplete Ms. Sugiyama is using a limited rule to escape a universal safety obligation. AB 130 is not the only legal basis for requiring an evacuation study. Section 66474 imposes independent, mandatory obligations on tentative map approval under the Subdivision Map Act. It requires the City to make affirmative findings that the proposed subdivision will not cause serious public health problems before a map can be approved. That obligation exists entirely outside CEQA. Staff’s reliance on AB 130 created a legal blind spot: they answered a CEQA question while completely ignoring a mandatory public health finding required for map approval. AB 130 does not amend it. HAA deemed consistency does not satisfy it. Ms. Sugiyama answered a CEQA question. The correct answer was that AB 130 addressed one basis for requiring the study, and the Subdivision Map Act imposed another, and the second was untouched. The Applicant was told the issue was closed. The February 2026 Story Was Built Backward When residents raised evacuation at the the January 28, 2026 residents’ meeting with the Applicant ahead of the February 24, 2026 Planning Commission hearing, the Applicant needed an explanation for the missing study. Cox Castle's February 12, 2026 letter provided one: the Applicant relied on the April 2025 HAA clearance, evacuation was not flagged at that time, and the project was therefore deemed consistent on evacuation routes. The October 2025 email makes that account impossible. The Applicant does not meet with Fehr and Peers about a site specific evacuation study in October 2025 if it resolved the evacuation question through an April 2025 HAA clearance. The Applicant does not ask the City planner for evacuation criteria in October 2025 if it believed that question was settled 6 months earlier. The Applicant's own conduct proves the April reliance theory was not the reason it skipped the study. It was the reason constructed after evacuation became a threat to the project's approval. What This Means for the City Council The evacuation question was never resolved. The Applicant was moving toward an analysis. City staff stopped it, citing only AB130. The Subdivision Map Act obligation was never addressed. When the omission became a liability, the Applicant reached back eight months to manufacture a justification that its own October emails contradict. The Subdivision Map Act requires an affirmative safety finding before this map can be approved. That finding has never been made. The Council has the October email and the Cox Castle letter in front of it. They cannot be read together and produce approval. Lastly, please refer to separate letters by me and other members of the community on the applicability of AB 130 CEQA exemption to this project as we demonstrate exhaustively that the exemption does not apply. Regards, David Yan Linda Vista Drive Neighborhood Resident March 26, 2026 Ferh & Peers Evacuation Study Required to be Considered for Evulich Project This correspondence will be submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 hearing. Use of the Fehr and Peers Evacuation Study in the Subdivision Map Act Safety Finding This letter addresses whether the City may disregard the Fehr and Peers Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment on the grounds that it was prepared for a future Safety Element update rather than for this specific project. The argument that the study is irrelevant because it was commissioned for a different purpose is not supported by the Subdivision Map Act, administrative law principles, or the City’s own evidentiary practices. Government Code section 66474 requires the City to deny a subdivision map if the design of the subdivision is likely to cause serious public health or safety problems. To approve a map, the City must make an affirmative finding that the subdivision does not create such a risk. That finding must be supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. The Fehr and Peers study is substantial evidence directly relevant to whether residents can safely evacuate the Linda Vista corridor under existing conditions. The purpose for which the study was originally commissioned does not alter its evidentiary value. The content of the study addresses the physical capacity of the evacuation routes serving this corridor. That is the same factual question the City must evaluate under section 66474. The Subdivision Map Act requires the City to consider all relevant substantial evidence in its possession Section 66474 does not limit the City to evidence prepared for a specific project. It requires the City to determine whether the subdivision would create a serious public health or safety problem. If the City possesses evidence that bears directly on that question, the City must consider it. Courts do not permit agencies to disregard relevant evidence simply because it was generated in a different context. The Fehr and Peers study evaluates the evacuation capacity of the same roads that serve the project site. It finds both exits of Linda Vista Drive operating at more than twice their physical capacity under evacuation conditions. These findings speak directly to whether residents can safely evacuate. The City cannot ignore this evidence without creating an arbitrary record. The City has relied on citywide studies to make project level decisions The City Attorney’s position that the Fehr and Peers study cannot be used because it was prepared for a Safety Element update is inconsistent with the City’s own practice. However, the City has relied on citywide and programmatic studies to evaluate specific development applications. For example, in the Housing Element Rezoning (2022 to 2024): During the Housing Element rezoning cycle, the City used the Housing Element Environmental Assessment, the citywide hazard mitigation plan, and the citywide emergency operations plan to evaluate parcel level wildfire exposure and evacuation constraints. These documents were not prepared for individual parcels. They were citywide planning documents used to justify parcel‑specific zoning decisions. The City cannot exclude the Fehr and Peers study while relying on programmatic documents for other project‑level determinations. The City uses broader planning studies when they are relevant to the physical conditions that affect a project. The City’s position on Ferh and Peers should be no different. The Applicant’s own statements make the Fehr and Peers study more relevant, not less At the Planning Commission hearing on February 24, the Applicant stated that the City cannot evaluate evacuation because no evacuation plan has been adopted. If that were correct, then the City could not rely on the Housing Element Environmental Assessment or the Hexagon analysis, both of which reference the same emergency planning framework. The Applicant cannot argue that the City lacks an adopted plan for purposes of rejecting the Fehr and Peers study, while simultaneously relying on the Housing Element assessment to claim clearance. These positions cannot be reconciled. If the absence of an adopted plan prevents the City from evaluating evacuation, then the City cannot make the safety finding required by section 66474. If the City can evaluate evacuation, then the Fehr and Peers study is directly relevant. Further, the Applicant's counsel argues in her February 12, 2026 letter that because the City did not flag evacuation during the HAA consistency review period that expired April 18, 2025, the project is deemed consistent with evacuation standards. That argument conflates two separate legal obligations and misrepresents what the April 2025 review actually evaluated. The HAA consistency review is a procedural snapshot. It evaluates whether a project is consistent with written local standards as they existed at that moment. The Subdivision Map Act requires an independent affirmative safety finding based on the record as it exists at the time of the vote. Those are different obligations measured at different times against different evidence. The City's procedural silence on evacuation in April 2025 does not satisfy the substantive safety finding required in April 2026. More importantly the physical conditions being measured did not change between April 2025 and October 2025. The roads were the same roads. The capacity was the same capacity. What changed was the City's knowledge of conditions that already existed. A procedural determination made before that knowledge existed does not establish that the underlying physical condition was safe. It establishes that nobody had looked. Deemed consistent on an unmeasured condition is not a safety clearance. It is a gap in the record. The City Council is not obligated to ratify a gap that Planning created by failing to evaluate evacuation before the consistency window closed. The Subdivision Map Act exists precisely to catch what earlier review missed. This is that moment. The Fehr and Peers study is more probative than the Hexagon analysis The City Attorney’s argument would require the City to disregard a peer reviewed, City commissioned study in favor of a last minute, applicant commissioned analysis that was not peer reviewed and that evaluates only a portion of the evacuation system. The Fehr and Peers study measures the actual capacity of the evacuation routes. Hexagon measures only the throughput of a single intersection under ideal conditions. If the City excludes the Fehr and Peers study on the basis of purpose, it must apply the same standard to the Hexagon analysis. The Hexagon study was not prepared for this project, was not reviewed by the City, and was submitted hours before the hearing. If purpose is the test, Hexagon fails it. If relevance is the test, Fehr and Peers meets it. The City cannot adopt a standard that excludes its own consultant’s work while admitting the Applicant’s. Applicant's counsel additionally argues that no 'objective, identified written public health or safety standards, policies, or conditions' related to evacuation routes exist, and therefore no specific adverse impact finding can be made under the HAA. That representation is factually incorrect. The Fehr and Peers Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment is precisely what the HAA definition describes as an objective, identified, written analysis of public health and safety conditions commissioned by the City of Cupertino. The HAA argument premised on the absence of such a document fails because the document exists. The City cannot make the required safety finding without considering the Fehr and Peers study The City must determine whether residents can safely evacuate. The Fehr and Peers study provides the only peer reviewed, City commissioned analysis of the evacuation capacity of the corridor. It finds that both exits operate at more than twice their physical capacity under existing conditions. The Hexagon analysis does not evaluate the corridor and does not address whether the existing baseline is safe. If the City disregards the Fehr and Peers study, it removes the only evidence that evaluates the actual evacuation routes. Without that evidence, the City lacks substantial evidence to support a finding of safety. Approval without such evidence would violate section 66474. Conclusion There is no record of Cupertino excluding relevant evidence because it was prepared for a different purpose. The City has repeatedly relied on citywide studies to inform project‑level decisions. The Applicant itself relies on a programmatic citywide study. The City Attorney’s argument is therefore inconsistent with City practice and cannot serve as a basis for disregarding the Fehr and Peers evacuation analysis. The study is substantial evidence directly relevant to the safety finding required under Government Code section 66474. March 31, 2026 Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao, City Councilmembers: This letter responds to the supplemental memo submitted by Assistant Fire Chief Hector Estrada on March 30, 2026. What the Applicant’s Attorney Claimed Fire Did In its February 12, 2026 letter, the Applicant through its Attorney, made the following representation to this Council: “As part of the AB 130 process, the Fire Department confirmed that the Project complies with those standards” — referring specifically to PRC 4290, PRC 4291, and Chapter 7A as a conjunctiveset required for AB 130 eligibility. That is the representation the Applicant’s Attorney made to this Council. It is the foundation of their AB 130 exemption claim. The table below shows what the Applicant’s Attorney claimed against what Chief Estrada’s memo actually says. Requirement Applicant’s Attorney Claimed (Feb 12, 2026) What Estrada’s Memo Actually Shows (Mar 30, 2026) PRC 4290 (Setback — distance between buildings and property lines) Fire confirmed compliance with applicable Fire Code and AB 130 VHFHSZ standards. APPROVED. Same Practical Effect exception request for 30-foot setback under Section 1276.01. Explicit written approval signed by Fire Official. PRC 4291 (Defensible Space — cleared vegetation buffer around each structure) Fire confirmed compliance with standards established under PRC 4291 as part of the AB 130 process. Not mentioned. Not reviewed. Not analyzed. Four structural hardening measures approved — all Chapter 7A. No vegetation clearance, no Zone 1/Zone 2 analysis, no defensible space feasibility determination. Chapter 7A (Structural Hardening — building materials and construction standards) Fire confirmed compliance with Chapter 7A standards. Addressed through the four structural hardening measures in the exception request. These are Chapter 7A measures. What Chief Estrada Actually Said Chief Estrada’s memo describes one approval: a Same Practical Effect exception request under Section 1276.01 of the Fire Safe Regulations for the thirty-foot setback requirement under PRC 4290. PRC 4290 governs the required distance between buildings and property lines eg. setback. His memo is precise and professional. It describes exactly what Fire reviewed and approved. It does not mention PRC 4291. It does not analyze Zone 1 or Zone 2 clearance for any building. It does not evaluate whether the proposed site configuration can achieve the required defensible space distances around each structure. PRC 4291 governs defensible space. Chief Estrada did not claim to have reviewed PRC 4291. The Applicant claimed he did. Chief Estrada states: “County Fire memorialized its approval of the exception request in its January 7 and January 27 plan review comments, which have been presented to the City Planning Commission and City Council.” A review of those underlying documents confirms the same scope. The January 27 comments state explicitly: “Alternate Means/Methods Application for an exception request to PRC 4290.” Plan Status: “The exception request to PRC 4290 methods request is APPROVED.” PRC 4291 does not appear in either document. The Same Practical Effect Argument Does Not Extend to PRC 4291 Chief Estrada’s memo references the Same Practical Effect standard under 14 C.C.R. § 1270.07, which includes “fuel modification sufficient for civilian and firefighter safety” as one of five elements. This language addresses the PRC 4290 setback exception. It does not constitute a PRC 4291 defensible space feasibility analysis. Chief Estrada’s four approved measures consist entirely of structural hardening, non-combustible materials, ignition-resistant building components, sprinklers, and fire-rated exterior assemblies. These are Chapter 7A measures. Chapter 7A governs how a building is constructed to resist ignition. PRC 4291 requires a structure-level evaluation of whether each building can independently maintain Zone 1: the 30-foot managed clearance zone and Zone 2: the 30 to 100-foot reduced fuel zone given the actual site configuration. That analysis requires examining each building’s geometry, its proximity to adjacent structures, and whether the required clearance distances are physically achievable. Chief Estrada’s memo contains none of that. The Applicant demonstrated they know how to obtain a Same Practical Effect exception. They did it for PRC 4290 a written application, a narrative, a Fire Authority review, a signed approval via an AMMR (Alternate Means/Methods). If the Same Practical Effect standard were equally available for PRC 4291, the natural question is why they didn't simply file the same request for 4291 as they did for 4290? A site specific PRC 4291 feasibility analysis would have required demonstrating that each building can independently achieve the required clearance distances given the actual configuration - 10 buildings on 2.5 acres with setbacks reduced to 10 feet. That is a question the site geometry cannot answer favorably. The absence of a PRC 4291 exception request by the Applicant was not an oversight. It is the answer. Why No PRC 4291 Exception Request Was Filed The answer is in the Applicant’s own submission to Fire. The formal application submitted by the Applicant to the Santa Clara County Fire Department cited Section 1276.01 of the Fire Safe Regulations, the PRC 4290 setback requirement as the sole basis for the request. The description of request was for a reduction of the 30 foot setback. PRC 4291 is not referenced anywhere in the Applicants request of Fire. Fire reviewed what it was asked to review. The gap in the record is not Fire’s failure. It is the Applicant’s fractional request of Fire. See below for the Applicant’s own application to Fire, scoped entirely to PRC 4290 setback: continued on next page The applicant filed a formal exception request for PRC 4290. That process produced a written application, a narrative justification, a Fire Authority review, and a signed approval. That is how exception requests work when they are properly submitted. No equivalent process was followed for PRC 4291. No application. No narrative. No Fire Authority review scoped to defensible space feasibility. The same process that produced a documented PRC 4290 exception was never initiated for PRC 4291. There is a geometric reason for this. The AMMR that reduced the required setback from 30 feet to 10 feet under PRC 4290 physically consumed the space PRC 4291 requires. Zone 1 requires 30 feet of managed vegetation clearance from each structure. On the northern, southern, and western property boundaries, the AMMR reduced available space to 10 feet. Zone 2 which runs from 30 to 100 feet from each structure has no room to begin where Zone 1 cannot exist. The applicant’s own Defensible Space Fire Zone Plan confirms this: Zone 2 appears only at the outer perimeter of the site. It is geometrically absent from every interior-facing facade. This is not a paperwork gap. It is a geometry problem. Complying with PRC 4290 via the AMMR and complying with PRC 4291 are in direct tension on this site. A proper PRC 4291 feasibility analysis would surface that tension. That analysis was never submitted to Fire because submitting it would require answering a question the site geometry cannot answer favorably. Chief Estrada states that “County Fire approved the Same Practical Effect exception request for the Application.” The exception request submitted by the Applicant was for PRC 4290 setback. County Fire approved what it was asked to review. The record contains no indication that a PRC 4291 defensible space feasibility review was ever requested or submitted. Conclusion Chief Estrada’s memo is a professional and accurate description of what Fire reviewed. The problem is not what he said. The problem is what the Applicant claims he said. The Applicant through its Attorney told the City of Cupertino that Fire confirmed compliance with all three AB 130 fire standards. Chief Estrada’s memo confirms Fire reviewed one, the PRC 4290 setback. The AB 130 exemption requires all three to be adopted before the exemption is granted. That standard has not been met. Regards, David Yan Linda Vista Neighborhood Resident March 30, 2026 On the Improper Rezoning of 10857 -10887 Linda Vista Drive from R1 to R3 This letter looks at whether the City of Cupertino actually complied with the legal notification requirements in rezoning 10857-10887 Linda Vista Drive, sometimes called “Evulich Court,” from R1 to R3. This analysis is based on a chronological review of the City’s documents and their consistency with California Government Code Sections 65090 and 65091. The City had seven opportunities to reach the people most affected and failed at every one. Summary Compliance with state housing mandates does not excuse procedural violations. In fact, ensuring public participation and transparency is critical to achieving the equitable housing goals envisioned by state law. The City of Cupertino's rezoning of Evulich Court did not comply with statutory notification requirements or reasonable standards of transparency. The City's documents, when analyzed chronologically, reveal significant procedural deficiencies: 1. January 2022 Citywide Mailing: An initial mailing predated the inclusion of Evulich Court in the Housing Element and failed to notify residents of any specific rezoning plans. 2. June 5, 2024 Housing Element Rezoning Meeting eNotification: An electronic notification sent to subscribers lacked specificity about Evulich Court and did not reach nonsubscriber residents. 3. June 18, 2024 Affidavit of Mailing Notice: The City mailed notices to an "interested parties" list that did not include residents directly affected by the rezoning. 4. June 21, 2024 Public Hearing Display Ad: A newspaper ad in the Cupertino Courier was insufficient in reach and did not adequately inform residents of the specific rezoning. 5. June 27, 2024 City Council Meeting eNotification: Another electronic notification suffered from the same limitations as prior e-notifications. 6. July 2, 2024 City Council Meeting: The City proceeded with rezoning despite inadequate notification and public participation. 7. September 2024: Disregarded Community Petition: The city disregarded a petition signed by 745 about concerns about the rezoning of Euvulich Court, yet it was neither acknowledged nor placed on the City Council agenda for discussion. Two facts really stand out here. First: the City produced a mailing list for the Evulich Court rezoning that names the parcel owner and does not include a single residential neighbor within 300 feet. The list reached school districts, water agencies, and commercial landlords across the region. It did not reach the street next door. Second: the City’s own Assistant Director of Community Development stated in writing on November 5, 2024 that when the Evulich parcels were rezoned in July 2024, there was no citywide mailed notification to residents, and that the City instead relied on newspaper publication, its website, and opt-in e-notifications. That is in the administrative record. On top of that, there’s also a serious conflict of interest issue. The council member who cast a deciding vote on July 2, 2024 of the upzoning, Councilmember Sheila Mohan, resided approximately 959 feet from Evulich Court and did not recuse, despite a reasonably foreseeable material financial effect on her property under FPPC Regulations. Residents were excluded before the meeting while a materially interested councilmember participated in the vote that concluded it. Every other deficiency documented below compounds those facts. Legal Requirements for Rezoning Notification A. California Government Code Sections 65090-65091 ● Section 65090: Requires that notices of public hearings be published in a newspaper of general circulation and mailed to all owners of real property within a 300 foot radius of the subject property at least 10 days prior to the hearing. ● Section 65091: Mandates that notices must include the date, time, and place of the hearing, a general explanation of the matter to be considered, and a description of the property under consideration. HUD Requirements for Disclosure Framework The Housing Element Sites Inventory framework, mandated by HUD, requires jurisdictions to disclose site-specific data by street address and assessor parcel number, not by internal application codes. Cupertino's notices identified the Evulich Court rezoning only through application numbers such as “MCA-2023-001” or “SPA- 2023-001” (as per the relied upon documents) with no street name or parcel reference a resident could independently locate or verify. That choice was inconsistent with the transparency the framework requires. B. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) Requirements ● Section 8899.50 imposes a separate and independent mandatory duty on all public agencies to administer housing programs in a manner that affirmatively furthers fair housing. This duty applies to notification practices. A process that directs mailed notice to commercial landlords and government agencies across the region while sending nothing to the residential neighbors most directly affected by the rezoning is not one that affirmatively furthers fair housing. Chronological Analysis of City's Documents Each of the notice actions described above fails to meet the requirements of Sections 65090 and 65091. Taken together, they demonstrate that no compliant notice was ever provided. 1. January 2022 Citywide Mailing ● The City mailed a postcard to approximately 20,000 residents in January 2022 announcing the kickoff of the Housing Element update. This mailing had serious problems. ● Timing: The mailing occurred before Evulich Court was added to the Housing Element in February 2022; therefore, it could not have notified residents of the specific rezoning plans. ● Passage of Time: There is a long lapse between the January 2022 mailing and the July 2024 rezoning. Normal residential turnover, compounded by the significant time gap, likely means many current residents never received any initial communication about the rezoning process. ● Lack of Specificity: The mailing did not mention Evulich Court, Linda Vista Drive, or any specific sites proposed for rezoning. 2. June 5, 2024 Housing Element Rezoning Meeting eNotification ● On June 5, 2024, the City sent an email notification to subscribers of Cupertino General News, Housing, or Planning Commission Meetings, announcing a meeting about the Housing Element rezoning. This is insufficient by any reasonable standard. ● Limited Audience: Only reached residents who had subscribed to receive such notifications, excluding those unaware of the subscription process. Relying on digital notifications disproportionately excludes certain populations, such as older residents or those with limited access to digital resources. ● Lack of Specificity: Did not mention Evulich Court or Linda Vista Drive, instead referring generally to the Housing Element rezoning. 3. June 18, 2024 Affidavit of Mailing Notice ● On June 18, 2024, the City filed an affidavit stating that it mailed a Notice of Public Hearing for the July 2, 2024 City Council meeting to parties on an "interested parties" list. This mailing list was a major failure. ● Inadequate Mailing List: The “interested parties” list includes regional agencies and commercial property owners with no nexus to Linda Vista Drive such as the West Valley Mission Community College District of Saratoga and Cupertino Bowl LLC. It includes the Evulich parcel owner, confirming the City could identify site specific owners when it chose to. It does not include a single residential neighbor within 300 feet. 4. June 21, 2024 Public Hearing Display Ad ● On June 21, 2024, the City published a public hearing notice in the Cupertino Courier regarding the July 2, 2024 City Council meeting. This ad falls way short. ● Limited Circulation: The Cupertino Courier does not have a demonstrable reach within the Linda Vista Drive neighborhood. ● Ambiguity: The notice referred to application numbers like "MCA-2023- 001" without mentioning Evulich Court or Linda Vista Drive. 5. June 27, 2024 City Council Meeting eNotification ● On June 27, 2024, the City sent an email to subscribers announcing the July 2, 2024 City Council meeting. Again, clearly deficient. ● Same Issues as Prior eNotifications: Limited to subscribers, excluding many residents. Low engagement (31% unique opens and 3% click rate), further highlighting its insufficiency as a notification method. ● Lack of Specificity: Failed to mention Evulich Court, relying instead on cryptic application numbers. 6. July 2, 2024 City Council Meeting ● The City Council proceeded with the rezoning of Evulich Court on July 2, 2024 without evidence of proper notification to affected residents. The City later confirmed this in its own words. Four months after the councile meeting, in an email, the City’s Assistant Director of Community Development confirmed that no mailed notice was sent and that the City relied on publication, its website, and opt in eNotifications. Email screenshot on next page for reference. 7. Conflict of Interest at the Point of Decision Councilmember Sheila Mohan (Mayor at the time) participated in and voted in favor of the July 2, 2024 upzoning without recusing herself, despite residing approximately 959 feet from the Evulich Court site. Under California FPPC Regulation 18702.2(a)(8), a public official has a disqualifying financial interest when a governmental decision will have a reasonably foreseeable material financial effect on real property in which the official holds an interest, when that property lies between 500-1000 feet, if the effect is individually and materially distinguishable from its effect on the public generally. The rezoning of an immediately adjacent parcel from single family to high density does exactly that. It changes the character of the surrounding neighborhood in ways that directly and measurably affect proximate property values. Councilmember Mohan voted on this rezoning without disclosing or recusing on either. The City may argue that recusal was impractical because the vote was structured as a single ordinance. That argument is unavailable here. The July 2 vote covered five specific priority housing sites, not a general citywide policy. Recusal on the Evulich component while voting on the remaining four sites was procedurally available to Councilmember Mohan. She did not avail herself of that option. The notification failures locked residents out before the meeting. The conflict of interest tainted the vote that concluded it. The process failed at both ends. 8. August - September 2024 Petition Submission ● Disregard for a Community Submitted Petition: A petition signed by 745 residents was submitted in August and September 2024, after the July 2 vote. That timing matters: the upzoning was already complete, and the petition gave the City a clear opportunity to acknowledge the notification failures and initiate corrective action. It did neither. The petition was never acknowledged and never placed on a City Council agenda. ● On the Relevance of This Issue in 2026: One might try to argue that notification deficiencies are moot because residents now know about the project. The right to notice is not a right to eventually find out. It is a right to participate before an irreversible decision is made. Proper notification under Sections 65090-65091 would have enabled affected residents to appear at the July 2, 2024 hearing, submit written comments, seek advice, present objections before the Council voted and raise concerns about fire safety and evacuation that we are doing now. By the time most residents learned of the rezoning, the upzoning had already occurred. The harm is that the window for meaningful participation opened and closed without the residents who had the most at stake ever being told it existed. Subsequent awareness does not retroactively cure the deprivation of that opportunity. Courts have consistently held that the purpose of notice requirements is prospective, not remedial. ● To Make an Analogy of It: Real estate disclosure law makes the same point from a different angle. A seller cannot bury a known material defect in fine print and claim the buyer was informed. The City knew exactly which parcels were being upzoned; the residents did not. Requiring them to decode internal application numbers and search municipal databases mirrors the kind of information asymmetry that disclosure law is designed to prevent. The record shows a consistent pattern: no direct notice, no site specific disclosure, and no meaningful opportunity for affected residents to participate. Legal Implications A. Violation of California Sections 65090-65091 as discussed above. B. Challenge of Zoning Procedure is Supported by Case Law ● In Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, the California Supreme Court held that land use decisions which constitute a “substantial or significant deprivation of the property rights of other landowners” require that affected persons receive reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before the decision occurs. The court further held that these due process requirements “are not rooted in statute but are compelled by the stronger force of constitutional principle.” In other words, even where a statutory procedure exists, the Constitution independently demands meaningful notice to those whose property interests are at stake. The City cannot satisfy this floor by pointing to newspaper publication or subscriber email lists. Those methods did not reach the residents whose property would be most directly and materially affected by the rezoning of the adjacent parcel. ● In Scott v. City of Indian Wells (1972) 6 Cal.3d 541, the California Supreme Court held that adjacent property owners have standing to challenge a land use decision where the city failed to notify them of a public hearing, and that a city owes a duty to consider the interests of neighboring owners even when, as in that case, they reside outside city limits. The facts of Scott are instructive well beyond standing doctrine. The City of Indian Wells issued a conditional use permit for a large residential development on land formerly zoned R-1 single family. No neighboring owners outside city limits were notified. One owner appeared at the council meeting and attempted to submit a petition bearing 45 signatures from neighboring property owners within 300 feet. The petition was refused and, in the court’s words, “totally ignored.” The California Supreme Court found this deeply problematic and reversed the lower court’s dismissal. The parallels to Evulich Court are direct. A petition bearing 745 signatures, 16x the number at issue in Scott, was submitted and was never acknowledged, never placed on a City Council agenda, and never addressed. The court held that proper notice is a substantive due process safeguard, not a procedural technicality, and that ignoring the voices of affected neighbors is not a harmless error. Conclusion The record is what the City created. It speaks for itself. March 24, 2026 10857 - 10887 Linda Vista Dr “Evulich Court”, Rebuttal of Hexagon Evacuation Analysis This correspondence will be submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 hearing. The Hexagon Evacuation Analysis submitted by the Applicant does not demonstrate that this corridor is safe for evacuation. It demonstrates that the corridor already fails to meet the survivable window for a wildfire, before this project is added to the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone. The question is not whether 51 units add delay. It is whether this corridor is safe today. Hexagon never asked that question. The Evidentiary Record Is Not Neutral Before addressing the methodology, the Council should understand how the evidentiary record was assembled. The City's own consultant, Fehr and Peers, submitted a report 6 months ago, in October 2025 to study evacuation capacity covering this corridor. That study found both exits of Linda Vista Dr which are McClellan Rd and Bubb Rd, operating at over 200% of capacity under evacuation conditions. It has been routed to the Health and Safety Element process. The Applicant submitted the Hexagon study to the City hours before the hearing. The City's Senior Planner forwarded it to the City Clerk at 2:46 PM with a cover note explicitly stating: the study is not considered part of the project's application materials, was prepared without City input, and has not undergone the City's 3rd party peer review process. The Council is therefore in the following position: the Applicant's self commissioned, not peer reviewed, submitted last minute study is in the record for this project. Yet, the City's own professionally commissioned study which it had 6 months prior, which found the corridor at over 200% of capacity, is not being considered for this project. That asymmetry warrants scrutiny. Furthermore, evacuation was not part of the project’s evaluation until it was raised through independent analysis submitted by a resident. It is a subsequent analysis prepared after the issue was identified, using a framework that evaluates incremental impact rather than baseline safety. The sequence matters because it explains why the analysis focuses on whether the project adds marginal delay, rather than whether the corridor can safely evacuate under existing conditions. Hexagon Never Evaluated Whether the Existing Baseline Is Safe Hexagon's own analysis shows evacuation takes 59 minutes under existing conditions, excluding travel time along Linda Vista Drive before reaching the intersection. Hexagon never asks whether 59 minutes is safe. Instead, Hexagon cites the City's 2023 -2031 Housing Element Environmental Assessment, which concluded that implementation of the Housing Element would not substantially impair an adopted emergency response plan or emergency evacuation plan. That was a programmatic, citywide finding made before the City commissioned the far more detailed Fehr and Peers Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment. A finding about a citywide housing program is not a safety clearance for a specific project on a specific road in a fire hazard zone. The Applicant has previously stated at a Planning Commission (February 24, 2026) that the City cannot evaluate evacuation because no evacuation plan has been adopted by the City. They cannot have it both ways. They're saying the evacuation plan is too incomplete to evaluate against, but complete enough to claim clearance from. Evacuation safety is part of the City’s obligation to determine whether a project would create a serious public health risk under Government Code § 66474(f). If the City lacks substantial evidence that residents can safely evacuate, it cannot make that finding. Therefore, lets look at the data. Hexagon Contradicts the City's Own Consultant Without Explanation Hexagon's own Table 1 shows evacuation demand of 2,648 vehicles against a stated capacity of 2,700 vehicles per hour. With the project they cite 2,742 vehicles bringing the V/C ratio to 1.01, meaning demand exceeds the intersection's own stated capacity. Fehr and Peers, assessed the V/C ratio for these exact same roads at over 2.00, meaning the volume is double the physical capacity of the road. These two studies are analyzing the exact same streets and reaching conclusions that differ by a factor of > 2. A technical analysis that ignores directly contrary findings from the City's own expert consultant is one sided. Hexagon (Applicant) Fehr and Peers (City) V/C Ratio at Critical Exit Paths of Linda Vista Dr 0.98 existing or, 1.01 with project (see footnote A below) > 2.0 (200% capacity) existing Evacuation Time 59 min existing, 61 min with project Both exits over 200% capacity under existing conditions Compared to 30-min safety window Not addressed Fails by factor of 2+ Peer reviewed No Yes Commissioned by Applicant City of Cupertino Footnote A: Existing: 2,648 vehicles divided by 2,700 vph capacity = 0.98. With project: 2,742 vehicles divided by 2,700 vph capacity = 1.015, rounded to 1.01. Source: Hexagon Transportation Consultants, Evacuation Analysis for the Proposed Townhomes at 10857 Linda Vista Drive, February 26, 2026, Table 1. Even using Hexagon’s own assumptions, the system is at or beyond capacity. The City’s consultant shows it is already well beyond it. Hexagon frames the project's contribution as moving the V/C ratio from 0.98 to 1.01, a change of 3%. In an evacuation it is not negligible. A V/C ratio below 1.0 means the system can eventually clear. Above 1.0 it cannot. A standing queue forms that will not resolve because in a wildfire evacuation demand does not drop when residents are leaving simultaneously. The project does not add 3% to a functioning system. It pushes a system already at 98% of capacity past the point of no return. Once you exceed capacity, the queue only grows. That queue forms on Linda Vista Dr itself, not at the intersection, blocking residents before they ever reach an exit. The Analysis Relies on Intersection Capacity Rather Than Corridor Evacuation Constraints Hexagon estimates evacuation capacity at approximately 2,700 vehicles per hour based on three operational lanes at the Bubb Rd and McClellan Rd intersection. Fehr and Peers measured the capacity of the evacuation routes themselves. McClellan Rd and Bubb Rd each have a capacity of approximately 570 vehicles per hour. That downstream capacity governs the evacuation system. As a result, the intersection functions as an upstream release point feeding into a constrained corridor. Even if vehicles clear the intersection, they immediately enter a roadway operating at multiples of its capacity, causing queues that propagate backward through the system. Fehr and Peers Table 4 below documents the actual roadway capacity of the evacuation routes serving this corridor. The system cannot evacuate faster than its slowest segment. Hexagon counts three outbound movements at the Bubb/McClellan intersection: "the eastbound left- turn, eastbound through, and northbound through", at 900 vph each. 900 + 900 + 900 = 2,700 vph, by their calculation. But for each of those three movements, Fehr and Peers measured the roads (McClellan and Bubb) at 570 vph. 570 + 570 + 570 = 1,710 vph. Not 2,700. Hexagon 2,700 vph does measure intersection capacity, not route capacity per Ferh and Peers. That distinction proves an important point that releasing 2,700 vehicles per hour through an intersection into roads that can only absorb 1,710 vph does not evacuate 2,700 vehicles per hour. Fehr and Peers Table 4: Evacuation Route Capacity Fehr and Peers Table 4 reports downstream evacuation route capacity, not intersection throughput. McClellan Road and Bubb Road operate as single outbound lane collectors at approximately 570 vehicles per hour. That segment capacity governs evacuation once vehicles clear the intersection. Hexagon Assumed Ideal Conditions for a Non Ideal Scenario Hexagon's capacity estimate assumes there are three lanes at Bubb and McClellan fully operational with normal signal timing throughout the evacuation. Wildfires can cause power outages. When traffic signals fail, intersections revert to four way stop operations. Capacity at a four way stop is a fraction of capacity at a functioning signal. Hexagon does not model this scenario. It does not mention power outages. It does not acknowledge that the scenario it is evaluating, a wildfire emergency, is precisely the scenario most likely to degrade the infrastructure its capacity estimate depends on. The Corridor Fails Well Beyond the Intersection Even after clearing the intersection, conditions worsen. Fehr and Peers Table 11 (below) shows evacuation route link capacity. McClellan Road east of Bubb Road operates at a V/C ratio of 4.2 under evacuation conditions. Every vehicle that clears the Bubb/McClellan intersection immediately enters a road operating at 420 percent of capacity going east, or 240% going north. Hexagon modeled the gate, not the corridor beyond it. Fehr and Peers Table 11: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis. McClellan Road east of Bubb Road (green) reaches a V/C ratio of 4.2. McClellan Road east of Imperial Avenue and Bubb Road north of Hyannisport Drive (yellow) reach 2.1 and 2.4 respectively. These are existing conditions before this project is built. Hexagon Modeled an Intersection, Not a Corridor Adding 51 units to the middle of Linda Vista Dr does not just add vehicles to the intersection count. It inserts a new conflict point into the center point of the corridor, where Evulich Ct traffic must merge into a standing queue of Linda Vista Dr residents already attempting to evacuate. As discussed above, evacuation is constrained by corridor capacity, not intersection throughput. In a real wildfire evacuation the pipe matters as much as the gate. If the only two exits from Linda Vista Drive are operating over 200% of capacity, the queue does not form at the intersection. It forms on Linda Vista Drive itself, trapping residents before they ever reach the gate. Am I saying housing can never be built on a street with a high V/C ratio? No, absolutely not. A road with a 2.0 V/C ratio on Stevens Creek Blvd is an inconvenience. The same V/C ratio on a street exiting a VHFHS Zone is a trap. Evacuation Time Must Include Both the Corridor and the Intersection Evacuation from this corridor occurs in sequence, first along Linda Vista Drive and then through the Bubb/McClellan intersection. Table 1 from the Hexagon report shows that at a V/C ratio of 1.01, evacuation time is 61 minutes, but that estimate reflects only clearance through the intersection. DerChang Kau, a veteran engineer and Adjunct Professor of Engineering, applied standard queuing methodology to estimate evacuation time along the Linda Vista corridor at approximately 93 minutes. This analysis evaluates the Linda Vista spine, which is not included in Hexagon’s estimate. Hexagon estimates clearance through the Bubb/McClellan intersection, while Mr. Kau evaluates clearance along Linda Vista Drive before vehicles reach that intersection. Both segments must be traversed in sequence during an evacuation. As a result, even accepting Hexagon’s assumptions, the 61 minute estimate does not represent total evacuation time to safety. Lastly, having defined the Bubb/McClellan intersection as the critical evacuation outlet, the Applicant cannot treat the roadway segments feeding that intersection as out of scope. The capacity of those segments is precisely what Fehr and Peers measured. This is one of multiple independent reasons the Fehr and Peers evacuation analysis must be included in the record. What the Council Should Require You have all the evidence that evacuation of the Linda Vista Dr corridor cannot safely evacuate residents in a wildfire of this Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone. Under Government Code Section 66474(f) of the Subdivision Map Act, the Council may deny this project if there is substantial evidence that it would cause serious public health or safety problems. The Council has both the authority and the obligation to act on it. Approval without evidence of safety violates the Subdivision Map Act. Sincerely, David Yan Linda Vista Neighborhood Resident March 30, 2026 Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao, City Councilmembers: The CEQA exemption under AB130 requires compliance with PRC 4291. The Santa Clara County Fire Authority signed off on PRC 4290. Not 4291. This letter addresses a separate and independent issue from the threshold eligibility argument I submitted on March 21 2026 10:51am PST. Each stands on its own. AB130 Existing Standards Framework AB 130's fire hazard mitigation criteria are conjunctive. Government Code Section 65913.4(6)(D) requires compliance with all of the following: PRC 4291, PRC 4290, and Chapter 7A. The statute uses the word "all." The Conflation Problem The applicant has treated PRC 4290 setback and PRC 4291 defensible space as the same requirement. They are not. PRC 4290 governs setback, the distance between structures or property lines. PRC 4291 governs defensible space, the clearance of vegetation around structures. They address different risks. In plain terms: setback is about how close buildings sit to each other. Defensible space is about whether there is enough cleared vegetation around those buildings for occupants to survive a wildfire. The David J. Powers AB 130 Qualification Memo, dated February 18, 2026 which is the City’s own qualifying document makes this conflation explicit. On page 12, under Condition 7, their entire fire hazard mitigation showing consists of: Chapter 7A compliance, noncombustible landscaping, fire sprinklers within 30 feet of the property line, enhanced exterior materials, and the AMMR reducing the required 30 foot setback. PRC 4291 is not mentioned once. Why the Setback Reduction Makes This More Urgent The AMMR reduced the required setback from 30 feet to 10 feet. PRC 4291 independently requires 100 feet of defensible space clearance around structures. These are not the same measurement addressing the same concern. The setback reduction compressed buildings together. Whether the resulting site configuration of buildings 10 feet apart on a 2.5 acre parcel in a VHFHSZ can support the required defensible space clearance is precisely the analysis that was required before the exemption was granted. A site with buildings separated by 10 feet must still provide up to 100 feet of defensible space around each structure. The record contains no analysis demonstrating that this is physically achievable on a 2.5 acre site. Without that showing, compliance with PRC 4291 is speculative. What the Record Actually Shows The David J. Powers memo states that the Santa Clara County Fire Department "has determined that appropriate fire hazard mitigation measures have been incorporated by the project." That determination was scoped to PRC 4290. Footnote 5 cites only the Fire Prevention Plan Review Comments dated January 27, 2026. Those comments do not mention PRC 4291. The Fire Authority reviewed setback. It did not review defensible space. Meanwhile, Jensen Hughes, the Applicant’s consultant scoped their review to structural hardening and defensible space requirements "as required by Public Resources Code 4290," alongside Chapter 7A. The Fire Authority's scope mirrors Jensen Hughes exactly. Both reviewed 4290. Neither reviewed 4291. This is not an oversight in the paperwork. It is the boundary of what was actually evaluated. Chapter 7A: Reviewed by Jensen Hughes. PRC 4290: Reviewed by Jensen Hughes via the AMMR. PRC 4291: No analysis by any party. Absent from the record entirely. There is therefore no document in the record that supports a finding that the project complies with PRC 4291. See below from Jensen Hughes own memo: Distinguishing Conceptual Landscape Zoning From PRC 4291 Compliance PRC 4291 compliance is not a landscaping question. It is a feasibility question: can each proposed structure independently maintain the required clearance distances given the actual site configuration? A zone diagram showing Zone 0, Zone 1, and Zone 2 on a site plan does not answer that question. The record contains no analysis demonstrating that the required clearance conditions can be met for each building without overlap or conflict from adjacent structures placed 10 feet apart on a 2.5 acre parcel. That feasibility showing was required before the exemption was granted. It is absent. Absence of PRC 4291 Analysis Renders the "All" Requirement Unmet The anticipated response is that PRC 4291 carries an ongoing maintenance obligation rather than a preapproval signoff, and therefore its absence from the record is unremarkable. That argument misses the point. PRC 4291 does impose an ongoing maintenance obligation on property owners. But that obligation presupposes a site configuration capable of supporting compliance. An ongoing maintenance requirement does not fix a feasibility or geometry problem. This is precisely why PRC 4291 is signed off at both pre-approval as well as post build. AB 130 requires that fire hazard mitigation measures, including PRC 4291 be adopted as a condition of eligibility, not deferred to the permit stage. If the record contains no evidence addressing whether the configuration can meet those conditions, the Council has no basis to conclude that PRC 4291 is satisfied. The Council must be able to make a finding, based on the record before it, that the proposed site configuration can satisfy PRC 4291. No document in the record shows how the proposed layout satisfies PRC 4291 for each structure. Because the applicant may point to various diagrams as “defensible space,” Appendix 2 includes those exhibits and demonstrates why none of them satisfy PRC 4291 or establish the required feasibility finding. The Ask The record before this Council contains no PRC 4291 analysis. That is not a resident's interpretation. It is confirmed by the applicant's own consultant in their own words. The AB 130 exemption the City has allowed to stand was granted without the analysis the statute requires. Because AB 130 requires compliance with PRC 4291, the Council must be able to support that finding with evidence in the record. The record contains none. Any after the fact letter or conclusory signoff does not substitute for evidence already in the record supporting that finding. If the record does not contain such evidence, the Council cannot make the required eligibility determination and the exemption must be withdrawn. The two independent grounds for withdrawing the AB 130 exemption are in this letter and in my March 21st submission. Both stand on their own and either is sufficient. The City of Cupertino is better protected by getting this right before April 1 than by defending it afterward. Regards, David Yan Linda Vista Neighborhood Resident Appendix 1 Government Code Section 65913.4(6)(D) Conjunctive Fire Hazard Criteria The statute requires compliance with all of the following as a conjunctive set: Section 4291 of the Public Resources Code, Section 4290 of the Public Resources Code, and Chapter 7A of the California Building Code. The word "all" is in the statute itself. These are not alternative pathways. A project in a VHFHSZ must satisfy each one. Appendix 2 - Why the Applicant’s Exhibits Do Not Constitute PRC 4291 Compliance (from Fire PRA) The applicant may point to various diagrams and plan sheets as evidence of PRC 4291. For clarity and completeness, each of the four relevant exhibits is reproduced below, followed by a brief explanation of why none of them individually or collectively satisfy PRC 4291 or the AB 130 eligibility requirement to demonstrate defensible space feasibility before granting an exemption. Additionally, none of the applicant’s fire-related exhibits reference PRC 4291 or perform the defensible space feasibility analysis the statute requires. Continued on next page Exhibit 1 - Setback Site Plan (PRC 4290) Why Exhibit 1 is not PRC 4291: This sheet is a setback diagram, which falls under PRC 4290, not PRC 4291. Continued on next page Exhibit 2 - Conceptual Landscape Zoning – NOT SIGNED OFF BY FIRE This exhibit shows defensible space zones around the proposed buildings. PRC 4291 applies at the structure level, requiring clearance outward from each building. For interior buildings, that clearance is constrained by adjacent structures. The plan does not show how those buildings achieve the Zone 2 requirement under those conditions. Why this is not PRC 4291: This is a conceptual landscape architect zoning diagram, not a statutory feasibility analysis. It shows: • Zone 0 / Zone 1 / Zone 2 coloring • tree canopy spacing • generic CAL FIRE “guidelines and recommendations” PRC 4291 applies at the structure level and requires clearance outward from each building. For interior buildings, that clearance is constrained by adjacent structures. The exhibit shows Zone 2 generally across the site, but does not show how interior buildings achieve the required clearance where surrounding buildings limit outward space. In these areas, defensible space is effectively shared and is effectively restricted to Zones 0 and 1. The Zone 2 areas shown are primarily at the site edges. For example, between buildings 3 and 4, and along the interior areas north of buildings 1-5 and south of buildings 6-10, Zone 2 appears only in limited and fragmented areas. The plan does not show a clear Zone 2 area for each building in those locations. Lastly, this is a design intent exhibit, not evidence supporting a finding that the project complies with PRC 4291 or one that shows the Fire performed a detailed review or measurements. Continued on next page Exhibit 3 — Landscape Materials and Planting Guidance Sheet Why this is not PRC 4291: This sheet provides general materials and spacing guidance for vegetation. It defines Zone 2 as an area extending outward from each structure. Zone 2 is defined as an outward area from each structure. For interior buildings, that outward area is cut off by adjacent buildings and circulation space. The plan does not show where the Zone 2 area described in this sheet exists for those buildings. Continued on next page Exhibit 4 — Wildfire Construction Requirements (Chapter 7A / CRC R337) Why this is not PRC 4291: This sheet addresses structural hardening: • ember resistant vents • tempered glazing • noncombustible siding • ignition-resistant materials PRC 4291 is not about building materials. Aggregate Conclusion These exhibits show the site layout, defensible space zones, vegetation standards, and construction requirements. Exhibit 1 shows where the buildings are placed. This is a 4290 not 4291 requirement. Exhibit 2 shows defensible space zones across the site. Exhibit 3 defines how those zones are intended to function. Exhibit 4 addresses building materials. This is a 7A not 4291, requirement Exhibit 3 defines Zone 2 as an outward area from each structure. In the layout shown that outward area is limited for interior buildings by adjacent structures and circulation space. The plan does not show where the Zone 2 area exists for those. Based on the spacing between interior buildings, the outward area required by Zone 2 is not present for those structures. The plan does not show that PRC 4291 is satisfied. No document in the record shows that the Fire Authority evaluated or approved compliance with PRC 4291. From:Vikram Saxena To:City Attorney"s Office; Kitty Moore; Tina Kapoor; City Clerk Cc:DerChang Kau; lindavistatt@gmail.com; davidcyan@gmail.com; Mark Fantozzi Subject:Legal Incompatibility of AB 130 Ministerial Exemption with Discretionary Fire Safety Findings – 10857 Linda Vista Drive Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 12:03:51 PM Attachments:Attachment_Z_SCCFD_Response_Hector_Estrada.pdf Memo_Gaps_In_Estrada_SCCFD_Response_Revised-3.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Mayor Moore and City Attorney Andrews: The project at 10857 Linda Vista Drive cannot legally use the AB 130 CEQA exemption. State law requires projects in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone to have “adopted fire hazard mitigation measures” under all three state fire standards: PRC 4290, PRC 4291, and Chapter 7A of the Building Code (Gov. Code § 65913.4(a)(6) (D)). This project does not comply with PRC 4290—it has an exception from it. The Fire Department’s own approval is titled “Application for Use of Alternate Materials, Methods of Construction, or Modification of Code.” A modification of the code is not compliance with the code. Beyond this threshold statutory problem, the approval process itself is incompatible with the ministerial pathway AB 130 requires. Legal Argument: Failure to Meet Ministerial Criteria Ministerial Streamlining Requirement: AB 130 is designed specifically to streamline housing projects that are ministerial, meaning they must be approved based on a checklist of objective standards without the exercise of personal or professional judgment. VHFHSZ Exclusion: Projects located in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ) are explicitly excluded from the AB 130 exemption unless they satisfy specific state fire mitigation measures. Non-Compliance with Objective Setbacks: The state’s primary objective fire safety standard for these zones is a mandatory 30-foot setback from all property lines (14 C.C.R. § 1276.01). Discretionary “Exception” Pathway: Rather than meeting this objective 30- foot requirement, the developer is seeking a reduction to as little as 10 feet. This requires a finding of “Same Practical Effect,” which is a discretionary exception process under 14 C.C.R. § 1270.07. Legal Incompatibility: Because the project’s fire safety compliance depends on a discretionary “exception” and a subjective “determination” by fire officials, it fails the “objective planning standards” test required for a ministerial CEQA exemption. Discretionary Judgment vs. Objective Standards in the Estrada Memo The supplemental report from Assistant Fire Chief Hector Estrada (the “Estrada Memo”) confirms that the Fire Department’s analysis is based on professional judgment rather than the application of fixed, objective rules: 1. Qualitative Determinations: The memo explicitly states that staff “determined” the proposed mitigation measures provided “appropriate” alternatives. In a ministerial process, staff should only confirm if a project meets a specific number (e.g., 30 feet); deciding what is “appropriate” is a discretionary act. 2. Subjective Sufficiency: The Fire Department concluded the fuel modification was “sufficient” for safety. “Sufficiency” is a matter of professional opinion and interpretation, not a binary, objective standard. 3. Admitted Deficiencies: The Department’s own internal plan review labels the 10-foot setback as a “deficiency” that is “non-conforming.” Mitigating a documented deficiency through a negotiated set of alternative measures is the definition of a discretionary approval process. 4. Case-by-Case Evaluation: The Estrada Memo confirms that “Same Practical Effect” requests are approved on a “case-by-case basis.” Any process that varies case-by-case based on staff analysis is discretionary and ineligible for a ministerial streamline. Procedural and Technical Deficiencies Beyond the discretionary nature of the approval, there are l questions regarding the Estrada Memo’s findings that remain unaddressed. As detailed in the residents’ memorandum of March 31, 2026, these evidentiary gaps include: An unsupported evacuation finding that lacks any documented traffic modeling or data to back its conclusions. A failure to reconcile findings with the City’s own Fehr & Peers study, which shows the Linda Vista evacuation corridor is already operating at four times its design capacity. The omission of two out of five mandatory components required by law to prove “Same Practical Effect” under 14 C.C.R. § 1270.01—specifically water accessibility and fire/address signing. The missing signature of the City Building Official on the required Alternate Means and Methods Request (AMMR) form, which is a violation of CBC § 104.11. The City cannot legally rely on a discretionary fire safety “exception”—whose validity has not been tested by technical experts and is based on conclusory statements rather than documented analysis—to justify a ministerial CEQA exemption. I respectfully request that the Council direct the City Attorney to evaluate whether these discretionary findings, which the record shows suffer from significant evidentiary deficiencies, disqualify the project from its current approval pathway. Sincerely, Vikram Saxena On behalf of Linda Vista Drive Residents Page 1 of 2 TO: Cupertino City Officials FROM: Hector Estrada, Assistant Fire Chief SUBJECT: Housing Development - Linda Vista Drive As requested by City Manager Kapoor and in response to the questions from the Cupertino City Council, this supplemental staff report provides a summary of the process that led to the Santa Clara County Fire Department’s plan review comments on the Architectural and Site Approval Permit Application for the proposed subdivision at 10857 Linda Vista Drive. Background The Santa Clara County Fire Department (“County Fire”) provides fire safety plan review comments for land development in the City of Cupertino. Specifically, County Fire reviews Architectural and Site Approval Permit Applications for compliance with applicable state and local fire safety requirements related to site design.1 County Fire staff then prepares plan review comments and presents them to City officials to support the City’s decision to approve or deny an Architectural and Site Approval Permit Application. Summary In January 2026, County Fire staff provided plan review comments on the Architectural and Site Approval Permit Application for the proposed residential subdivision at 10857 Linda Vista Drive (ASA-2024-015) (the “Project” and the “Application”). Because the Project is located in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone, it is subject to the State Minimum Fire Safe Regulations (“Fire Safe Regulations”) (14 C.C.R. §§ 1270, et seq.), in addition to generally applicable fire safety requirements in the California Building Standards Code.2 The Fire Safe Regulations include an exception request process that allows projects to move forward even if they cannot meet specific site-design criteria.3 Specifically, the Fire Safe Regulations allow for the approval of exception requests on a case-by-case basis if the exception provides “the Same Practical Effect as these regulations towards providing Defensible Space.” (14 C.C.R. § 1270.07.)4 The Application includes a Same Practical Effect exception request for the thirty-foot setbacks required by Section 1276.01 of the Fire Safe Regulations. The applicant proposed the following measures to support the exception request: (1) Non-combustible material extending five feet horizontally around the buildings. (2) Wildfire home hardening protective measures, including but not limited to a Class A roof, non-combustible exterior building material, protected eave vents, and double paned tempered glass. 1 At the building permit phase, County Fire reviews building permit applica:ons for compliance with addi:onal fire safety requirements, including those related to construc:on. 2 Public Resources Code Sec:on 4290 addresses the applicability of the Fire Safe Regula:ons in Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones. 3 The process and standards for approving Same Prac:cal Effect excep:on requests in the Fire Safe Regula:ons are dis:nct from the process and standards for approving for Alternate Materials and Methods Requests (AMMR) in the California Building Standards Code. 4 The Fire Safe Regula:ons define “Same Prac:cal Effect” as “an Excep:on or alterna:ve with the capability of applying accepted wildland fire suppression strategies and tac:cs, and provisions for fire fighter safety, including: (1) access for emergency wildland fire equipment, (2) safe civilian evacua:on, (3) signing that avoids delays in emergency equipment response, (4) available and accessible water to effec:vely aWack Wildfire or defend a Structure from Wildfire, and (5) fuel modifica:on sufficient for civilian and fire fighter safety.” (14 C.C.R. § 1270.01(aa).) Page 2 of 2 (3) Exterior fire sprinkler heads protecting covered porches and decks that are within thirty feet of the property line. (4) Fire resistance rated exterior elements within thirty feet of the property lines including: a. Exterior Walls - Fire resistance rated for one hour. b. Projections (portions of the building protruding beyond exterior walls) - Fire resistance rated for one hour. c. Penetrations (e.g., mechanical, electrical, plumbing services) - Protected to maintain fire resistance rated assemblies. Section 1276.01 of the Fire Safe Regulations provides guidance on exception requests related to the thirty-foot setback requirement: A reduction in the minimum setback shall be based upon practical reasons, which may include but are not limited to, parcel dimensions or size, topographic limitations, Development density requirements or other Development patterns that promote low- carbon emission outcomes; sensitive habitat; or other site constraints, and shall provide for an alternative method to reduce Structure-to-Structure ignition by incorporating features such as, but not limited to: (1) non-combustible block walls or fences; or (2) non-combustible material extending five (5) feet horizontally from the furthest extent of the Building; or (3) hardscape landscaping; or (4) a reduction of exposed windows on the side of the Structure with a less than thirty (30) foot setback; or (5) the most protective requirements in the California Building Code, California Code of Regulations Title 24, Part 2, Chapter 7A, as required by the Local Jurisdiction. (14 C.C.R. § 1276.01(b).) Based on our analysis of the site and the combined impact of the measures proposed in the exception request, County Fire staff determined that these measures provide appropriate alternative methods to reduce the risk of structure-to-structure ignition, and County Fire approved the Same Practical Effect exception request for the Application. The Project includes two of the five measures identified in Section 1276.01 as alternative methods to reduce the risk of structure-to-structure ignition and two additional measures: exterior sprinklers and increased fire resistive rated exterior elements. Analyzing these measures based on accepted wildland fire suppression strategies and tactics and provisions for firefighter safety, County Fire staff determined that the exception request provided appropriate access for emergency wildland fire equipment and safe civilian evacuation and that the exception request included fuel modification sufficient for civilian and firefighter safety. County Fire memorialized its approval of the exception request in its January 7 and January 27 plan review comments, which have been presented to the City Planning Commission and City Council. County Fire’s plan review comments also notified the applicant that they will need to submit a final fire protection plan, onsite fire hydrant design specifications, and a construction site safety plan as part of their building permit application. Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response MEMORANDUM TO:Cupertino City Council FROM:Linda Vista Neighborhood Residents DATE:March 31, 2026 RE:Evidentiary Deficiencies in the SCCFD Supplemental Memorandum of Assistant Fire Chief Estrada Regarding the Same Practical Effect Exception for the Proposed Development at 10857 Linda Vista Drive (ASA-2024-015) I. Introduction and Summary This memorandum responds to the supplemental report submitted by Assistant Fire Chief Hector Estrada of the Santa Clara County Fire Department (“SCCFD”), dated March 2026 and included as Attachment Z in the supplemental packet for the April 1, 2026 City Council hearing on the proposed 51-unit residential development at 10857 Linda Vista Drive. The Estrada memorandum purports to explain and defend SCCFD’s approval of a Same Practical Effect exception under the State Minimum Fire Safe Regulations (14 C.C.R. §§ 1270 et seq.) for the reduction of mandatory 30-foot setbacks to as little as 10 feet. The memorandum concludes that the exception “provided appropriate access for emergency wildland fire equipment and safe civilian evacuation.” We submit that this conclusion is unsupported by the evidence, contradicted by the City’s own adopted data, and fails to satisfy the evidentiary standard required for the AB 130 CEQA exemption (PRC § 21080.66) in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone. Specifically, the memorandum suffers from five critical deficiencies: 1. Unsupported evacuation finding. The memorandum asserts that safe civilian evacuation has been provided but offers no data, analysis, methodology, or modeling to support that conclusion. 2. Failure to address contrary evidence. The memorandum does not reference, address, or reconcile its evacuation finding with the City’s own Fehr & Peers Health and Safety Element Update, which documents that the Linda Vista Drive evacuation corridor operates at approximately four times its design capacity. 3. Incomplete application of the regulatory standard. The memorandum narrows its analysis to structure-to-structure ignition mitigation while the regulatory definition of “Same Practical Effect” requires a five-part finding that includes safe civilian evacuation, emergency equipment access, signing, water supply, and fuel modification. Page 1 Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response 4. Impermissible deferral of compliance. The memorandum defers key fire safety compliance to the building permit phase, while the AB 130 CEQA exemption requires that fire hazard mitigation measures be adopted at the entitlement stage. 5. Procedural recharacterization of the approval process. The memorandum recharacterizes the approval as a Fire Safe Regulations exception rather than an Alternative Means and Methods Request (AMMR). This shift has the effect of bypassing the dual sign-off requirement that the Building Official has not satisfied under CBC § 104.11. Each of these deficiencies is analyzed below. II. The Evacuation Finding Is Unsupported by Any Evidence in the Record The final substantive paragraph of the Estrada memorandum states: County Fire staff determined that the exception request provided appropriate access for emergency wildland fire equipment and safe civilian evacuation and that the exception request included fuel modification sufficient for civilian and firefighter safety. This sentence is the only statement in the entire memorandum addressing evacuation. It is a bare conclusion. The memorandum provides: • No evacuation study or analysis; • No traffic modeling or vehicle count data; • No volume-to-capacity analysis of the evacuation corridor; • No assessment of the impact of adding 51 units and 102 vehicles to a single-access cul-de-sac; • No reference to any methodology by which “safe civilian evacuation” was evaluated; and • No explanation of what “safe civilian evacuation” means in the context of a corridor the City’s own data shows is already failing. Under established principles of California administrative law, a conclusory statement by an agency, unsupported by evidence in the record, does not constitute substantial evidence. (Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515 [implicit in the substantial evidence standard is the requirement that the agency must set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between raw evidence and the ultimate decision].) The Estrada memorandum does not set forth the findings necessary to bridge the analytic gap between the evidence in the record and the evacuation conclusion, as Topanga requires. Page 2 Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response III. The Finding Contradicts the City’s Own Adopted Evacuation Data The Estrada memorandum does not merely fail to provide evidence for its evacuation finding. It makes that finding in the face of contrary evidence already in the City’s possession. The City’s Health and Safety Element Update, prepared by Fehr & Peers, documents the following conditions for evacuation zone CUP-029, which includes the Linda Vista Drive corridor serving the project site: • McClellan Road, the primary evacuation outlet: volume-to-capacity (V/C) ratio of 4.2 • Foothill Boulevard: V/C ratio of 4.0 • Evacuation zone CUP-029 generates 38% of all modeled evacuation trips A volume-to-capacity ratio above 1.0 indicates an oversaturated roadway. Ratios of 4.0 to 4.2 mean the corridor is operating at approximately four times its design capacity during a wildfire evacuation — at current densities. The Fehr & Peers study models the project site at its existing 4-unit residential density. It does not account for the proposed 51-unit development with 102 on-site parking spaces, which would approximately double the evacuation vehicle load generated from this parcel. SCCFD’s memorandum does not mention this data. It does not distinguish it. It does not explain why its conclusion is consistent with it. An agency finding that is contradicted by evidence in the administrative record, and that provides no explanation for the contradiction, does not constitute substantial evidence. (Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 516 [requiring agencies to disclose “the analytic route the agency traveled from evidence to action”].) IV. The Memorandum Applies the Wrong Standard A. The Regulatory Definition of “Same Practical Effect” The Fire Safe Regulations define “Same Practical Effect” at 14 C.C.R. § 1271.00 (formerly § 1270.01(aa)) as follows: “Same Practical Effect: As used in this subchapter, means an exception or alternative with the capability of applying accepted wildland fire suppression strategies and tactics, and provisions for fire fighter safety, including: (a) access for emergency wildland fire equipment, (b) safe civilian evacuation, (c) signing that avoids delays in emergency equipment response, (d) available and accessible water to effectively attack wildfire or defend a structure from wildfire, and (e) fuel modification sufficient for civilian and fire fighter safety.” SCCFD acknowledges this definition. Footnote 4 of the Estrada memorandum reproduces it in full. The memorandum therefore cannot claim ignorance of the standard. Page 3 Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response B. The Analysis Addresses Only One of Five Required Elements Despite reproducing the five-part definition, the substantive analysis in the body of the memorandum focuses almost entirely on a single element: structure-to-structure ignition. The memorandum devotes two paragraphs to explaining how the four proposed mitigation measures reduce “the risk of structure-to-structure ignition.” It identifies which measures correspond to the alternatives listed in § 1276.01(b). This analysis is detailed and specific. By contrast, the evacuation finding consists of a single sentence with no supporting analysis. The memorandum provides no discussion of: • How a 51-unit development on a dead-end cul-de-sac satisfies the requirement for “safe civilian evacuation”; • Whether the existing road network can support simultaneous emergency equipment access and civilian evacuation, as required by § 1273.00; • Whether the signing requirements of element (c) have been satisfied; • Whether the water supply requirements of element (d) have been evaluated at the entitlement stage; or • How the four proposed mitigation measures — which address building materials and construction standards — provide any capability for civilian evacuation. The evacuation finding is unsupported by any technical analysis in the memorandum, in contrast to the detailed substantiation provided for the structure-to-structure ignition mitigation. This disparity creates an internally inconsistent record in which building-level safety is documented but corridor-wide life safety is addressed only by assertion. C. The Proposed Mitigations Have No Functional Relationship to Evacuation The four mitigation measures identified in the Estrada memorandum are: (1) Class A fire-rated roofing, (2) non-combustible exterior wall siding, (3) tempered glass windows, and (4) automatic fire sprinkler systems. Each of these measures addresses structure-to-structure ignition resistance. None of them increases the width of a road, adds an evacuation route, reduces the vehicle count on the Linda Vista Drive corridor, or otherwise has any functional relationship to evacuation capacity. A finding that reduced setbacks achieve the “same practical effect” as the 30-foot requirement must address all five elements of § 1271.00, including safe civilian evacuation. Mitigations that harden buildings against radiant heat do not, by themselves, demonstrate that residents can safely evacuate through a corridor already operating at four times its design capacity. The memorandum does not explain how building-level mitigations substitute for the evacuation capacity that the 30-foot setback requirement was, in part, designed to protect. Page 4 Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response D. Article 2 of the Fire Safe Regulations Requires Concurrent Evacuation Capacity The Estrada memorandum does not reference Article 2 of the Fire Safe Regulations (§§ 1273.00–1273.09), which governs emergency access and egress. Section 1273.00 states: “Roads and driveways, whether public or private, unless exempted under 14 CCR § 1270.02(d), shall provide for safe access for emergency wildfire equipment and civilian evacuation concurrently, and shall provide unobstructed traffic circulation during a wildfire emergency.” This is not a general aspiration. It is a mandatory standard: roads serving the development must support firefighting access and civilian evacuation at the same time. The Fehr & Peers data shows that the Linda Vista Drive corridor is already at approximately four times its design capacity for evacuation alone, before accounting for concurrent emergency vehicle access. The Estrada memorandum does not address whether the Evulich Court cul-de-sac and the Linda Vista Drive corridor can meet this requirement, either at current densities or with the proposed 51-unit addition. V. The Memorandum Impermissibly Defers Compliance to the Building Permit Stage Footnote 1 of the Estrada memorandum states: “At the building permit phase, County Fire reviews building permit applications for compliance with additional fire safety requirements, including those related to construction.” The final paragraph further states that the applicant “will need to submit a final fire protection plan, onsite fire hydrant design specifications, and a construction site safety plan as part of their building permit application.” This deferral creates a legal problem for the AB 130 CEQA exemption. Government Code § 65913.4(a)(6)(D) provides that the VHFHSZ exclusion “does not apply to sites that have adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures.” The operative word is “adopted” — past tense. The fire hazard mitigation measures must be in place at the time the CEQA exemption is claimed, not promised for a future permitting stage. The items deferred to the building permit phase — a final fire protection plan, onsite fire hydrant design specifications, and a construction site safety plan — are not ministerial verification tasks. They involve substantive design decisions that determine whether the mitigation measures actually achieve the same practical effect as the 30-foot setback. If the fire protection plan has not been finalized, the City cannot assess at the entitlement stage whether the mitigation measures are adequate. This is precisely the problem identified in case law regarding deferred mitigation. Page 5 Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response A CEQA exemption determination is made at the entitlement stage. If material fire safety compliance is deferred to the building permit stage, the exemption condition has not been satisfied at the time the exemption is invoked. The City cannot rely on future compliance to justify a present exemption. (Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 296, 306–307 [agency cannot defer mitigation to future date when adequacy of mitigation cannot be assessed at time of project approval].) VI. The Recharacterization of the Approval Process Sidesteps the Missing Building Official Signature Footnote 3 of the Estrada memorandum states: “The process and standards for approving Same Practical Effect exception requests in the Fire Safe Regulations are distinct from the process and standards for approving for Alternate Materials and Methods Requests (AMMR) in the California Building Standards Code.” This footnote is procedurally significant. The AMMR form used by the applicant includes signature lines for both the Fire Official and the Building Official. The Fire Official (SCCFD) has signed. The Building Official (City of Cupertino) has not. Under the California Building Code (§ 104.11) and the California Fire Code (§ 104.10), both officials must independently determine that the proposed alternative is “not less than the equivalent” of the code standard. By recharacterizing the approval as a Fire Safe Regulations exception under § 1270.06 rather than a Building Code AMMR, the Estrada memorandum establishes a framework in which the Building Official’s signature is not required. This recharacterization should be scrutinized for three reasons: • The applicant submitted an AMMR form — not a § 1270.06 exception request. The form itself requires dual sign-off. • The DJP AB 130 qualification memorandum references the AMMR, not a Fire Safe Regulations exception, as the basis for the fire safety compliance finding. • Regardless of the regulatory pathway, the Building Official retains an independent obligation under CBC § 104.11 to evaluate and approve any departure from building standards. That obligation is not discharged by SCCFD’s approval under a different regulatory framework. The recharacterization does not eliminate the Building Official’s independent review authority over building setbacks and fire-resistive construction. Because the AMMR form remains unsigned by the Building Official, the dual-approval requirement of CBC § 104.11 remains unfulfilled, rendering the current fire safety approval procedurally incomplete. VII. The AB 130 CEQA Exemption Cannot Rest on This Memorandum Page 6 Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response The AB 130 CEQA exemption (PRC § 21080.66) requires that the project satisfy the site requirements of Government Code § 65913.4(a)(6). For sites in a VHFHSZ, § 65913.4(a)(6)(D) requires that the project have “adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development, including, but not limited to, standards established under Section 4291 of the Public Resources Code.” The DJP AB 130 qualification memorandum relies on SCCFD’s approval as the evidence that fire hazard mitigation measures have been adopted. The Estrada memorandum is the most detailed articulation of that approval in the record. If the Estrada memorandum does not constitute substantial evidence that the state fire mitigation measures have been satisfied — and we submit it does not, for the reasons stated above — then the AB 130 exemption lacks its evidentiary foundation. The deficiency is particularly acute with respect to evacuation. The Fire Safe Regulations define “Same Practical Effect” to include “safe civilian evacuation” (§ 1271.00). Article 2 requires roads to support evacuation and emergency access concurrently (§ 1273.00). PRC § 4291, specifically named in the statute, was returned as “NOT APPROVED” by SCCFD. The Estrada memorandum asserts evacuation safety but provides no evidence. The City’s own Fehr & Peers data contradicts the assertion. Under these circumstances, where the project’s primary defensible space requirements (PRC § 4291) were marked as “NOT APPROVED” and the evacuation finding is at odds with the City’s own traffic data, the record does not support a finding that “fire hazard mitigation measures” have been legally adopted as required by Government Code § 65913.4(a)(6)(D). VIII. Request For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the City Council: 1. Decline to approve the project under the AB 130 CEQA exemption until the evidentiary deficiencies in the fire safety record are addressed, including a documented evacuation analysis that accounts for the proposed density increase on the Linda Vista Drive corridor; 2. Direct staff to obtain from SCCFD a written analysis — not a conclusory statement — explaining how the Same Practical Effect exception satisfies the five-part definition at § 1271.00, with specific attention to safe civilian evacuation under the conditions documented in the Fehr & Peers study; 3. Require the Building Official to complete the evaluation required under CBC § 104.11 and either sign or decline to sign the AMMR form, as the Building Code requires; and 4. If the Council determines it must approve the project notwithstanding these deficiencies, amend the resolution to acknowledge the unresolved evacuation and fire safety concerns, Page 7 Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response as proposed in the separate memorandum submitted by these residents on March 31, 2026. Respectfully submitted, Linda Vista Neighborhood Residents Page 8 From:Nick Kau To:City Clerk Subject:4/1 Cupertino City Council Document Submission Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 12:03:15 PM Attachments:20260401 Safety, Privacy and Noise.pptx CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. I am submitting the following documents to be shared @ Cupertino's City Council Meeting today @ 6:30 for agenda item 3. Thanks, Nick 1 Key Issues •Privacy Impact •Upper-story windows directly facing neighboring homes •Elevated sightlines eliminate yard and swimming pool (Cupertino Club) privacy •Height, Massing, and Setback on Fire Safety Concerns •Proposed buildings exceed surrounding 1–2 story context •2700 sf homes are not ”starter” homes •Vertical mass near property lines creates shadowing, dominance, and safety concerns •Multi-story structures radiate higher heat load during fire •SummerHill project plan fundamentally inconsistent with SCCFD Safety recommendation per AC Estrada’s letter •Interface Risk Between New and Existing Homes – •Noise transmission •height transition 2 Requested Approval Conditions •2-story limit and roof eaves ≤ 25 ft adjacent to R1 homes •No windows facing existing residences •≥15 ft setback from neighboring structures •8-ft fire-resistant Class-A perimeter fence •Fence construction + maintenance funded by HOA 3 From:DerChang Kau To:Kitty Moore; City Council Cc:Floy Andrews; Tina Kapoor; Public Comments; City Clerk Subject:Re: PUBLIC COMMENT - Evulich Court / 10857 Linda Vista Drive - MEETING DATE: APRIL 1, 2026 Agenda #3 Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 11:46:04 AM Attachments:20260401 - Written Communication and Oral Presentation to Apr-1 CC meeting Agenda 3.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. This correspondence is submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 City Council meeting on Agenda #3 To: City Mayor Moore and Council Cc: City Attorney Andrews and Manager Kapoor City Clerk and Public CommentFrom: DerChang Kau, Resident of Cupertino Date: April 1, 2026 Subject: Written Communication for Oral Presentation in Public Comment of Apr/1 City Council Meeting, Agenda #3 <Please see attached pdf file> To: City Mayor Moore and Council Cc: City A1orney Andrews and Manager Kapoor City Clerk and Public Comment From: DerChang Kau, Resident of Cuper@no Date: April 1, 2026 Subject: Wri1en Communica@on for Oral Presenta@on in Public Comment of Apr/1 City Council Mee@ng, Agenda #3 This correspondence is submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 City Council meeting on Agenda #3 Dear Mayor Moore and Council members, I’m DerChang Kau, speaking for many Cuper@no residents. This project sits in one of the highest wildfire-risk zones in the city, directly on the Monta Vista–Shannon Fault. Tonight, I’ll show how the developer moved from acknowledging these risks to avoiding responsibility for them — and why this creates a real, specific danger to public safety. 1. The EvacuaEon Problem Is Real — and It Was Acknowledged The developer originally admi1ed Evulich Court is in the red wildfire-risk zone. But aZer that acknowledgment, the focus shiZed to only the 51 units, ignoring the cumula@ve risk to the en@re Linda Vista corridor. In October 2025, SummerHill’s officers recognized the evacua@on problem. I later met with them and walked through my analysis showing a Required Safe Egress Time of more than 90 minutes. That warning was set aside. Their consultants used assump@ons that effec@vely erase our neighbors from the evacua@on map. Even their own third-party reviewer, Jensen Hughes, stated: “Compliance with codes does not eliminate all hazards and risks.” That is their reviewer saying the plan is not enough. 2. FicEon vs. Fact The developer’s traffic model claims this project adds only two minutes to evacua@on @me. But the City’s expert, Fehr & Peers, shows something very different: a 200% capacity failure. When a system is opera@ng at double its capacity, cars do not move — they are trapped. Why the discrepancy? • The developer counts only residents. • The City’s expert counts the real popula@on: students from three schools, employees from Apple and many local business, and visitors to see the legend of Silicon Vally. • The developer assumes perfect condi@ons — clear skies, no smoke, no panic. • The City’s expert uses wildfire condi@ons, where capacity drops from 3 lanes of 900 vehicles per lane to about 570 total. One is a spreadsheet. The other reflects reality. 3. The Physics of Entrapment The developer uses a sta@c model, as if traffic flows like a highway. But Linda Vista is a spine-and-rib system. In a wildfire triggered by an earthquake, we face power failure, smoke, blocked lanes, and fire engines. Roadway capacity can fall to one-sixth of ideal. Fire under Diablo winds spreads 200 feet per minute. A spark within 1.1 miles reaches Evulich Court in 30 minutes. That is our survival window. Today, evacua@on takes about 26 minutes — barely inside that window. With this project, evacua@on @me jumps to 93.5 minutes. That creates a 63-minute “death gap.” The last 10% of cars will not escape. We have seen this pa1ern in real fires: when evacua@on demand exceeds capacity, wildfire outruns the roadway. 4. Your Responsibility City staff wrote, “The city does not have any adopted standard.” That does not remove your responsibility — it heightens it. When there is no single number, you must rely on expert analysis. And your own expert, Fehr & Peers, shows a catastrophic failure. This is not about finding a legal hook. It is about moral obliga@on, intellectual honesty, and compassion for the people who live here. You are making a life-and-death decision. Before approving this project, you must require a full CEQA review and a real mi@ga@on plan. Closing History shows this danger is not theore@cal. The Stevens Fire in 2007 happened right here in these hills. For the safety of our residents, our children, and our elderly, I urge you: Please vote NO unEl a full CEQA review and miEgaEon plan are completed. Thank you. From:David Yan To:City Clerk; City Council Subject:Presentation Slides for Agenda Item 3 (Evulich Court) for April 1, 2026 City Council meeting Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 11:44:40 AM Attachments:Evulich Court City Council_Presentation_04.01.2026.pdf Evulich Court City Council_Presentation_04.01.2026.pptx CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. For inclusion in the written communications for the April 1st, 2026 City Council meeting and made part of the administrative record for agenda item 3 Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao, and Councilmembers: Please see attached presentation regarding the Evulich Court project. I have included both PowerPoint and PDF formats. City Clerk - I will be presenting these slides at the meeting. Could you please confirm receipt and arrange for them to be displayed during my presentation? Regards, David Yan EVULICH COURT | 10857 LINDA VISTA DRIVE, CUPERTINO A Case for a Closer Look. A summary for City Council. April 1, 2026. What the Council Must Find and What the Record Shows THE THRESHOLD Substantial evidence that the project will pose a health and safety hazard. Government Code Section 66474(f) Subdivision Map Act Any one of these grounds is sufficient for denial. 01 The AB 130 CEQA exemption was never legally available to this project. 02 3 minimum fire requirements for a fire hazard zone were diluted to 1 03 The evacuation corridor was already failing before this project adds a single unit. 04 The stated reason for skipping an evacuation study is contradicted by Applicant and City emails. 05 The City's own study documented that failure and was kept out of the record. 06 The upzoning that created this project was approved without required notice and with an undisclosed conflict of interest. Ground 1 The AB 130 Exemption Was Never Legally Available THE RULE A project in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone is ineligible for the AB 130 CEQA exemption. PRC Section 21080.66 Government Code Section 65913.4(a)(6)(D) BUT THE NARROW CARVEOUT There is one exception. It applies only if the site has adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing standards —measures that must be formally adopted before the project invokes the exemption. WHAT THE CITY CLAIMED Title 16 of the Cupertino Municipal Code satisfies the carveout: the baseline Residential Code, Wildland Urban Interface Code, and Fire Code. These are baseline codes that apply to every project in every jurisdiction in California. If they satisfied the carveout, the exclusion would have no effect. The Legislature would have written it for nothing. WHY THE CARVEOUT IS NOT MET Cupertino has no adopted wildfire mitigation framework for Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones: no ordinance, no overlay, no general plan policy. The statute uses the word "adopted" a formal governmental act. Project level compliance approved during your own review is not adoption. The Application proposed accepts all AB130’s benefits while discarding its most basic requirements. Ground 2 Three Separate Minimum Fire Signoffs Became Diluted into One AB 130 requires compliance with all three: PRC 4290, PRC 4291, and Chapter 7A. The statute uses the word “ALL."They are not alternatives. 7A –Building Materials REVIEWED Reviewed by: Jensen Hughes Structural hardening: ember resistant vents, tempered glazing, noncombustible siding, ignition resistant materials. Governs how buildings are built. 4290 -Setback USED ALTERNATE MEANS Reviewed by: Jensen Hughes / Fire Authority Setback and building separation distance. A 30 foot requirement was reduced to 10 feet via an Alternative Means and Methods Report exception. 4291 –Defensible Space NOT REVIEWED BY ANYONE Reviewed by: No party Defensible space: Zone 0 –2 clearance around each structure. Absent from: -Applicant consultant memo -Fire Signoff, -Assistant Chief Estrada memo -David J. Powers AB 130 qualification memo. Not mentioned once. The Fire Authority's scope mirrors Jensen Hughes exactly. Both reviewed 4290. Neither reviewed 4291. That is the boundary of what was actually evaluated. Ground 3 The Evacuation Corridor Was Already Failing All data below is from the Fehr and Peers Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment, commissioned by the City of Cupertino, October 2025. >200% McClellan Road capacity under evacuation conditions Fehr and Peers Table 11 >200% Bubb Road capacity under evacuation conditions Fehr and Peers Table 11 4.2x V/C ratio on McClellan Road east of Bubb Road under evacuation load 420% of physical capacity ZERO Corridor evacuation analyses in the record before project approval Across the entire proceeding WHAT OVER 200% MEANS At 100% utilization a standing queue forms and does not resolve. Both exits to Linda Vista Drive, McClellan Road and Bubb Road were already at more than 2X their physical capacity under evacuation conditions before this project adds a single vehicle. The queue does not form at the intersection. It forms on Linda Vista Drive itself, trapping residents before they ever reach an exit. This is not a future risk. It is a current condition documented by the City's own consultant 6 months before the Planning Commission hearing.Linda Vista Drive has not changed in 50 years. No application date, project clearance or vesting predates the conditions. Ground 4 The Justification for Not Studying Evacuation Was Built Backward THE DEVELOPER'S CLAIM (FEB 12, 2026) Applicant’s February 12, 2026 attorney letter states the developer relied on the April 2025 HAA consistency clearance. No evacuation study was commissioned because evacuation was not flagged during that review window, the project was deemed consistent. In other words: the question was resolved in April 2025. There was no reason to commission a study after that. VS WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS (OCT 10, 2025) But in October 10, 2025 six months after that supposed clearance, Summerhill emailed the Cityr to ask for criteria for an evacuation route study. The City’s Planner replied on October 16, 2025 that an Evacuation Study was no longer needed under AB 130 CEQA Exemption. This is the real reason evacuation was not studied. That interpretation is incorrect as CEQA is not the only requirement for Evacuation. Ignores the Subdivision Map Act. A developer does not commission an evacuation study in October 2025 if it resolved the evacuation question in April 2025. The October email makes the April reliance story impossible. It was not the reason the study was skipped. It was the reason constructed after evacuation became a threat to the project's approval. They cannot be read together and produce approval. Ground 5 The City Had the Evidence and Kept It Out of the Record OCTOBER 2025 City receives Fehr and Peers study. Both exits at over 200% of physical capacity under evacuation conditions. The City routed the study to the Safety Element update process. FEBRUARY 24, 2026 Planning Commission approves the project without being provided the study The Fehr and Peers study is not in the administrative record. It was not disclosed to commissioners. It was not disclosed to the public. The vote was taken without the City's own technical findings about the corridor's evacuation capacity. MARCH 9, 2026 Study produced for the first time on March 9th. Two weeks after the Planning Commission vote, the Fehr and Peers study was produced as part of the Health and Safety element. Despite its direct relevance to Evulich, the City plans on ignoring it. The Subdivision Map Act requires a present tense safety finding at the time of approval. The study exists. The City to consider it for Evulich. When Residents Raised Evacuation, the Applicant Submitted a Study Hours Before the Planned March 17, 2026 Meeting. It Measured the Wrong Thing LEG 1: Linda Vista Drive to Bubb or McClellan LEG 2: Bubb / McClellan intersection START 51 units add INTER SECT EXIT Residents queued on Linda Vista Drive New conflict point inserted mid-corridor Hexagon's measurement scope WHAT HEXAGON MEASURED Clearance time through the Bubb Road / McClellan Road intersection: 61 minutes with the project. but already failing even by their own account. Hexagon counted 3 outbound lanes at the of Bubb / McClellan 1.1 miles away 900 vehicles per hour each -2,700 total. McClellan Road and Bubb Road each only carry 570 vehicles per hour the Fehr and Peers report the City wants to ignore. Hexagon did not. WHAT HEXAGON LEFT UNMEASURED The time to travel along Linda Vista Drive before reaching the intersection was not measured at all. DerChang Kau, a Professor of Engineering, applied standard traffic queuing modeling to estimate clearance of the Linda Vista corridor at approx.93 minutes. This is not a competing estimate. It is the upstream leg Hexagon omitted. Both legs must be completed in sequence. Hexagon's 61 minutes begins only after Kau's 93 minutes end. The true evacuation time materially exceeds 61 minutes Ground 6 The Upzoning That Created This Project Was Procedurally Invalid TWO INDEPENDENT FAILURES 1 No mailed notice reached a single neighbor. Code Sections 65090 and 65091 require mailed notice to all property owners within 300 feet. Not a single resident received a notification. 2 Councilmember Mohan voted with an undisclosed conflict of interest. A property between 500 and 1,000 feet triggers a disqualifying interest when the decision has a reasonably foreseeable material financial effect. Rezoning an adjacent parcel from R1 to R3 does exactly that. Recusal on the Evulich was procedurally available. She did not take it. Email | November 5, 2024 | From: Luke Connolly, Asst. Director, Community Development Subject:RE: request for copy of mailer/postcard to residents regarding rezoning Let me clarify what I said at the August 22 meeting... There was a citywide mailing done in January 2022 when the Housing Element update was kicking off... "In July of this year when the four Evulich parcels were rezoned, along with 54 other parcels in the City, there was not a similar citywide mailed notification to residents..." ...notice was provided through newspaper publication, the City's website and e-notifications to residents who had signed up to receive notification of public meetings. Luke Connolly Assistant Director of Community Development City of Cupertino The City's own Assistant Director of Community Development confirmed in writing that no mailed notice was sent to residents when the Evulich parcels were upzoned. 745 residents later signed a petition. It was never acknowledged. THE RECORD The Council cannot approve this project on this record. 01 The AB 130 CEQA exemption does not apply. Cupertino never adopted a wildfire mitigation framework for Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones beyond baseline minimum standards already in existence. 02 PRC 4291 was never reviewed or approved by any party. This is 1 of 3 required approvals. 03 Both evacuation exits operate at over 200% of physical capacity under existing conditions. The corridor fails today, before a single unit is added. 04 The City's own Fehr and Peers study documented that failure and was kept out of the record before the Planning Commission hearing. It must be considered now. 05 The developer's justification for skipping an evacuation study was constructed after the fact. The October 2025 email makes their explanation impossible. 06 The upzoning was approved without legally required mailed notice to nearby residents and with an undisclosed conflict of interest at the deciding vote. Any one of these grounds independently requires denial. Together, they leave no room for a lawful approval. From:Emi Sugiyama To:City Clerk Subject:FW: AB 130 & VHFSZ Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 11:11:40 AM Attachments:AB 130 VHFSZ-3.24.26 - signed.pdf For inclusion in written communication. Emi Sugiyama Senior Planner Community Development EmiS@cupertino.gov (408)777-3205 From: Kristy Weis <kweis@davidjpowers.com> Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2026 4:52 PM To: Emi Sugiyama <emis@cupertino.gov> Cc: Nick Towstopiat <ntowstopiat@davidjpowers.com> Subject: AB 130 & VHFSZ CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Hi Emi, Please see the attached. Best, Kristy Kristy L. Weis | Vice President & Principal PM David J. Powers & Associates, Inc. 1871 The Alameda, Suite 200 | San José, CA 95126 Main: 408.248.3500 | Direct: 408.454.3428 kweis@davidjpowers.com DJP&A is a certified Green Business, DBE, and MWBE Note: I will be out of office April 13-17 1 1871 The Alameda, Suite 200 • San José, CA 95126 • Tel: (408) 248-3500 • www.davidjpowers.com March 25, 2026 Emi Sugiyama, Senior Planner City of Cupertino Community Development 10300 Torre Avenue Cupertino, CA 95014 Sent via email to: EmiS@cupertino.gov RE: AB 130 Qualification for Sites Located in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone Dear Emi Sugiyama: We at David J. Powers & Associates, Inc. are writing to provide clarification regarding the qualification of housing projects located within Very High Fire Severity Zones (VHFHSZ) under Assembly Bill 130 (AB 130). AB 130 exempts qualifying housing projects from the provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). AB 130 became effective on June 30, 2025 and is codified in Public Resources Code (PRC) Section 21080.66. Per PRC Section 21080.66(a)(6), projects must satisfy the requirements specified in paragraph (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 65913.4 of the Government Code. Per Government Code Section 65913.4(a)(6): The development is not located on a site that is any of the following…(D) Within a very high fire hazard severity zone, as determined by the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection pursuant to Section 51178, or within the state responsibility area, as defined in Section 4102 of the Public Resources Code. This subparagraph does not apply to sites that have adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development, including but not limited to, standards established under all of the following or their successor provisions: (i) Section 4291 of Public Resources Code or Section 51182, as applicable. (ii) Section 4290 of the Public Resources Code. (iii) Chapter 7A of the California Building Code (Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations). 2 1871 The Alameda, Suite 200 • San José, CA 95126 • Tel: (408) 248-3500 • www.davidjpowers.com In other words, AB 130 does not prohibit development within VHFHSZ, rather, development proposed within VHFHSZ are permitted under AB 130 provided that applicable fire mitigation measures are implemented. Thank you for this opportunity to provide clarity on this issue. Respectfully, Kristy L. Weis Vice President/Principal Project Manager Shannon George Vice President/Principal Project Manager AB 130 VHFSZ-3.24.26 Final Audit Report 2026-03-25 Created:2026-03-25 By:Kristy Weis (kweis@davidjpowers.com) Status:Signed Transaction ID:CBJCHBCAABAADaLVYKNFgh8qfJhMVe9cFNiAZXUWcXBw "AB 130 VHFSZ-3.24.26" History Document created by Kristy Weis (kweis@davidjpowers.com) 2026-03-25 - 11:32:29 PM GMT Document emailed to Kristy Weis (kweis@davidjpowers.com) for signature 2026-03-25 - 11:32:33 PM GMT Email viewed by Kristy Weis (kweis@davidjpowers.com) 2026-03-25 - 11:32:54 PM GMT Document e-signed by Kristy Weis (kweis@davidjpowers.com) Signature Date: 2026-03-25 - 11:33:06 PM GMT - Time Source: server Document emailed to Shannon George (sgeorge@davidjpowers.com) for signature 2026-03-25 - 11:33:08 PM GMT Email viewed by Shannon George (sgeorge@davidjpowers.com) 2026-03-25 - 11:47:28 PM GMT Document e-signed by Shannon George (sgeorge@davidjpowers.com) Signature Date: 2026-03-25 - 11:47:40 PM GMT - Time Source: server Agreement completed. 2026-03-25 - 11:47:40 PM GMT From:Vikram Saxena To:City Clerk Subject:Fwd: Evulich Court: Response to Hector Estrada Memo Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 10:58:56 AM Attachments:Memo_Gaps_In_Estrada_SCCFD_Response_Revised.docx Attachment_Z_SCCFD_Response_Hector_Estrada.pdf F - Alternative Means and Methods Request Approval.pdf Attachment_SCCFD_Plan_Review_Comments_2025-12-29.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear City Clerk: Please do enter this into Written Communications for the Evulich court -Summerhill agenda item. And thans for keeping up with the flurry of emails from the residents :) -Vikram ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Vikram Saxena <vsaxena@gmail.com> Date: Tue, Mar 31, 2026 at 11:14 AM Subject: Evulich Court: Response to Hector Estrada Memo To: Kitty Moore <kmoore@cupertino.gov>, Tina Kapoor <tinak@cupertino.gov>, <floya@cupertino.gov> Cc: DerChang Kau <derchang@gmail.com>, <lindavistatt@gmail.com>, <davidcyan@gmail.com>, City Clerk <cityclerk@cupertino.gov> Dear Mayor Moore, City Manager Kapoor, and City Attorney Andrews, Please find attached our response to Assistant Fire Chief Hector Estrada's letter regarding the Evulich Court project. AB130 is not supposed to apply to VHFHSZ and the bar for any exception must be high, and the evidence should demonstrate that risk to public safety is mitigated. The enclosed document identifies why the memo does not address significant concerns, and is not sufficient to permit an approval under AB 130. I urge you to review these points. I also empathize with the challenges the City Attorney and the Council faces, and suggest that, if felt appropriate, the city consider additional technical/legal counsel on this matter prior to the upcoming meeting. Your Sincerely, Vikram Saxena on behalf of Linda Vista Neighborhood Residents Attached: 1. Gap in Estrada Response 2. Estrada Response 3. AMMR (part of packet) 4. Dec 29 SCC FD Review (via PRA) fra) SANTA E DEPARTMENT 1315 Dell Avenue, Campbell, CA 95008 | (408) 378-4010 | SCCFD.org FIRE PREVENTION PLAN REVIEW COMMENTS PROJECT INFO: PREPARED BY: FIRE DEPT PLAN REVIEW #:| 251740 NAME/TITLE:| Caleb Flanagan CITY/COUNTY PROJECT #:| ™-2024-009 /ASA-2024-015/TR- | EMAIL:| Caleb.flanagan@sccfd.org 2024-044 LOCATION:| 10857 Linda Vista Dr DATE: 12/29/25 PROJECT NAME:| Multi-family subdivision The scope of this project includes the following: Proposed new 10 building 51 unit multi-family residential subdivision. Plans Status: Plans are NOT APPROVED. Revise and resubmit drawings and provide a response letter addressing comments on this plan review. Plan Review Comments **1. PRC 4290: This project shall comply with PRC 4290 comments. Exception request to PRC 4290 submitted and under review. **2. Provide a "Preliminary Fire Protection Plan". This plan shall address fire department access, egress, road and address signage, water supply in addition to fuel reduction in accordance with Public Resources Code (PRC) 4290; the defensible space requirements in accordance with PRC 4291 or Government Code 51182; and the applicable building codes and standards for wildfire safety. The plan shall identify mitigation measures to address the project's specific wildfire risk and shall include the information required in CFC section 4903.2.1. [CFC section 4903] This review shall not be construed to be an approval of a violation of the provisions of the California Fire Code or of other laws or regulations of the jurisdiction. A permit presuming to give authority to violate or cancel the provisions of the fire code or other such laws or regulations shall not be valid. Any addition to or alteration of approved construction documents shall be approved in advance. [CFC, Ch. 1, 105.3.6] Page 1 of 2 TO: Cupertino City Officials FROM: Hector Estrada, Assistant Fire Chief SUBJECT: Housing Development - Linda Vista Drive As requested by City Manager Kapoor and in response to the questions from the Cupertino City Council, this supplemental staff report provides a summary of the process that led to the Santa Clara County Fire Department’s plan review comments on the Architectural and Site Approval Permit Application for the proposed subdivision at 10857 Linda Vista Drive. Background The Santa Clara County Fire Department (“County Fire”) provides fire safety plan review comments for land development in the City of Cupertino. Specifically, County Fire reviews Architectural and Site Approval Permit Applications for compliance with applicable state and local fire safety requirements related to site design.1 County Fire staff then prepares plan review comments and presents them to City officials to support the City’s decision to approve or deny an Architectural and Site Approval Permit Application. Summary In January 2026, County Fire staff provided plan review comments on the Architectural and Site Approval Permit Application for the proposed residential subdivision at 10857 Linda Vista Drive (ASA-2024-015) (the “Project” and the “Application”). Because the Project is located in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone, it is subject to the State Minimum Fire Safe Regulations (“Fire Safe Regulations”) (14 C.C.R. §§ 1270, et seq.), in addition to generally applicable fire safety requirements in the California Building Standards Code.2 The Fire Safe Regulations include an exception request process that allows projects to move forward even if they cannot meet specific site-design criteria.3 Specifically, the Fire Safe Regulations allow for the approval of exception requests on a case-by-case basis if the exception provides “the Same Practical Effect as these regulations towards providing Defensible Space.” (14 C.C.R. § 1270.07.)4 The Application includes a Same Practical Effect exception request for the thirty-foot setbacks required by Section 1276.01 of the Fire Safe Regulations. The applicant proposed the following measures to support the exception request: (1) Non-combustible material extending five feet horizontally around the buildings. (2) Wildfire home hardening protective measures, including but not limited to a Class A roof, non-combustible exterior building material, protected eave vents, and double paned tempered glass. 1 At the building permit phase, County Fire reviews building permit applica:ons for compliance with addi:onal fire safety requirements, including those related to construc:on. 2 Public Resources Code Sec:on 4290 addresses the applicability of the Fire Safe Regula:ons in Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones. 3 The process and standards for approving Same Prac:cal Effect excep:on requests in the Fire Safe Regula:ons are dis:nct from the process and standards for approving for Alternate Materials and Methods Requests (AMMR) in the California Building Standards Code. 4 The Fire Safe Regula:ons define “Same Prac:cal Effect” as “an Excep:on or alterna:ve with the capability of applying accepted wildland fire suppression strategies and tac:cs, and provisions for fire fighter safety, including: (1) access for emergency wildland fire equipment, (2) safe civilian evacua:on, (3) signing that avoids delays in emergency equipment response, (4) available and accessible water to effec:vely aWack Wildfire or defend a Structure from Wildfire, and (5) fuel modifica:on sufficient for civilian and fire fighter safety.” (14 C.C.R. § 1270.01(aa).) Page 2 of 2 (3) Exterior fire sprinkler heads protecting covered porches and decks that are within thirty feet of the property line. (4) Fire resistance rated exterior elements within thirty feet of the property lines including: a. Exterior Walls - Fire resistance rated for one hour. b. Projections (portions of the building protruding beyond exterior walls) - Fire resistance rated for one hour. c. Penetrations (e.g., mechanical, electrical, plumbing services) - Protected to maintain fire resistance rated assemblies. Section 1276.01 of the Fire Safe Regulations provides guidance on exception requests related to the thirty-foot setback requirement: A reduction in the minimum setback shall be based upon practical reasons, which may include but are not limited to, parcel dimensions or size, topographic limitations, Development density requirements or other Development patterns that promote low- carbon emission outcomes; sensitive habitat; or other site constraints, and shall provide for an alternative method to reduce Structure-to-Structure ignition by incorporating features such as, but not limited to: (1) non-combustible block walls or fences; or (2) non-combustible material extending five (5) feet horizontally from the furthest extent of the Building; or (3) hardscape landscaping; or (4) a reduction of exposed windows on the side of the Structure with a less than thirty (30) foot setback; or (5) the most protective requirements in the California Building Code, California Code of Regulations Title 24, Part 2, Chapter 7A, as required by the Local Jurisdiction. (14 C.C.R. § 1276.01(b).) Based on our analysis of the site and the combined impact of the measures proposed in the exception request, County Fire staff determined that these measures provide appropriate alternative methods to reduce the risk of structure-to-structure ignition, and County Fire approved the Same Practical Effect exception request for the Application. The Project includes two of the five measures identified in Section 1276.01 as alternative methods to reduce the risk of structure-to-structure ignition and two additional measures: exterior sprinklers and increased fire resistive rated exterior elements. Analyzing these measures based on accepted wildland fire suppression strategies and tactics and provisions for firefighter safety, County Fire staff determined that the exception request provided appropriate access for emergency wildland fire equipment and safe civilian evacuation and that the exception request included fuel modification sufficient for civilian and firefighter safety. County Fire memorialized its approval of the exception request in its January 7 and January 27 plan review comments, which have been presented to the City Planning Commission and City Council. County Fire’s plan review comments also notified the applicant that they will need to submit a final fire protection plan, onsite fire hydrant design specifications, and a construction site safety plan as part of their building permit application. D S T R E E T A S T R E E T B S T R E E T C S T R E E T E S T R E E T LI N D A V I S T A D R I V E (P U B L I C R O A D ) EVULICH COURT(PUBLIC ROAD) BLDG 6 BLDG 1 BLDG 2 BLDG 3 BLDG 4 BLDG 5 BLDG 7 BLDG 8 BLDG 9 BLDG 10 H:\3988-000\ACAD\EXHIBITS\XB-033_SETBACK SITE PLAN.DWG SETBACK SITE PLAN 10857 LINDA VISTA DRIVE CITY OF CUPERTINO SANTA CLARA COUNTY CALIFORNIA SCALE: 1" = 20'DATE: SEPTEMBER 15, 2025 6040200 CIVIL ENGINEERS SURVEYORS PLANNERS SAN RAMON WWW.CBANDG.COM ROSEVILLE (925) 866-0322 (916) 788-4456 LEGEND ABBREVIATIONS 38 1 . 0 7 8 10857 Linda Vista Drive Cupertino, CA September 15, 2025 3000 Executive Parkway, Suite 450 San Ramon, Ca 94583 650-857-0122 PROJECT DATA A08 WILDFIRE PROTECTION CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS BEING LOCATED IN A LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY AREA (LRA) VERY HIGH FIRE HAZARD SEVERITY ZONE. THE PROJECT SHALL BE CONSTRUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF CALIFORNIA RESIDENTIAL CODE SECTION R337, MATERIALS AND METHODS FOR EXTERIOR WILDFIRE EXPOSURE , AS FOLLOWS: 1. EXTERIOR WINDOWS AND EXTERIOR DOORS WITH GLAZING EXTERIOR WINDOWS AND EXTERIOR DOORS WITH GLAZING, SHALL BE CONSTRUCTED OF MULTI-PANE GLAZING WITH A MINIMUM OF ONE TEMPERED PANE. (C.R.C. R337.8.2.1) 2. EXTERIOR DOORS SHALL MEET ONE OF THE FOLLOWING (C.R.C. R337.8.3): A. THE EXTERIOR SURFACE OR CLADDING SHALL BE OF NON-COMBUSTIBLE OR IGNITION-RESISTANT MATERIAL. B. SHALL HAVE A FIRE-RESISTANCE RATING OF NOT LESS THAN 20 MIN. WHEN TESTED ACCORDING TO NFPA 252. SHALL BE TESTED TO MEET THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF SFM STANDARD 12-7A-1. 3. GARAGE DOORS SHALL RESIST THE INTRUSION OF EMBERS FROM ENTERING BY PREVENTING GAPS BETWEEN DOORS AND DOOR OPENINGS, AT HTE BOTTOM, SIDES, AND TOPS OF DOORS, FROM EXCEEDING 1/8". gAPS BETWEEN DOORS AND DOOR OPENINGS SHALL BE CONTROLLED BY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING METHODS: A. WEATHER STRIPPING PRODUCTS MADE OF MATERIALS THAT: (A) HAVE BEEN TESTED FOR TENSILE STRENGTH IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM D638 AFTER EXPOSURE TO ASTM G155 FOR A PERIOD OF 2,000 HOURS, WHERE THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE DIFFERENCE IN TENSILE STRENGTH VALUES BETWEEN EXPOSED AND NONEXPOSED SAMPLES DO NOT EXCEED 10% AND (B) EXHIBIT A V-2 OR BETTER FLAMMABILITY RATING WHEN TESTED TO UL 94. B. DOOR OVERLAPS ONTO JAMBS AND HEADERS. C. GARAGE DOOR JAMBS AND HEADERS COVERED WITH METAL FLASHING 4. VENTS SHALL RESIST BUILDING IGNITION FROM THE INTRUSION OF BURNING EMBERS AND FLAME THROUGH THE VENTILATION OPENINGS WITH THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS (C.R.C. R337.6) A. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE OPENINGS THEREIN SHALL BE A MIN. OF 1/16TH INCH AND SHALL NOT EXCEED 1/8TH INCH. B. THE MATERIALS SHALL BE INCOMBUSTIBLE C. THE MATERIALS USED SHALL BE CORROSION RESISTANT. 5. THE EXTERIOR WALL COVERING OR WALL ASSEMBLY SHALL COMPLY WITH ONE OF THE FOLLOWING C.R.C. R337.7.3: A. NONCOMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL. B. IGNITION- RESISTANT MATERIAL. C. SAWN LUMBER OR GLUE-LAMINATED WOOD WITH THE SMALLEST MINIMUM NOMINAL DIMENSION OF 4". SAWN OR GLUE-LAMINATED PLANKS SPLINED, TONGUE-AND-GROOVE, OR SET CLOSE TOGETHER AND WELL SPIKED. D. LOG WALL CONSTRUCTION. E. WALL ASSEMBLIES THAT HAVE BEEN TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TEST PROCEDURES FOR A 10-MINUTE DIRECT FLAME CONTACT EXPOSURE TEST SET FORTH IN ASTM E2707 WITH THE CONDITIONS OF ACCEPTANCE SHOWN IN SECTION R337.7.3.1. F. WALL ASSEMBLIES THAT MEET THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS CRITERIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TEST PROCEDURES FOR A 10-MINUTE DIRECT FLAME CONTACT EXPOSURE TEST SET FORTH IN SFM STANDARD 12-7A-1. EXCEPTIONS: ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SHALL BE DEEMED TO MEET THE ASSEMBLY PERFORMANCE CRITERIA AND INTENT OF THIS SECTION: A. ONE LAYER OF 5/8" TYPE X GYPSUM SHEATHING APPLIED BEHIND THE EXTERIOR COVERING OR CLADDING ON THE EXTERIOR SIDE OF THE FRAMING. B. THE EXTERIOR PORTION OF A 1-HOUR FIRE RESISTIVE EXTERIOR WALL ASSEMBLY DESIGNED FOR EXTERIOR FIRE EXPOSURE INCLUDING ASSEMBLIES USING GYPSUM PANEL AND SHEATHING PRODUCTS LISTED IN THE GYPSUM ASSOCIATION FIRE RESISTIVE FIRE DESIGN MANUAL. 6. DECKING SURFACES SHALL COMPLY WITH C.R.C. R337.9.3. THE WALKING SURFACE MATERIAL OF DECKS, PORCHES, BALCONY AND STAIRS SHALL BE CONSTRUCTED WITH ONE OF THE FOLLOWING MATERIALS: A. MATERIAL THAT COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION R337.9.4 WHEN TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BOTH ASTM E2632 AND ASTM E2726. B. IGNITION-RESISTANT MATERIAL THAT COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION R337.4.3 WHEN TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM E84 OR UL 723. C. MATERIAL THAT COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH SFM STANDARD 12-7A-4 AND SFM STANDARD 12-7A-5. D. EXTERIOR FIRE RETARDANT TREATED WOOD. E. NONCOMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL. F. ANY MATERIAL THAT COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF SFM STANDARD 12-7A-4A WHEN ATTACHED EXTERIOR WALL COVERING IS ALSO COMPOSED OF NONCOMBUSTIBLE OR IGNITION-RESISTANT MATERIAL. EXCEPTION: WALL MATERIAL MAY BE OF ANY MATERIAL THAT OTHERWISE COMPLIES WITH THIS CHAPTER WHEN THE DECKING SURFACE MATERIAL COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS ASTM E84 WITH A CLASS B FLAME SPREAD RATING. G. AY MATERIAL THAT COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION R337.9.5 WHEN TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM E2632 AND WHEN ATTACHED EXTERIOR WALL COVERING IS ALSO COMPOSED OF ONLY NONCOMBUSTIBLE OR IGNITION-RESISTANT MATERIALS. EXCEPTION: WALL MATERIAL SHALL BE PERMITTED TO BE OF ANY MATERIAL THAT OTHERWISE COMPLIES WITH THIS CHAPTER WHEN THE DECKING SURFACE MATERIAL COMPLIES WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS ASTM E84 WITH A CLASS B FLAME SPREAD INDEX. Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response Page 1 MEMORANDUM TO: Cupertino City Council FROM: Linda Vista Neighborhood Residents DATE: March 31, 2026 RE: Evidentiary Deficiencies in the SCCFD Supplemental Memorandum of Assistant Fire Chief Estrada Regarding the Same Practical Effect Exception for the Proposed Development at 10857 Linda Vista Drive (ASA-2024-015) I. Introduction and Summary This memorandum responds to the supplemental report submitted by Assistant Fire Chief Hector Estrada of the Santa Clara County Fire Department (“SCCFD”), dated March 2026 and included as Attachment Z in the supplemental packet for the April 1, 2026 City Council hearing on the proposed 51-unit residential development at 10857 Linda Vista Drive. The Estrada memorandum purports to explain and defend SCCFD’s approval of a Same Practical Effect exception under the State Minimum Fire Safe Regulations (14 C.C.R. §§ 1270 et seq.) for the reduction of mandatory 30-foot setbacks to as little as 10 feet. The memorandum concludes that the exception “provided appropriate access for emergency wildland fire equipment and safe civilian evacuation.” We submit that this conclusion is unsupported by the evidence, contradicted by the City’s own adopted data, and fails to satisfy the evidentiary standard required for the AB 130 CEQA exemption (PRC § 21080.66) in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone. Specifically, the memorandum suffers from five critical deficiencies: 1. Unsupported evacuation finding. The memorandum asserts that safe civilian evacuation has been provided but offers no data, analysis, methodology, or modeling to support that conclusion. 2. Failure to address contrary evidence. The memorandum does not reference, address, or reconcile its evacuation finding with the City’s own Fehr & Peers Health and Safety Element Update, which documents that the Linda Vista Drive evacuation corridor operates at approximately four times its design capacity. 3. Incomplete application of the regulatory standard. The memorandum narrows its analysis to structure-to-structure ignition mitigation while the regulatory definition of “Same Practical Effect” requires a five-part finding that includes safe civilian evacuation, emergency equipment access, signing, water supply, and fuel modification. Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response Page 2 4. Impermissible deferral of compliance. The memorandum defers key fire safety compliance to the building permit phase, while the AB 130 CEQA exemption requires that fire hazard mitigation measures be adopted at the entitlement stage. 5. Procedural recharacterization of the approval process. The memorandum recharacterizes the approval as a Fire Safe Regulations exception rather than an Alternative Means and Methods Request (AMMR). This shift has the effect of bypassing the dual sign-off requirement that the Building Official has not satisfied under CBC § 104.11. Each of these deficiencies is analyzed below. II. The Evacuation Finding Is Unsupported by Any Evidence in the Record The final substantive paragraph of the Estrada memorandum states: County Fire staff determined that the exception request provided appropriate access for emergency wildland fire equipment and safe civilian evacuation and that the exception request included fuel modification sufficient for civilian and firefighter safety. This sentence is the only statement in the entire memorandum addressing evacuation. It is a bare conclusion. The memorandum provides: • No evacuation study or analysis; • No traffic modeling or vehicle count data; • No volume-to-capacity analysis of the evacuation corridor; • No assessment of the impact of adding 51 units and 102 vehicles to a single-access cul- de-sac; • No reference to any methodology by which “safe civilian evacuation” was evaluated; and • No explanation of what “safe civilian evacuation” means in the context of a corridor the City’s own data shows is already failing. Under established principles of California administrative law, a conclusory statement by an agency, unsupported by evidence in the record, does not constitute substantial evidence. (Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515 [implicit in the substantial evidence standard is the requirement that the agency must set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between raw evidence and the ultimate decision].) The Estrada memorandum does not set forth the findings necessary to bridge the analytic gap between the evidence in the record and the evacuation conclusion, as Topanga requires. Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response Page 3 III. The Finding Contradicts the City’s Own Adopted Evacuation Data The Estrada memorandum does not merely fail to provide evidence for its evacuation finding. It makes that finding in the face of contrary evidence already in the City’s possession. The City’s Health and Safety Element Update, prepared by Fehr & Peers, documents the following conditions for evacuation zone CUP-029, which includes the Linda Vista Drive corridor serving the project site: • McClellan Road, the primary evacuation outlet: volume-to-capacity (V/C) ratio of 4.2 • Foothill Boulevard: V/C ratio of 4.0 • Evacuation zone CUP-029 generates 38% of all modeled evacuation trips A volume-to-capacity ratio above 1.0 indicates an oversaturated roadway. Ratios of 4.0 to 4.2 mean the corridor is operating at approximately four times its design capacity during a wildfire evacuation — at current densities. The Fehr & Peers study models the project site at its existing 4-unit residential density. It does not account for the proposed 51-unit development with 102 on- site parking spaces, which would approximately double the evacuation vehicle load generated from this parcel. SCCFD’s memorandum does not mention this data. It does not distinguish it. It does not explain why its conclusion is consistent with it. An agency finding that is contradicted by evidence in the administrative record, and that provides no explanation for the contradiction, does not constitute substantial evidence. (Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 516 [requiring agencies to disclose “the analytic route the agency traveled from evidence to action”].) IV. The Memorandum Applies the Wrong Standard A. The Regulatory Definition of “Same Practical Effect” The Fire Safe Regulations define “Same Practical Effect” at 14 C.C.R. § 1271.00 (formerly § 1270.01(aa)) as follows: “Same Practical Effect: As used in this subchapter, means an exception or alternative with the capability of applying accepted wildland fire suppression strategies and tactics, and provisions for fire fighter safety, including: (a) access for emergency wildland fire equipment, (b) safe civilian evacuation, (c) signing that avoids delays in emergency equipment response, (d) available and accessible water to effectively attack wildfire or defend a structure from wildfire, and (e) fuel modification sufficient for civilian and fire fighter safety.” SCCFD acknowledges this definition. Footnote 4 of the Estrada memorandum reproduces it in full. The memorandum therefore cannot claim ignorance of the standard. Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response Page 4 B. The Analysis Addresses Only One of Five Required Elements Despite reproducing the five-part definition, the substantive analysis in the body of the memorandum focuses almost entirely on a single element: structure-to-structure ignition. The memorandum devotes two paragraphs to explaining how the four proposed mitigation measures reduce “the risk of structure-to-structure ignition.” It identifies which measures correspond to the alternatives listed in § 1276.01(b). This analysis is detailed and specific. By contrast, the evacuation finding consists of a single sentence with no supporting analysis. The memorandum provides no discussion of: • How a 51-unit development on a dead-end cul-de-sac satisfies the requirement for “safe civilian evacuation”; • Whether the existing road network can support simultaneous emergency equipment access and civilian evacuation, as required by § 1273.00; • Whether the signing requirements of element (c) have been satisfied; • Whether the water supply requirements of element (d) have been evaluated at the entitlement stage; or • How the four proposed mitigation measures — which address building materials and construction standards — provide any capability for civilian evacuation. The evacuation finding is unsupported by any technical analysis in the memorandum, in contrast to the detailed substantiation provided for the structure-to-structure ignition mitigation. This disparity creates an internally inconsistent record in which building-level safety is documented but corridor-wide life safety is addressed only by assertion. C. The Proposed Mitigations Have No Functional Relationship to Evacuation The four mitigation measures identified in the Estrada memorandum are: (1) Class A fire-rated roofing, (2) non-combustible exterior wall siding, (3) tempered glass windows, and (4) automatic fire sprinkler systems. Each of these measures addresses structure-to-structure ignition resistance. None of them increases the width of a road, adds an evacuation route, reduces the vehicle count on the Linda Vista Drive corridor, or otherwise has any functional relationship to evacuation capacity. A finding that reduced setbacks achieve the “same practical effect” as the 30-foot requirement must address all five elements of § 1271.00, including safe civilian evacuation. Mitigations that harden buildings against radiant heat do not, by themselves, demonstrate that residents can safely evacuate through a corridor already operating at four times its design capacity. The memorandum does not explain how building-level mitigations substitute for the evacuation capacity that the 30-foot setback requirement was, in part, designed to protect. Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response Page 5 D. Article 2 of the Fire Safe Regulations Requires Concurrent Evacuation Capacity The Estrada memorandum does not reference Article 2 of the Fire Safe Regulations (§§ 1273.00–1273.09), which governs emergency access and egress. Section 1273.00 states: “Roads and driveways, whether public or private, unless exempted under 14 CCR § 1270.02(d), shall provide for safe access for emergency wildfire equipment and civilian evacuation concurrently, and shall provide unobstructed traffic circulation during a wildfire emergency.” This is not a general aspiration. It is a mandatory standard: roads serving the development must support firefighting access and civilian evacuation at the same time. The Fehr & Peers data shows that the Linda Vista Drive corridor is already at approximately four times its design capacity for evacuation alone, before accounting for concurrent emergency vehicle access. The Estrada memorandum does not address whether the Evulich Court cul-de-sac and the Linda Vista Drive corridor can meet this requirement, either at current densities or with the proposed 51-unit addition. V. The Memorandum Impermissibly Defers Compliance to the Building Permit Stage Footnote 1 of the Estrada memorandum states: “At the building permit phase, County Fire reviews building permit applications for compliance with additional fire safety requirements, including those related to construction.” The final paragraph further states that the applicant “will need to submit a final fire protection plan, onsite fire hydrant design specifications, and a construction site safety plan as part of their building permit application.” This deferral creates a legal problem for the AB 130 CEQA exemption. Government Code § 65913.4(a)(6)(D) provides that the VHFHSZ exclusion “does not apply to sites that have adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures.” The operative word is “adopted” — past tense. The fire hazard mitigation measures must be in place at the time the CEQA exemption is claimed, not promised for a future permitting stage. The items deferred to the building permit phase — a final fire protection plan, onsite fire hydrant design specifications, and a construction site safety plan — are not ministerial verification tasks. They involve substantive design decisions that determine whether the mitigation measures actually achieve the same practical effect as the 30-foot setback. If the fire protection plan has not been finalized, the City cannot assess at the entitlement stage whether the mitigation measures are adequate. This is precisely the problem identified in case law regarding deferred mitigation. Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response Page 6 A CEQA exemption determination is made at the entitlement stage. If material fire safety compliance is deferred to the building permit stage, the exemption condition has not been satisfied at the time the exemption is invoked. The City cannot rely on future compliance to justify a present exemption. (Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 296, 306–307 [agency cannot defer mitigation to future date when adequacy of mitigation cannot be assessed at time of project approval].) VI. The Recharacterization of the Approval Process Sidesteps the Missing Building Official Signature Footnote 3 of the Estrada memorandum states: “The process and standards for approving Same Practical Effect exception requests in the Fire Safe Regulations are distinct from the process and standards for approving for Alternate Materials and Methods Requests (AMMR) in the California Building Standards Code.” This footnote is procedurally significant. The AMMR form used by the applicant includes signature lines for both the Fire Official and the Building Official. The Fire Official (SCCFD) has signed. The Building Official (City of Cupertino) has not. Under the California Building Code (§ 104.11) and the California Fire Code (§ 104.10), both officials must independently determine that the proposed alternative is “not less than the equivalent” of the code standard. By recharacterizing the approval as a Fire Safe Regulations exception under § 1270.06 rather than a Building Code AMMR, the Estrada memorandum establishes a framework in which the Building Official’s signature is not required. This recharacterization should be scrutinized for three reasons: • The applicant submitted an AMMR form — not a § 1270.06 exception request. The form itself requires dual sign-off. • The DJP AB 130 qualification memorandum references the AMMR, not a Fire Safe Regulations exception, as the basis for the fire safety compliance finding. • Regardless of the regulatory pathway, the Building Official retains an independent obligation under CBC § 104.11 to evaluate and approve any departure from building standards. That obligation is not discharged by SCCFD’s approval under a different regulatory framework. The recharacterization does not eliminate the Building Official’s independent review authority over building setbacks and fire-resistive construction. Because the AMMR form remains unsigned by the Building Official, the dual-approval requirement of CBC § 104.11 remains unfulfilled, rendering the current fire safety approval procedurally incomplete. VII. The AB 130 CEQA Exemption Cannot Rest on This Memorandum Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response Page 7 The AB 130 CEQA exemption (PRC § 21080.66) requires that the project satisfy the site requirements of Government Code § 65913.4(a)(6). For sites in a VHFHSZ, § 65913.4(a)(6)(D) requires that the project have “adopted fire hazard mitigation measures pursuant to existing building standards or state fire mitigation measures applicable to the development, including, but not limited to, standards established under Section 4291 of the Public Resources Code.” The DJP AB 130 qualification memorandum relies on SCCFD’s approval as the evidence that fire hazard mitigation measures have been adopted. The Estrada memorandum is the most detailed articulation of that approval in the record. If the Estrada memorandum does not constitute substantial evidence that the state fire mitigation measures have been satisfied — and we submit it does not, for the reasons stated above — then the AB 130 exemption lacks its evidentiary foundation. The deficiency is particularly acute with respect to evacuation. The Fire Safe Regulations define “Same Practical Effect” to include “safe civilian evacuation” (§ 1271.00). Article 2 requires roads to support evacuation and emergency access concurrently (§ 1273.00). PRC § 4291, specifically named in the statute, was returned as “NOT APPROVED” by SCCFD. The Estrada memorandum asserts evacuation safety but provides no evidence. The City’s own Fehr & Peers data contradicts the assertion. Under these circumstances, where the project’s primary defensible space requirements (PRC § 4291) were marked as “NOT APPROVED” and the evacuation finding is at odds with the City’s own traffic data, the record does not support a finding that “fire hazard mitigation measures” have been legally adopted as required by Government Code § 65913.4(a)(6)(D). VIII. Request For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the City Council: 1. Decline to approve the project under the AB 130 CEQA exemption until the evidentiary deficiencies in the fire safety record are addressed, including a documented evacuation analysis that accounts for the proposed density increase on the Linda Vista Drive corridor; 2. Direct staff to obtain from SCCFD a written analysis — not a conclusory statement — explaining how the Same Practical Effect exception satisfies the five-part definition at § 1271.00, with specific attention to safe civilian evacuation under the conditions documented in the Fehr & Peers study; 3. Require the Building Official to complete the evaluation required under CBC § 104.11 and either sign or decline to sign the AMMR form, as the Building Code requires; and 4. If the Council determines it must approve the project notwithstanding these deficiencies, amend the resolution to acknowledge the unresolved evacuation and fire safety concerns, Memorandum: Evidentiary Deficiencies in SCCFD Supplemental Response Page 8 as proposed in the separate memorandum submitted by these residents on March 31, 2026. Respectfully submitted, Linda Vista Neighborhood Residents From:DerChang Kau To:Public Comments; City Clerk; City Council Subject:PUBLIC COMMENT - Evulich Court / 10857 Linda Vista Drive - MEETING DATE: APRIL 1, 2026 Agenda #3 Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 10:57:23 AM Attachments:img-2d323928-064e-46e2-9283-8cf784fbb15a img-c44d47f2-ab4b-4266-aa42-06c71046aa9b img-61476dd6-e22f-4451-b5e9-da0cc2e578de img-f8931fc7-74a8-4e9c-b891-73a7fb524f56 img-31c58062-a9a6-4515-a2c5-452af2ab5334 20260330 From Acknowledging Risk to Avoiding Responsibility.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. This correspondence is submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 City Council meeting on Agenda #3 From: DerChang Kau <derchang@gmail.com> Date: Monday, March 30, 2026 at 2:50 PM To: Kitty Moore <kmoore@cupertino.gov>, Cupertino City Council <citycouncil@cupertino.gov>, Liang Chao <lchao@cupertino.gov> Cc: floya@cupertino.gov <floya@cupertino.gov>, Tina Kapoor <tinak@cupertino.gov>, Mark Shumate <mark.shumate@sccfd.org>, Hector Estrada <hector.estrada@sccfd.org>, Maryanne Casas-Perez <maryanne@sanjosespotlight.com> Subject: How SummerHill Homes architects "Evacuation Fiction" at Evulich Ct, Cupertino – From Acknowledging Risk to Avoiding Responsibility This correspondence will be submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 hearing. To: City Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao and Council Members Cc: City Attorney Andrews and Manager Kapoor SCCFD Deputy Chief Shumate and Assistant Chief Estrada San Jose Spotlight Maryanne Casas-Perez Bcc: Residents of Linda Vista Corridor From: DerChang Kau, Resident of Cupertino Date: March 30, 2026 Subject: How SummerHill Homes architects "Evacuation Fiction" at Evulich Ct, Cupertino – From Acknowledging Risk to Avoiding Responsibility Dear Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao and Council members There is a significant discrepancy between the developer’s (SummerHill Homes) approach to safety and the emergency‑evacuation modeling conducted by residents and by the City’s own commissioned experts. Communications between the City Planning Division and SummerHill Homes—along with the Kau‑Bull face‑to‑face meeting and subsequent emails—reveal a troubling timeline: both SummerHill Homes and the City of Cupertino shifted from acknowledging evacuation risks to actively avoiding a formal study. Instead, they relied on a “voluntary” analysis that sidesteps the physical realities of wildfire behavior and evacuation constraints. What emerges is a clear storyline: a progression from awareness of the risk, to avoidance by seeking loopholes in health and safety requirements, and ultimately a retreat from evaluating specific, adverse impacts on public safety toward a narrow focus on code compliance and waivers for the project’s own defensible space. Event 1. The Baseline: High-Hazard Reality (March 2025) The story begins with the March 2025 CAL FIRE update, which officially designated the Linda Vista corridor as a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ). Subsequently, the City's own consultant, Fehr & Peers, determined that major evacuation routes like Foothill Boulevard and McClellan Road were already at or over capacity, identifying them as "critical bottlenecks" with Volume-to-Capacity (V/C) ratios greater than 2.0. (Oct/2025) Event 2. The Acknowledgement of Due Diligence (October 10, 2025) Early in the process, SummerHill appeared to recognize that a wildfire evacuation analysis was a required part of their project scope. Steve Bull explicitly asks the City for "the criteria for the evacuation route study" and notes that their submitted traffic report "does not yet include the evacuation route analysis". Event 3. Discovery of the "Legal Hook" Dodge (October 16, 2025) Just six days later, the City provided SummerHill with a way to bypass formal safety scrutiny by citing Assembly Bill 130. The City senior planner Sugiyama informs SummerHill: "Now that the project is in review under AB 130, the City is no longer requesting an evacuation study to address fire safety concerns under CEQA". Crucially, she adds that any voluntary study provided "will not require... peer review". Event 4. The Good-Faith Disclosure (January 15, 2026) Alice Lin and DerChang Kau met with SummerHill’s leadership (Steve Bull, VP and Kevin Ebrahimi , SVP) to provide a full disclosure of the corridor's life-safety risks, offering data to seek a "win-win solution ". DerChang handed Steve and Kevin a hardcopy of Linda Vista Corridor Emergency Evacuation analysis and proposed a win-win strategy. In a follow-up email, DerChang provided electronic copy of the disclosure showing that increasing density beyond the R1 baseline triples the non-survivable window, extending evacuation times from 30 minutes to over 90 minutes. Steve Bull replied on Jan 16, stating they were "reviewing your analysis with our consultant team" Event 5. The Pivot to "Defensive Fiction" (February – March 2026) Rather than using Kau’s data to adjust the project for safety, SummerHill utilized its consultant, Hexagon, to generate a counter-narrative. Event 5-1. The Submission of "Evacuation Fiction" (February 2026) Following this exemption, SummerHill submitted a "voluntary, non-CEQA, informational assessment" prepared by Hexagon Transportation Consultants. Hexagon modeled the evacuation using "Steady-State" metrics—modeling only 30 vehicles per hour (essentially a daily commute) to claim a negligible 2-minute delay. DerChang Kau submitted a technical rebuttal in the City record. It counters that a real wildfire surge involves 250+ vehicles attempting to exit in a 30-minute window, which pushes the corridor to 110% saturation and a 93.5-minute evacuation time. Event 5-2. SummerHill’s substituting Hardening for Egress (March 2026) Rather than address the road capacity failure, SummerHill shifted focus to structural hardening (sprinklers and fire-rated walls). This email submits a review from Jensen Hughes that confirms compliance with building codes but explicitly states that "compliance with relevant codes and standards does not imply... eliminating all hazards and risks" and focuses strictly on structural hardening rather than evacuation egress. The timeline shows that SummerHill was aware of the evacuation requirements, was granted a legal exemption by the City to avoid formal peer review, and then used a community meeting to identify technical threats to their project approval. Instead of addressing those threats with safer density, they submitted a study based on "flawed metrics" that erases thousands of neighbors already living in the "peninsula" of the Linda Vista corridor from the survival map. Respectfully, DerChang Kau Resident of Cupertino This correspondence will be submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 hearing. To: City Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao and Council Members Cc: City Attorney Andrews and Manager Kapoor SCCFD Deputy Chief Shumate and Assistant Chief Estrada San Jose Spotlight Maryanne Casas-Perez Bcc: Residents of Linda Vista Corridor From: DerChang Kau, Resident of Cupertino Date: March 30, 2026 Subject: How SummerHill Homes architects "Evacuation Fiction" at Evulich Ct, Cupertino – From Acknowledging Risk to Avoiding Responsibility Dear Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao and Council members There is a significant discrepancy between the developer’s (SummerHill Homes) approach to safety and the emergency-evacuation modeling conducted by residents and by the City’s own commissioned experts. Communications between the City Planning Division and SummerHill Homes—along with the Kau-Bull face-to-face meeting and subsequent emails—reveal a troubling timeline: both SummerHill Homes and the City of Cupertino shifted from acknowledging evacuation risks to actively avoiding a formal study. Instead, they relied on a “voluntary” analysis that sidesteps the physical realities of wildfire behavior and evacuation constraints. What emerges is a clear storyline: a progression from awareness of the risk, to avoidance by seeking loopholes in health and safety requirements, and ultimately a retreat from evaluating specific, adverse impacts on public safety toward a narrow focus on code compliance and waivers for the project’s own defensible space. Event 1. The Baseline: High-Hazard Reality (March 2025) The story begins with the March 2025 CAL FIRE update, which officially designated the Linda Vista corridor as a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ). Subsequently, the City's own consultant, Fehr & Peers, determined that major evacuation routes like Foothill Boulevard and McClellan Road were already at or over capacity, identifying them as "critical bottlenecks" with Volume-to-Capacity (V/C) ratios greater than 2.0. (Oct/2025) Event 2. The Acknowledgement of Due Diligence (October 10, 2025) Early in the process, SummerHill appeared to recognize that a wildfire evacuafon analysis was a required part of their project scope. Steve Bull explicitly asks the City for "the criteria for the evacua-on route study" and notes that their submiged traffic report "does not yet include the evacuafon route analysis". Event 3. Discovery of the "Legal Hook" Dodge (October 16, 2025) Just six days later, the City provided SummerHill with a way to bypass formal safety scrutiny by citing Assembly Bill 130. The City senior planner Sugiyama informs SummerHill: "Now that the project is in review under AB 130, the City is no longer requesting an evacuation study to address fire safety concerns under CEQA". Crucially, she adds that any voluntary study provided "will not require... peer review". Event 4. The Good-Faith Disclosure (January 15, 2026) Alice Lin and DerChang Kau met with SummerHill’s leadership (Steve Bull, VP and Kevin Ebrahimi , SVP) to provide a full disclosure of the corridor's life-safety risks, offering data to seek a "win-win solution ". DerChang handed Steve and Kevin a hardcopy of Linda Vista Corridor Emergency Evacuation analysis and proposed a win-win strategy. In a follow-up email, DerChang provided electronic copy of the disclosure showing that increasing density beyond the R1 baseline triples the non-survivable window, extending evacuation times from 30 minutes to over 90 minutes. Steve Bull replied on Jan 16, stating they were "reviewing your analysis with our consultant team" Event 5. The Pivot to "Defensive Fiction" (February – March 2026) Rather than using Kau’s data to adjust the project for safety, SummerHill utilized its consultant, Hexagon, to generate a counter-narrative. Event 5-1. The Submission of "Evacuation Fiction" (February 2026) Following this exemption, SummerHill submitted a "voluntary, non-CEQA, informational assessment" prepared by Hexagon Transportation Consultants. o Hexagon modeled the evacuation using "Steady-State" metrics—modeling only 30 vehicles per hour (essentially a daily commute) to claim a negligible 2-minute delay. o DerChang Kau submitted a technical rebuttal in the City record. It counters that a real wildfire surge involves 250+ vehicles attempting to exit in a 30-minute window, which pushes the corridor to 110% saturation and a 93.5-minute evacuation time. Event 5-2. SummerHill’s substituting Hardening for Egress (March 2026) Rather than address the road capacity failure, SummerHill shifted focus to structural hardening (sprinklers and fire-rated walls). This email submits a review from Jensen Hughes that confirms compliance with building codes but explicitly states that "compliance with relevant codes and standards does not imply... eliminating all hazards and risks" and focuses strictly on structural hardening rather than evacuation egress. The timeline shows that SummerHill was aware of the evacuation requirements, was granted a legal exemption by the City to avoid formal peer review, and then used a community meeting to identify technical threats to their project approval. Instead of addressing those threats with safer density, they submitted a study based on "flawed metrics" that erases thousands of neighbors already living in the "peninsula" of the Linda Vista corridor from the survival map. Respectfully, DerChang Kau Resident of Cupertino From:James Lloyd To:Kitty Moore; Liang Chao; Sheila Mohan; J.R. Fruen; R "Ray" Wang Cc:Piu Ghosh (she/her); City Attorney"s Office; Cupertino City Manager"s Office; City Clerk; City of Cupertino Planning Dept. Subject:public comment re item 3 for tonight"s Council meeting Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 10:46:53 AM Attachments:Cupertino - 10857-87 Linda Vista Drive- HAA Letter - CC - 1 Apr 2026.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Cupertino City Council, The California Housing Defense Fund (“CalHDF”) submits the attached public comment re item 3 for tonight's Council meeting, the proposed 51-unit housing development project at 10857, 10867, 10877, and 10887 Linda Vista Drive, which includes 10 median- and moderate- income units. Sincerely, James M. Lloyd Director of Planning and Investigations California Housing Defense Fund james@calhdf.org CalHDF is grant & donation funded Donate today - https://calhdf.org/donate/ Apr 1, 2026 City of Cupertino 10300 Torre Avenue Cupertino, CA 95014 Re: Proposed Housing Development at 10857-87 Linda Vista Drive By email: kmoore@cupertino.gov; lchao@cupertino.gov; smohan@cupertino.gov; jrfruen@cupertino.gov; rwang@cupertino.gov CC: piug@cupertino.gov; CityAttorney@cupertino.gov; CityManager@cupertino.gov; CityClerk@Cupertino.gov; planning@cupertino.gov; Dear Cupertino City Council, The California Housing Defense Fund (“CalHDF”) submits this letter to remind the City of its obligation to abide by all relevant state laws when evaluating the proposed 51-unit housing development project at 10857, 10867, 10877, and 10887 Linda Vista Drive, which includes 10 median- and moderate-income units. These laws include the Housing Accountability Act (“HAA”), the Density Bonus Law (“DBL”), Housing Element Law, and AB 130. The HAA provides the project legal protections. It requires approval of zoning and general plan compliant housing development projects unless findings can be made regarding specific, objective, written health and safety hazards. (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j).) The HAA also bars cities from imposing conditions on the approval of such projects that would reduce the project’s density unless, again, such written findings are made. (Ibid.) As a development with at least two-thirds of its area devoted to residential uses, the project falls within the HAA’s ambit, and it complies with local zoning code and the City’s general plan. Increased density, concessions, and waivers that a project is entitled to under the DBL (Gov. Code, § 65915) do not render the project noncompliant with the zoning code or general plan, for purposes of the HAA (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j)(3)). The HAA’s protections therefore apply, and the City may not reject the project except based on health and safety standards, as outlined above. Furthermore, if the City rejects the project or impairs its feasibility, it must conduct “a thorough analysis of the economic, social, and environmental effects of the action.” (Id. at subd. (b).) 2201 Broadway, PH1, Oakland, CA 94612 www.calhdf.org Of note, the City has planned for housing development on the site by including it in its current Housing Element site inventory. Specifically, the City has planned for 84 units on the site including 31 lower-income units. CalHDF also writes to emphasize that the DBL offers the proposed development certain protections. The City must respect these protections. In addition to granting the increase in residential units allowed by the DBL, the City must not deny the project the proposed waivers and concessions with respect to height, setback, floor area ratio, outdoor space, parking dimensions, and unit mix. If the City wishes to deny requested waivers, Government Code section 65915, subdivision (e)(1) requires findings that the waivers would have a specific, adverse impact upon health or safety, and for which there is no feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the specific adverse impact. If the City wishes to deny requested concessions, Government Code section 65915, subdivision (d)(1) requires findings that the concessions would not result in identifiable and actual cost reductions, that the concessions would have a specific, adverse impact on public health or safety, or that the concessions are contrary to state or federal law. The City, if it makes any such findings, bears the burden of proof. (Gov. Code, § 65915, subd. (d)(4).) Of note, the DBL specifically allows for a reduction in required accessory parking in addition to the allowable waivers and concessions. (Id. at subd. (p).) Additionally, the California Court of Appeal has ruled that when an applicant has requested one or more waivers and/or concessions pursuant to the DBL, the City “may not apply any development standard that would physically preclude construction of that project as designed, even if the building includes ‘amenities’ beyond the bare minimum of building components.” (Bankers Hill 150 v. City of San Diego (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 755, 775.) Finally, the project is exempt from state environmental review pursuant to AB 130 (Pub. Res. Code, § 21080.66). Caselaw from the California Court of Appeal affirms that local governments err, and may be sued, when they improperly refuse to grant a project a CEQA exemption or streamlined CEQA review to which it is entitled. (Hilltop Group, Inc. v. County of San Diego (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 890, 911.) As you are well aware, California remains in the throes of a statewide crisis-level housing shortage. New housing such as this is a public benefit: it will increase the city’s tax base; it will bring new customers to local businesses; and it will reduce displacement of existing residents by reducing competition for existing housing. It will also help cut down on transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions by providing housing in denser, more urban areas, as opposed to farther-flung regions in the state (and out of state). While no one project will solve the statewide housing crisis, the proposed development is a step in the right direction. CalHDF urges the City to approve it, consistent with its obligations under state law. 2 of 3 CalHDF is a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation whose mission includes advocating for increased access to housing for Californians at all income levels, including low-income households. You may learn more about CalHDF at www.calhdf.org. Sincerely, Dylan Casey CalHDF Executive Director James M. Lloyd CalHDF Director of Planning and Investigations 3 of 3 From:Benjamin Fu To:Lauren Sapudar; Luke Connolly; Emi Sugiyama Cc:City Clerk; Tina Kapoor; Floy Andrews Subject:RE: Written Communications Item 3 Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 10:29:10 AM Attachments:Cupertino-HAU-033026.pdf Hi Lauren, We also received a letter from HCD on Monday afternoon. Tina already shared with City Council but should also be included in written communications. Thanks, Ben Benjamin Fu Director of Community Development Community Development BenjaminF@cupertino.gov (408) 777-3247 From: Lauren Sapudar <LaurenS@cupertino.gov> Sent: Wednesday, April 1, 2026 9:45 AM To: Benjamin Fu <BenjaminF@cupertino.gov>; Luke Connolly <LukeC@cupertino.gov>; Emi Sugiyama <EmiS@cupertino.gov> Cc: City Clerk <CityClerk@cupertino.gov> Subject: FW: Written Communications Item 3 FYI Lauren Sapudar City Clerk City Manager's Office LaurenS@cupertino.gov (408) 777-1312 From: Kitty Moore <KMoore@cupertino.gov> Sent: Monday, March 30, 2026 6:29 PM To: Lauren Sapudar <LaurenS@cupertino.gov>; Kirsten Squarcia <KirstenS@cupertino.gov>; Tina Kapoor <TinaK@cupertino.gov>; City Clerk <CityClerk@cupertino.gov> Cc: Liang Chao <LChao@cupertino.gov> Subject: Written Communications Item 3 Dear City Clerk, Please provide the attached Evacuation Study performed under the direction and expense of the City of Cupertino into the record for Item 3, Summerhill proposed project. I do not know if it has been included in the public record for the hearing yet. Thank you, Kitty Moore Kitty Moore Mayor City Council KMoore@cupertino.gov (408) 777-1389 STATE OF CALIFORNIA - BUSINESS, CONSUMER SERVICES AND HOUSING AGENCY GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIVISION OF HOUSING POLICY DEVELOPMENT 651 Bannon Street, Suite 400, Sacramento, CA 95811 (916) 263-2911 / FAX (916) 263-7453 www.hcd.ca.gov March 30, 2026 Ben Fu, Community Development Director Cupertino City Hall 10300 Torre Avenue Cupertino, CA 95014 Dear Ben Fu: RE: City of Cupertino – 10857 Linda Vista Drive – Letter Support and Technical Assistance The California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) understands that on April 1, 2026, the City Council of the City of Cupertino will consider a Tentative Map, Architectural and Site Approval, and Tree Removal Permit for the construction of a housing development project that includes moderate income affordable units (Project) on a 2.53-acre site located at 10857 Linda Vista Drive (APNs: 356-06-001, -002, -003, and - 004). The purpose of this letter is to assist the City with its decision making by providing technical assistance related to the Housing Accountability Act (HAA) and State No Net Loss Law. Background HCD understands that the Project is proposing 51 for-sale townhome units, including 10 units deed restricted for moderate income households. The Project is located within the R-3/TH (Multiple-Family Residential, Townhome) zoning district and the Residential – Medium High Density General Plan Land Use Designation. The Project is utilizing the State Density Bonus Law (SDBL)1 to utilize five waivers and one concession from applicable standards of the General Plan and Zoning Code. HCD additionally understands that the Project is consistent with the General Plan,2 Zoning,3 and state and local regulations applicable to Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones (VHFHSZ).4 On February 24, 2026, the City’s Planning Commission voted to recommend the City Council approve the Project.5 1 Gov. Code, § 65915, subd. (b)(1)(D). 2 City of Cupertino February 24, 2026, Planning Commission Hearing Staff Report on 10857 Linda Vista Drive, page 2. 3 Ibid. See page 3. 4 Ibid. See page 9: “The Santa Clara County Fire Department has found that the project has demonstrated consistency with these requirements.” 5 City of Cupertino February 24, 2026, Planning Commission Hearing Minutes. Ben Fu, Community Development Director Page 2 Analysis Housing Accountability Act The Project meets the definition of a “housing development project” under the HAA.6 The Project may only be disapproved or approved at a lower density if the City makes written findings, supported by a preponderance of evidence on the record, that (1) a specific, adverse impact upon the public health or safety would result from the project and (2) mitigation of the adverse impact is not possible.7 Specific, adverse, impact means a significant, quantifiable, direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, identified written public health or safety standards, policies, or conditions.8 “Objective” means, “involving no personal or subjective judgment by a public official and being uniformly verifiable by reference to an external and uniform benchmark or criterion available and knowable by both the development applicant or proponent and the public official.”9 Additionally, the Legislature has clarified that these impacts are intended to arise “infrequently.”10 Housing Element No Net Loss Law No Net Loss Law requires that a jurisdiction ensure there is development opportunity remaining throughout the planning period to accommodate the jurisdiction’s Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA). Because the approval of the Project would result in capacity becoming inadequate to accommodate the RHNA, the City will have up to 180 days from the approval to identify or rezone “sufficient additional, adequate, and available sites” to accommodate the remaining RHNA.11 HCD understands that the Project site consists of four contiguous lots listed in the City’s 6th Cycle Housing Element and the approval of the project may trigger a No Net Loss Law obligation for the City in the moderate income and lower-income categories. In the Planning Commission Staff Report for the Project, the City has stated that, while it “is unable to identify additional sites to accommodate its RHNA concurrently with this project’s approval, it is working toward being compliant with State law in a timely manner. 12” HCD reminds the City that Housing Element No Net Loss Law specifically provides that the City may not disapprove a housing project on the basis that approval of the development would trigger the identification or zoning of additional adequate sites to accommodate the remaining RHNA.13 6 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (h)(2). 7 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j)(1). 8 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (j)(1)(A). 9 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (h)(9). 10 Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (a)(3). 11 Gov. Code, § 65863., subd. (c)(2). 12 City of Cupertino February 24, 2026, Planning Commission Hearing Staff Report on 10857 Linda Vista Drive, page 18. 13 See HCD’s October 2, 2019 No Net Loss Law Memo, page 1, available at: https://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housing-element/housing-element- memos/docs/sb-166-final.pdf. Ben Fu, Community Development Director Page 3 Conclusion For purposes of entitling AB 130-eligible projects, the City should assume compliance with local building codes. Whether the project is indeed code compliant should be determined at the post-entitlement phase. This prevents the entitlement review process from becoming bogged down in technical details that are strictly governed by other laws. HCD informs the City that AB 712 (Government Code Section 65914.2.) went into effect on January 1, 2026. Among other things, the new law increases penalties that a court may impose on a local government if the local government was advised in writing prior to the commencement of a lawsuit brought by the Attorney General or HCD that the local government’s decision, action, or inaction would represent a violation of specified housing laws. HCD hopes this technical assistance is helpful. HCD has enforcement authority over the HAA and Housing Element Law, among other state housing laws. Accordingly, HCD may review local government actions to determine consistency with these laws. Pursuant to Government Code section 65585, subdivision (j), if HCD finds that a jurisdiction’s actions do not comply with state law, HCD may notify the California Office of the Attorney General. HCD remains committed to supporting the City of Cupertino in facilitating housing at all income levels and hopes the City finds this clarification helpful. If you have questions or need additional information, please contact Brandon Yung at Brandon.Yung@hcd.ca.gov. Sincerely, Melinda Coy Housing Accountability Unit Chief From:DerChang Kau To:Public Comments; City Clerk; City Council Subject:PUBLIC COMMENT - Evulich Court / 10857 Linda Vista Drive - MEETING DATE: APRIL 1, 2026 Agenda #3 Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 10:04:17 AM Attachments:Evacuation modeling methodology and Linda Vista Wildfire Evacuation analysis.pdf 20260324 To AC Estrada - Quantitative Wildfire Evacuation Modeling .pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. This correspondence is submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 City Council meeting on Agenda #3 From: DerChang Kau <derchang@gmail.com> Date: Tuesday, March 24, 2026 at 11:21 AM To: Hector Estrada <hector.estrada@sccfd.org> Cc: Mark Shumate <mark.shumate@sccfd.org> Subject: Re: Technical Concern: Cumulative Evacuation System Failure on the Linda Vista Corridor (re: Evulich Court Project) To: Assistant Chief Estrada, SCCFD Fire Prevention Cc: Deputy Chief Shumate, SCCFD From: DerChang Kau, Resident of Cupertino Date: March 24, 2026 Subject: Quantitative Wildfire Evacuation Modeling & Risk Assessment for the Monta Vista Foothills Dear Assistant Chief Estrada, Thank you for taking the time to engage so directly with the residents of the Linda Vista corridor. Your willingness to listen to our concerns regarding the intersection of local development and public safety is greatly appreciated by the community. I particularly valued our discussion regarding the technical nuances of evacuation modeling. As a career engineer, I have always believed that data-driven transparency serves as the most effective bridge between community anxiety and operational reality. To that end, I am pleased to share the enclosed assessment, which provides a rigorous engineering framework for evaluating wildfire evacuation risks within our unique geography. In organizing this document, I wanted to move beyond mere observation and into a structured analysis of the physics of movement. The report begins by establishing the methodology, specifically contrasting the steady-state metrics used in standard transportation engineering with the dynamic requirements of evacuation science. From there, it explores the "Physics of Failure," detailing the Utilization Ratio (V/C) and explaining why system performance collapses non-linearly when volume exceeds capacity. I have concluded the study with a series of comparative "Stress Test" scenarios that match our current R1 baseline against the planned R3 intensification at Evulich Court, supported by technical appendices rooted in established Industrial and Civil Engineering queuing standards. Ultimately, this work is intended to help us better navigate the delicate balance between the forces of Mother Nature and the necessity of Human Intervention. While we use Fire Hazard Severity Zones to respect the natural reality of our landscape, the efficacy of our intervention depends on how we harmonize three distinct levels of planning. It begins with the robustness of our physical infrastructure (such as road, power, water and etc.) to handle worst-case scenarios, followed by the strategic coordination of local government to ensure that density allocation never exceeds the "life- safety bandwidth" of those roads. Only when these two foundations are set can we move to the third level: the execution of urban development with strict wildfire hardening. As you and your department hold the unique jurisdiction to see the holistic "connective tissue" between these stages, I would like to formally invite you to utilize this modeling as a resource. The Evulich Court project offers a timely opportunity for the SCCFD to lead by example, helping to guide City leadership toward a more thoughtful alignment between density and the physical laws of a safe evacuation. I look forward to our continued collaboration in making the Monta Vista foothills a model of wildfire resilience. Respectfully, DerChang Kau Retired Intel Fellow Adjunct Professor, National Taiwan University From: Hector Estrada <hector.estrada@sccfd.org> Date: Thursday, March 19, 2026 at 1:51 PM To: DerChang Kau <derchang@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Shumate <mark.shumate@sccfd.org> Subject: Re: Technical Concern: Cumulative Evacuation System Failure on the Linda Vista Corridor (re: Evulich Court Project) DerChang, It was a pleasure speaking with you and your neighbors on Tuesday evening after the City Council Meeting. It's always valuable to speak to members of the community and to discuss concerns. I look forward to receiving the additional information that you offered to clarify your work and methodology. I hope I provided useful information and I thank you for the discussion. Respectfully, Hector R. Estrada Assistant ChiefFire Prevention Division Santa Clara County Fire DepartmentOffice: (408) 341-4420 On Wed, Mar 4, 2026 at 3:56 PM DerChang Kau <derchang@gmail.com> wrote: Dear Assistant Chief Estrada, Thank you for acknowledging my previous email. I am a retired Intel Fellow and Engineering Professor and have modeled the Linda Vista corridor under the project density which is pending approval. The analysis shows the road reaches 110% utilization under emergency evacuation conditions, which produces a standing queue that does not clear within the 30 minute safety window established by the 2025 Palisades Fire data. I would welcome 20 minutes to walk your team through the methodology and findings before the City Council hearing. If the analysis contains errors, I want to know. If it does not, your department should have it before the vote. I am available early next week. Please let me know what works. Respectfully, DerChang Kau 10847 Linda Vista Dr (408) 398-6086 From: Hector Estrada <hector.estrada@sccfd.org> Date: Wednesday, March 4, 2026 at 1:07 PM To: DerChang Kau <derchang@gmail.com> Subject: Re: Technical Concern: Cumulative Evacuation System Failure on the Linda Vista Corridor (re: Evulich Court Project) Good afternoon Mr. DerChang Kau, I am in receipt of your email and the attached documents regarding the Evulich Court Project. We will review the documents you have submitted. Respectfully, Hector R. Estrada Assistant ChiefFire Prevention DivisionSanta Clara County Fire DepartmentOffice: (408) 341-4420 On Fri, Feb 27, 2026 at 3:22 AM DerChang Kau <derchang@gmail.com> wrote: To: Assistant Chief Hector Estrada, Santa Clara County Fire Department CC: Cupertino City Council & Clark, Cupertino Planning Commissioners & division, Mercury Newspaper, Alice Lin and Frank Swanson From: DerChang Kau Date: Feb. 27, 2026 Subject: Technical Concern: Cumulative Evacuation System Failure on the Linda Vista Corridor (re: Evulich Court Project) Dear Assistant Chief Estrada, I am DerChang, a 3-decade Cupertinian. I am writing to you as a resident of the Linda Vista corridor. I know you are a hands-on leader who prioritizes public safety and operational readiness over theoretical paperwork. This is why I am bringing a critical "cumulative impact" safety concern to your attention regarding the proposed 51-unit townhome development at 10857 Linda Vista Drive. I am seeking your advocacy regarding the proposed 51-unit development at Evulich Court. Currently, your department’s "Finding of Consistency" is being used by the developer to bypass CEQA environmental review. However, that finding appears limited to the interior of the project site (hydrant pressure, turn radii, and hose-pull). We are deeply concerned that the “cumulative impact” on the Linda Vista "Spine" during a wildfire has not been modeled and the risk is not properly assessed. The implications for life safety are catastrophic. The Tactical Reality: A Single-Point-of-Failure Imagine a wind-driven wildfire encroaching from the South/Southwest (Stevens Creek County Park). The tree canopy over Linda Vista becomes a "fuel tunnel." Residents have only one exit: North, funneling toward East bound of McClellan Road. In this scenario, the Fire Department’s ability to defend the neighborhood depends on the residents being able to clear the road. Our analytical modeling—based on the current VHFHSZ classification— shows that at the proposed R3 density, the addition of 51 high-density units will push the road Utilization Ratio of 110%. Mathematically, this creates a "System Failure." Once the evacuation surge begins, cars will be trapped in a standing queue. From an operational standpoint, this is a significant "trap hazard." If the road capacity is exceeded, the bottleneck at the intersection will prevent not just residents from leaving, but emergency vehicles from efficiently entering the corridor to stage for structure protection or rescue operations. The Hexagon Report Gap: The developer's traffic study models only 30 cars per hour. The Evacuation Reality: We are facing a surge of 250+ vehicles attempting to exit in a 30-minute window. The Result: A mathematical "System Failure" where the exit rate at McClellan is slower than the arrival rate. This creates a standing queue that stretches the length of the spine. Why the Current Assessment is Incomplete The developer’s counsel argues that because the project meets internal Fire Code, it is exempt from further CEQA review. We believe this is an operational oversight. 1. Merging Shockwaves: Concentrating 51 units at one entry point creates a "forced merge" scenario. Our models show this adds 28 minutes of stutter-delay to the uphill residents already in the queue. 2. Order-to-Safety Time: Total evacuation time jumps from a survivable less than 30 minutes to 90+ minutes. In a fire moving 200 acres in 20 minutes, a 90 plus-minute bottleneck is a non-survivable event. Our Request to the Fire Department We believe this project cannot be adequately reviewed through a standard site-plan exemption. To ensure the safety of our neighborhood, we respectfully ask the Fire Department to: 1. Expand the Scope: Review the cumulative impact of this density on the entire Linda Vista evacuation corridor, rather than just the project interior. 2. Model the "Surge": Evaluate whether the egress route can maintain a "Total Order to Safety" time within the 30-minute critical fire-spread window (200 acres in 20 minutes) as established by recent regional wildfire events (eg. 2025 Pacific Palisade Fire). If our neighborhood’s evacuation capacity is mathematically compromised, we believe this project does not meet the "safety requirements" necessary for a CEQA exemption. We cannot allow "paper compliance" to override the physical reality of a wildfire. We would welcome the opportunity to walk the corridor with you or a member of your team to show you the physical bottlenecks that our models have identified. Again, our ask is your review of Emergency Evacuation Corridor Analysis for the entire "Spine," not just the project interior. Specifically, we request that the Fire Department clarify to the Planning Commission that: Internal site compliance does not equate to neighborhood evacuation safety. A CEQA exemption is inappropriate without a Cumulative Evacuation Surge Study that accounts for the 155-unit total load on the Linda Vista bottleneck. Attached you will find 4 documents 1. Detailing the evacuation model and assumption 2. Our plead to the public hearing of Cupertino City Planning Commission. 3. Technical Rebuttal to Hexagon Transportation Analysis 4. This letter. Thank you for your dedication to the safety of our community. We are eager to provide you with our full analytical data package to assist in your review. Respectfully, DerChang Kau Intel Fellow, Retired Adjunct Professor, National Taiwan University 10847 Linda Vista Drive DerChang@gmail.com Home: (408)446-5150 Mobil: (408)298-6086 QUANTITATIVE WILDFIRE EVACUATION MODELING METHODOLOGY & LIFE SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT March 24, 2026 DerChang Kau Retired Intel Fellow Adjunct Professor of NTU Resident of Cupertino A Comparative Analysis of Dynamic Egress vs. Static Transportation Engineering for Linda Vista Corridor Transitioning from Static Transportation Engineering to Dynamic Emergency Flow: Evaluating Systemic Failure and Entrapment Risks under R3 Density Intensification Prepared For: Assistant Chief Estrada, Santa Clara County Fire Department ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 2 Table of Content Preface Abstract Section 1: Transportation Engineering vs. Evacuation Science 1.1 Static vs. Dynamic Metrics: Convenience vs. Survival 1.2 The Volume-Capacity (V/C) Divergence 1.3 Modeling Application: Equilibrium vs. Dynamic 1.4 Roadway Topology: The "Spine & Rib" Problem 1.5 Evacuation Clearance Model is used Section 2: Survival Window vs. Evacuation Processes (ASET vs. RSET) 2.1 Defining the Survival Window (ASET) 2.1.1 Speed of Spread (The "Explosion") 2.1.2 Spatial Tolerance of 30 minutes ASET 2.2 Analytical Breakdown: Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) 2.3 The Survival Calculus: RSET vs. ASET on Current vs. Planned Density Section 3: Evacuation Modeling of the Linda Vista Spine 3.1 Housing Inventory and Projected Density Increases 3.1.1 Housing Inventory 3.1.2 Vehicle Load 3.2 Road Capacity Degradation and Functional Collapse 3.2.1 Effective Capacity Degradation due to Density 3.2.2 Additional degradation – Wildfire Reality, Static Model Overestimates Capacity 3.2.3 Effective Capacity: Degradation Affected by Density 3.3 The V/C Surge: Sunday Afternoon Peak Occupancy Scenario 3.3.1 The Scenario: "Sunday Afternoon Peak Occupancy" 3.3.2 The Trigger: "The Red Flash Warning & Instantaneous Surge" 3.3.3 Model Assumption Table: R1 vs. R3 Scenarios 3.4 Dynamic Delay Math: Queuing and Merging Friction 3.4.1 When V/C is < 1.0 (The R1 Baseline) 3.4.2 When V/C Approaches or Exceeds 1.0 (The R3 Failure) 3.4.3 The Answer: RSET (𝑇!"!#$) 3.4.4 Analytical Conclusion Conclusion Reference ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 3 Preface The analysis presented in this report is born out of a critical necessity to bridge the gap between municipal zoning logic and tactical fire safety reality. As a career engineer and resident of the Linda Vista corridor, I have observed that current land-use decisions often rely on "Steady-State" transportation metrics (VMT and LOS) that were never intended to model life- safety outcomes during a wildfire surge. This report provides a formal methodology for "Evacuation Clearance Modeling." It treats our roadway infrastructure not as a convenience for commuters, but as a finite-capacity pressure pipe during a disaster. The goal of this work is to provide the Santa Clara County Fire Department with a data-driven framework to assess "System Failure" thresholds—the point where density creates mathematical entrapment. It is my hope that this engineering-first approach assists City of Cupertino and the Department in its mission to protect life and property in our Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones. ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 4 Abstract This report introduces a Dynamic Evacuation Model designed to assess the survivability of wildfire evacuation surges in constrained, single-access hillside corridors. Using the Linda Vista "Spine" in Cupertino as a case study, the model evaluates the transition from current low- density (R1) status to proposed high-density (R3) intensification. Unlike traditional Local Transportation Analysis (LTA), which assumes linear delays, this methodology identifies a Non-Linear Tipping Point centered on the Volume-Capacity Ratio (V/C). The findings demonstrate that while the R1 baseline operates within a safe 30-minute survival window (V/C=0.37), the cumulative R3 intensification pushes the corridor to a state of Oversaturation (V/C=1.10). The modeling accounts for three critical delay factors: Human/Pre-evacuation timing, Deterministic Queuing, and Forced-Merge Turbulence. The analysis concludes that R3 density results in a "System Failure," extending the total "Order-to-Safety" time to 93.5+ minutes— tripling the non-survivable window and creating a significant risk of stationary entrapment on the corridor's primary evacuation route. ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 5 Section 1 Transportation Engineering vs. Evacuation Science Transportation consultants typically focus on Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT), Intersection Level of Service (LOS), or Local Transportation Analysis (LTA)—metrics designed for everyday traffic operations and CEQA compliance. These frameworks are fundamentally different from Emergency Flow or Evacuation Clearance, which evaluate roadway performance under life-safety conditions. 1.1 Static Metrics vs. Dynamic Metrics: Convenience vs. Survival The divergence between Static Transportation Engineering and Evacuation Science is the difference between optimizing for convenience versus optimizing for survival. While a housing developer looking at a new development (like Evulich Court) might use VMT, LOS or LTA to check for "acceptable" traffic, an evacuation model treats the roadway as a finite-capacity pipe under a high- pressure surge. The distinction between these methodologies lies in their temporal resolution and behavioral assumptions. In the engineering world, we separate these into Steady-State (Planning Level) models, which assume an equilibrium over time, and Transient-State (Dynamic Traffic Assignment) models, which track the physics of movement as it evolves second-by-second. Metric Name Primary Focus Failure Definition Static VMT Environmental impact Having to wait through two signal cycles at an intersection. Static LOS Driver comfort/convenience. Same as VMT Static LTA Daily peak-hour capacity and "fair share" mitigation. Adding 10 cars to a turn lane that is already full. Dynamic Evacuation Clearance Total system emptying time. The time when the last car crosses the safety boundary. Dynamic Emergency Flow Throughput stability under extreme stress and "panic" behavior. Gridlock where speed drops to 0 mph (System Lock). 1.2 The Volume-Capacity (V/C) Divergence In a static model, a V/C ratio of 1.0 is unpleasant, but stable. In an evacuation, V/C = 1.0 is a catastrophic tipping point. • The "Time-to-Clear" Phenomenon For the same V/C ratio, the results differ because of Non-Linear Queue Propagation. Þ Static (LOS/LTA): Assumes "Steady State." If V/C = 1.1, you have a 10% overflow. The model assumes people will eventually clear the light or take a different route. Þ Dynamic (Evacuation): Assumes "Transient State." If V/C = 1.1, that 10% extra volume creates a backward-propagating shockwave. Since every resident on the "Linda Vista Spine" is trying to leave simultaneously, there is no "alternate route." • The Math of Delay Static models often use the BPR (Bureau of Public Roads) function for travel time T: 𝑇=𝑡%$1 +𝛼(𝑉 𝐶+ & , In an evacuation, the β exponent (the "penalty" for congestion) effectively spikes. While a 10% over-capacity surge in a static model might add 2 minutes to a commute, in an evacuation of a single-exit corridor, that same 10% can add 30+ minutes to the total "Clearance Time" because of the geometric constraints of cul-de-sacs entering the main spine. ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 6 1.3 Modeling Application: Equilibrium vs. Dynamic • Static Models: These use User Equilibrium. They assume drivers are "smart" and will find the fastest path over many days of commuting. • Evacuation Models (Dynamic): They account for the "loading" time (how long it takes you to get the kids and pets in the car) and the physical interaction of cars merging from side streets like Rae Lane and Baxley Ct. 1.4 Roadway Topology: The "Spine & Rib" Problem The models apply differently depending on the "topology" of the road: • Arterials/Grids: Static LOS works well here because traffic can diffuse into parallel streets. If one intersection is blocked, there are 4 other ways out. • The "Spine & Rib" Topology (Linda Vista): This is a Single-Exit System. Þ The LTA view: It sees Linda Vista as a "Local Collector" with plenty of capacity for daily trips. Þ The Evacuation view: It sees it as a bottlenecked funnel. Every side street (Rae, Baxley, Evulich, Mt. Crest) is a "rib" feeding into a single "spine." If the flow on the spine reaches capacity, the "ribs" cannot merge. 1.5 Evacuation Clearance Model is used If a Transportation Consultant says a project has "No Significant Impact" based on VMT, LOS or LTA, they are technically correct about the daily environment, but they are ignoring the life safety reality. In a wildfire, Static Model doesn't matter; Throughput at the Chokepoint (Hyannisport Dr) is the only variable that dictates survival. If the demand at that chokepoint is 155 units but the capacity remains fixed at the current lane width, the "Time-to-Clear" doesn't just increase—it potentially exceeds the ASET (Survival Window) we calculated earlier. Section 2 Survival Window vs. Evacuation Processes – ASET vs. RSET The January 2025 Palisades Fire serves as a brutal "design basis" for wildfire modeling because it demonstrated that in a wind-driven event (Santa Ana or Diablo winds), the time between ignition and the "critical arrival" at residential structures can be as little as 20 to 30 minutes. To determine how much time personnel on the Linda Vista "Spine" have to exit the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ), eg. Evulich Ct., before the environment becomes non-survivable, we look at the Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) versus the Available Safe Egress Time (ASET). 2.1 The Survival Window (ASET) In the Palisades event, the fire spread was driven by high-velocity winds and steep terrain— conditions nearly identical to the "Diablo Wind" patterns that affect the Cupertino hills. 2.1.1 Speed of Spread (The "Explosion") ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 7 In the Palisades Fire, the fire spread at a rate of approximately 2.3 miles per hour. For the Linda Vista corridor, which is tucked against the wildland-urban interface (WUI), the "Available Safe Egress Time" is effectively dictated by the speed of the flame front and ember spotting. • Initial Growth: On the morning of January 7, 2025, the fire grew from 10 acres to 200 acres in just 20 minutes. • Rapid Expansion: By 2:10 p.m., it had reached 700 acres, and just one hour later, it had nearly doubled again to 1,262 acres. • Analytical Conversion: For a fire to cover that area, the linear Rate of Spread (ROS) is estimated at approximately 180 to 200 feet per minute. • Linda Vista Application: The distance from the high-density brush at the edge of the Mt. Crest/Rae Lane ridge to the primary "Spine" (Linda Vista Dr) is often less than 1,500 feet. 𝑇#''()#$=𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑂𝑆=1500𝑓𝑡 200𝑓𝑡/𝑚𝑖𝑛=7.5 𝑚𝑖𝑛 2.1.2 Spatial Tolerance of 30 minutes ASET The image below illustrates a 6,000-foot (~1.1-mile) radius centered on the “eye” of the Linda Vista spine (Evulich Ct). A wildfire igniting within the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (red area) yields an Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) of 30 minutes or less. This means residents have no more than half an hour to evacuate before conditions become life-threatening. When ASET ≤ 30 minutes, evacuation feasibility depends critically on roadway performance. If the Volume-to-Capacity (V/C) ratio approaches or exceeds 100%, Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) surpasses ASET—indicating that the transportation system cannot clear evacuees in time. This mismatch constitutes a failure of evacuation clearance and poses an unacceptable risk to public safety. ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 8 2.2 Analytical Breakdown: Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) To reach safety (defined as crossing the boundary at Hyannisport Dr out of the VHFHSZ), the total time is calculated as: 𝑇!"!#$=𝑇#$*'!+𝑇+'*++𝑇!'#)*$ A. Alert & Recognition (𝑇#$*'!) • Target: 5 minutes. • Reality: In the Palisades event, orders were issued 40 minutes late. If residents wait for an official "Go" order, the RSET already exceeds the 30-minute ASET. B. Preparation & Loading (𝑇+'*+) This is where the demographic "penalty" occurs. Based on standard evacuation behavior models (e.g., NFPA/FEMA standards): • Adults: ~5–10 minutes (grabbing go-bags, vehicle positioning). • Seniors/Children: +10 minutes. Reduced mobility and the need for assistance increase the "notification-to-movement" lag. • Pets: +5–15 minutes. Locating cats or loading dogs into crates/vehicles is a known "bottleneck" in residential evacuations. • Subtotal 𝑇+'*+: ~20–25 minutes for a diverse household. Given the diverse demographic characteristics of residents along the Linda Vista spine, this evacuation model applies a 20-minute assumed departure time. C. Travel & Clearance (𝑇!'#)*$) This is the mechanical constraint of the "Linda Vista Spine." • Current Capacity (~70 Units): Based on the Evacuation Clearance Model, 6.5 minutes is assessed • Planned Capacity (~155 Units): Adding the ~85 planned units (including the 51 townhomes at Evulich Court) increases the volume-to-capacity (V/C) ratio to over 110% resulting in more than 73.5 minutes of 𝑇!'#)*$ Detailed 𝑇!'#)*$model, parameter will be discussed in the subsequent sections. 2.3 The Survival Calculus: RSET vs. ASET on Current vs. Planned Variable Current With Planned Units Preparation Time 20 Minutes 20 Minutes Clearance Time (𝑇!'#)*$) 6.5 Minutes 73.5+ Minutes Total RSET 26.5 Minutes 93.5 Minutes* Survival Window (ASET) 30 Minutes 30 Minutes THE GAP None 63.5 Minutes Late *: Traffic delay is non-linear. As V/C exceeds 1.0, small increases in volume cause exponential increases in delay. 3 4 ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 9 5 Section 3 Evacuation Modeling of Linda Vista Spine 5.1 Linda Vista Spine Based on recent planning documents from the City of Cupertino and real estate data for 2026, the section of Linda Vista Drive between Hyannisport Drive and Santa Teresa Drive is currently an established single-family neighborhood undergoing significant transition due to state-mandated housing laws. 3.1.1 Housing Inventory This stretch of Linda Vista Drive consists primarily of single-family ranch-style homes built between 1962 and 1973. There are two major housing projects currently moving through the city's approval process that will drastically increase the density in this specific corridor. • Evulich Court / Summerhill Homes II – Located at 10857–10887 Linda Vista Drive, this project is in the final stages of the 2026 approval cycle. Þ Planned: 51 Townhomes. Þ Net Change: This replaces the 4 existing houses currently on the site, adding a net of 47 new units. • Vista Heights (Former McDonald Dorsa Quarry) – Located west of Mt. Crest Drive and south of Linda Vista Park. Þ Planned: 33 Units (25 single-family homes and 8 condominiums). Þ Details: This project includes a private community center and uses a single access point through the entry of Linda Vista Park. The addition of these units is a point of significant local discussion, specifically regarding traffic on Linda Vista Drive during school commute times and fire safety access. Location Current Planned Linda Vista Dr (Main) ~32 ~32 Rae Lane ~23 ~23 Baxley Court ~6 ~6 Mt. Crest Pl & Dr ~10 ~10 Evulich Court 4 51 Vista Height 33 Total Units ~75 Units* ~158 Units¶ *: 70 units used in baseline model ¶: 155 units used in Planned model 3.1.2 Vehicle Load In this study, 1.6 vehicles/household consolidation is used. 5.2 Road Capacity – The Denominator The reason road capacity degrades from the R1 baseline to the R3 planned scenario is rooted in Traffic Flow Theory[1,2], specifically the transition from "Free-Flow" to "Oversaturated" conditions. While the physical asphalt remains the same width, the Functional Capacity (the ability of the road to actually process vehicles) collapses because of how density changes the physics of the "Spine." 3.2.1 Effective Capacity Degradation due to Density Here is the analytical breakdown of why R3 density causes this degradation: ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 10 • The "Side-Friction" and Turbulence Effect – In an R1 environment, houses are spaced far apart. When a car pulls out of a driveway, it usually finds a "gap" in traffic. Cars can maintain a consistent speed (20–25 mph), and the road functions near its theoretical capacity. By concentrating 51 units into a single point (Evulich Court), you create a massive "Conflict Point." Because the road is already near its limit, there are no gaps. Every car exiting the new development must "Force Merge. Each force-merge act causes the car on the main road to brake. This creates a backward-traveling shockwave. In traffic engineering, as turbulence increases, the "discharge rate" (capacity) of the road segment drops significantly. • Intersection Degradation (The "Four-Way Stop" Reality) – Capacity is largely determined by the "Control" at the end of the road. A lane can move ~900 vehicles per hour. However, a high- demand Four-Way Stop — where drivers must negotiate "who goes next" amidst smoke and panic—drops to a maximum of 450~600 vehicles per hour, depending on demand. The R3 density triggers this "Operational Collapse" that the R1 density does not. 3.2.2 Additional degradation – Wildfire Reality, Static Model Overestimates Capacity Static Model assumes the traffic signal at Bubb and McClellan is functioning perfectly with optimized green-light timing. The capacity is calculated based on how many cars can pass during a protected green phase. Emergency evacuation accounts for the high probability of power failure or "All-Red" emergency flashing during a wildfire. When a signal fails, it defaults to a Four-Way Stop. Static Model focuses on the "Funnel" (the intersection). It assumes the "Pipe" (Linda Vista Drive) is always clear enough to feed the funnel. Evacuation Model recognizes that when density increased to R3 levels, the "Pipe" itself becomes a bottleneck. Static Model only models one-way flow (concert goers leaving parking lot). Evacuation Model accounts for the Santa Clara County Fire Department engines attempting to enter the "Spine" while residents are leaving. Static Model assumes "Ideal Conditions"—clear weather, alert drivers, and standard spacing. Evacuation Model accounts for smoke obscuration and driver panic. When visibility drops, "Headway" (the distance between cars) increases significantly. 3.2.3 Effective Capacity: Degradation Affected by Density Feature R1 Baseline (Current) R3 Planned (High Density) Flow Type Laminar (Smooth) Turbulent (Choppy) Intersection Minimum Impact Saturated 4-Way Stop Conflict Minimal High (Resident vs. Fire Engine) Functional Capacity ~600vph ~450 vph Hexagon assumes capacity is a constant at theoretic or intrinsic capacity level of 900 vph per lane with 3 lane open. That is a 2700-vph denominator used, 6X reduction in V/C ratio. In reality, capacity is a variable that decreases as density and stress increase. By ignoring this degradation, the applicant is significantly overestimating the safety of the corridor. 5.3 The Volume and V/C Ratio 3.3.1 The Scenario: "Sunday Afternoon Peak Occupancy" This subsection establishes the High-Probability/Worst-Case baseline. Unlike a Tuesday morning where many residents are at work in other cities, a Sunday afternoon represents "Maximum Neighborhood Load." ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 11 • Occupancy: Households are nearly 100% occupancy as families prepare for the upcoming work/school week. • Environmental Context: A late-summer North/Northwest wind event has dried the fuel bed of the adjacent Stevens Creek County Park to critical levels (Fuel Moisture < 5%). • Vehicle Availability: Most household vehicles are parked on-site. 3.3.2 The Trigger: "The Red Flash Warning & Instantaneous Surge" This subsection describes the Reactionary Logic of the evacuation. • Alerting: At 2:00 PM, a Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) and "Know Your Zone" (Genasys) Red Flash Warning are broadcast to all mobile devices in Zone CUP-029. • The Preparation Window (𝑇+'*+): Residents take an average of 15–20 minutes to gather essentials and load vehicles. • The Surge: Rather than trickling out over a 2-hour window, the community enters the "Linda Vista Spine" simultaneously. This creates a "Massive Concurrent Entry" event. The demand is not modeled as vehicles-per-hour, but as a Volume-to-Capacity Surge that immediately exceeds the physical limits of the single-lane exit. 3.3.3 Model Assumption Table: R1 vs. R3 Scenarios This table provides the "hard numbers" that drives 110% Utilization Ratio conclusion. Parameter R1 Baseline (Current) R3 Planned (Proposed) Analytical Basis Total Households 70 Units 155 Units Includes Evulich Ct & Vista Heights. Vehicle Consolidation 1.6 Cars / Household 1.6 Cars / Household Families often take two cars in fires. Total Vehicle Load 112 Vehicles 248 Vehicles The total "Slug" of traffic. Evacuation Window (ASET) 30 Minutes 30 Minutes The "Survival Window" before fire arrival. Departure Distribution Log-Normal Surge Log-Normal Surge Peak arrivals occur at the 20-min mark. Peak Volume (V) 224 Vehicles / Hr 496 Vehicles / Hr (Total Load / 0.5hr Window). Effective Capacity (C) 600 Vehicles / Hr 450 Vehicles / Hr Capacity drops as density increases. Utilization Ratio (V/C) 0.37 (37%) 1.10 (110%) V/C ≥ 1.0 = System Failure. In the R3 scenario, the Volume (V) reaches 496 vehicles per hour during the surge. Because the Road Capacity (C) has degraded to 450 vehicles per hour (due to the "Force Merge" friction and intersection saturation we discussed earlier), the Utilization Ratio (V/C) hits 1.10. Once V/C exceeds 1.0, resulting "Stack", the queue length grows infinitely until the demand stops. In a 30-minute fire window, this means the last 10% of cars (and anyone stuck behind them) never reach the exit. 5.4 Travel & Clearance (𝑇!'#)*$), Part of RSET (𝑇!"!#$) In Dynamic Evacuation Model, once a system reaches a certain density, delays shift from being "incremental" to "exponential." Total delay (𝑇!"!#$) or RSET is the sum of three distinct components: Human/Pre-evacuation Delay (𝐷,), Queuing Delay (𝐷-) and Merging/Friction Delay (𝐷.). 𝑇!"!#$=𝐷,+𝑇!'#)*$ 𝐷,=𝑇#$*'!+𝑇+'*+ 𝑇!'#)*$=𝐷-+𝐷. 𝐷,, as described in Section 2.2, include two components – Þ 𝑇#$*'! : wildfire start to red flash warning issued, and Þ 𝑇+'*+ : time from alert to vehicle in gear ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 12 Given the diverse demographic characteristics of residents along the Linda Vista spine, this evacuation model applies a 20-minute assumed departure time. In this model the math for 𝐷- and 𝐷. changes fundamentally based on whether the V/C is below or above 1.0. 5.4.1 When V/C is < 1.0 (The R1 Baseline) In this state, the road has "spare" capacity. Delays are stable and predictable. • Theoretical Math (Steady-State): Engineers use the M/M/1 Queuing Theory[3,4] or the BPR (Bureau of Public Roads) Function[5,6,7]. 𝑇=𝑡%$1 +𝛼(𝑉 𝐶+ & , Where 𝑡% is the "free-flow" travel time. Because V/C is low (0.37 in R1 model), the exponent doesn't trigger a spike. • In practical sense, there are "gaps" between cars. If someone pulls out of a driveway (merging), the car behind them only needs to lift their foot off the gas slightly. • Merging Delay (𝐷.): Calculated as 𝑛× 𝑡/ (where 𝑡/ is a small gap-acceptance constant). In R1 model, this is only 4 minutes for the entire neighborhood. 5.4.2 When V/C Approaches or Exceeds 1.0 (The R3 Failure) Once V/C ≥ 1.0, the "Steady-State" math used by Hexagon breaks. Deterministic Queuing Analysis[8,9] must be used. • Theoretical Math (Oversaturation): Þ The Accumulation Formula: 𝑁(𝑡)=(𝑉−𝐶)× 𝑡 Þ Where: V is Arrival Rate (Volume), C is Service Rate (Capacity), and t is Duration of the surge. Þ If V > C, the queue length 𝑁(𝑡) grows continuously. It does not stabilize. • Queuing Delay (𝐷-): This is the time the last vehicle spends waiting for the "slug" of traffic in front of it to clear the bottleneck. Þ Math: 𝐷-= 0% 2(3 4 × F5 6 −1G Þ In R3 model, with a surge window of 30 minutes and V/C = 1.10, the last car faces a stationary wait of 45+ minutes just to reach the start of the exit line. • Merging Delay (𝐷.): In an oversaturated "Wall of Cars (n)," 𝑡/ (gap acceptance)[6,10] becomes 𝑡7 (forced merge). Þ Math: 𝐷.=𝑛× 𝑡7 Þ With 51 units at Evulich Court and a 𝑡7 of 30 seconds (time to force into a bumper-to- bumper line), conservatively, this adds 25.5 to 28.5 minutes of "stutter delay" to every car behind the merge point. 5.4.3 The Answer: RSET (𝑇!"!#$) ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 13 As prescribed by Dynamic Evacuation Model, Total delay (𝑇!"!#$) or RSET is the sum of three distinct components: Human/Pre-evacuation Delay (𝐷,), Queuing Delay (𝐷-) and Merging/Friction Delay (𝐷.). 𝑇!"!#$=𝐷,+𝐷-+𝐷. Component R1 Math (ρ=0.37) R3 Math (ρ=1.10) Impact of R3 𝐷! Constant (20m) Constant (20m) Baseline overhead. 𝐷" ≈0 (Free flow) (𝑉−𝐶)× 𝑡 Exponential growth; creates a standing queue. 𝐷# 𝑛× 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑛× 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒 Turbulence; stops the entire spine flow. 𝑇$%$&' ~26.5 Minutes 93.5+ Minutes System Failure. 5.4.4 Analytical Conclusion In Hexagon’s Evacuation analysis, the "2-minute adder" assumes the road is a Linear System. However, traffic is a Non-Linear System. When you increase the vehicle load by 2/3 (moving from R1 to R3), you aren't just adding 2/3 more delay. You are pushing the Utilization Ratio over the 1.0 Threshold. • Below 1.0, the road is a Conveyor Belt (everything moves). • Above 1.0, the road is a Parking Lot (everything stops). By modeling the "Force Merge" and the "Oversaturated Queue", the Dynamic Model proves that the R3 density creates a State Change in the neighborhood. This is why the delay jumps from 26 minutes (safe) to 90+ minutes (fatal), rather than just adding two minutes. This "State Change" is the core technical evidence the Council must consider. Conclusion The modeling of the Linda Vista corridor demonstrates that wildfire evacuation is a non-linear system. While traditional static models might suggest that adding new housing units results in only incremental delays, dynamic modeling proves that the proposed R3 density pushes the infrastructure past a catastrophic tipping point. The analytical results of this model confirm that the Linda Vista corridor cannot safely absorb the vehicle load of the proposed R3 intensification. The "2-minute adder" conclusion found in previous applicant- led studies is a mathematical artifact of an improperly scaled model. When analyzed through the lens of Dynamic Evacuation Science, the impact of adding 51 units to a saturated spine is not incremental; it is a State Change from a functional roadway to a failed system. The crossing of the 1.0 Utilization (V/C) Threshold marks the transition from "Congestion" to "Entrapment." In the R3 scenario, the 45-minute Queuing Delay and 28.5-minute Merging Delay are physically manifested as a "Wall of Cars." Under these conditions, the physical road width is irrelevant because the discharge rate at the bottleneck is lower than the arrival rate from the new developments. For the SCCFD and City leadership, the data suggests that any further intensification of the Linda Vista "Spine" without a corresponding increase in physical exit capacity (e.g., a secondary permanent emergency egress) constitutes a significant threat to life safety. In a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone, a model that predicts a 93-minute exit time in a 30-minute fire- spread window is a prediction of disaster. We recommend that the City of Cupertino and SCCFD adopt Utilization Ratio Modeling as a standard requirement for all high-density developments in the Wildland- Urban Interface (WUI) to ensure that zoning approvals do not supersede the physical laws of safe evacuation. ©2026, DerChang Kau. All rights reserved. 14 Reference [1] Daiheng Ni, Traffic Flow Theory: Characteristics, Experimental Methods, and Numerical Methods by Elsevier/Butterworth- Heinemann [2] B.S. Kerner, The Physics of Traffic. Springer, Heidelberg. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40986-1 [3] Hillier and Lieberman, Introduction to Operations Research, McGraw-Hill [4] Alan J. Miller, A Queueing Model for Road Traffic Flow, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1961.tb00391.x [5] Michael Meyer and Eric Miller, Urban Transportation Planning, McGraw-Hill [6] Transportation Research Board (1985) Special Report 209: Highway Capacity Manual. NRC, Washington DC [7] Mtoi and Moses, Calibration and Evaluation of Link Congestion Functions, J of Transportation Technologies, 2014, 4, 141- 149, DOI: 10.4236/jtts.2014.42014 [8] Roger Roess, Elena Prassas, William McShane, Traffic Engineering, Pearson [9] Ford–Fulkerson algorithm, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford%E2%80%93Fulkerson_algorithm [10] W. S. Jewell, Forced Merging in Traffic, DOI: 10.1287/opre.12.6.858 To: Assistant Chief Estrada, SCCFD Fire Preven5on Cc: Deputy Chief Shumate, SCCFD From: DerChang Kau, Resident of Cuper5no Date: March 24, 2026 Subject: Quan5ta5ve Wildfire Evacua5on Modeling & Risk Assessment for the Monta Vista Foothills Dear Assistant Chief Estrada, Thank you for taking the 5me to engage so directly with the residents of the Linda Vista corridor. Your willingness to listen to our concerns regarding the intersec5on of local development and public safety is greatly appreciated by the community. I par5cularly valued our discussion regarding the technical nuances of evacua5on modeling. As a career engineer, I have always believed that data-driven transparency serves as the most effec5ve bridge between community anxiety and opera5onal reality. To that end, I am pleased to share the enclosed assessment, which provides a rigorous engineering framework for evalua5ng wildfire evacua5on risks within our unique geography. In organizing this document, I wanted to move beyond mere observa5on and into a structured analysis of the physics of movement. The report begins by establishing the methodology, specifically contras5ng the steady- state metrics used in standard transporta5on engineering with the dynamic requirements of evacua5on science. From there, it explores the "Physics of Failure," detailing the U5liza5on Ra5o (V/C ) and explaining why system performance collapses non-linearly when volume exceeds capacity. I have concluded the study with a series of compara5ve "Stress Test" scenarios that match our current R1 baseline against the planned R3 intensifica5on at Evulich Court, supported by technical appendices rooted in established Industrial and Civil Engineering queuing standards. Ul5mately, this work is intended to help us be^er navigate the delicate balance between the forces of Mother Nature and the necessity of Human Interven5on. While we use Fire Hazard Severity Zones to respect the natural reality of our landscape, the efficacy of our interven5on depends on how we harmonize three dis5nct levels of planning. It begins with the robustness of our physical infrastructure (such as road, power, water and etc.) to handle worst-case scenarios, followed by the strategic coordina5on of local government to ensure that density alloca5on never exceeds the "life-safety bandwidth" of those roads. Only when these two founda5ons are set can we move to the third level: the execu5on of urban development with strict wildfire hardening. As you and your department hold the unique jurisdic5on to see the holis5c "connec5ve 5ssue" between these stages, I would like to formally invite you to u5lize this modeling as a resource. The Evulich Court project offers a 5mely opportunity for the SCCFD to lead by example, helping to guide City leadership toward a more thoughful alignment between density and the physical laws of a safe evacua5on. I look forward to our con5nued collabora5on in making the Monta Vista foothills a model of wildfire resilience. Respecfully, DerChang Kau Re5red Intel Fellow Adjunct Professor, Na5onal Taiwan University From:DerChang Kau To:Public Comments; City Clerk; City Council Subject:PUBLIC COMMENT - Evulich Court / 10857 Linda Vista Drive - MEETING DATE: APRIL 1, 2026 Agenda #3 Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 10:04:10 AM Attachments:image.png Rebuttal to Supplemental Staff Report Q11 .pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. This correspondence is submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 City Council meeting on Agenda #3 From: DerChang Kau <derchang@gmail.com> Date: Saturday, March 21, 2026 at 11:33 PM To: Kitty Moore <kmoore@cupertino.gov>, Cupertino City Council <citycouncil@cupertino.gov> Cc: Floy Andrews <fandrews@awattorneys.com>, Floy Andrews <floya@cupertino.gov>, Tina Kappor <tinak@cupertino.gov> Subject: On Evulich Ct. Project -- Rebuttal to Supplemental Staff Report Q11 This correspondence will be submitted to the administrative record in advance of the April 1 hearing. To: City Mayor Moore and Council Cc: City Attorney Andrews and Manager Kapoor From: DerChang Kau, Resident of Cupertino Date: March 21, 2026 Subject: Rebuttal to Supplemental Staff Report Q11 – Failure to Address Substantial Evidence of Evacuation Hazard Dear Mayor Moore and Members of the City Council, I am writing to formally challenge the City staff’s response to Question Q11-1 and Q11-2 in the Supplemental Staff Report (attached at the end of the message.) The staff’s assertion that theOctober 2025 Fehr & Peers Evacuation Study "does not pertain to the proposed residential development" is a legal fallacy that invites significant administrative risk and ignores the physical reality of the Linda Vista corridor. 1. The Present-Tense Obligation of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) – Staff argues the Fehr & Peers study is merely for "planning purposes" to inform future policy. However, under Government Code Section 66474(f), the Council is legally prohibited from approving a Tentative Map unless it can find that the design is "not likely to cause serious public health problems". This safety finding is a present-tense obligation made at the time of the hearing. The Fehr & Peers study provides "substantial evidence" that the neighborhood’s only two exit routes already operate at over 200% of capacity under evacuation conditions. The Council cannot logically or legally conclude that adding 51 units to a corridor that is already failing by 100% will not cause a "serious public health problem." 2. The Circular Logic of "Objective Standards" – Staff justifies the lack of an evacuation analysis by claiming the City has no "adopted objective standards" for evacuation. This is circular reasoning: the City commissioned the Fehr & Peers study specifically to create those standards. Intentionally ignoring the study’s data because the City has not yet finished the paperwork to "adopt" it constitutes an administrative loophole that compromises resident safety. Under the HousingAccountability Act (HAA), a study produced by the City’s own consultant qualifies as a "written" objective standard that documents a "significant, quantifiable, and direct" safety impact. 3. Inaccurate Assessment of Cumulative Impact (Q11-2) – Staff’s count of ~90 homes in the response to Q11-2 is artificially narrow. It fails to account for the cumulative evacuation demand from connected single-exit streets like Rae Lane. 4. CEQA Exemption Does Not Waive Safety Findings – Staff suggests that the AB 130 CEQAexemption "precludes" the City from requiring a project-specific evacuation study. This is incorrect. While AB 130 may exempt the project from certain environmental reporting processes, it does not waive the Subdivision Map Act’s requirement for an affirmative safety finding. AB 130 itself requires that projects in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone adopt fire mitigations that achieve a "practical effect" equivalent to state standards. Without an evacuation capacity analysis, there is zero evidence in the record to prove such an equivalency exists. In conclusion, Staff’s response to Q11 attempts to dismiss a documented 200% corridor failure as a "planning" issue rather than a "project" issue. Physical reality does not make such a distinction. I urge the Council to reject the findings for TM-2024-009 until the record includes a project-specific Wildfire Evacuation Capacity Study that accounts for the City’s own technical data. Respectfully, DerChang Kau Resident of Cupertino Excerpted from CC 03-17-2026 Item No. 12 SummerHill Homes_Supplemental Report This correspondence will be submi2ed to the administra5ve record in advance of the April 1 hearing. To: City Mayor Moore and Council Cc: City A1orney Andrews and Manager Kapoor From: DerChang Kau, Resident of Cuper<no Date: March 21, 2026 Subject: Rebu1al to Supplemental Staff Report Q11 – Failure to Address Substan<al Evidence of Evacua<on Hazard Dear Mayor Moore and Members of the City Council, I am wri<ng to formally challenge the City staff’s response to Ques5on Q11-1 and Q11-2 in the Supplemental Staff Report (a1ached at the end of the message.) The staff’s asser<on that the October 2025 Fehr & Peers Evacua5on Study "does not pertain to the proposed residen<al development" is a legal fallacy that invites significant administra<ve risk and ignores the physical reality of the Linda Vista corridor. 1. The Present-Tense Obliga5on of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) – Staff argues the Fehr & Peers study is merely for "planning purposes" to inform future policy. However, under Government Code Sec5on 66474(f), the Council is legally prohibited from approving a Tenta<ve Map unless it can find that the design is "not likely to cause serious public health problems". This safety finding is a present-tense obliga5on made at the <me of the hearing. The Fehr & Peers study provides "substan<al evidence" that the neighborhood’s only two exit routes already operate at over 200% of capacity under evacua<on condi<ons. The Council cannot logically or legally conclude that adding 51 units to a corridor that is already failing by 100% will not cause a "serious public health problem." 2. The Circular Logic of "Objec5ve Standards" – Staff jus<fies the lack of an evacua<on analysis by claiming the City has no "adopted objec<ve standards" for evacua<on. This is circular reasoning: the City commissioned the Fehr & Peers study specifically to create those standards. Inten<onally ignoring the study’s data because the City has not yet finished the paperwork to "adopt" it cons<tutes an administra<ve loophole that compromises resident safety. Under the Housing Accountability Act (HAA), a study produced by the City’s own consultant qualifies as a "wri1en" objec<ve standard that documents a "significant, quan<fiable, and direct" safety impact. 3. Inaccurate Assessment of Cumula5ve Impact (Q11-2) – Staff’s count of ~90 homes in the response to Q11-2 is ar<ficially narrow. It fails to account for the cumula<ve evacua<on demand from connected single-exit streets like Rae Lane. 4. CEQA Exemp5on Does Not Waive Safety Findings – Staff suggests that the AB 130 CEQA exemp5on "precludes" the City from requiring a project-specific evacua<on study. This is incorrect. While AB 130 may exempt the project from certain environmental repor(ng processes, it does not waive the Subdivision Map Act’s requirement for an affirma<ve safety finding. AB 130 itself requires that projects in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone adopt fire mi<ga<ons that achieve a "prac<cal effect" equivalent to state standards. Without an evacua<on capacity analysis, there is zero evidence in the record to prove such an equivalency exists. In conclusion, Staff’s response to Q11 a1empts to dismiss a documented 200% corridor failure as a "planning" issue rather than a "project" issue. Physical reality does not make such a dis<nc<on. I urge the Council to reject the findings for TM-2024-009 un<l the record includes a project-specific Wildfire Evacua5on Capacity Study that accounts for the City’s own technical data. Respecgully, DerChang Kau Resident of Cuper<no Excerpted from CC 03-17-2026 Item No. 12 SummerHill Homes_Supplemental Report From:Dennis Martin To:Kitty Moore; Liang Chao; Sheila Mohan; J.R. Fruen; R "Ray" Wang Cc:Emi Sugiyama; City Clerk; City Attorney"s Office Subject:4.1.26 Cupertino City Council Agenda Item #3, Linda VIsta Drive Project Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 8:24:23 AM Attachments:BIABA_Cupertino_AB712_3.31.26.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Mayor, City Council Members, and City Staff, Please find the attached correspondence from the Building Industry Association of the Bay Area (BIA) regarding the Summerhill Homes project on Linda Vista Drive and the implications of AB 712. The BIA urges the City Council to follow the guidance of the Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) and approve this project. HCD has determined that the project is protected by the Housing Accountability Act and is eligible under AB 130. Please be advised that project denial or failure to approve may violate state law; any subsequent litigation brought under AB 712 may result in significant penalties for the City. Best regards, Dennis Martin -- Dennis Martin BIA | Bay Area DATE:March 31, 2026 TO:Hon. Kitty Moore, Mayor and Hon. Members of the Cupertino City Council FROM:Paul Campos, Senior Vice President of Governmental Affairs And General Counsel SENT VIA:Email to the address list below RE:AB 712 and 10857 Linda Vista Drive Project Dear Mayor Moore and Council Members: The Building Industry Association of the Bay Area (BIA) respectfully submits this letter in connection with the City Council’s scheduled April 1, 2026 consideration of the 10857 Linda Vista Drive Project (Project). BIA represents more than 400 companies involved in the entitlement, development, design and construction of new homes throughout the Bay Area. The purpose of this letter is to provide additional information about the relationship of recently enacted state legislation–AB 712 (Wicks)–to the City Council’s deliberation and decision on the Project. The California Building Industry Association (CBIA), BIA’s state-affiliate, sponsored AB 712 which was enacted in 2025 and became effective Jan. 1, 2026. While we understand that the California Department of Housing and Community Development’s March 30, 2026 Letter of Support and Technical Assistance to the City’s Community Director briefly mentions AB 712, we think the new law’s profound alteration of the monetary consequences for local agencies that improperly deny or refuse to approve housing projects in violation of a housing reform law warrants further discussion. AB 712 added Section 65914.2 to the Government Code. Section 65914.2 contains three principal provisions: 1.Mandatory award of attorney’s fees and costs to a housing project applicant that is the prevailing party in litigation challenging a city’s failure to comply with a “housing reform law.”1 (65914.2(b)(1)) Importantly, the award of 1The statute defines “housing reform law” broadly to mean “any law or regulation, or provision of any law or regulation, that establishes or facilitates rights, safeguards, streamlining benefits, time limitations, or other protections for the benefit of applicants for housing development projects, or restricts, proscribes, prohibits, or procedural or substantive limitation on a public agency for the benefit of a housing development project.” Page | 2 attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party developer is neither discretionary nor subject to any conditions or prerequisites. Unlike other attorney’s fee shifting statutes, AB 712 awards the applicant’s fees automatically. There is no need for the developer to show that the city’s action was taken in bad faith or was objectively unreasonable or undertaken for an improper purpose. Nor is there any exception to a fee award based on the applicant’s financial interest in the project. Based on this provision of AB 712, if the city denies or refuses to approve the Project, and the applicant challenges that action and prevails in a lawsuit, the applicant will be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. 2.Mandatory fine imposed on a city if it was advised in writing by either HCD or the Attorney General that its action would represent a violation of a housing reform law, and the project applicant subsequently prevails in litigation on substantially the same issue (Section 65914.2 (b)(2)(A)(i). The fine imposed pursuant to this provision is also mandatory and, unlike the fines in the Housing Accountability Act, is not dependent on a judicial finding that the city failed to comply with a prior court order or acted in bad faith. If a developer successfully brings a legal challenge alleging that a city violated a housing reform law, and the city was previously advised in writing by HCD or the AG that the action would violate that reform law, a mandatory fine of not less than $10,000 for each unit in the proposed project shall be levied. We understand that the Project is proposing 51 units. We also understand that (i) the city has been advised in writing that the Project qualifies for the protections of the Housing Accountability Act and therefore cannot lawfully be denied or have its density reduced unless the city makes the requisite health or safety findings which arise “infrequently”; (ii) HCD’s letter advised the city that it cannot deny the project based on the city’s obligation to find additional housing capacity under the No Net Loss Law; and (iii) HCD’s letter advised the city that the Project is “AB 130-eligible” and that as such, it is exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act and is entitled to establish building code compliance at the appropriate post-entitlement permit stage as provided in other laws (e.g., the post-entitlement statute, Gov’t Code Section 65913.3). Based on this provision of AB 712, if the city were to deny or refuse to approve the Project, and subsequently the applicant files a legal challenge that establishes a violation of the Housing Accountability Act, No Net Loss Law, or AB 130 (all “housing reform laws”) described in HCD’s written notification, the city will be automatically liable for a fine of $510,000. 3.Mandatory fine imposed on a city if it loses a second time in the same housing element planning period in litigation involving a violation of the same housing reform law (Section 65914.2(b) (2) (A)(ii). The fine imposed pursuant to this provision is also mandatory but is $50,000 per unit rather than $10,000. Based on this provision of AB 712, if the city were to deny or refuse to approve the Project, and subsequently the applicant files a legal challenge that establishes a violation of a housing reform law (e.g., the HAA, No Net Loss, AB 130), the city would effectively have “one strike” against it for the current planning period. If, during the remainder of the planning period, the city were to be sued by the Page | 3 same or another developer alleging a violation of the same housing reform law, upon a court finding a second such a violation, the city would be automatically liable for a fine of $2,550,000. AB 712 reflects the Legislature’s determination to end decades of local governments flouting state housing reform laws. AB 712 was intended to change the longstanding dynamic in which anti-housing pressure could be brought to bear on local elected officials to induce them to ignore state housing reform laws with no consequences other than using public funds to pay for a city’s legal defense costs on the rare occasions when applicants sued to vindicate their rights. Now there are consequences. Potentially very serious ones. Sincerely yours, Paul Campos Senior Vice President of Governmental Affairs & General Counsel BIA|Bay Area 1000 Burnett Ave., Ste. 340, Concord, CA 94520 925-951-6844 (office) pcampos@biabayarea.org Councilmembers: kmoore@cupertino.gov lchao@cupertino.gov smohan@cupertino.gov jrfruen@cupertino.gov rwang@cupertino.gov City Staff: emis@cupertino.gov CityClerk@Cupertino.gov CityAttorney@cupertino.gov From:Kitty Moore To:City Clerk; Lauren Sapudar; Tina Kapoor; Floy Andrews Subject:Written Communications and Questions Item 3 Summerhill/Evulich Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 7:33:41 AM Attachments:image.png img-cb369502-96b8-44ec-95b2-d04cfb1991a3 img-36eecbb6-ca90-47fd-9049-f17ad2b7399d img-2b5a006b-71e0-4e2e-bb99-d062bb5e3f0d image.png Dear City Clerk, Please include the following for written communications for Item 3, Summerhill/Evulich: Vesting Tentative Map: 1. Thank you for providing the Title Report and missing maps for the Council to review for the Vesting Tentative Map. The current/existing parcels are not delineated on the Vesting Tentative Map. The Planning Commission was not provided the Title Report or Parcel Maps which showed the ownership, easements, and street dedication to help them make findings according to the SMA and CMC. a. The original cul de sac was for an R1-7.5 subdivision of approximately 5 homes. The parcel map from 1969 is in the Supplemental Reports. 2. Evulich Ct. was dedicated to the City in 1969 but was not improved as a proper city street to city standards and left as more of a driveway. 3. The Evulich Ct. ROW was mentioned as a reason for the need of the setback waiver in the AMMR. The City of Cupertino owns the ROW, however the dedication was for a different type of development. 4. What would be the process for the city to vacate Evulich Ct. ROW if a different roadway layout was proposed by the developer? 5. Parcel Ownership in the Supplemental Materials Map does not match the VTM. 6. Who is the engineer or surveyor of record for the parcel ownership map in the Supplemental Materials map, could they please sign off on it and/or explain why the mismatch with the VTM? It seems the VTM needs a correction regarding parcel ownership? Shouldn’t each parcel be labeled on the VTM and/or there be an ownership key of some sort? 7. Owner addresses need to be on the VTM and they are missing? Environmental Site Assessments: Auto Shop, AST/UST Hazardous Waste, and Onsite Landfill Dumps: 1. There are various ESAs which (please) need to be ordered chronologically and please clarify if the City’s 3rd party peer review had all of the information in the various Phase I and Phase II ESAs at the time of their review, because it seems like they may not have. 2. The site has had multiple ASTs (hazardous waste drums and various containers) including a 300- gallon diesel AST, four UST listings and an EDR HIST Auto listing for Vinculum International Auto Transmission Repair Shop at 10867 Linda Vista Dr. 3. Can you point to any ESA which describes Vinculum International Auto Transmission Repair Shop, what it did? Where exactly on the property it was located? This listing shows up in the EDR reports for the Target Property for 2002-2008. Auto repair shops often use degreasers such as PCE which can remain in the soil for an extremely long time. 4. The site has had above ground hazardous waste drums stored and an apparent 300 gallon diesel AST tank. The various hazardous waste drums, which looked to have been there for an extended period, may have been partially or fully removed in 2024/2025: a. Do we have inspection reports from SCCFD/SCCDEH regarding the drums? Photographs of the area shows multiple containers with rust and what looks like paint with no labeling. b. What were their contents? How do we know? c. What Certified Program Agency like SCCDEH/RWQCB provided oversight for their apparently fairly recent removal and inspection of the dirt area they were kept in? Has there been soil sampling? d. The agenda record clipped off the date of some tank removals in the attachments, please provide a clean record copy. e. Would these hazardous waste drums be accurately described as single wall, unsecured, above ground storage tanks, with unknown contents? Why did the site have multiple drums of hazardous waste on it? Was it for the Transmission Repair Shop? f. Where in the 3rd party peer review by the City’s consultant is the disposition and removal of the hazardous waste drums described? 5. A Phase I ESA shows an onsite transformer which may contain PCBs, where is this described and what are the recommendations for oversight of removal since electrical will be underground? 6. The site has had 4 Underground Storage Tanks a. Were these single wall tanks? b. When were each removed and what Certified oversight did each removal have, please provide a timeline and details. c. Where on Geotracker are these tank removals listed, there does not appear to be a record there, please explain. d. Did the City’s 3rd party peer review know that 2 tanks were fairly recently removed without SCCDEH, the CUPA, oversight and that no Geotracker reports exist? 7. The site has 2 buried dump locations with unknown contents a. Did the City’s 3rd party peer review evaluate these and provide recommendations regarding them? b. Does the Geotechnical Report discuss how these will impact foundation design? c. What is the process for having these small landfill locations evaluated and cleaned up? Has there been soil testing? 8. Will SCCDEH be provided with a SMP? Will the owners be entering into a SCCDEH Regulatory Oversight Agreement for the site? The Resolution, unlike Mary Villas, has no paragraph regarding environmental mitigation with SCCDEH oversight and following CMC Chapter 17. Please explain. Thank you. Here are the screen shots of the two onsite buried dumps: Kitty Moore Mayor City Council KMoore@cupertino.gov (408) 777-1389 From:Jack Farrell To:City Clerk Subject:Public Comment Item 3 Date:Wednesday, April 1, 2026 5:21:00 AM Attachments:Linda Vista Dr. Letter of Support.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Good morning, Please find attached letter of support from YIMBY Law for tonight's meeting of the Council. Sincerely, Jack Farrell he/him Research Attorney 267-218-1147 Check out everything we achieved in 2024! YIMBY Law 2261 Market Street STE 10416 San Francisco, CA 94114 hello@yimbylaw.org April 1, 2026 City of Cupertino City Council 10350 Torre Avenue Cupertino, CA Via email: CityClerk@Cupertino.gov Re: 10857, 10867, 10877 & 10887 Linda Vista Drive, Agenda Item 3 Dear City Council, We are pleased to submit this letter of support of the proposed Summerhill Homes project at Linda Vista Drive. YIMBY Law is a 501(c)3 non-profit corporation, whose mission is to increase the accessibility and affordability of housing in California. The Summerhill Homes project will consist of a development of 51 townhomes, including 10 affordable units, to replace four single family homes on a 2.51-acre site, lo cated close to the intersection of Linda Vista Dr and Columbus Ave. We concur with the Planning Commission’s vote and the assessment of your staff that the project is exempt from CEQA and qualifies for final approval of all necessary entitlements. Failure to comply could subject Cupertino to the following penalties: ● Attorney’s fees to the prevailing applicant, with enhanced penalties if you receive notice from California’s Attorney General or Department of Housing and Community Development.1 1 CA Gov Code § 65914.2(a)(2)(A)(II). YIMBY Law 2261 Market Street STE 10416 San Francisco, CA 94114 hello@yimbylaw.org ● Decertification of the Cup ertino Housing Element, which would subject the city to the Builder’s Remedy. This would attach the requirement to amend and recertify the Housing Element.2 In compliance with AB130 lo cal building code requirements, the project will include various resiliency upgrades such as hardened exteriors and roof eaves, emb er resistant vents, and Zone 0 L andscap e Buffers. These protections qualify it under the law as CEQA exempt, as attested to by your staff ’s recommendation and the official opinion of the Santa Clara County Fire Department. We support staff ’s assessment that this should receive a finding of exemption, and approval of all permits at issue in today’s hearing. The Housing Crisis Act of 2019 (SB 330) and the City’s Housing Element Summerhill Homes submitted an SB 330 Preliminary Application on October 9, 2024, and a final application on Decemb er 13, 2024. Pursuant to Gov. Code § 65589.5, the application is only subject to the ordinances, policies, and standards adopted and in effect when the Preliminary Application was submitted. The proposed project is consistent with the City’s General Plan and zoning ordinance and other applicable objective standards. In addition, the City’s approved 2023–2031 Housing Element identifies the project as a Housing Inventory Site. By designating the site as a Housing Inventory Site, the City selected the site for residential use and determined that residential development of the site would assist the City in meeting its Regional Housing Needs Allocation. The State Density Bonus Law SummerHill proposes to provide 10 of the 51 town home-styles at below market rate prices. By designating at least 10 p ercent of the units for Moderate Income households, the project qualifies for benefits under the State Density Bonus Law. Under the State Density Bonus L aw, a develop er may propose unlimited waivers of development standards that would have the effect of physically precluding construction of a qualifying project at the densities or with the concessions or incentives p ermitted by the 2 CA Gov Code § 65585(i)(1)(A). YIMBY Law 2261 Market Street STE 10416 San Francisco, CA 94114 hello@yimbylaw.org Density Bonus L aw. SummerHill is entitled to the waivers it has requested, all of which will provide relief from development standards that would physically preclude construction of the project at the density proposed. Once a project qualifies for a density b onus, State law provides that the City may deny a requested waiver only if it would have a specific, adverse impact up on health or safety, would have an adverse impact on a historic resource, or would be contrary to State or Federal law. In this context, specific adverse impact “means a significant, quantifiable, direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, identified written public health or safety standards, p olicies, or conditions as they existed on the date the application was deemed complete.”3 There is no substantial evidence in the record that any of SummerHill’s requested waivers would meet the criteria for City denial. The Housing Accountability Act The Housing Accountability Act, in Section 65589.5(j)(1)(A)-(B), limits a municipality’s ability to deny or condition on lower density a housing development project that complies with objective standards. The City may only disapprove the project or impose conditions on the project that would reduce density if necessary to avoid a “significant, quantifiable, direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, identified written public health or safety standards, policies, or conditions as they existed on the date the application was deemed complete” and there is no feasible method to mitigate or avoid those impacts other than disapproval or development at a lower density. We have reviewed the project plans, the CEQA document and the various expert reports that have been prepared for the project, and there is not a preponderance of evidence in the record that would justify the City’s disapproval of the project or conditioning the project in a manner that would reduce density. Summary The Legislature has made numerous amendments to California Housing L aw in an effort to provide increased clarity and certainty for both municipalities and housing providers. Based on these laws, the project is subject only to the objective standards that were in 3 Gov. Code, §§ 65915, subd. (e)(1), 65589.5, subd. (d)(2). YIMBY Law 2261 Market Street STE 10416 San Francisco, CA 94114 hello@yimbylaw.org effect on the date of the Preliminary Application; the project is entitled to the requested waivers under D ensity Bonus law; with those waivers the project is consistent with applicable objective standards; and the evidence in the record would not justify the City’s denial of the project or imposition of approval that would reduce density. Disapproval of the project or approval with conditions that would render the project infeasible at the density proposed would contravene State law. YIMBY Law closely monitors projects to ensure that all relevant state laws are properly applied, including the HA A. Should the City fail to follow these laws, YIMBY Law will not hesitate to file suit to ensure state housing policies are enforced. I am signing this letter both in my capacity as the Executive Director of YIMBY Law, and as a resident of California who is affected by the shortage of housing in our state. I look forward to seeing this project approved and brought to realization to help change the tides of the housing crisis in the B ay Area. Sincerely, Sonja Trauss Executive Director YIMBY Law From:mwfantozzi@tfanco.com To:City Clerk Cc:City Council; City Attorney"s Office; Public Comments Subject:Written Communications-SummerHill, LLC 10857, 10867, 10877, and 10887 Linda Vista Drive Townhomes Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 11:00:03 PM Attachments:City Council Letter_April_1_2026_v1.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear City Clerk, Honorable Mayor, Councilmembers, and City Attorney, Please accept the attached updated letter sent earlier as written communication regarding: Project: SummerHill - Evulich Ct. Townhomes; Application Number: TM-2024-009, ASA-2024-015, TR-2024-044; Agenda Item: 12; scheduled for consideration on April 1, 2026. I respectfully request that this documents be: 1. Posted to the public agenda packet as written communication, and 2. Distributed to the full City Council for their review. Please confirm receipt and posting at your earliest convenience. Thank you for your attention and for ensuring these materials are included in the public record. Sincerely, Mark W. Fantozzi, PECupertinomwfantozzi@tfanco.com March 30, 2026 City Clerk, Honorable Mayor, Council Members, City Attorney City of Cupertino 10300 Torre Ave. Cupertino, CA 95014 Re: SummerHill-Homes Linda Vista Drive VIA EMAIL On August 11, 2024, I wrote a letter to the City Council expressing my concern over the upzoning of the Evulich property on Linda Vista Drive. My assessment was made based on my engineering background as a registered professional engineer in the State of California. Once I was able to review the Planning Staff report prior to the February 24, 2026 Planning Commission public hearing, I found that my concerns were well founded. A few of us in the neighborhood began analyzing the project in more detail in preparation of the March 17 Council meeting and we found numerous failures by Staff, Fire and SummerHill in the analysis of this project. Further research has shown that the project has serious issues over how the project was determined to be in conformance with standards and how Staff ignored public safety. This Council did not create this situation. But it is being asked to ratify it. The Evulich property was quietly added to the Housing Element after a legal settlement, without meaningful notice to the neighborhood most affected. Planning then shepherded it through a process that systematically deferred, omitted, and concealed the analyses that would have exposed its deficiencies. The result is a project before this Council with an incomplete safety record, an unsupported CEQA exemption, and unresolved fire and evacuation risks in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone. A yes vote does not just approve 51 townhomes. It ratifies every step that brought this project here. I think it is important to understand how we got here. The Evulich property was put on the list of properties to be considered for the Housing Element back in 2022. However, the property was removed from the list prior to the city-wide notification that went out in 2022. I received that notice and the Evulich property was not shown. The Evulich property was zoned R1 Single Family with a minimum lot size of 7500 sq ft. The infrastructure in our neighborhood was built over 60 years ago and designed to support 11 houses on this property. The proposed development would put 5 times the demand on the infrastructure in place. The property simply could not support upzoning and the conditions for a CEQA review made it untenable. On January 10, 2024, The City settled a law suit with YIMBY over the delay in the City submitting its Housing Element plan. As part of the settlement, the City agreed to waive CEQA for rezoning properties that are designated as part of the Housing Element. In February 2024, the Evulich property was put back on the Housing Element and rezoned to R3. One of the many complaints I and my neighbors have about this project was the lack of notification of the zoning change on the property. We had several neighborhood meetings with Luke Connoly and staff from Planning. Each time they claimed the city did an extensive public outreach. However, from public records we determined 1. The Evulich property was added after the general notification of properties placed under the Housing Element. 2. The Evulich property notification was done by a posted notice at City Hall, a post card mailing that did not go to anyone in the neighborhood and the City website. Furthermore, only the APN was provided, no street address. Do any of you know your APN number? Do any of you know your neighbor’s APN? This notification may have satisfied the process allowed under the current housing laws but it was not in any way extensive as described by Luke Connoly. An effective outreach would have insured those most affected by the rezoning were notified in writing similar to what we received for the public hearing on the project. As I research this incident, it is clear that there was a concerted effort by Planning to conceal from the neighborhood the addition of the Evulich property to the Housing Element and subsequent rezoning. Understanding how we got here is important because it shows a pattern by Planning to conceal information that may jeopardize project approval. In addition, the exclusion of the property from the original Housing Element list and the subsequent addition of the property as a result of the YIMBY settlement made it clear that Planning was aware of the challenges this site has with respect to higher density. It's also important to consider the timing of events. 1. Waiver of CEQA as part of the YIMBY settlement in January 2024, 2. Addition of the property to the Housing Element in February 2024 3. Approval of the upzoning by City Council in early summer 2024 4. SummerHill filing of the project in August 2024. The sequence of events is not coincidental. It evidences outside influence put on the City to move on this property. It suggests a Planning Department that is more interested in pushing a project through instead of honoring a commitment to the community to ensure transparency, accountability, and fairness in the decision-making processes. Based on my review of the project documents and Staff Report, it is clear the Council must deny the project or at a minimum require a full CEQA review and completion of all life-safety, environmental, and mobility analyses before any approval is considered. I have previously submitted detailed descriptions of the deficiencies found in Planning and Fire determinations as written communications and are summarized below. 1. This site is in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone, and the safety record is incomplete Your own record confirms the site sits in a VHFHSZ and that the project’s safety case is unfinished. The Fire Department’s conditional notes still require a Final Fire Protection Plan, acknowledge non-conforming setbacks, and call for a compliant turnaround—proof that key fire-safety issues remain outstanding today, not at some future building-permit stage. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF], [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF] Despite this, the applicant provided no wildfire evacuation analysis for a neighborhood with single-egress constraints and documented bottlenecks, which is directly contrary to the Fire Code, PRC 4290, and CEQA’s wildfire impact requirements. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF] Bottom line: You cannot make current, defensible findings on fire safety or evacuation on this record. [Biological Errors | PDF] 2) Fire-flow and water-supply reliability were not demonstrated (modeling isn’t proof) The submittals do not include: Hydrant flow tests or on-the-ground verification of residual pressure and duration, Peak-demand, PSPS, or multi-structure fire scenarios, and Hydrant spacing/placement and redundancy verification for a hillside VHFHSZ subdivision. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF] Your integrated exhibits log documents 17 fire-flow, 9 fire-access, and 17 water-supply deficiencies— structural, not clerical. These are mandatory life-safety elements under CFC Appendix B/C/D and PRC 4290—not optional. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF] Hydraulic models are only as valid as their assumptions and boundary conditions; without physical flow tests and reliability checks, they can be easily skewed. In a VHFHSZ with a 50-year-old water main and no redundancy, that is unacceptable. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF] I’ve done extensive computer modeling in my work. Computer models are only as good as the assumptions made and the boundary conditions used in the model. You can vary the results to achieve a desired result by simply changing the assumptions and/or boundary conditions. Testing is the only way to validate your model. Without field testing, there needs to be a thorough review of the safety factors used and system redundancies to account for inaccuracies in the computer model. As an example, in structural engineering, there are certain types of connections used in the lateral force resisting systems of a building that require testing to use the full capacity of the connection. Without testing, higher safety factors are required to in the design of the connection to account for defects and unforeseen conditions. The project site is about 3.7 miles from the San Andreas earthquake fault, a source of major historical ground shaking. Beyond validating the computer model, the system needs to be analyzed for redundancy. In the event of a major earthquake, our neighborhood will be subject to strong ground shaking. This can result in pipe ruptures and failure of the fire water system. This occurred in the Marina District of San Francisco during the Loma Prieta Earthquake and the 1906 Earthquake where most of the damage was due to fires because pipes ruptured and there was limited water to fight the fires. It’s not just about resiliency. Redundancy is required for system operation in a major event. In the Palisades Fire, there was a lack water at the fire hydrants because the City was doing maintenance at the water supply reservoir and there was no redundant system to effectively replace lost capacity to fight the fire. Ask: Require field hydrant flow testing, reliability modeling for peak/PSPS, and a water-main capacity/ redundancy plan before any approvals. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF], [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF] 3) Evacuation and access: no study, single egress, known bottlenecks The record shows no wildfire evacuation analysis—even though the corridor is single egress (Evulich → Linda Vista) with known choke points, and even though the Fire Code and PRC 4290 require safe ingress/egress. The City’s own policy framework and recent evacuation capacity work underscore these constraints. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF] Planning staff’s reliance on a claim that the City lacks an “adopted evacuation plan” does not excuse the project’s duty to demonstrate safe evacuation now, particularly in a VHFHSZ. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF] Ask: Require a CEQA-level evacuation analysis with clearance times, network performance under wildfire loading, and mitigation/secondary access feasibility before action. [Biological Errors | PDF] 4) CEQA exemption is legally unsupportable on this record CEQA exemptions fail where unusual circumstances raise a reasonable possibility of significant impact: VHFHSZ location, discretionary PRC 4290 exception, missing wildfire/evacuation/water-reliability analyses, and conditional fire approval. All are present here. [Biological Errors | PDF] Moreover, because a PRC 4290 exception is discretionary, the project is not ministerial for CEQA purposes. CEQA does not allow approval premised on future mitigation such as a later Fire Protection Plan. [Biological Errors | PDF] The reason this property was removed from the original Housing Element list was the challenges a CEQA review would uncover and the resulting mitigations would make the project infeasible. The timing of the reinstatement following the YIMBY settlement is not coincidental. Ask: Direct staff to prepare a full CEQA analysis (wildfire behavior, evacuation, water reliability, biological, hazardous materials, and transportation updates). [Biological Errors | PDF] 5) General Plan consistency cannot be found Formatted: Font: 12 pt Under Government Code §§65300.5 and 65860, you must make General Plan consistency findings regardless of CEQA status. You cannot do so here: the project lacks verified evacuation capacity, fire-flow reliability, and present (not deferred) hazard mitigation—all core Safety Element requirements. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF] Ask: Until the safety record is complete and consistent, General Plan findings cannot be made. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF] 6) Environmental & Biological E&O: data gaps that matter in the field Phase II ESA tested only organochlorines (8081A); it did not test for organophosphates like parathion or dithiocarbamates like ziram—pesticide classes commonly present in legacy orchard soils. The corrective action is straightforward: run supplemental sampling/analysis (e.g., 8321B/validated OP/DTC suites), compare to SF Bay RWQCB ESLs, and issue a Phase II Addendum. Approving without this is a CEQA-level gap. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF] Biological report omissions: no species-level analysis for red-tailed hawk (a protected raptor), no acoustic bat surveys despite suitable structures, and no bird-safe design (glass/lighting/pets) or cumulative foraging assessment—each a standard expectation for CEQA biology in this setting. [Biological Errors | PDF] I grew up on a farm in Morgan Hill. As part of our farming operation, we farmed several hundred acres of fruit orchards much like what was here prior to development. I am familiar with the pesticides and fungicides used in orchards, and parathion and ziram were widely used up until the 70’s. Developers are required to test for all legacy chemicals used as part of the historical use of the property. Ask: Require the ESA addendum and complete biological surveys/mitigation (raptor nesting, bat surveys, bird-safe measures) before hearing reconsideration. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF] 7) Transportation E&O: safety, code, and CEQA posture problems The Transportation Study contains numerous errors and omissions: Parking minimums mis-stated; bicycle parking obligations omitted; both are material to plan compliance. Missing intersections (e.g., Columbus/Terrace) even though the report itself says some trips will use them; skewing impact location. Invalid CEQA/VMT posture (mis-reliance on AB 130); must either meet the new PRC §21080.66 infill criteria or follow Cupertino’s 2025 Guidelines for VMT screening/analysis. Sight-distance/school-area controls not translated into enforceable striping/signage exhibits (CA MUTCD). [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF] Ask: Require a corrected LTA: add the missing intersections/assignments, fix parking/bike parking, provide the AB 130/PRC §21080.66 compliance memo or VMT analysis, and submit stamped sight-triangle/ school-area control sheets. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF] 8) “Vesting” does not freeze public safety; PRC 4290 exception needs evidence—incl. financials Staff suggested “vesting” insulates the project from updated safety rules. That is incorrect. SB 330 does not vest fire-safety, evacuation, water-supply, or VHFHSZ regulations—these are police-power standards that remain fully applicable. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF] Further, a PRC 4290 exception is discretionary and requires findings of equivalent fire safety, no feasible alternative, General Plan consistency, and not deferring mitigation. Your record also explains when financial disclosure is warranted—if an exception confers a financial benefit, the City may require pro formas and cost comparisons to evaluate feasibility claims prior to granting any safety deviation. [Biological Errors | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF] SummerHill intends to sell the market units for $2.2M to $2.6M. The construction costs are fixed regardless where the project is built in the Bay Area. Land costs may vary but the land cost is known up front and once known is considered fixed. The soft costs are variable. By providing exceptions to standards, the City is providing SummerHill a financial benefit by reducing their soft costs. This goes directly to profit. A profit made by sacrificing the health and safety of the public, and jeopardizing property is not acceptable. The City has the authority to require SummerHill to disclose the financials on the project. Ask: Do not grant or rely on any PRC 4290 exception without a complete evidentiary record, including applicant financials if they assert compliance is infeasible. [Biological Errors | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF] 9) About “peer review” and why it doesn’t cure missing evidence At the Planning Commission, SummerHill argued that reports were vetted by staff and “peer reviewed.” But peer review is not a substitute for required data. The Millennium Tower was expert-designed and peer-reviewed—and still failed, with taxpayers paying tens of millions. The question is not whether a report exists—it’s whether the record contains the required analyses and verified data to support your findings today. Here, it does not. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF] 10) The stakes: insurance, property values, and City liability Approving a 51-unit project in a VHFHSZ without verified evacuation, fire-flow reliability, ESA/biology completeness, and corrected transportation safety will drive insurance costs up and property values down while increasing the City’s exposure in foreseeable wildfire scenarios. The prudent course is to complete the analyses first. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF], [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF], [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF] SummerHill is aware the project will not withstand a CEQA review. The reports they filed for this project are deeply flawed and we have demonstrated that the reports will not stand up to scrutiny. In an effort to get conciliatory approval by some of the neighbors, they offered concessions to two of my neighbors in advance of the March 17 Council meeting. SummerHill refused to consider these same concessions when asked by one of the Commissioners at the Planning Commission meeting, claiming they “could not make the project work.” This confirms why the Evulich property was removed from the Housing Element back in 2022 when CEQA was required for rezoning, and why it was added back only after the CEQA waiver was granted by the City. This property should never have been upzoned in the first place and the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone only makes it worse for upzoning. As registered professional engineer, I am mandated by law to protect the health and safety of the public. This applies to the work I design. However, when I see the failure of a government agency to fulfill its duty to protect public safety and verify compliance, I feel it is my duty to identify the problems and demand compliance. Planning has clearly demonstrated indifference to public safety to the benefit of developers to simply meet a quota. This Council should not. The risks documented in this letter are now part of the public record regardless of how this Council votes. Supporting housing is defensible. Approving housing in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone without completing the required safety record is a different matter. If residents are trapped on Linda Vista Drive in a wildfire, the administrative record will show exactly what was known, who was told, and how each member voted. That record does not expire with a term. Please deny the project, or continue the hearing and direct staff to: 1. Prepare a full CEQA review addressing wildfire/evacuation, water-supply reliability, ESA addendum, complete biological surveys/mitigation, and a corrected transportation analysis. [Biological Errors | PDF], [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF], [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF] 2. Require a Final Fire Protection Plan now, not at building-permit stage; include verified hydrant flow tests, peak/PSPS reliability, and redundancy measures. [Transporta...Study E&O | PDF], [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF] 3. Require PRC 4290 exception findings supported by substantial evidence, including financial disclosure if the applicant claims safety compliance is infeasible. [Biological Errors | PDF], [Biological Errors | PDF] 4. Confirm General Plan consistency cannot be made until all safety and environmental requirements are satisfied on the record. [ESA Review...O Findings | PDF] Sincerely, Mark W. Fantozzi, PE From:Rhoda Fry To:Public Comments Cc:City Clerk; City Attorney"s Office; City Council; Cupertino City Manager"s Office Subject:4/1/2026 Agenda #3 Linda Vista Project needs to be rejected Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 3:31:20 PM Attachments:what the fire dept knew was expected of them.pdf David J Powers DJP ASKED for the 3 fire things.pdf summerhill-evacuation.pdf summerhill KNEW they needed extra fire info.pdf april 1 deadline.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear City Council, Hopefully, this is the last of my emails to your regarding this topic, which has kept me awake at night for weeks on end, although I am not personally affected by it. 1. You are being asked to vote on a number of things. You CAN VOTE NO. If you didn’t have a choice, the project would have been rejected or accepted ministerially. 2. Consider delaying the hearing in order for further due diligence – per PRAs, the only reason that the developer wishes to have this hearing date is because of a contractual agreement that they have – the City had asked for May. 3. Please revoke the SB330 “vested rights.” At the time this project was initially approved, we did not know that the project was subject to major public health and safety issues, including: a) increasing the fire hazard designation to the highest level – Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ). b) impacted emergency evacuation routes at 2X to 4X over-capacity assessed in October 2025 and only revealed after the February 24, 2026 Planning Commission meeting that narrowly approved the project. Because this and other information was unknown at the Planning Commission, their advisory vote should not be considered. A previously approved SB 330 project can be repealed or revoked due to severe health and safety risks. You can do this! Without SB330, the conditions for AB130 (and SB131) are likely modified. 4. CEQA is required. The objective of AB130 (and SB131) is to streamline straight- forward projects that don’t need CEQA. This project is not simple and there are compelling reasons why CEQA is required and that the project is not subject to AB130/SB131: a) Project is located in an earthquake zone b) Project is located in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ) and does NOT meet the criteria for loopholes in the law. Specifically, the Planning Department communicated the three requirements (4290, 4291, 7a) to both the Fire Department and the Developer. The Developer asked Fire for only a subset of requirements. The Developer subsequently checked in with Fire to make sure that everything they needed was provided, but Fire is not familiar with AB130. c) Project has a history of Underground Storage Tanks. This project not only fails the AB130 test, it also fails the reasonable person test. i) We know that the pipes in the old Monta Vista Water Works are brittle and some have failed recently. ii) We know that the project is in a very high fire zone. iii) We know that the project is in an active and dangerous thrust fault zone that is capable of a 7M earthquake iv) We know that evacuation routes are extremely compromised. If there is an earthquake and a fire, the proposed fire sprinklers on the exterior decks within 30 feet of the property line will fail. This is the type of thing that CEQA looks at. You owe it to the residents to put public health and safety first. 5. Use of AMMR is improper on two counts. a) The AB130 checklist mis-uses the AMMR as the only test for CEQA. Per above, this is false. b) The purpose of the AMMR is used during exceptional circumstances. Otherwise code prevails. The Developer falsely claimed exceptional circumstances. Although the Housing Element granted them 51 units, there was no requirement that they be 4- bedroom mansions. Specifically, AMMRs are used when physical limitations, unique site conditions, or design constraints make it impossible to follow the standard, prescriptive code path. This was not the case and the use of the AMMR was improper. 6. Please vote on the park-fee waiver separately. It should not be bundled into your vote on other aspects of the project. 7. Please require the developer to select a more appropriate tree. The developer proposes Chinese Pistache. Although it is more fire-resistant than some trees, it is very susceptible to Verticillium wilt which kills trees. Verticillium is very common in old orchards and this property is in an old orchard. 8. Councilmember Shiela Mohan must recuse due to her proximity to the site. She should have recused during the Housing Element hearings – had she recused then, the zoning for this site would have been different. I have also put in an inquiry to the FPPC on this matter. Please see enclosed attachments from PRAs. Additionally, through this email, all PRAs pertaining to this project, published and unpublished are included. In Community, Rhoda Fry, 40+ year Cupertino Resident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( / * & 1 1 * 2 $;"=:%; :;;!"G $;"=:%; :;;<% ::::::::::* . ::::::::: * $ "" $( 2!% !"!# !$ D&' C $(':!"!;:""<733:!"!;:" #7(9:!"!;:";; ( $) * + + 1$' .'- ./ "! )$,*-/ 0 1 26 C F#*$3*)4 "C E "#$#%"$$&B'('"#$#%"$)*B+"#$#%"$%% " G#$#% "! &B)$B#* D %#&$B D E 0 # 11 C 1 ( 1 5E%$,"3%)"%%#$ 1 E%$,"3%)"%%%) From:Kitty Moore To:City Clerk; Lauren Sapudar Cc:Tina Kapoor Subject:Written Communications Item 3 Summerhill Evulich Ct. Date:Tuesday, March 31, 2026 1:28:06 PM Attachments:evacuation_route_capacity_analysis_oct_2025.pdf Guenoc Case 2024-a165677.pdf Dear City Clerk, Please include this email and the attached documents as written communications for Item 3: Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Study Center for Biological Diversity v. County of Lake (2022) / Bonta v. County of Lake (2024 Appellate Update). Thank you, Kitty Moore Kitty Moore Mayor City Council KMoore@cupertino.gov (408) 777-1389 Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment Submitted to: City of Cupertino Submitted in: October 2025 Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment Prepared for: Submitted in: City of Cupertino October 2025 P Table of Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Study Purpose ......................................................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Study Context ........................................................................................................................................................ 1 1.3 Natural Hazards .................................................................................................................................................... 2 1.3.1 Flood and Inundation Hazards ............................................................................................................... 2 1.3.2 Seismic And Geologic Hazards ............................................................................................................ 3 1.3.3 Fire Hazards ............................................................................................................................................... 4 1.3.4 Hazardous Waste And Materials .......................................................................................................... 5 2. Background ................................................................................................................................ 6 2.1 Legislative Requirements .................................................................................................................................. 6 2.2 Emergency Planning in Cupertino ................................................................................................................. 6 3. Approach and Methods............................................................................................................. 8 3.1 Identify the Evacuation Scenarios .................................................................................................................. 8 3.2 Define the Evacuation Area ............................................................................................................................. 11 3.3 Define Evacuation Routes ................................................................................................................................ 11 3.4 Estimate Vehicle Trips ...................................................................................................................................... 11 3.5 Assign Vehicle Trips .........................................................................................................................................14 3.6 Evacuation Route Assessment ...................................................................................................................... 15 3.6.1 Assessing Evacuation Route Capacity .............................................................................................. 15 3.6.2 Distance to Evacuation Gateway ....................................................................................................... 17 4. Evacuation Route Assessment ................................................................................................ 18 4.1 Estimate Evacuation Vehicle Trips ................................................................................................................ 18 4.1.1 Resident and Employee Population .................................................................................................... 18 4.1.2 Student Population ................................................................................................................................. 19 4.1.3 Visitor Population .................................................................................................................................. 20 4.1.4 Total Estimated Evacuation Demand .............................................................................................. 20 4.2 Evaluating Evacuation Route Capacity ....................................................................................................... 21 4.2.1 Scenario A (Quantitative Analysis) ..................................................................................................... 21 4.2.2 Scenario B (Quantitative Analysis) ..................................................................................................23 4.2.3 Scenario C (Qualitative Analysis) ..................................................................................................... 27 4.3 Analyzing Distance to Evacuation Gateways ........................................................................................... 27 5. Recommendations................................................................................................................... 29 5.1 Supply-Side Strategies ....................................................................................................................................29 5.2 Demand-Side Strategies ............................................................................................................................... 30 P 5.3 Information-Side Strategies ......................................................................................................................... 30 5.4 Additional Considerations ............................................................................................................................ 30 Appendices Appendix A: Socioeconomic Data Appendix B: Trip Distribution List of Figures Figure 1: Fire Hazard Severity Zones ......................................................................................................................... 10 Figure 2: Evacuation Routes ......................................................................................................................................... 13 Figure 3: Trip Distribution for Scenario A ............................................................................................................... 22 Figure 4: Trip Distribution for Scenario B ............................................................................................................... 25 Figure 5: Distances to Evacuation Gateways ........................................................................................................ 28 Figure A-1: Census Block Group and Census Tract Locations ......................................................................... 34 Figure A-2: Genasys Protect Zone Locations (highlighted numbers in study area) ................................. 36 Figure A-3: Transportation Analysis Zone (TAZ) Locations (light blue indicates study area) ............... 38 List of Tables Table 1: Scenario Definitions .......................................................................................................................................... 9 Table 2: Vehicle Demand Calculations in the Evacuation Area ......................................................................... 14 Table 3: Planning Level Roadway Capacity per Hour per Lane ......................................................................... 15 Table 4: Evacuation Route Capacity .......................................................................................................................... 16 Table 5: Composition of Evacuees by Scenario .................................................................................................... 18 Table 6: Resident Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area ................. 19 Table 7: Employee Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area ............... 19 Table 8: Student Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area ................. 20 Table 9: Visitor Land Use and Evacuation Demand of the Evacuation Area ................................................ 20 Table 10: Total Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips for the Evacuation Area ............................. 20 Table 11: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario A)...................................................................... 23 Table 12: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario B) .................................................................... 26 Table A-1: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Census1 .................................................................................... 33 P Table A-2: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Genasys Protect1 .................................................................. 35 Table A-3: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Santa Clara County VMT Estimation Tool1 ....................37 Table A-4: School Enrollment Data .......................................................................................................................... 39 Table A-5: Estimated Student Evacuation Trips ................................................................................................... 39 Table A-6: Estimated Visitor Evacuation Trips ..................................................................................................... 40 Table B-1: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario A) ................................................ 42 Table B-2: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario B) ............................................... 43 Table B-3: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario C) .............................................. 44 Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 1 1. Introduction The City of Cupertino's comprehensive planning efforts make it appropriate to assess evacuation route capacity while simultaneously updating the General Plan and Emergency Operations Plan . This assessment provides the City of Cupertino with emergency evacuation event information and is consistent with requirements outlined in Assembly Bill (AB) 747 (2019) and AB 1409 (2021), which specifically require local agencies to evaluate evacuation routes capacity and identify evacuation locations. This supplements the analysis that was prepared for the Draft Health and Safety Element Update (March 2025) regarding residential street accessibility to identify parcels in hazard areas with limited egress routes as required by Senate Bill (SB) 99. 1.1 Study Purpose The following is a summary of the purpose of this evacuation study: • Identify major evacuation routes and shelter locations/gateways; • Inform development of evacuation strategies and conduct evacuation route capacity assessment of wildfire evacuation scenarios with other hazards that could limit evacuation route capacity; • Identify bottlenecks on major evacuation routes based on the evacuation route capacity assessment results; • Identify evacuation strategies to improve performance of the road network during evacuations; and • Identify potential future/ongoing efforts for a detailed Evacuation Plan . 1.2 Study Context This assessment evaluates roadway capacity under certain described scenarios and should not be considered an evacuation plan. Emergency evacuations can be triggered by a number of events, and natural and man-made disasters can be as unpredictable as individual behavior related to evacuation events. As such, this assessment is intended to provide the City of Cupertino with a broad “planning level” assessment of transportation system capacity during worst case evacuation scenarios; it does not provide system adequacy guarantees, nor does it guarantee the findings are applicable to all situations. This assessment will help the City develop policies to prioritize evacuation routes and centers based on the findings of this analysis. Moreover, because emergency evacuation assessment is an emerging field, there is no established standard methodology. We have utilized existing methods in transportation planning that, in our knowledge and experience, we believe offer the most appropriate planning level understanding of roadway capacity for evacuation events. Nevertheless, such methods are limited by the budgetary and time constraints in our scope of work, by the current state of the practice, and of our knowledge. The City of Cupertino has requested this study to aid in planning and implementing potential evacuation plans/scenarios. This assessment should help the city be better prepared for those events; however, in no way can Fehr & Peers guarantee the efficacy of the information used in this assessment, as such would be beyond our professional duty and capability . Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 2 1.3 Natural Hazards The Health and Safety Element Background Report (July 23, 2025) described the following potential natural hazards. For this assessment, we considered various natural hazards in the preparation of evacuation scenarios. The natural hazards are described 1.3.1 Flood and Inundation Hazards Flooding is the rising and overflowing of water onto normally dry land. Floods are one of the most frequent natural hazards impacting Santa Clara County and among the costliest natural disasters in terms of human hardship and economic loss nationwide, causing substantial damage to structures, landscapes, and utilities, as well as life-safety issues. Flooding can be extremely dangerous; even six inches of moving water can knock a person over. Floodwaters can transport large objects downstream, damaging or removing stationary structures, such as dam spillways. Ground saturation can result in instability, collapse, or other damage that breaks utility lines and interrupts services. Objects can also be buried or destroyed through sediment deposition from heavy fl ooding. Standing water can cause damage to roads, foundations, and electrical circuits, as well as spread vector-borne illnesses. Other problems connected with flooding and stormwater runoff include erosion, degradation of water quality, and losses of environmental resources. Floods are usually caused by large amounts of stormwater, either from a period of very intense rainfall or a long period of steady rain. Historically, Cupertino has been at risk of flooding primarily during the winter and spring when stream systems swell with heavy rain. This type of flood results from prolonged, heavy rainfall and typically occurs due to high peak flows of moderate duration and a large volume of runoff. Flooding is more severe when prior rainfall has saturated the ground. The watersheds in the Santa Cruz Mountains feed into four major streambeds that traverse the city, Permanente Creek, Stevens Creek, Regnart Creek, and Calabazas Creek. These creeks collect surface runoff and drain into channels leading to the San Francisco Bay. During heavy rainfall, these creeks create a potential flooding risk in the city as water levels may exceed the top of the creekbank. Occasionally, flash flooding from short-duration, high-intensity precipitation events (often during atmospheric river events) may occur. Atmospheric rivers are a relatively common weather pattern that brings southwest winds and heavy rain to California. Atmospheric rivers are long, narrow regions in the atmosphere that transport water vapor carried away from the tropics. These columns of vapor move with the weather, carrying large amounts of water vapor and strong winds. When the atmospheric rivers make landfall, they often release this water vapor in the form of rain or snow, often causing heavy rains that can lead to flooding and mudslide events. Flash floods can occur even during a drought. Such events can tear out trees, undermine buildings and bridges, and scour creek channels. In urban areas, flash flooding is an increasingly serious problem due to removing vegetation and replacing groundcover with impermeable surfaces such as roads, driveways, and parking lots. The greatest risk from flash floods is occurrence with little to no warning. 1.3.1.1 Dam and Pipeline Failure A dam failure is an uncontrolled release of water from a reservoir through a dam because of structural failures or deficiencies in the dam, usually associated with intense rainfall or prolonged flooding. Water pipeline or aqueduct failures can create a similar sudden flood. Dam and pipeline failures can range from minor to catastrophic, potentially harming human life and property downstream from the failure. In addition, ecosystems and habitats can be destroyed by fast-moving floodwaters, debris, Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 3 and sedimentation from inundation. Although dam and pipeline failures are very rare, these events are not unprecedented. There are four major causes of failures: • Overtopping: These failures occur when a reservoir fills too high with water, especially in times of heavy rainfall, leaving water to rush over the top of the dam. Other causes of this type of failure include settling of the crest of the dam or spillway blockage. • Foundation defects: These failures occur as a result of settling in the foundation of the dam, instability of slopes surrounding the dam, uplift pressures, and seepage around the foundation. All these failures result in structural instability and potential dam failure. • Piping and seepage failures: These failures occur as a result of internal erosion caused by seepage and erosion along hydraulic structures, such as the spillways of a dam, or failures in the walls of a water pipeline. Animal burrows and cracks in the dam structure may also cause ero sion. • Conduit and valve failure: These failures occur as a result of problems with valves and conduits in a dam or pipeline’s systems. Many dam and pipeline failures are also the secondary result of other natural disasters, such as earthquakes, landslides, and extreme storms. Other causes include equipment malfunction, structural damage, and sabotage. Dams are constructed with safety features known as “spillways” that allow water to overtop the dam if the reservoir fills too quickly. Spillway overflow events, often referred to as “design failures”, result in increased discharges downstream and increased flooding potential. In a dam failure scenario, the greatest threat to life and property typically occurs in those areas immediately below the dam since flood depths and discharges generally decrease as the flood wave moves downstream. The primary danger associated with dam failure is the high-velocity flooding downstream of the dam and limited warning times for evacuation. 1.3.2 Seismic And Geologic Hazards Seismic and geologic hazards are risks caused by the movement of different parts of the earth’s crust or surface. Seismic hazards include earthquakes and hazardous events caused by them. Geologic hazards are other hazards involving land movements that are not linked to seismic activity and can inflict harm to people or property. Additional information about seismic and geologic hazards i n Cupertino, including development review coordination is in General Plan Appendix E, Geologic and Seismic Hazards. 1.3.2.1 Seismic Hazards Seismic activity occurs along boundaries in the earth’s crust, called faults. Pressure along the faults builds over time and is ultimately released, resulting in ground shaking commonly referred to as an earthquake. Earthquakes can also trigger other hazards, including surface rupture (cracks in the ground surface), liquefaction (causing loose soil to lose its strength), landslides, and subsidence (sinking of the ground surface). Earthquakes and other seismic hazards often damage or destroy property and public infrastructure, including utility lines, and falling objects or structures pose a risk of injury or death. 1.3.2.1.1 EARTHQUAKES While Cupertino is at risk from many natural and human-caused hazards, the event with the greatest potential for loss of life or property and economic damage is an earthquake. This risk is true for most of the San Francisco Bay Area region since damaging earthquakes affect widespread areas and trigger many secondary effects that can overwhelm the ability of local jurisdictions to respond. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 4 Earthquakes in the Bay Area result from strain energy constantly accumulating across the region because of the motion of the Pacific Plate, relative to the North American Plate. Earthquake risk is very high in Santa Clara County, including the City of Cupertino, due to the presence of three major active faults1 in the region, the Hayward Fault, Calaveras Fault, and San Andreas Fault. Both the San Andreas and the Hayward Faults have the potential for experiencing major to great events. 1.3.2.1.2 OTHER SEISMIC HAZARDS In addition to the direct physical damage that can result from the motion of an earthquake, damage can result from liquefaction. Liquefaction occurs primarily in saturated, loose, fine - to medium- grained soils in areas where the groundwater table is within approximately 50 feet of the surface. Shaking causes the soils to lose strength and behave as a liquid. Excess water pressure is vented upward through fissures and soil cracks and can result in a water -soil slurry flowing onto the ground surface. This subsurface process can lead to near-surface or surface ground failure that can result in property damage and structural failure. Groundwater that is less than 10 feet to the surface can cause the highest liquefaction susceptibility, with lower groundwater levels causing lower liquefaction risks. 1.3.2.2 Geologic Hazards Landslides and rock falls may occur in sloped areas, especially areas with steep slopes, and usually in loose and fragmented soil areas. Slope stability depends on many factors and interrelationships, including rock type, pore water pressure, slope steepness, and natural or human-made undercutting. Landslides, rockfalls, and debris flows occur continuously on all slopes; some processes act very slowly, while others occur very suddenly, often with disastrous results. Landslides are often triggered by other natural hazards, such as heavy rain, floods, or wildfires, so landslide frequency is often related to the frequency of these other hazards. In Santa Clara County, landslides typically occur during and after severe he avy rainfall, so the risk of landslides often rises during and after sequential severe storms that saturate steep, loose soils. Landslides and mudslides are a common occurrence and have caused damage to homes, public facilities, roads, parks, and sewer lines. 1.3.3 Fire Hazards Fire hazards include both wildfires and urban fires. The combination of complex terrain, climate, vegetation and development patterns contribute to an elevated risk of wildfire. The Community Wildfire Protection Plan 2023 (CWPP) describes how each of these variables contributes to fire risk, and describes how fire risk varies throughout the city. Historically, the fire season extended from early summer through late fall of each year during the hotter, dryer months, although it is increasingly a hazard that can occur year-round. Fire conditions arise from a combination of high temperatures, low moisture content in the air and plant matter, an accumulation of vegetation, and high winds. Three types of fires are of concern to Cupertino: (1) wildfires, (2) wildland-urban interface fires, and (3) structural fires. 1 Active faults are defined by their current movement and deformation and their potential to cause earthquakes or other types of ground deformation in the future. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 5 1.3.3.1 Wildfires Wildfires occur on mountains, hillsides, and grasslands. Fuel, weather, and topography are primary factors that affect how wildland fires spread. In and around Cupertino, grassland and woodland habitat provide highly flammable fuel that is conducive to wildfires. These plant species are capable of regeneration after a fire, making periodic wildfires a natural part of the ecology of these areas. The climate of Cupertino and the surrounding area keeps the grass dry and more readily combustible during fire season. Wildfire potential for Santa Clara County is typically greatest in the months of August, September, and October, when dry vegetation coexists with hot, dry winds. During these times, controlling a fire becomes far more difficult. Areas adjacent to the city that are susceptible to wildfires are also of concern as these conditions could exacerbate vulnerabilities within the city. Grassland fires are easily ignited, particularly in dry seasons. These fires are relatively easily controlled if they can be reached by fire equipment, although after a fire, the burned slopes are highly subject to erosion and gullying. While brushlands are naturally adapted to frequent light fires, fire suppression in recent decades has resulted in heavy fuel accumulation on the ground. Wildland fires, particularly near the end of the dry season, tend to burn fast and very hot, threatening homes and leading to serious destruction of vegetative cover. In woodland and forested areas, a wildland fire can generate a destructive crown fire, which is a fire that burns materials at the top of trees, spreading from treetop to treetop. They can be very intense and difficult to contain. Because areas of the city with natural vegetation are extremely flammable during late summer and fall, wildfire is a serious hazard in undeveloped hillside areas in the western portion of the city, as well as open space areas adjacent to the city. These areas include State Responsibility Area (SRA) lands west of the city, such as the Rancho San Antonio Open Space, Picchette Ranch Open Space, Stevens Creek County Park, Saratoga Creek County Park, Sanborn County Park, Fremont Older Open Space, as well as Local Responsibility Area (LRA) lands in the hillsides of Saratoga. 1.3.4 Hazardous Waste And Materials Hazardous materials are materials that pose a significant risk to public safety, or human and environmental health. These include toxic chemicals, flammable or corrosive materials, petroleum products, and unstable or dangerously reactive materials. They can be released through human error, malfunctioning or broken equipment, or as an indirect consequence of other emergencies (e.g., if a flood damages a hazardous material storage tank). Hazardous materials can also be released accidentally during transportation because of vehicle accidents. The release or spill of bulk hazardous materials could result in fire, explosion, toxic cloud, or direct contamination of water, people, and property. The effects may involve a local site or many square miles. Health problems may be immediate, such as corrosive effects on the skin and lungs, or gradual, such as the development of cancer from a carcinogen. Property damage could range from immediate destruction by explosion to permanent contamination by a persistent hazardous material. Most hazardous materials in the region are transported on truck routes along major roadways, such as I - 280 and SR-85 that pass through Cupertino. The most vulnerable areas along this route are considered the on-/off-ramps and interchanges. Since 1970, one reported roadway hazardous materials incident occurred in Cupertino. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 6 2. Background 2.1 Legislative Requirements Assembly Bill (AB) 747 (2019) and AB 1409 (2021) both mandate local jurisdictions to update their safety elements to include comprehensive evacuation planning. • AB 747 (2019) adds California Government Code Section 65302.15, which requires the safety element to be reviewed and updated, upon the next update of a local hazard mitigation plan (LHMP) after January 1, 2022, to identify evacuation routes and their capacity, safety, and viability under a range of emergency scenarios.2 • AB 1409 (2021) adds evacuation locations to Section 65302.15 of the California Government Code and requires the safety element to be reviewed and updated to identify evacuation locations. Accordingly, this report considers: • Identification of Evacuation Routes: The study identifies all evacuation routes and assesses their capacity, safety, and viability under various emergency scenarios. • Capacity Assessment: The study evaluates the capacity of evacuation routes to handle the expected volume of traffic and evacuees during an emergency. • Safety and Viability: The study considers the safety and viability of the identified routes and centers for use during emergencies. • Mapping Evacuation Gateways: This involves mapping evacuation centers and shelters and/or shortest path to evacuation gateways to ensure they are accessible and adequately equipped. • Policy Development: Policies to prioritize evacuation routes and centers based on the findings. • Integration with Local Hazard Mitigation Plans (LHMP): Updates to the Health and Safety Element should be coordinated with the existing LHMP or other relevant emergency planning documents to ensure consistency and alignment. 2.2 Emergency Planning in Cupertino This City of Cupertino maintains and publishes several emergency planning documents:3 The Emergency Operations Plan (2019)4 provides guidance on the City's response to the most likely and demanding emergency conditions. It outlines the incident management structure, legal compliance, whole community engagement, continuity of government, and other critical components. 2 The City of Cupertino participated in the Santa Clara County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan which was approved by FEMA in February 2024 which triggered compliance with this requirement. 3 https://www.cupertino.gov/files/assets/city/v/1/your-city/documents 4 https://www.cupertino.gov/files/assets/city/v/1/your-city/documents/cupertino-emergency-operations-plan.pdf. Accessed August 28, 2025. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 7 The Health and Safety Element (last amended in 2005, with minor edits in 2015)5, a Chapter in the General Plan, describes local hazards and mitigation measures. It identifies that people in the foothills and mountains of Cupertino’s planning area, covering approximately 16 square miles, are most at risk from fire. The City is currently updating the Health and Safety Element. The Health and Safety Element Update lists the following policies to prepare for and respond to disasters and emergencies: • Policy HS-2.1: Building And Fire Code Compliance • Policy HS-2.2: Promote Emergency Preparedness • Policy HS-2.3: Emergency Operations And Training • Policy HS-2.4: Volunteer Groups • Policy HS-2.5: Emergency Public Information • Policy HS-2.6: Fire Prevention And Emergency Preparedness • Policy HS-2.7: Hazard Preparedness • Policy HS-2.8: Educational And Outreach Materials • Policy HS-2.9: Poor Air Quality Event Assistance • Policy HS-2.10: Disaster Medical Response • Policy HS-2.11: Evacuation Routes • Policy HS-2.12: Evacuation Awareness • Policy HS-2.13: Ingress And Egress • Policy HS-2.14: Secondary Ingress And Egress. • Policy HS-2.15: Emergency Access The City’s Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) (February 21, 2024)6 is an annex to the Santa Clara County Multijurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan. It assesses potential hazard risks as well as mitigation measures to prevent loss of life, injury, and property damage. It identifies earthquake, severe weather, flood, landslide, and wildfire as hazards of greatest concern. In the LHMP, Table 17 lists the actions that comprise the City’s hazard mitigation action plan. The Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) (2023)7 describes projects from the Santa Clara County CWPP (2023). These plans are required to be updated every five years to remain eligible for funding implementation projects through the Fire Safe Councils and CAL FIRE. 5 https://www.cupertino.gov/files/assets/city/v/1/your-city/documents/gp-chap-06-health.pdf. Accessed August 28, 2025. 6 https://oem.santaclaracounty.gov/multi-jurisdictional-hazard-mitigation-plan-mjhmp. Accessed October 24, 2025. 7 https://www.sccfd.org/santa-clara-county-community-wildfire-protection-plan/. Accessed October 24, 2025. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 8 3. Approach and Methods This analysis focuses on the transportation system capacity during a wildfire evacuation event. The following flow chart illustrates the steps in the process. 3.1 Identify the Evacuation Scenarios Fehr & Peers, City of Cupertino staff, the Santa Clara County Fire Department, and the Santa Clara County Sherriff’s Office worked together to identify the hazard of highest concern for this assessment (wildfires in the Fire Hazard Severity Zone (FHSZ)) and three evacuation scenarios. In developing the evacuation scenarios, all hazards identified in Section 1.3 were considered. The defined evacuation scenarios represent hazards with the greatest potential to generate the largest number of vehicles requiring evacuation. Consideration was given to wildfire vulnerability, as well as access limitations that may occur due to compounding hazards such as a landslide or flood damage along an evacuation route. Table 1 defines the evacuation scenarios. Scenarios A to C reflect Existing Conditions in year 2025. This assessment conducted baseline analysis using existing socioeconomic conditions to establish current evacuation performance and identify potential constraints under present -day conditions. This provides a foundation for evaluating how future growth could affect evacuation route capacities. When considering cumulative conditions with projected buildout, increased evacuation population would likely exacerbate bottlenecks identified in the baseline analysis. These scenarios assume no evacuation population will “shelter in place” within the hazard area or evacuation area. Instead, these scenarios evaluate evacuation from the evacuation area using the shortest path. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 9 • Scenario A was assessed quantitatively. It assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation within the evacuation area at 2 PM on a school day. All roadways are assumed to be accessible to evacuees, which include residents, employees, students, and visitors. • Scenario B was assessed quantitatively. It assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation following an earthquake at 6 AM, during a time when schools are not in session. McClellan Road at Club House Lane near the Deep Cliff Golf Course is assumed to be closed. Evacuees include residents and a small portion of employees. • Scenario C was assessed qualitatively. It is based on Scenario A by assuming the same evacuation demand, but with additional roadway closures on Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR- 85 and SR-85 Southbound Ramps at Stevens Creek Boulevard because of an earthquake causing the wildfire. Table 1: Scenario Definitions Scenario A (Quantitative) Scenario B (Quantitative) Scenario C (Qualitative) Hazard Type(s) Wildfire Wildfire after Earthquake Wildfire after Earthquake Scale of Emergency Evacuation Area1 Evacuation Area1 Evacuation Area1 Time of Event Fall 2 PM (School in session) Summer 6 AM (School not in session) Fall 2 PM (School in session) Road Closures due to Hazard All roadways open McClellan Road at Club House Lane near the Deep Cliff Golf Course due to earthquake • Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR- 85 • SR-85 Southbound Ramps at Stevens Creek Boulevard Type of Evacuees Residents, employees, students, visitors Residents, small portion of employees Residents, employees, students, visitors Notes: 1. The boundary of evacuation area is defined as the Genasys Protect zones within the fire hazard severity zone (FHSZ) lands in the western portions of the City and homes within the foothills of the Santa Cruz Mountains, shown in Figure 1. Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. Fire Hazard Severity Zones FIGURE 1 Page 32 Appendix H:Health and Safety Element Background Report | August 2024 Figure S-9 Fire Hazard Severity Zones Data Source: Health and Safety Element Background Report, July 23, 2025 6% 25% 25% 6% 12% 19% 7% 31% 25% 2% 16% 6% 13% 7% Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Screenline East of the WUI Screenline West of SR-85 Screenline Trip Distribution Scenario B SR-85 Trip Distribution % Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) % 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 11 3.2 Define the Evacuation Area According to the Cupertino Municipal Code Chapter 16.74.020, “Wildland‐Urban Interface (WUI) or Wildland‐Urban Interface Fire Area (WUIFA) mean a geographical area identified by the state as a Fire Hazard Severity Zone in accordance with the Public Resources Code Sections 4201 through 4204 and Government Code Sections 51175 through 51189, or other areas desig nated by the enforcing agency to be at a significant risk from wildfires”. The evacuation area is defined as the Genasys Protect8 zones within the WUI, or the moderate to very high FHSZ in Cupertino. Figure 1 illustrates the fire hazard severity zones included in the Health and Safety Element Background Report. The safe area is established at SR-85 and I-280 and serves as the evacuation gateway, representing the boundary beyond which evacuees are considered to have exited the evacuation area, and are therefore no longer at immediate risk. 3.3 Define Evacuation Routes This analysis uses the evacuation routes provided by the City of Cupertino in August 2025, developed as part of the City’s ongoing effort to update its Health and Safety Element. The evacuation routes for the City of Cupertino and surrounding unincorporated areas are used to transport evacuees using their own vehicle and transit dependent evacuees to temporary shelter. This analysis assumes that routes that provide the most direct path to evacuate the community with the least exposure to risk will be used by evacuees. The major evacuation routes consider the location of critical facilities (i.e., safety and security, health and medical, and communications) as well as residential, employment, school, and recreational uses. Figure 2 shows the evacuation routes provided by the City. 3.4 Estimate Vehicle Trips The number of evacuation vehicle trips assigned to the roadway network are a combination of trips generated by residential households, employee trips, student trips, and visitor trips at the time of the evacuation. These trips include those generated by uses in the City as well as surrounding unincorporated areas including PG&E Trailhead, McClellan Ranch Preserve, Stevens Creek County Park, and Fremont Older Open Space Preserve. Trips generated by residential households were informed by the most recent available data from the US Census Bureau and the California Department of Finance. This includes data on population, the number of households, persons per household, and vehicles per household. This data was cross- referenced with data in the Genasys Protect platform’s designated evacuation zones. The household data was then used to estimate evacuation vehicle trips based on the number of households, persons per household, auto-ownership information, population, and other factors that could affect the number of vehicles per household used during an evacuation event. 8 Genasys Protect is an evacuation management tool that helps communities and first responders plan, communicate, and conduct evacuations. It provides communications, situational awareness, and cross -agency coordination capabilities for emergency management. The platform delivers integrated hardware and software for proactive preparedness and multi-channel communication. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 12 Table 2 describes data sources and equations used to estimate vehicle evacuation demand for residents, employees, students, and visitors. Data sources reviewed for this assessment include the 2023 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year Estimates, Genasys Protect, Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool, and the adopted Housing Element. These sources provide population, household, and employment estimates that are within a similar range. Evacuation Routes FIGURE 2 280 280 280 85 85 yW e l l i v e l l e B S T a n t a u A v e ev A t h g i r W S S t e l l i n g R d Reg n a r t R d ev A h c n i F Prospect Rd Sara t o g a A v e dv l B a z n A e D N Doyle Rd dR b b u B S B l a n e y A v e Moorpark Ave Cox Ave McClellan Rd dR o t i u Q dv l B a z n A e D S S M a r y A v e ev A r e l l i M N T a n t a u A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F S Pruneridge Ave W Homestead Rd E Homestead Rd Jo h n s o n A v e N S t e l l i n g R d Ho l l e n b e c k A v e dR e f l o W S dR e l a v y n n u S - a g o t a r a S S Vallco Pk w y Rainbow Dr Bollinger Rd Stevens Creek Blvd W Ca m p b e l l A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F N N B l a n e y A v e dR e f l o W S t e v e n s C a n y o n R d Phil Ln ev A l i a u Q Mou n t E d e n R d Basemap FIGURE 2 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation RoutesCupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Evacuation Route (outside of City Boundary) Evacuation Route (in Cupertino) Fire Hazard Severity Zones FIGURE 1 Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Evacuation Routes (in Cupertino) Evacuation Routes (outside of City Boundary) Data Source: Draft Health and Safety Element, 2025 Rodrigues Ave Torre Ave 85 85 280 280 280 A B C D E F 1 2 3 4 5 6 0.9 miles from Point F to Gateway 6 1.1 miles from Point F to Gateway 5 1.3 miles from Point B to Gateway 1 1.4 miles from Point E to Gateway 4 1.6 miles from Point E to Gateway 5 1.6 miles from Point B to Gateway 2 1.9 miles from Point A to Gateway 1 2 miles from Point D to Gateway 3 2.2 miles from Point D to Gateway 4 2.4 miles from Point C to Gateway 3 2.5 miles from Point C to Gateway 1 Gateway Start Distance to Evacuation Gateway 0 - 0.5 Miles 0.5 - 1 Miles 1 - 1.5 Miles 1.5 - 2 Miles 2.5 - 3 Miles 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 14 Table 2: Vehicle Demand Calculations in the Evacuation Area Evacuation Demand Variable Data Source Equation 1. Employment Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool Data source provided value. 2. Residential Population Genasys Protect* Data source provided value. 3. Household Genasys Protect* Population / Household size 4. Household Vehicle Ownership Distribution Census Tract Number of households with 0, 1, 2, or 3+ vehicles / Total household 5. Household Vehicle Ownership Steps 4 & 5 Household vehicle ownership distribution * Household 6. Student Education Data Partnership Data source provided value1 7. Visitor Parking Spaces Available from Google Maps Portion of parking spaces occupied2 8. Estimated Vehicle Evacuation Demand Steps 1 & 6 Residents: 1 * zero-vehicle household + 1 * one-vehicle household + 2 * two-vehicle household + 2.5 * three-or-more vehicle household Employees: 0.99 * employment Students: 1 * drive-alone student + 0.5 * carpooling student + 1 * student picked up/dropped off Visitors: 0.5 * visitor Notes: Raw data is presented in Appendix A. 1. Educational Data Partnership shows school enrollment data for the following schools considered in the evacuation area: Abraham Lincoln Elementary School, Tessellations Elementary School, John F Kennedy Middle School, and Monta Vista High School. 2. Visitor presence considered at recreational attractions located within the evacuation area: PG&E Trailhead (50% of the Rancho San Antonio County Park parking spaces), Deep Cliff Golf Course (20% of the Linda Vista Park parking spaces), Rim Trail (45% of the Stevens Creek County Park Chestnut and Villa Maria parking lots), and Parker Ranch Trailhead (40% of the Fremont Older Open Space Preserve Prospect and Saratoga Country Club parking spaces). Source: 2023 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year Estimates; Genasys Protect; Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool; Educational Data Partnership; and Google Maps, Fehr & Peers, 2025. 3.5 Assign Vehicle Trips The total resident, employee, student, and visitor evacuation trips are disaggregated into 14 different geographically designated evacuation zones in the Genasys Protect platform. Trips are routed from each zone to the nearest evacuation route. Once on a major evacuation route, trips are assigned to the most efficient path toward either SR-85 or I-280. The city limit is used as the evacuation Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 15 gateways because it represents the boundary beyond which evacuees are considered to have exited the hazard area and the evacuation area, and are therefore no longer at immediate risk. 3.6 Evacuation Route Assessment An evacuation route assessment can be completed in a variety of ways to determine the capacity and viability of key evacuation routes. An assessment, like this project, can use volume to capacity ratios under typical non-congested conditions. Under more constrained and congested conditions, higher effort studies may involve modeled analysis of evacuation scenarios using dynamic traffic assignment to simulate traffic flow and evacuation times when street and freeway networks are at capacity. This evacuation route capacity divides the vehicle demand volumes by the roadway evacuation capacity to estimate the volume to capacity ratio during an evacuation event. Furthermore, the evacuation route assessment measures the distance evacuees have to travel to reach evacuation gateways. 3.6.1 Assessing Evacuation Route Capacity This analysis uses planning level roadway capacities based on the roadway cross section (e.g., two, four, or six travel lanes) with adjustments for the hilly nature of the evacuation routes in the evacuation area and anticipated lower visibility conditions present during an evacuation. These planning level roadway capacities are consistent with the level of planning for this AB 747/AB 1409 evacuation capacity analysis where the desired outcome is a list of policies and programs to integrate into the Health and Safety Element. Table 3 lists the peak one-hour planning capacity for each roadway type. These evacuation capacities do not incorporate contraflow , as the opposing direction is reserved for emergency responders. Table 3: Planning Level Roadway Capacity per Hour per Lane Roadway Type Planning Capacity1 (Typical Day) Planning Capacity (Low Visibility) Freeway 2,020 1,780 Divided Arterial 940 830 Undivided Arterial 890 780 Collector/Local 650 570 Notes: 1. Roadway planning capacity from Highway Capacity Manual (2000). Source: Highway Capacity Manual, 2000; Fehr & Peers, 2025. Additionally, during a fire or other emergency event, roadways typically operate at lower capacities due to changes in driver behavior and the presence of hazards such as low visibility due to smoke. Baseline capacities for all evacuation roadways were reduced by 12 percent to account for these hazards, based on recommended capacity reductions due to low visibility (due to weather) provided by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Road Weather Management Program.9 9 How weather events impact roadways? https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/weather/q1_roadimpact.htm#:~:text=Speed%20variance%20can%20fall%20by,12 %20percent%20in%20low%20visibility, accessed April 2025. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 16 Table 4 presents the roadway types and total evacuation route capacity at designated screenlines and a few additional roadway segments. A screenline is an imaginary line on a map to evaluate the evacuation route capacity (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). This analysis uses a screenline east of the evacuation area, and another at SR-85 and I-280, which represent the defined evacuation gateways. Table 4: Evacuation Route Capacity Roadway Name Roadway Type1 Outbound Lanes Evacuation Route Capacity Adjusted Evacuation Route Capacity2 1. East of the Evacuation Area Screenline Cristo Rey Drive west of Foothills Boulevard Collector 1 650 570 Foothill Boulevard north of Alpine Drive Local 1 650 570 Stevens Creek Boulevard east of Cupertino Road Collector 1 650 570 McClellan Road east of Imperial Avenue Collector 1 650 570 Bubb Road north of Hyannisport Drive Local 1 650 570 Rainbow Drive west of Seven Springs Lane Local 1 650 570 Prospect Road east of Parker Ranch Trailhead Local 1 650 570 2. West of SR 85 Screenline Foothill Boulevard south of I-280 Undivided Arterial 2 1,780 1,560 Stevens Creek Boulevard west of SR-85 Undivided Arterial 2 1,780 1,560 Bubb Road south of Stevens Creek Boulevard Collector 1 650 570 McClellan Road east of Bubb Road Collector 1 650 570 Stelling Road north of Orion Lane Collector 1 650 570 South De Anza Boulevard north of SR-85 Divided Arterial 3 2,820 2,490 Prospect Road east of S De Anza Boulevard Collector 2 1,300 1,140 Notes: 1. Roadway type determined by City of Cupertino Circulation Element (2025). 2. Vehicles per hour. Rounded to nearest 10. Source: Circulation Element, 2025; Fehr & Peers, 2025. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 17 3.6.2 Distance to Evacuation Gateway For this analysis, evacuation population groups are considered to be evacuated when they have either accessed gateways to the east of SR-85 or north of I-280. To assist with identifying potentially vulnerable communities during an evacuation event it is also helpful to identify City neighborhoods that need to travel the furthest and thus are potentially the most exposed in an evacuation event. This analysis measures the distances from each point along the roadway network to designated evacuation gateways. Up to two best routes from each point to the gateways are included in this assessment. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 18 4. Evacuation Route Assessment This chapter evaluates the evacuation route capacity during a wildfire evacuation event for the evacuation area and routes identified in Chapter 3. This section also analyzes the distances from each point along the roadway network to designated evacuation gateways to help identify City neighborhoods that need to travel the furthest and thus are potentially the most exposed in an evacuation event. 4.1 Estimate Evacuation Vehicle Trips Based on the identified scenarios, the areas requiring evacuation include the FHSZ since these areas are most vulnerable to wildfire hazards. The trips assigned to the transportation system are estimated based on household and employer demographics along with student and visitor population and assist with estimating evacuation demand during an evacuation event. Table 5 lists the composition of evacuees for each quantitative scenario. Note that Scenario C is a qualitative assessment, which builds on Scenario A and, therefore, has the same evacuation demand as Scenario A. Table 5: Composition of Evacuees by Scenario Type of Evacuees Scenario A (Quantitative) Scenario B (Quantitative) Scenario C (Qualitative) Residents 46% 100% 46% Employees 100% 2% 100% Students 100% 0% 100% Visitors 100% 0% 100% Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. 4.1.1 Resident and Employee Population A worst-case condition was estimated where all residents, and retail and restaurant (estimated to be half of all employees in the area) in the evacuation area would need to be evacuated. The number of residents, anticipated vehicle ownership per household, employees, students in schools, and visitors in the evacuation area were used to estimate the number of evacuee vehicles. Because the raw data for households, population, and employment cover geographic areas that differ from the evacuation area, the data were adjusted to estimate land use and evacuation demand. Table A-1 to Table A-3 provide raw socioeconomic data. Table 6 to Table 10 present the resident, employee, student, and visitor land uses and estimated evacuation demand in the evacuation area. As shown in Table 6, approximately one percent of households does not have access to a vehicle and would potentially confront mobility constraints during an evacuation event. This assessment uses zero-vehicle households as a proxy to provide an estimate of persons with mobility constraints that may need evacuation assistance. These zero-vehicle households would Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 19 require outside assistance. Although outside the scope of this assessment, the City may want to consider a program that ensures a more accurate accounting of households needing assistance and programs to facilitate their evacuation. This estimate also assumes employment centers would provide evacuation assistance to employees without access to a vehicle. Additionally, it was assumed that some households with more than two vehicles likely would not be able to utilize all of their vehicles during an evacuation event (e.g., homes with three or more vehicles but with only two licensed drivers). Table 6: Resident Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area Population1 Households2 Household Vehicle Ownership2 Estimated Evacuation Demand3,4,5 0 1 2 3+ Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 12,636 4,355 48 604 2,400 1,303 4,050 8,710 4,050 1% 14% 55% 30% Notes: 1. The estimated population is obtained from Genasys Protect data provided by the City staff on July 25, 2025. 2. The estimated number of households and household vehicle ownership is derived from 2023 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-Year Estimates and adjusted according to the estimated population. 3. Assumption of number of vehicles that will evacuate: zero-vehicle household: 1 vehicle; one-vehicle household: 1 vehicle; two-vehicle household: 2 vehicles; three-or-more vehicle household: 2.5 vehicles. 4. Assume that daytime population from Genasys Protect consists of residents, employees, students, and visitors. Calculated as (daytime population - employees - students - visitors) / residents * 100%, The residents present in the evacuation area were estimated to be 46% and 100% of the population for Scenarios A and B respectively. 5. It should be noted that this information does not constitute a specific analysis of households with mobility challenges as it does not specifically account for people who have mobility impairments that preclude them from using a vehicle; it also does not specifically account for households that own one or more vehicles, but where not all members of the household may necessarily have access to them at all times (for example, a household with one vehicle which a household member drives to work, leaving other members of the household at home with no vehicle available). Source: 2023 ACS 5-Year Estimates; Genasys Protect; Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool; Fehr & Peers, 2025. Table 7: Employee Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area Employment (A)1 Estimated Evacuation Demand2 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 556 550 10 550 Notes: 1. The estimated employment is obtained from the Santa Clara Countywide VMT Evaluation Tool, using 2025 as the baseline year. 2. Assumes that all the employees will evacuate with 0.99 vehicles per employee (one percent of evacuation area households are zero-vehicle households). Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. 4.1.2 Student Population Within the designated evacuation area, several schools serve a substantial student population that would require timely evacuation in the event of an emergency at working hours. Schools located Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 20 within the evacuation area include Abraham Lincoln Elementary School, Tessellations Elementary School, John F. Kennedy Middle School, and Monta Vista High School. Table 8 presents the estimated number of student evacuation trips during Scenario A. Table A-4 and Table A-5 show the school enrollment data and estimated student evacuation trips, categorized by mode of travel, including pick-up/drop-off by parents, carpooling, and individual student drivers. Table 8: Student Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area School Enrollment Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 3,560 3,120 0 3,120 Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. 4.1.3 Visitor Population Table 9 presents the estimated number of visitor trips generated by recreational land uses that would require evacuation during an emergency. Additional details on how these visitor trip estimates were developed can be found in Table A-6. Table 9: Visitor Land Use and Evacuation Demand of the Evacuation Area Visitors Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 355 180 0 180 Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. 4.1.4 Total Estimated Evacuation Demand Considering the estimated trips generated in the evacuation area from all employees, residents, students and visitors, the total number of estimated trips during an evacuation event can be estimated. The total evacuation demand is 7,900 and 8,720 during Scenario A and Scenario B respectively, as shown in Table 10. Table 10: Total Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips for the Evacuation Area Type of Evacuees Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Residents 4,050 8,710 4,050 Employees 550 10 550 Students 3,120 - 3,120 Visitors 180 - 180 Total 7,900 8,720 7,900 Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 21 Figure 3 shows the distribution of the evacuation demand across two screenlines. These screenlines represent the edge of the hazard area (screenline 1) and the estimated evacuation edge (screenline 2). 4.2 Evaluating Evacuation Route Capacity 4.2.1 Scenario A (Quantitative Analysis) The total estimated evacuation demand was distributed across the roadway network in proportion to the combined resident, employee, student, and visitor population data for each Genasys Protect zone10 within the evacuation area. Detailed percent trips assigned for each roadway can be found in Table B-1. The distance to evacuation gateways map (see Figure 5) was used to identify primary routes likely to be used by evacuees. Traffic volume data for the roadway segments on the evacuation area were collected in July 2025. These counts, combined with estimated demand, were used to calculate the total evacuation vehicle demand. StreetLight data from the same period in 2024 were collected and compared with data from October 2024 to evaluate the impact of school sessions versus non-school periods. For Scenario A, representing a typical Fall weekday at 2 PM, a factor of 1.2 was applied to account for the increased traffic associated with schools being in session. Evacuation route capacity was assessed by dividing vehicle demand volumes by roadway evacuation capacity to calculate the volume-to-capacity (V/C) ratio. As shown in Table 11, the results of the evacuation capacity assessment indicate that all evacuation routes have V/C ratios greater than 1 near the evacuation area except for Prospect Road. This indicates that these roads would require more than one hour to accommodate the evacuation demand from the hillside, making them bottlenecks during an evacuation. Foothill Boulevard, Stevens Creek Boulevard and McClellan Road are the most critical bottlenecks with V/C ratio greater than 2. Prospect Road and Stelling Road have V/C ratios of 1, suggesting they are at capacity and should be prioritized for evacuation demand and supply strategies. It is also important to note that emergency scenarios are often unpredictable (as well as driver behavior during the evacuation time period) and it is anticipated that evacuees would vacate at a rate that more closely resembles a bell curve from the time the evacuation order is issued. These are conditions which would affect the total estimated evacuation time in our assessment and are beyond the scope and budget of our assessment. There is also general unpredictability in operational issues, such as power issues that would trigger traffic signals to operate in “red flash mode” in which traffic would need to proceed through intersections in an all -way stop configuration. 10 A Genasys Protect zone is a predefined geographic area used during emergencies to streamline response efforts, reduce confusion, and optimize traffic flow. Trip Distribution for Scenario A FIGURE 3 280 280 280 85 85 yW e l l i v e l l e B S T a n t a u A v e ev A t h g i r W S S t e l l i n g R d Reg n a r t R d ev A h c n i F Prospect Rd Sara t o g a A v e dv l B a z n A e D N Doyle Rd dR b b u B S B l a n e y A v e Moorpark Ave Cox Ave McClellan Rd dR o t i u Q dv l B a z n A e D S S M a r y A v e ev A r e l l i M N T a n t a u A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F S Pruneridge Ave W Homestead Rd E Homestead Rd Jo h n s o n A v e N S t e l l i n g R d Ho l l e n b e c k A v e dR e f l o W S dR e l a v y n n u S - a g o t a r a S S Vallco Pk w y Rainbow Dr Bollinger Rd Stevens Creek Blvd W Ca m p b e l l A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F N N B l a n e y A v e dR e f l o W S t e v e n s C a n y o n R d Phil Ln ev A l i a u Q Mou n t E d e n R d Basemap FIGURE 2 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Data Source: Fehr & Peers Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes West of SR-85 Screenline East of the WUI Screenline Trip Distribution | Scenario A Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) Trip Distribution % SR-85 Trip Distribution % Rodrigues Ave Torre Ave 5% 18% 21% 14% 14% 22% 6% 23% 21% 4% 24% 5% 17% 6% Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Screenline East of the WUI Screenline West of SR-85 Screenline Trip Distribution Scenario A SR-85 Trip Distribution % Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) % 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 23 Table 11: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario A) Evacuation Route Link Evacuation Travel Demand1 Existing Hourly Traffic Total Evacuation Demand Adjusted Evacuation Route Capacity V/C Ratio2 1. East of the Evacuation Area Screenline Cristo Rey Drive west of Foothills Boulevard 400 239 639 570 1.1 Foothill Boulevard north of Alpine Drive 1,420 883 2,303 570 4.0 Stevens Creek Boulevard east of Cupertino Road 1,660 417 2,077 570 3.6 McClellan Road east of Imperial Avenue 1,110 100 1,210 570 2.1 Bubb Road north of Hyannisport Drive 1,110 234 1,344 570 2.4 Rainbow Drive west of Seven Springs Lane 1,740 20 1,760 570 3.1 Prospect Road east of Parker Ranch Trailhead 470 116 586 570 1.0 2. West of SR 85 Screenline Foothill Boulevard south of I-280 1,820 883 2,703 1,560 1.7 Stevens Creek Boulevard west of SR-85 1,660 719 2,379 1,560 1.5 Bubb Road south of Stevens Creek Boulevard 320 550 870 570 1.5 McClellan Road east of Bubb Road 1,900 506 2,406 570 4.2 Stelling Road north of Orion Lane 400 196 596 570 1.0 South De Anza Boulevard north of SR-85 1,340 1,578 2,918 2,490 1.2 Prospect Road east of S De Anza Boulevard 470 912 1,382 1,140 1.2 Note: Bolded text indicates roadways over one-hour evacuation capacity. 1. Rounded to nearest 10. 2. Total evacuation demand divided by adjusted outbound capacity. Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. 4.2.2 Scenario B (Quantitative Analysis) Scenario B assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation following an earthquake at 6 AM, during a time when schools are not in session. The total estimated evacuation demand was distributed across the Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 24 roadway network in proportion to the combined population, and employment population data for each Genasys Protect zone11 within the evacuation area. Detailed percent trips assigned for each roadway can be found in Table B-2. The distance to evacuation gateways map (see Figure 5) was used to identify primary routes likely to be used by evacuees. The results of the evacuation capacity assessment in Table 11 indicate that all the roadways near the evacuation area except for Cristo Rey Drive, McClellan Road and Prospect Road have V/C ratios greater than 2. This indicates that these roads would require more than one hour to accommodate the evacuation demand from the evacuation area, making them bottlenecks during an evacuation. This scenario is evaluated with a road closure on McClellan Road at Club House Lane near the Deep Cliff Golf Course, with schools not in session. When this segment of McClellan Road is closed, evacuees located east of Club House Lane can only travel eastbound along McClellan Road, while those west of the closure can only travel westbound. In other words, evacuees cannot cross the closed segment, which results in separate evacuation routes for areas on either side of the closure. Under these conditions, evacuation demand on McClellan Road would decrease, with some trips shifted to Foothill Boulevard and Stevens Creek Boulevard. As a result, McClellan Road would experience a lower V/C ratio. Under Scenario B, evacuation demand is higher than under Scenario A, as summarized in Table 10. However, because existing hourly traffic is lower at 6 AM under Scenario B, the total evacuation demand (i.e., the sum of evacuation travel demand and existing hourly traffic) on some roadways is lower under Scenario B than under Scenario A. A morning evacuation (6:00 AM) reflects conditions when most residents are at home, resulting in higher residential evacuation demand but relatively low existing traffic volumes on the roadways. In contrast, an afternoon evacuation (2:00 PM) occurs when many residents are at work or school, leading to lower residential evacuation demand but higher levels of existing traffic associated with general daytime travel activity. Scenario B has higher evacuation travel demand but lower existing traffic, resulting in a lower total evacuation demand on some roadways than Scenario A. As a result, these roadways show lower V/C ratios under Scenario B despite the higher evacuation travel demand. 11 A Genasys Protect zone is a predefined geographic area used during emergencies to streamline response efforts, reduce confusion, and optimize traffic flow. Trip Distribution for Scenario B FIGURE 4 280 280 280 85 85 yW e l l i v e l l e B S T a n t a u A v e ev A t h g i r W S S t e l l i n g R d Reg n a r t R d ev A h c n i F Prospect Rd Sara t o g a A v e dv l B a z n A e D N Doyle Rd dR b b u B S B l a n e y A v e Moorpark Ave Cox Ave McClellan Rd dR o t i u Q dv l B a z n A e D S S M a r y A v e ev A r e l l i M N T a n t a u A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F S Pruneridge Ave W Homestead Rd E Homestead Rd Jo h n s o n A v e N S t e l l i n g R d Ho l l e n b e c k A v e dR e f l o W S dR e l a v y n n u S - a g o t a r a S S Vallco Pk w y Rainbow Dr Bollinger Rd Stevens Creek Blvd W Ca m p b e l l A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F N N B l a n e y A v e dR e f l o W S t e v e n s C a n y o n R d Phil Ln ev A l i a u Q Mou n t E d e n R d Basemap FIGURE 2 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Data Source: Fehr & Peers Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes West of SR-85 Screenline East of the WUI Screenline Trip Distribution | Scenario B Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) Trip Distribution % SR-85 Trip Distribution % Rodrigues Ave Torre Ave 6% 25% 25% 6% 12% 19% 7% 31% 25% 2% 16% 6% 13% 7% Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Screenline East of the WUI Screenline West of SR-85 Screenline Trip Distribution Scenario B SR-85 Trip Distribution % Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) % 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 26 Table 12: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario B) Evacuation Route Link Evacuation Travel Demand1 Existing Hourly Traffic Total Evacuation Demand Adjusted Evacuation Route Capacity V/C Ratio2 1. East of the Evacuation Area Screenline Cristo Rey Drive west of Foothills Boulevard 520 31 551 570 1.0 Foothill Boulevard north of Alpine Drive 2,180 283 2,463 570 4.3 Stevens Creek Boulevard east of Cupertino Road 2,180 31 2,211 570 3.9 McClellan Road east of Imperial Avenue 520 13 533 570 0.9 Bubb Road north of Hyannisport Drive 1,050 64 1,114 570 2.0 Rainbow Drive west of Seven Springs Lane 1,660 85 1,745 570 3.1 Prospect Road east of Parker Ranch Trailhead 610 23 633 570 1.1 2. West of SR 85 Screenline Foothill Boulevard south of I-280 2,700 283 2,983 1,560 1.9 Stevens Creek Boulevard west of SR-85 2,180 142 2,322 1,560 1.5 Bubb Road south of Stevens Creek Boulevard 170 86 256 570 0.4 McClellan Road east of Bubb Road 1,400 31 1,431 570 2.5 Stelling Road north of Orion Lane 520 28 548 570 1.0 South De Anza Boulevard north of SR-85 1,130 362 1,492 2,490 0.6 Prospect Road east of S De Anza Boulevard 610 144 754 1,140 0.7 Note: Bolded text indicates roadways over one-hour evacuation capacity. 1. Rounded to nearest 10. 2. Total evacuation demand divided by adjusted outbound capacity. Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 27 4.2.3 Scenario C (Qualitative Analysis) Scenario C assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation following an earthquake at 2 PM on a school day. Scenario C demonstrates the worst-case evacuation condition in which an earthquake initiates wildfire. Scenario C builds on Scenario A by assuming the same evacuation demand, but with additional roadway closures at the following roadways because of an earthquake causing wildfire: • Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR-85 • SR-85 Southbound Ramps at Stevens Creek Boulevard Due to the results of the baseline scenario, no further quantification was conducted for Scenario C. However, in addition to the capacity constraints identified in Scenario A, the following evacuation route capacity issues have been noted: • The closure on Stevens Creek Boulevard and SR-85 Southbound Ramps would divert 2,378 evacuees assigned to Stevens Creek Boulevard (refer to Table 11) to the adjacent routes. The updated trip distribution is shown in Table B-3. These alternative routes include Foothill Boulevard, McClellan Road, and De Anza Boulevard. Since these routes are already bottlenecks in Scenario A, the added volume would result in further congestion and increase the severity of the bottleneck causing more delay and queuing. • Stevens Creek Boulevard also serves the evacuees from the entire corridor east and west of the FHSZ. A portion of the rerouted evacuation demand from Stevens Creek Boulevard is expected to shift towards Rainbow Drive and to Stelling Road or De Anza Boulevard, which serve as one of the key evacuation corridors to SR-85. • Foothill Boulevard is already identified as a critical bottleneck with a V/C ratio exceeding 4 in both the scenarios. The rerouted evacuation demand due to the roadway closures would further exacerbate congestion and significantly affect evacuation efficiency. 4.3 Analyzing Distance to Evacuation Gateways Distance to evacuation gateways is mapped in Figure 5. The map illustrates the primary evacuation routes likely to be used by evacuees. The distance for all the evacuation routes ranges from 0.9 to 2.5 miles with most falling between 1.5 to 2 miles. From each start point, there is one or two best routes to reach the gateways with similar distances. Routes A, B, E, and F (via Cristo Rey Drive, Stevens Creek Boulevard, Rainbow Drive, and Prospect Road, respectively) are within two miles of the nearest evacuation gateways. According to Table 11 and Table 12, Cristo Rey Drive and Prospect Road are not expected to experience capacity constraints under Scenarios A and B. As a result, evacuees using these routes are expected to have relatively short evacuation times. In contrast, Route D (via Bubb Road) is located 2 miles to the nearest evacuation gateway (Gateway 3), while Route C (via Foothills Boulevard) exceeds 2 miles in distance to the nearest gateway (Gateway 3). Given that Foothills Boulevard is projected to be over capacity (V/C > 4) under Scenarios A and B, and Bubb Road is over capacity (V/C > 2) under both scenarios, evacuees using these routes are likely to encounter significant traffic congestion and longer evacuation times. Distances to Evacuation Gateways FIGURE 5 280 280 280 85 85 yW e l l i v e l l e B S T a n t a u A v e ev A t h g i r W S S t e l l i n g R d Reg n a r t R d ev A h c n i F Prospect Rd Sara t o g a A v e dv l B a z n A e D N Doyle Rd dR b b u B S B l a n e y A v e Moorpark Ave Cox Ave McClellan Rd dR o t i u Q dv l B a z n A e D S S M a r y A v e ev A r e l l i M N T a n t a u A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F S Pruneridge Ave W Homestead Rd E Homestead Rd Jo h n s o n A v e N S t e l l i n g R d Ho l l e n b e c k A v e dR e f l o W S dR e l a v y n n u S - a g o t a r a S S Vallco Pk w y Rainbow Dr Bollinger Rd Stevens Creek Blvd W Ca m p b e l l A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F N N B l a n e y A v e dR e f l o W S t e v e n s C a n y o n R d Phil Ln ev A l i a u Q Mou n t E d e n R d Basemap FIGURE 2 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino City BoundaryCupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Distance to Evacuation Gateway 0 - 0.5 Miles 0.5 - 1 Miles 1 - 1.5 Miles 1.5 - 2 Miles 2.5 - 3 Miles Gateway Start A B C D E F 1 2 3 4 5 6 0.9 miles from Point F to Gateway 6 1.1 miles from Point F to Gateway 5 1.3 miles from Point B to Gateway 1 1.4 miles from Point E to Gateway 4 1.6 miles from Point E to Gateway 5 1.6 miles from Point B to Gateway 2 1.9 miles from Point A to Gateway 1 2 miles from Point D to Gateway 3 2.2 miles from Point D to Gateway 4 2.4 miles from Point C to Gateway 3 2.5 miles from Point C to Gateway 1 Gateway Start Distance to Evacuation Gateway 0 - 0.5 Miles 0.5 - 1 Miles 1 - 1.5 Miles 1.5 - 2 Miles 2.5 - 3 Miles 0 1 2 Miles Rodrigues Ave Torre Ave Data Source: Fehr & Peers Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 29 5. Recommendations The City of Cupertino has already implemented several key strategies that support evacuation readiness and enhance emergency response capabilities. These existing measures provide a strong foundation for coordinated and effective action during wildfire or other disaster events: • Established multi-jurisdictional plans that enable Fire and Sheriff departments to operate seamlessly under a unified command structure. This coordination ensures faster decision- making, effective resource deployment, and a cohesive response across different agencies and jurisdictions. • Traffic signals within the evacuation network are equipped with battery backup systems, allowing them to remain operational during power outages for up to eight hours. This functionality helps maintain orderly traffic flow, reduces confusion at intersections, and supports safer, more efficient evacuations. • Strong coordination and communication among key agencies including Fire, Sheriff, and Public Works—facilitate real-time updates and operational alignment. These communication protocols enable swift sharing of situational information, ensuring a collaborative response during rapidly evolving emergency situations. In addition to the recommended policies (Policy HS-2.1 to Policy HS-2.15) included in the Safety Element Update, the following recommendations are listed as potential measures that can enhance the evacuation process through the supply side (increasing evacuation capacity), demand side (managing evacuation volumes), and information side (improving awareness and communication). These recommendations will be incorporated into future updates of the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP), and Health and Safety Element Update to ensure consistency and alignment. Some recommendations can be implemented more readily through the EOP. Others may require additional coordination and formal adoption as part of the Safety Element Update or LHMP. 5.1 Supply-Side Strategies Supply-side strategies aim to temporarily increase evacuation capacity at key bottleneck locations while balancing the everyday safety and function of the roadway system. • Increasing capacity through the use of contraflow lanes or dual purpose shoulder evacuation/protected bike lane widening by changing future roadway design, especially in areas with less accessibility and located on key evacuation routes. These areas are primarily located on I-280, Foothills Boulevard, Stevens Creek Boulevard, Bubb Road, and SR-85 corridors. These routes should consider incorporating design treatments such as painted medians (instead of raised medians) or other treatments that could assist in creating reversible lanes, or a dual-purpose shoulder to facilitate additional capacity in an evacuation event scenario. • Extending water service into evacuation corridors strengthens firefighting capacity and long- term water investment ensures reliable resources that sustain evacuation operations under emergency conditions. • Managed traffic control during evacuation, including turn restrictions and route or ramp closures, to maximize outflows from evacuation areas. • Faster clearing of fire-induced road closures. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 30 • Plan for street parking management on high hazard days. 5.2 Demand-Side Strategies • The City of Cupertino can support vehicle volume reduction during an evacuation by encouraging carpooling and use of public transit; • Encouraging a one car per household evacuation pledge (for households that must have second vehicles, an alternative could involve early off-site placement of a second car when advance wildfire warnings or other hazard requiring evacuation are available); • Identifying shelter locations within the City limits and outside the FHSZ to reduce demand on evacuation routes outside the FHSZ and plan/implement shelter facilities; and 5.3 Information-Side Strategies The City of Cupertino can further support evacuation through the following measures: • Enhance community evacuation programs to improve resident, employee, student, and visitor preparedness and familiarity with evacuation routes and processes. • Strengthen coordination of emergency response equipment and resources between neighboring jurisdictions, allowing for shared use based on operational needs rather than ownership. • Enhance communication protocols between cities and elected officials to support unified decision-making, real-time information sharing, and coordinated emergency response across jurisdictional boundaries. • Explore and deploy wildfire early detection systems (i.e., wildfire video surveillance cameras, drones, etc.) especially for constrained access parcels. • Use real-time traffic management tools to implement dynamic route guidance and monitoring to guide evacuees away from congested routes and encourage the use of secondary or tertiary routes to distribute traffic more evenly. • Study a phased evacuation process where different groups or areas evacuate at different times to prevent congestion on main evacuation routes. This can be based on factors like proximity to danger, traffic volume, or priority of evacuation. • Study and install vehicle monitoring devices and variable message signs to monitor evacuation programs and provide notification of any changes in evacuation routes or plans due to a change in the wildfire or incidents to motorists along the road. 5.4 Additional Considerations This evacuation assessment includes trips generated by both employees and residents from the evacuation area and assumes all residents and employees will be evacuated using vehicles. A critical consideration for emergency personnel is to assist individual residents and employees who either do not have access to a vehicle or cannot drive, to ensure that compete evacuation is provided. The EOP includes provisions to coordinate with the VTA, Silicon Valley (SV) Hopper , and emergency services. Further research into strategies for evacuating people who do not have access to a vehicle is recommended. Options for assisting with evacuation in such situations could include, but not be limited to, the following: • Neighborhood “buddy” program to link people needing assistance with people willing to assist. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 31 • Partnership with transportation network companies (TNCs) like Uber and Lyft. For individual students and visitors who do not have access to a vehicle, options for assisting with evacuation in such situations could include, but not be limited to, the following: • Designated pick-up zones for TNCs or buses to ensure orderly evacuation. • Provide dedicated shuttle, school vans, or charter bus service, if available. P Appendix A: Socioeconomic Data P Table A-1: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Census1 Geographic Area Households Population Employment Household Vehicle Ownership 0 1 2 3+ Census Tract 5077.01 1,216 4,092 1,526 90 217 515 394 Block Group 1; Census Tract 5077.01 N/A 878 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Block Group 2; Census Tract 5077.01 N/A 1,927 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Census Tract 5077.02 2,163 6,107 3,310 24 300 1,192 647 Block Group 1; Census Tract 5077.02 N/A 2,052 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Block Group 2; Census Tract 5077.02 N/A 1,704 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Block Group 3; Census Tract 5077.02 N/A 2,351 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Census Tract 5077.04 1,214 3,466 1,453 150 299 457 308 Block Group 1; Census Tract 5077.04 N/A 1,060 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Block Group 2; Census Tract 5077.04 N/A 2,406 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Census Tract 5077.05 1,385 4,560 1,753 19 255 671 440 Block Group 1; Census Tract 5077.05 N/A 1,952 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Block Group 2; Census Tract 5077.05 N/A 1,373 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Block Group 3; Census Tract 5077.05 N/A 1,235 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Total 5,978 35,613 8,042 283 1,071 2,835 1,789 Notes: 1. Census block group and census tract locations are illustrated in Figure A-1. Source: 2023 ACS 5-year Estimates; Fehr & Peers, 2025. P Figure A-1: Census Block Group and Census Tract Locations P Table A-2: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Genasys Protect1 Geographic Area Total Population Total Daytime Population Total Households SCC-005 0 0 0 SCC-006 0 3 0 SCC-008 198 270 82 SCC-010 12 52 2 SCC-011 13 41 4 SCC-020 67 37 21 CUP-007 784 1,057 376 CUP-008 1,294 931 418 CUP-016 10 124 3 CUP-017 3,188 2,523 1,042 CUP-018 1,339 1,245 461 CUP-029 2,841 2,046 953 CUP-032 654 470 248 CUP-033 2,236 1,546 745 Total 12,636 10,345 4,355 Notes: 1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2. Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025. P Figure A-2: Genasys Protect Zone Locations (highlighted numbers in study area) P Table A-3: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Santa Clara County VMT Estimation Tool1 Geographic Area Households Population Employment TAZ 132 955 2,702 94 TAZ 130 0 0 0 TAZ 127 204 614 14 TAZ 128 231 693 25 TAZ 126 647 2,038 647 TAZ 103 193 530 77 TAZ 133 325 920 66 TAZ 102 278 749 55 TAZ 116 305 910 64 TAZ 115 1 3 1,448 TAZ 129 996 2,995 150 TAZ 105 413 1,240 5 TAZ 136 22 62 135 TAZ 122 328 1,033 0 TAZ 125 238 751 2 TAZ 131 273 822 5 TAZ 1334 661 1,880 55 TAZ 135 640 1,825 31 TAZ 134 677 1,916 7 TAZ 117 582 1,741 1,448 TAZ 123 466 1,472 0 Total 8,435 24,896 4,328 Notes: 1. TAZ locations are illustrated in Figure A-3. Source: Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool; Fehr & Peers, 2025. P Figure A-3: Transportation Analysis Zone (TAZ) Locations (light blue indicates study area) P Table A-4: School Enrollment Data School Name School Enrollment Abraham Lincoln Elementary 700 John F Kennedy Middle 930 Tessellations Elementary School 270 Total (non-driving students) 1,9001 Monta Vista High School (can drive) 1,6602 Total Students 3,560 Notes: 1. Elementary and middle school students are assumed to evacuate either by carpooling with another student (20%) or by being picked up/dropped off individually (80%). 2. High school students are assumed to be able to drive and are therefore assigned the following evacuation mode shares: drive alone (20%), carpool (30%), and pick-up/drop-off (50%). Table A-5: Estimated Student Evacuation Trips Driving Condition Percent Estimates Number of Students Factor1 Estimated Student Evacuation Trips 1,900 Students (Non- Driving) 1,660 Students (Can Drive) Drive Alone 0% 20% 330 1.0 330 Carpool 20% 30% 880 0.5 440 Drop-Off 80% 50% 2,350 1.0 2,350 Total 3,560 3,120 Notes: 1. Drive Alone trips assume one person per vehicle; Carpool trips assume two passengers per vehicle, excluding the driver; and Drop-Off trips assume one passenger per vehicle, with the driver not counted. P Table A-6: Estimated Visitor Evacuation Trips Recreational Attractions Location Number of Visitors1 PG&E Trailhead East of Rancho San Antonio County Park 200 Deep Cliff Golf Course North of Linda Vista Park 20 Rim Trail North of Stevens Creek County Park 100 Parker Ranch Trailhead East of Fremont Older Open Space Preserve 35 Total Visitors 355 Estimated Visitor Evacuation Trips2 180 Notes: 1. The number of visitors is based on the percentage of parking spaces assumed during the study period. (Refer to Table 2 notes for the percentages assumed). 2. Visitors are assumed to carpool (two or more passengers per vehicle). P Appendix B: Trip Distribution P Table B-1: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario A) Genasys Protect Zones1 Population Population Distribution Connected Roadways Evacuation Trip Distribution SCC-0052 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-006 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-008 198 1% Foothills Boulevard 1% SCC-010 12 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-011 13 0% Prospect Road 0% SCC-020 67 0% Prospect Road 0% CUP-007 784 5% Cristo Rey Drive 5% CUP-008 1,294 8% Foothills Boulevard 5% Stevens Creek Boulevard 3% CUP-016 10 0% McClellan Road 0% CUP-017 3,188 20% Foothills Boulevard 9% Stevens Creek Boulevard 10% McClellan Road 1% CUP-008 1,339 8% Foothills Boulevard 5% Stevens Creek Boulevard 3% CUP-029 2,841 38% Stevens Creek Boulevard 4% McClellan Road 24% Rainbow Drive 10% CUP-032 654 4% McClellan Road 2% Rainbow Drive 2% CUP-033 2,236 16% Stelling Road 5% Rainbow Drive 5% Prospect Road 6% Notes: 1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2. 2. SCC coded zones are located in Santa Clara County’s FHSZ. Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025. P Table B-2: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario B) Genasys Protect Zones1 Population Population Distribution Connected Roadways Evacuation Trip Distribution SCC-005 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-006 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-008 198 2% Foothills Boulevard 2% SCC-010 12 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-011 13 0% Prospect Road 0% SCC-020 67 1% Prospect Road 1% CUP-007 784 6% Cristo Rey Drive 6% CUP-008 1,294 10% Foothills Boulevard 7% Stevens Creek Boulevard 3% CUP-016 10 0% McClellan Road 0% CUP-017 3,188 25% Foothills Boulevard 10% Stevens Creek Boulevard 13% McClellan Road 2% CUP-008 1,339 11% Foothills Boulevard 8% Stevens Creek Boulevard 3% CUP-029 2,841 22% Stevens Creek Boulevard 2% McClellan Road 15% Rainbow Drive 5% CUP-032 654 5% McClellan Road 3% Rainbow Drive 2% CUP-033 2,236 18% Stelling Road 6% Rainbow Drive 6% Prospect Road 6% Notes: 1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2. 2. SCC coded zones are located in Santa Clara County’s FHSZ. Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025. P Table B-3: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario C) Genasys Protect Zones1 Population Population Distribution Connected Roadways Evacuation Trip Distribution2 SCC-0053 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-006 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-008 198 1% Foothills Boulevard 1% SCC-010 12 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-011 13 0% Prospect Road 0% SCC-020 67 0% Prospect Road 0% CUP-007 784 5% Cristo Rey Drive 5% CUP-008 1,294 8% Foothills Boulevard 8% Stevens Creek Boulevard 0% CUP-016 10 0% McClellan Road 0% CUP-017 3,188 20% Foothills Boulevard 15% Stevens Creek Boulevard 0% McClellan Road 5% CUP-008 1,339 8% Foothills Boulevard 8% Stevens Creek Boulevard 0% CUP-029 2,841 38% Stevens Creek Boulevard 0% McClellan Road 26% Rainbow Drive 12% CUP-032 654 4% McClellan Road 2% Rainbow Drive 2% CUP-033 2,236 16% Stelling Road 5% Rainbow Drive 5% Prospect Road 6% Notes: 1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2. 2. For Scenario C, due to road closure at Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR-85, trips assigned to Stevens Creek Boulevard under Scenario A were shifted to alternative roadways. 3. SCC coded zones are located in Santa Clara County’s FHSZ. Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025. 1 Filed 10/23/24 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION* IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA EX REL. ROB BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al., Petitioners and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LAKE, Respondent; LOTUSLAND INVESTMENT HOLDINGS, INC., et al., Real Parties in Interest. A165677 (Lake County Super. Ct. Nos. CV421152, CV421193) Petitioners Center for Biological Diversity and California Native Plant Society challenged Respondents County of Lake and the Lake County Board of Supervisors’ (collectively, the County) approval of the Guenoc Valley Mixed-Use Planned Development Project (project) proposed by Real Party in Interest Lotusland I6nvestment Holdings, Inc. (Lotusland) and certification of a final environmental impact report (FEIR) for the project adopting its findings. Petitioners argued the FEIR did not properly analyze and/or mitigate the project’s impacts on evacuation routes, wildfire risk, greenhouse * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100 and 8.1110, sections IV, V, and VII of this opinion are certified for publication. 2 gases, and water use. They further argued that the County failed to properly consider project alternatives and failed to recirculate the FEIR for public review after adding significant new information. The trial court held that the County’s findings regarding the impacts on the existing community’s emergency evacuation routes were not supported by substantial evidence, and thus the FEIR did not comply with California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). It otherwise rejected Petitioners’ other challenges, which they appealed. We too reject these other challenges to the FEIR, but we agree that its conclusory discussion of the project’s potential impact of exacerbating wildfire ignitions fails to provide meaningful information for the environmental assessment required by CEQA. Because the FEIR is invalid in part, a new environmental impact report (EIR) must be prepared, mooting Petitioners’ request that the FEIR be recirculated. BACKGROUND Lotusland proposed the project, a luxury resort consisting of residential estate villas, hotel units, and related infrastructure, on 16,000 acres in an unincorporated and largely undeveloped area of Lake County known as the Guenoc Valley Ranch. Having been designated the “lead agency” for purposes of approving the project under Public Resources Code, section 21067,1 the County first published a draft environmental impact report (DEIR). The DEIR offered the public insight into the County’s evaluation of the project’s environmental impacts, the County’s proffered mitigation measures, and alternatives to the proposed project. 1 All further statutory references are to CEQA provisions as codified in Public Resources Code sections 21000–21177 unless otherwise indicated. Where applicable, the CEQA guidelines (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15000– 15387) are denoted as “Guidelines.” 3 Public comment letters alleged several deficiencies in the DEIR’s analysis. The County published its responses to the public comments along with the FEIR in June 2020. Petitioners and the Attorney General, on behalf of the People, submitted further comment letters maintaining that the FEIR fails to resolve many of the DEIR’s issues. Most relevant here, public comment letters challenged the adequacy of disclosure and mitigation regarding Impacts 3.16- 2 (exacerbating wildfire risks), 3.7-1 (generating greenhouse gas emissions), 3.9-2 (decreasing groundwater supplies), as well as the rejection of an environmentally superior alternative. Of note, Petitioners averred the “FEIR remains deficient because it fails to acknowledge or adequately analyze the increased risk of wildfire that results from development and increasing the intensity of use in undeveloped areas subject to wildfire.” While acknowledging the FEIR’s wildfire prevention plan (Wildfire Plan) may reduce Impact 3.16-2, Petitioners criticized the FEIR for failing to disclose “the Project’s potential to increase wildfire ignitions as compared to existing conditions on the Project site,” particularly “ ‘how adding new residents will affect the potential for wildfires to start.’ ” Petitioners also argued the FEIR’s analysis of the project’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions failed to correct deficiencies identified in comments to the DEIR. They applauded the inclusion “for the first time in the FEIR an administrative draft Transportation Demand Management plan” but nonetheless argued it fell short of CEQA’s standards for mitigation measures and was improperly deferred. Petitioners also urged the County to “consider the use of legally adequate carbon offset program to offset the Project’s unmitigated GHG emissions.” 4 Beyond addressing their complaints in a revised FEIR, Petitioners requested that the County recirculate it. At Lotusland’s request, the Board continued its hearing. The County then published an errata to the FEIR and a supplemental report addressing the latest public comments. The errata acknowledges that “[d]evelopment of the Guenoc Valley Site would introduce additional wildfire risk factors as compared to existing conditions,” including by an “increase in vehicular traffic” and an “increase [in] the number of inhabitants . . . thereby increasing the risk of wildfire due to human-caused ignitions.” It also explains that the Wildfire Plan is a project commitment and “would ensure that features are incorporated into the [project] such that wildfire risks are not exacerbated.” But the errata does not purport to amend the Wildfire Plan, which was last edited on June 1, 2020. However, certain fire prevention design features are included in the FEIR’s Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Plan, and the errata states the Wildfire Plan is “a component of the Proposed Project.”2 This did not, however, assuage Petitioners’ or the Attorney General’s concerns. Regarding the increased wildfire risk, for example, the Attorney General noted the errata “fails to provide the required Project-specific 2 On July 17, 2020, Lotusland’s attorney sent the County a letter (Philippakis Letter) addressing several of the comment letters’ concerns. The Philippakis Letter explained that, because Lotusland “voluntarily offered at the outset to mitigate any risks of wildfire it had identified,” the FEIR’s “analysis largely analyzed the voluntary design features” instead of “identifying risks that need to be mitigated.” Although it conceded that “humans are the main cause of fire ignitions,” the letter claimed the “[p]roject design features make the risks . . . inapplicable.” But due to concerns raised by the Attorney General that the Wildfire Plan’s “measures were discretionary,” the letter assured the County that it could enforce the commitments incorporated into the Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Plan. 5 analysis of increased wildfire risk” as opposed to a “general summary of wildfire research on the effects of new development on wildfires.” Accordingly, the Attorney General and Petitioners sought further revisions to the FEIR and “sufficient time . . . to review and understand the wildfire risks associated with the Project.” The County did not further revise the FEIR or recirculate it after releasing the errata. Instead, on July 21, 2020 — less than a week after publishing the errata — the Board held its hearing as scheduled, at which it certified the FEIR, approved the project, and adopted the County’s Findings and Facts in Support of Findings and Statement of Overriding Considerations (Findings and Statement of Overriding Considerations). Petitioners filed writ petitions alleging the project’s approval violated CEQA.3 The petitions allege that the FEIR fails to properly disclose, analyze, or mitigate the project’s wildfire and community safety impacts, greenhouse gas emissions, offsite water use, and alternatives to the project. The trial court ruled that the FEIR violates CEQA by failing to consider the project’s impact on the community’s ability to evacuate from a wildfire. But it rejected Petitioners’ other contentions. The court entered final judgment and issued a writ directing the County to set aside the project approvals, vacate the associated findings, and de-certify the FEIR. Petitioners appealed.4 3 The People, represented by the Attorney General’s Office, successfully moved to intervene in the action filed by the Center for Biological Diversity. The People’s petition raised substantially similar issues. Months later, the trial court ordered the Petitioners’ actions consolidated. 4 The Attorney General filed a notice of appeal before reaching a settlement with Lotusland, and the appeal was dismissed. It is unclear from the briefing and the materials submitted why the AG voluntarily had its appeal dismissed. 6 DISCUSSION I. CEQA The Legislature has declared that it is the policy of the state that the procedures required by CEQA “are intended to assist public agencies in systematically identifying both the significant effects of proposed projects and the feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures which will avoid or substantially lessen such significant effects.” (§ 21002.) In an effort to achieve these goals, CEQA requires the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIR), the purpose of which “is to identify the significant effects on the environment of a project, to identify alternatives to the project, and to indicate the manner in which those significant effects can be mitigated or avoided.” (§ 21002.1.) The EIR should include, among other things, a detailed statement setting forth “[a]ll significant effects on the environment of the proposed project” and “[m]itigation measures proposed to minimize significant effects on the environment.” (§ 21100, subd. (b)(1); see also Guidelines, § 15126 [“Significant Environmental Effects of the Proposed Project” and “The Mitigation Measures Proposed to Minimize the Significant Effects” shall be discussed “preferably in separate sections or paragraphs of the EIR”].) “For each significant effect, the EIR must identify specific mitigation measures; where several potential mitigation measures are available, each should be discussed separately, and the reasons for choosing one over the others should be stated.” (Sacramento Old City Assn. v. City Council (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1027 (Sacramento Old City Assn.).) If the EIR identifies significant environmental effects, the public agency may approve the project only if it makes one or more of the following findings: “(a) . . . [¶] (1) Changes or alterations have been required in, or incorporated 7 into, the project which mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment . . . . [¶] (3) Specific economic, legal, social, technological or other considerations . . . make infeasible the mitigation measures or [project] alternatives identified in the environmental impact report.” (§ 21081; see also Sacramento Old City Assn., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1034.) These findings must be made for each identified significant effect “accompanied by a brief explanation of the rationale for each finding.” (Guidelines, § 15091.) However, “in the event specific economic, social, or other conditions make infeasible such project alternatives or such mitigation measures, individual projects may be approved in spite of one or more significant effects thereof.” (§ 21002.) II. Mandamus Standard of Review As in other mandamus cases, we review the “agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision; in that sense appellate judicial review under CEQA is de novo.” (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 427 (Vineyard).) In reviewing an agency’s compliance with CEQA, we review the administrative record for prejudicial abuse of discretion. (§ 21168.5.) Such abuse occurs “if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.” (Ibid.; Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 426.) We approach procedural and factual issues under two different standards of review. (Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 512 (Sierra Club).) “[W]e determine de novo whether the agency has employed the correct procedures, ‘scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements,’ ” but “we accord greater deference to the agency’s substantive factual conclusions.” (Ibid.) Mixed questions of law and 8 fact are “generally subject to independent review,” but a more deferential standard may be warranted in circumstances where factual questions predominate. (Id., at p. 516.) “Substantial evidence shall include facts, reasonable assumptions predicated upon facts, and expert opinion supported by facts.” (§ 21082.2, subd. (c); Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (a) [“substantial evidence” is “enough relevant information and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion, even though other conclusions might also be reached”].) “In determining whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the court may not reconsider or reevaluate the evidence presented to the administrative agency. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21168.) All conflicts in the evidence and any reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of the agency’s findings and decision.” (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1167, 1177.) III. Substantial Evidence Shows Wildfire Plan and Biological Resources Analyses Are Reconcilable We first address Petitioners’ contention that the FEIR fails to reconcile its Wildfire Plan and its protection for biological resources. We reject the argument.5 The Wildfire Plan includes animal grazing and manual vegetation removal. It provides a map showing where “grazing and manual vegetation removal” will occur. Studies also located all special status plants observed across approximately 11,550 acres — about half of the total project 5 We observe that Petitioners bore their burden of showing this specific issue was raised by the Attorney General and thus exhausted the administrative remedies on this issue. (§ 21177, subd. (a); Maintain Our Desert Environment v. Town of Apple Valley (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 430, 439.) 9 site — and estimated the protected species’ total acreage territory and number of individuals. Based on this information, the FEIR concludes that “[g]iven the scattered distribution of special-status plants on the [project] Site, and the existing and ongoing grazing activities, inclusion of grazing activities for the use of vegetative fuel reduction to reduce fire hazard would not result in long- term adverse impacts to special-status plants. This impact is therefore considered less than significant.” Given the extensive studies and evidence supporting the County’s conclusion, we do not reconsider it. (Save North Petaluma River and Wetlands v. City of Petaluma (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 207, 216.) Petitioners’ reliance on San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center v. County of Merced (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 645, 655, in which the challenged EIR disclosed an increase in mining production that was “entirely inconsistent with the assurances elsewhere that there would be no increase in production” is unavailing. The County’s mitigation measure to counter the impacts of vegetation clearing (MM 3.4-18) is not incompatible with the Wildfire Plan. As the FEIR explains, most sensitive habitats do not require any vegetation removal under the Wildfire Plan. Where that is not the case, MM 3.4-18 manages, and in some cases bars, the use of heavier equipment and grazing to clear vegetation. There is no irreconcilable inconsistency undermining the FEIR as an information document. (Cf. San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center, at pp. 654–657.) IV. FEIR Did Not Adequately Analyze Wildfire Risk While we do not pass upon the correctness of the FEIR’s determination that the project’s purported design features sufficiently alleviate the potential impact of human-caused wildfires, the FEIR fails to sufficiently inform the 10 public of this risk. (See Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 392 (Laurel Heights).) Specifically, the errata’s belated mention of the project’s potential to increase wildfire risks does not adequately disclose the increased risks relative to the baseline existing conditions. A. Governing Standards An EIR is “ ‘an informational document’ ” central to “CEQA’s fundamental goal that the public be fully informed as to the environmental consequences of action by their public officials.” (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 391, 404.) Consequently, an EIR “shall” set forth “[a]ll significant effects on the environment of the proposed project” and “[m]itigation measures proposed to minimize significant effects on the environment.” (§ 21100, subd. (b).)6 “[S]ignificant effect” is defined as “a substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change in the environment.” (§§ 21100, subd. (d), 21068.) CEQA requires these analyses to be distinct. (§ 21100, subd. (b); see also Sacramento Old City Assn., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1027.) “ ‘To facilitate CEQA’s informational role, the EIR must contain facts and analysis, not just the agency’s bare conclusions or opinions.’ ” (Laurel Heights, at p. 404.) In short, “there must be a disclosure of the ‘analytic route the . . . agency traveled from evidence to action.’ ” 6 Mitigation measures are “feasible changes in any or all activities involved in the project in order to substantially lessen or avoid significant effects on the environment.” (Guidelines, § 15041, subd. (a).) The Guidelines define “mitigation” to include “avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action,” “[m]inimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action,” “[r]ectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the impacted environment,” “[r]educing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance operations,” and “[c]ompensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources.” (Guidelines, § 15370, subds. (a)–(e).) 11 (Ibid.) An agency’s inadequate or conclusory discussion of a potentially substantial adverse change in the environment deprives the public of information necessary for informed self-government and constitutes a prejudicial abuse of discretion. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 512–514; § 21168.5.) On review, we defer to the agency’s factual finding, including which methodologies best identify and analyze significant environmental impacts. (Sierra Club, at p. 516.) But we independently review “whether the EIR includes enough detail ‘ “ ‘to enable those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed project.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) B. FEIR Insufficiently Disclosed Project’s Potential Adverse Effects of Increased Wildfire Risks The errata to the FEIR discloses, under Impact 3.16-2 regarding exacerbating wildfire risks, that “[d]evelopment of the [project site] would introduce additional wildfire risk factors as compared to existing conditions.” Specifically, the errata outlines — in a single paragraph — that increased human habitation in a wildlife-urban interface increases the fire risk from “arson, children playing with fire, and debris-burning”; that increased vehicular traffic increases fire risk from “sparks, catalytic converters, and discarding of cigarettes”; and that “[t]he introduction of residences within the site would create a wildland-urban interface” that increases the general potential for human-ignited wildfires. These factors, it explains, “expose project occupants to pollutant concentrations from wildfire or the uncontrolled spread of wildfire.” The errata further states that “wildfires tend to cause more damage” to low density developments. And the County’s staff report, released following the errata’s publication, states “[t]he Final EIR acknowledges that wildfire risk from development of the Proposed 12 Project would be potentially significant” and “would result in impacts associated with increased risk of wildfire ignition.” The need for the FEIR’s disclosure of the potentially substantial adverse risk of human-caused wildfire is uncontroversial given the context. (See League to Save Lake Tahoe Mountain v. County of Placer (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 63, 136 [“Developing new homes and stores in a very high fire hazard area risks exacerbating the hazard . . . .”]; California Building Industry Assoc. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, 385 [“EIR should evaluate any potentially significant impacts of locating development in other areas susceptible to hazardous conditions (e.g., . . . , wildfire risk areas)”]; see Guidelines, § 15126.2, subd. (a).)7 Initially, the errata’s information came too late. (Sierra Watch v. County of Placer (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 86, 103 (Sierra Watch).) “CEQA requires agencies to discuss a project’s potentially significant impacts in the draft EIR and final EIR. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15120, subd. (c); see also id., §§ 15125, 15126.2.)” (Ibid.) And an agency cannot “make up for the lack of analysis in the EIR” through post-EIR analysis. (Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 131 (Save Our Peninsula Committee) [errata not “subjected to the same ‘ “critical evaluation that occurs in the draft stage” ’ ”].) Otherwise, the public would be denied the “ ‘ opportunity to test, assess, and evaluate the [newly revealed information] and make an informed judgment as to the validity of 7 We note that disclosures in the County’s initial study — which promises “[p]otential impacts related to wildfire will be addressed in the Wildfire section of the EIR” — does not suffice. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 520 [“The relevant informational document here is the EIR”].) Moreover, in tension with the errata, the revised FEIR still asserts that “the prospect of growth, by itself, does not create an adverse effect on the environment.” 13 the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. ’ ” (Id., at p. 131.) The same holds true for the letter from Lotusland’s attorney, Katherine Philippakis, presented to the public the day before the Board hearing to approve the Project, and her oral testimony at the hearing in support of the Project. Neither the letter nor the testimony was made part of the FEIR, and therefore, cannot be said to have remedied the FEIR’s insufficiencies. (See Communities for a Better Environment v. City of Richmond (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 70, 88 (Communities) ([rejecting project proponent’s post- EIR expert letter as “too little, and certainly too late, to satisfy CEQA’s requirements” because “[i]t is the adequacy of the EIR with which [courts] are concerned, not the propriety of the subsequent decision to approve the Project”].) It is fundamental to the purpose of CEQA that the public obtain a full understanding of the environmental impacts of a project from a single source relevant informational document — that being the EIR. (Cf. Guidelines § 15150, subd. (b) [“Where part of another document is incorporated by reference, such other document shall be made available to the public for inspection”]; Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 520 [“The relevant informational document here is the EIR”].) This allows for easy access to the relevant information and direct accountability for the agency when dealing with large volumes of documents and material. Material not contained in the EIR cannot be expected to be considered; and therefore, cannot be relied upon to support an adequate EIR. (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 405 [“ ‘ “Whatever is required to be considered in an EIR must be in that formal report; what any official might have known from other writings or oral presentations cannot supply what is lacking in the report” ’ ”].) This also 14 ensures the public is fully informed of the environmental risks posed by the proposed project. The FEIR in this case did not contain the information in the errata nor the Philippakis letter or Board presentation, as such, it came too late and may not be considered when evaluating the sufficiency of the FEIR. Moreover, even if its discussion of the project’s potentially significant impacts on wildfire risks did not come too late, the errata’s passing disclosure is insufficient to comply with CEQA. “[T]he adequacy of an EIR’s discussion of environmental impacts is an issue distinct from the extent to which the agency is correct in its determination whether the impacts are significant.” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 514; cf. Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 403–404 [“Even if the Regents are correct in their conclusion that there are no feasible alternatives . . . , the EIR is nonetheless defective” because the “treatment of alternatives was cursory at best”].) An EIR’s analysis must “provide decisionmakers with information which enables them to make a decision which intelligently takes account of environmental consequences.” (Guidelines, § 15151.) The instant FEIR does not perform this function. Specifically, the FEIR fails to reasonably describe the “additional wildfire risk factors as compared to existing conditions” that the project would “introduce” to the area. Instead, the errata points to several sources of “human-caused ignitions” — i.e., arson, debris-burning, vehicle sparks, and discarding of cigarettes — and then cites a general study finding that “increased fire education, a decline in smoking, and modern vehicles . . . have reduced the impacts of anthropogenic causes of wildfire ignitions [other than by powerlines] in recent times.” It concerns us that the County did not appear to “use its best efforts to find out and disclose all that it reasonably can” about the project’s impact on these risk factors. (Guidelines, § 15144.) 15 The errata in no way explains the extent to which bringing in over 4,000 new residents to the largely undeveloped project site increases the risk of human-caused wildfire over the existing baseline risk. For example, given the general decline in human-caused wildfires, how many such ignitions occur per 1,000 people in a wildland-urban interface, and how much has that rate reduced as wildfire safety and education has increased? And how many wildfires ignite per 1,000,000 miles driven by vehicles with and by vehicles without catalytic converters, and how has the mix of vehicles on public roads affected those statistics over time?8 The current discussion prevents decision-making and the public from adequately evaluating the merits of the Wildfire Plan. (Guidelines, § 15151; Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 514 [“adequate description of adverse environmental effects is necessary to inform the critical discussion of mitigation measures and project alternatives”].) Despite imposing no revisions to the Wildfire Plan, the errata affirms the FEIR’s original conclusion that the project “would not exacerbate the risk of wildfire from existing levels with implementation of the Wildfire Prevention Plan.” As the FEIR currently stands, there is no way to connect the dots between the “additional wildfire risk factors,” which the errata concedes exist, and the Wildfire Plan’s prevention strategies, which the errata does not update. 8 Of course, we do not require that these specific questions be answered in the FEIR. (See Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 515 [“agency has considerable discretion to decide the manner of the discussion of potentially significant effects in an EIR”].) Nor must the risk be quantified if that is not possible. (Id., at p. 520 [“if it is not scientifically possible to do more than has already been done to connect air quality effects with potential human health impacts, the EIR itself must explain why, in a manner reasonably calculated to inform the public of the scope of what is and is not yet known about the Project’s impacts”].) But an EIR cannot give a mere cursory mention of potential significant impacts as the FEIR does here. 16 The errata contains a single sentence of such analysis, asserting that the Wildfire Plan’s requirement of fire breaks will “reduce the risk of wildfire ignition from sparks or discarded cigarettes along project roadways.” It vaguely points to the Wildfire Plan and a general decline in human-caused wildfire ignitions as support for its conclusion that the project does not exacerbate the risk of wildfire. While the Wildfire Plan comprehensively analyzes the project site’s current wildfire risk, it does not expound on the anthropogenic risks that the errata admits development at the project site will “introduce.” No component of the FEIR, therefore, discusses this aspect of the project in detail sufficient to enable the public to discern “the ‘analytic route the . . . agency traveled from evidence to action.’ ” (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 404.) The County counters that there is no need to separately discuss the project’s potential adverse effects on increased wildfire risks because the Wildfire Plan’s “design features” are a “central part of the [p]roject” — not mitigation measures — that reduce Impact 3.16-2 to “less than significant.” But even if the Wildfire Plan’s prevention strategies are properly characterized as part of the project, the FEIR still violates CEQA.9 The dispositive issue is whether the FEIR “obfuscates required disclosure of the 9 Certainly, aspects of the Wildfire Plan — such as undergrounding power lines — reflect design choices. (E.g., Lotus v. Department of Transportation (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 645, 656, fn. 8 (Lotus) [“composition of paving” plausibly part of design].) But we observe that other components of the Wildfire Plan, such as animal grazing, “[p]running tree limbs,” and “remov[ing] vegetation debris that accumulates on [rooves],” are more naturally understood as “maintenance operations” aimed at “[r]educing . . . impacts” of a project introducing people to undeveloped, fire-prone areas. (See Guidelines, § 15370, subd. (d).) We are not persuaded that making it a project objective to be a “ ‘ “model project” of wildfire mitigation’ ” converts such measures into project design features. 17 project’s environmental impacts and analysis of potential mitigation measures.” (Mission Bay Alliance v. Office of Community Investment & Infrastructure (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 160, 185 (Mission Bay); cf. Save Our Peninsula Committee, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 130 [finding information regarding mitigation measure disclosed in errata “does not make up for the lack of analysis in the EIR”].) It plainly does. Mission Bay is an instructive contrast. There, a construction project was defined to include a transportation management plan, which in turn incorporated a special event transit service plan (Muni TSP). (Mission Bay, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 179–180.) The court determined the EIR was adequate because it analyzed the project’s environmental impacts on vehicle traffic and transit “both with and without implementation of the Muni TSP and applie[d] the same threshold standards to determine the significance of those impacts.” (Id., at p. 185.) Thus, “the environmental impacts of the project on vehicle traffic and transit [were] fully disclosed in the FSEIR.” (Ibid.) That is not so here, where the County admits that no similar analysis occurred with and without the Wildfire Plan because the project as proposed is “the only one that Lotusland seeks to build.” Again, we do not prescribe the appropriate manner of discussing the project’s potentially significant effects. We do not hold that the County must analyze the project’s environmental impacts on wildfire ignitions with and without the Wildfire Plan. The County retains discretion in choosing the methodologies employed for analyzing environmental impacts and mitigation measures. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 516, 521.) But the FEIR must sufficiently discuss the project’s potential adverse effect of human-cause ignitions and analyze in some detail how the project’s design (or mitigation measures) alleviates such risks. It is not sufficient to cite a scientific study 18 unrelated to the project and summarily state that “increased fire education, a decline in smoking, and modern vehicles . . . have reduced the impacts of anthropogenic causes of wildfire ignitions.” That may be true, but it does not inform the public how this evidence led the County to conclude that the Wildfire Plan eliminates those otherwise reduced — but still present — risks. (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 392.) Such a discussion is critical to the public’s understanding of the efficaciousness of the Wildfire Plan.10 Here, the County presents no industry standard modeling tools, no methodology or analysis for its conclusory findings, nor any other discussion of how the Wildfire Plan proposes to address the existing baseline conditions other than the Project design proposal itself. This is insufficient. Failure to separately identify and analyze the significant impacts of the fire risk to the Project area and its baseline existing conditions before proposing mitigation measures violates CEQA. (Lotus, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 655–658.) Because the FEIR must be revised to provide critical information about the increased risk of wildfire ignitions, Petitioners’ claim that the County erred by refusing to recirculate the FEIR in light of the errata’s “ ‘significant new information’ ” is undeniably moot. (See § 21092.1; see also Guidelines, § 15088.5, subd. (a)(1).)” (Communities, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 101.) “Because the EIR is invalid in part, a new EIR must be prepared, submitted for public review and comment, and certified in accord with CEQA procedures.” (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 391, 404.) 10 Given the FEIR’s failure to identify or describe with any particularity the project’s potential to increase wildfire ignitions, we do not resolve whether the FEIR’s mitigation of the project’s wildfire impacts is deficient. 19 V. FEIR’s Inclusion of Carbon Credit Program Does Not Violate CEQA Petitioners challenge the FEIR’s inclusion of a carbon credit program to mitigate the project’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on the grounds that it is ineffective, improperly deferred, and unenforceable. We find their position meritless. An EIR must discuss and adopt “feasible” mitigation measures that alleviate significant adverse impacts. (§ 21002; Guidelines, § 15126.4.) A mitigation measure is feasible if it is “capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, social, and technological factors.” (§ 21061.1.) Whether a measure is feasible is a factual finding reviewed for substantial evidence. (Cherry Valley Pass Acres & Neighbors v. City of Beaumont (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 316, 350). Infeasible measures need not be analyzed “in any detail.” (Ibid.) In reaction to the FEIR’s conclusion that the project’s impact due to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would be significant even after adopting feasible mitigation measures,11 Petitioners’ comment letter urged the County to “consider the use of a legally adequate carbon offset program.” But as a memorandum detailing the County’s responses to public comments explains, carbon offset credits “cannot be considered feasible” as a mitigation measure because “there is a limited supply of verifiable, reliable, real carbon offsets,” 11 The FEIR evaluates and adopts several measures to mitigate the project’s significant impact on the direct and indirect generation of GHG emissions. These include using energy efficient technology, net zero energy buildings, and renewable energy (MM 3.7-1); implementing a transportation demand management plan (MM 3.13-4 incorporated through MM 3.7-1); utilizing less polluting engines during construction (MM 3.3-1 incorporated through MM 3.7-2); and conserving oak woodland habitat and replanting oak trees (MM 3.4-16). 20 and “no way to sure that adequate offset credits will be available” at the time that Lotusland would need to purchase them. Nonetheless, the errata adds a condition to the FEIR’s Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Plan requiring Lotusland to “purchase [14,865] GHG emissions credits from a [California Air Resources Board] approved registry source or project to offset the difference between the mitigated project emissions and the [relevant significance] thresholds.” Meanwhile, the County’s Findings and Statement of Overriding Considerations restates that “[s]pecific economic, legal, social, technological, or other considerations make infeasible additional mitigation measures or project alternatives identified in the Final EIR [regarding GHG emissions].” Petitioners do not challenge the County’s infeasibility finding. Rather, they argue that, by virtue of being in the FEIR, the carbon credit program must meet CEQA’s standards for feasible mitigation measures. Indeed, Petitioners suggest that the County would have avoided any alleged defect by simply rejecting the program from the FEIR altogether. But Petitioners cite no authority for the contention that CEQA bars considering potentially beneficial measures that agencies deem too uncertain to be feasible. (Temple of 1001 Buddhas v. City of Fremont (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 456, 204 [arguments unsupported by legal authority or cogent analysis are forfeited].) And, contrary to Petitioners’ contention, the program was not relied upon to eliminate the project’s impacts. At the July 21, 2020 Board hearing, it was explained that the carbon credit program’s addition would not avert the project’s significant and unavoidable impact from GHG emissions “given the limited supply of carbon offsets and the uncertainty regarding the availability of offset credits throughout the life of the project.” The errata does not state otherwise; it merely explains the 21 amount of carbon credits Lotusland would seek to purchase is the “difference between the total project emissions and the [state recognized 2030 service population] thresholds.” Petitioners’ reliance on Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 485 for the proposition that mitigation measures for GHG emissions must ensure that carbon credits are “ ‘real, additional, quantifiable, permanent, verifiable, and enforceable’ ” is therefore inapposite. Moreover, Petitioners do not contend the carbon credit program will impose any adverse impacts. Thus, to the extent the addition of this program to the FEIR did not comply with CEQA, we find it does not constitute prejudicial error because its inclusion did not “deprive[] the public and decision makers of substantial relevant information about the Project’s likely adverse impacts.” (Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439, 463.) VI. Transportation Demand Management Plan Not Improperly Deferred We reject Petitioners’ arguments that proposed mitigation measure 3.13-4 — implementing a Transportation Demand Management (TDM) — is improperly deferred and inadequate. An EIR cannot put off formulating mitigation measures (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B)), but it need not be exhaustive. (San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 656, 696.) A measure’s specific details “ ‘may be developed after project approval when it is impractical or infeasible to include those details during the project’s environmental review’ provided that the agency” “ ‘(1) commits itself to the mitigation, (2) adopts specific performance standards the mitigation will achieve, and (3) identifies the type(s) of potential action(s) that can feasibly achieve that performance standard and 22 that will [be] considered, analyzed, and potentially incorporated in the mitigation measure.’ ” (East Oakland Stadium Alliance v. City of Oakland (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1226, 1254–1255; Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).) We “ ‘scrupulously enforc[e]’ ” these legislatively mandated CEQA requirements and determine de novo whether they have been followed. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 512.) There was no impermissible deferral here because the TDM satisfies all three requirements. We first observe the reasonable rationale for deferring the details for mitigating the project’s impact as measured by vehicle miles traveled (VMT). While the County accepted the State recommended significance threshold for VMT, the FEIR notes that a “limitation of VMT measurements is the inability to easily observe or measure them” requiring that they be estimated based on the number of vehicles observed multiplied by a probabilistic average of the distances traveled.12 VMT is not static or even stable over time; this inherently limits the specificity of a plan to reduce VMT. (Cf. Guidelines, § 15146 [“The degree of specificity required in an EIR will correspond to the degree of specificity involved in the underlying activity which is described”].) Thus, it is “readily apparent” why specifying the TDM’s details was “impractical or infeasible at the time the [F]EIR was certified.” (Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 260, 281.) The County then met the necessary conditions for deferring a mitigation measure’s minutiae. First, the FEIR commits the County and 12 Nonetheless, based on such estimations, the FEIR does not mask the project’s significant and unavoidable impact on VMT “due to the rural nature of the project setting and associated longer distances required for travel.” For this reason, the County adopted a statement of overriding considerations with respect to this impact. And it devised the TDM with VMT-reducing strategies that may be revised or augmented based on their performance. 23 Lotusland to the TDM. The FEIR provides that Lotusland “shall develop and submit to the County a final Transportation Demand Management Program” for the project “[p]rior to issuance of occupancy permits for Phase 1 . . . .” Second, the FEIR adopts a specific performance standard that the TDM must achieve. It specifies the TDM’s goal “shall be” reducing the project’s expected VMT by 15 percent, which the TDM restates as its “minimum reduction goal.” This is sufficiently concrete. (City of Hayward v. Trustees of California State University (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 833, 855 (City of Hayward) [“The Master Plan goal to reduce drive alone vehicle trips is the performance standard that the TDM plan will strive to meet”].) Third, the TDM identifies nearly a dozen strategies that can feasibly achieve that goal because they are “expected to collectively reduce vehicle trips by 3 to 20 percent.” One, for example, includes public and private shuttle services, the latter of which is “expected to accommodate approximately 40 [percent] of resort patrons,” and which together, along with a “dial-a-ride” service, are expected to reduce the project’s VMT by 2–10 percent. The TDM further requires the post-implementation efficaciousness of the strategies to be analyzed. Specifically, it requires a coordinator to “monitor daily one-way vehicle trips” and “compare these vehicle trips to the aggregate daily one-way vehicle trips anticipated based on the trip generation rates contained within the Project’s DEIR.” If the results reveal the TDM’s measures “are not achieving the reduction goal” then Lotusland “shall adjust the TDM plan . . . in consultation with County staff.” This requirement is also enshrined in the FEIR’s Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Plan. This satisfies CEQA. (See City of Hayward, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 855 [“The monitoring program which is an integral part 24 of the plan ensures that the public will have access to the information necessary to evaluate compliance . . . .”].) Petitioners’ related charge that there is no evidence of the enumerated strategies’ effectiveness is a factual inquiry we review for substantial evidence. (Save the Hill Group v. City of Livermore (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1114.) Here, “[t]he estimated trip reductions associated with the TDM strategies are based on research compiled” by the California Air Pollution Control Officers Association and reflect the County’s expert’s conclusions based on that report’s trip reduction methodology. This is enough, “even though other conclusions might also be reached.” (Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (a); see also South of Market Community Action Network v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 321, 339.) Accordingly, we conclude that the FEIR does not improperly defer or inadequately analyze mitigation of VMT impacts. VII. FEIR Adequately Discloses Potential Impact of Off-Site Well The project devises two separate water systems. Potable water would be supplied through on-site groundwater supply wells, and non-potable water “would be supplied by a combination of surface water from the on-site reservoirs, recycled from the on-site water recycling plants, and groundwater supply wells.” While the FEIR anticipates on-site water supplies would adequately supply the project’s non-potable water demands, it also identifies an off-site well that “may be developed” to provide a supplemental non- potable water supply “if required.” Because the well’s potential use is contingent on an unanticipated shortfall and because the aquifer it draws from is ill-defined, the County concluded the well would have a “potentially significant impact.” Petitioners argue the County erred by “omit[ting]” disclosure of the project’s potential use of the off-site well and for “mak[ing] 25 no effort to quantify the amount of groundwater the Project will draw” from that source. We disagree. While an EIR “necessarily involves some degree of forecasting” that requires an agency to “use its best efforts to find out and disclose all that it reasonably can” (Guidelines, § 15144), “the sufficiency of an EIR is to be reviewed in the light of what is reasonably feasible” (Guidelines, § 15151), and an agency may “terminate discussion of [an] impact” if its investigation “finds that [it] is too speculative for evaluation.” (Guidelines, § 15145.) Thus, rather than speculate about project impacts, the agency “may discuss potential project impacts at a ‘level of specificity . . . determined by the nature of the project and the rule of reason.’ ” (Sierra Watch, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 105; see Guidelines, § 15146.) Whether further disclosure and analysis by an EIR is reasonably feasible “presents a mixed question of law and fact, which usually is subject to independent review and is subject to substantial evidence review only when questions of fact predominate.” (King & Gardiner Farms, LLC v. County of Kern (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 814, 843 (King & Gardiner Farms, LLC).) As discussed below, disclosure and analysis of the well’s potential environmental impacts turn on the foreseeability of the well’s actual use and the water source from which it draws. We find these factual questions predominate the inquiries, and therefore review for substantial evidence. (King & Gardiner Farms, LLC, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 843–844.) Here, the FEIR discloses that non-potable water would be supplied by onsite reservoirs, onsite recycled wastewater, and groundwater wells. Those groundwater wells would consist of existing onsite irrigation wells and “[i]f necessary, an off-site high production well . . . .” Based on these supplies, the FEIR determines “availability of water supplies [even] during dry water 26 years is projected to exceed projected water demands.” Moreover, given “current groundwater and surface water supplies” — which does not include the undeveloped offsite well — the non-potable water supply would exceed demand during a “critical dry year” by thousands of acre feet. And during normal water years, the water supply from surface water entitlements (e.g., onsite reservoirs) and recycled water exceed projected water demands without any groundwater from any source. Nonetheless, the County evaluated the potential offsite well’s production capacity and the underlying groundwater basin. The FEIR explains that “[p]ump test results indicate that the existing well has a high production capacity measured at 1,100” gallons per minute. Because of the existing well’s “marginal” condition, a new well would need to be constructed that would “yield high flows over 1,000” gallons per minute. Use of the offsite “well has the potential to draw down the Collayomi Valley Groundwater Basin,” but the County’s investigation into “regional studies and local well data” reveals that “the nature and extent of the aquifer that would be utilized is not well defined.” This is because it is not “a uniform alluvium aquifer” but “a series of layers and lenses of permeable or semi-permeable materials that are partially interconnected (Wagner and Bonsignore, 2019).” Accordingly, “the amount of water that could be withdrawn without substantially decreasing groundwater supplies has not been determined.” Petitioners do not challenge these findings, nor can they given the substantial evidence supporting them. Rather, they fault the County for “mak[ing] no effort to quantify the amount of groundwater the Project will draw from offsite.” Petitioners’ argument is misplaced. The County unambiguously explains that the well would only be used “[i]f necessary,” which it cannot 27 reasonably forecast given its uncontested finding that the well’s use is contingent on extreme circumstances that would not arise under the County’s most conservative model of water supplies during “critical dry years.” (See Sierra Watch, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 105 [“EIR was not required to supply speculative estimates” of construction’s duration].) Petitioners point to language in the FEIR stating the offsite well would “be used as a primary source of non-potable water” but fail to emphasize that sentence concludes with the caveat “if required,” which the record reveals is exceedingly unlikely. For this reason, Petitioners’ reliance on Santiago County Water Dist. v. County of Orange (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 818, 829–830, where the EIR failed to evaluate the impact of supplying 12,000 to 15,000 gallons of water per day that “[t]he EIR disclose[d] . . . will be consumed,” is unavailing. We therefore find the FEIR was “prepared with a sufficient degree of analysis” and specificity under the rule of reason regarding the amount of water the offsite well would draw. (Guidelines, §§ 15151, 15146.) We are also unpersuaded that the County should be reasonably expected to disclose more information regarding the well’s potential impact on the underlying aqueduct or Middletown’s water supply. The County relies on sufficient evidence in support of its finding that the ill-defined nature of the aqueduct precluded a conclusive evaluation of the well’s impacts on the aquifer. Coupled with the unlikely and uncertain use of the offsite well, the FEIR’s limited discussion of the off-site well’s potential impact is reasonable.13 (Guidelines, §§ 15145, 15146; see also Sierra Watch, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 105.) 13 These same circumstances justify the deferred nature of Mitigation Measure 3.9-3, which imposes “safe yield analysis and monitoring” of the offsite well. (See Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B); see also Section VI, 28 VIII. FEIR Properly Rejected Alternative C Petitioners contend the FEIR rejected a less environmentally impactful alternative — Alternative C — as infeasible without the properly supported findings that CEQA requires. We are unpersuaded. As our Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘[o]ne of [an EIR’s] major functions . . . is to ensure that all reasonable alternatives to proposed projects are thoroughly assessed.’ ” (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 565, italics omitted.) This assessment is critical because “agencies should not approve projects as proposed if there are feasible alternatives . . . available which would substantially lessen the significant environmental effects of such projects.” (§ 21002.) Thus, an EIR must “describe a range of reasonable alternatives” that “would feasibly attain most of the basic objectives of the project but would avoid or substantially lessen any of the significant effects of the project.” (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a); Citizens of Goleta Valley, at p. 566; Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 400.) Once such alternatives are identified, however, the agency has discretion to reject them if the agency “make[s] one or more of the findings required by section 21081.” (City of Marina v. Board of Trustees of California ante, p. 21.) The FEIR commits itself to the measure, adopts specific performance criteria for a safe yield — i.e., “avoid drawdown of groundwater beyond 300 feet of the well” — and identifies actions to achieve this — i.e., “incorporate[ing] pump testing,” identifying monitoring wells, limiting pumping rates and durations based on hydraulic analysis, “submit[ting] annual monitoring reports” on quarterly groundwater pumping and groundwater level data, and requiring the analysis to be “certified by a Registered Professional Engineer or Registered Geologist.” This is sufficient. (See Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B); see also East Oakland Stadium Alliance v. City of Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1254–1255; Section IV, ante, p. 9.) 29 State University (2006) 39 Cal.4th 341, 350; see § 21002 [“in the event specific economic, social, or other conditions make infeasible such project alternatives . . . , individual projects may be approved in spite of one or more significant effects thereof”]; § 21002.1, subd. (c) [similar].) Pursuant to paragraph (3) of that provision, an agency may reject an alternative after finding it is infeasible. (§ 21081, subd. (a)(3).) Specifically, the agency may determine that “[s]pecific economic, legal, social, technological, or other considerations, including considerations for the provision of employment opportunities for highly trained workers, make infeasible the mitigation measures or alternatives identified in the environmental impact report.” (Ibid.) And if the agency makes such an infeasibility finding, then it must also “find[] that specific overriding economic, legal, social, technological, or other benefits of the project outweigh the significant effects on the environment.” (§ 21081, subd. (b); Preservation Action Council v. City of San Jose (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1353 (Preservation Action Council).) Notably, an agency does not abuse its discretion by rejecting alternatives as “infeasible” based on “policy considerations” or project objectives. (E.g., California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957, 1001 (California Native Plant) [“an alternative ‘may be found infeasible on the ground it is inconsistent with the project objectives as long as the finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record’ ”]; Planning and Conservation League v. Department of Water Resources (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 892, 918 [alternatives must be evaluated “in relation to the objectives of the project”]; City of Del Mar v. City of San Diego (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 401, 417 [alternative “reasonably rejected . . . in view of the social and economic realities”].) Moreover, a reasonable reading of a project’s 30 “ ‘fundamental purpose’ ” in light of its listed objectives may defeat a proposed alternative’s feasibility. (Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC v. Regents of University of California (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 779, 798 (Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC); In re Bay-Delta etc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1143, 1165.) An agency’s findings are presumed correct, and the burden is on the party seeking mandamus to prove otherwise. (California Native Plant, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 997.) Thus, we review the County’s finding that Alternative C would be infeasible for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) The instant FEIR explains the project was designed “to align with the objectives of the Middletown Area Plan Special Study Area, and existing County planning documents.” Those plans “identif[y] the need to develop more tourist destinations” and “encourage development of resorts with more commercial uses than residential.” The FEIR then sets forth the project’s specific development and economic objectives. Relevant here, these objectives include: (1) “Develop a luxury international destination resort that generates financial profits for the investor”; (2) “Meet Middletown Area Plan objectives by incorporating smart growth principles and low density development strategies while providing high end luxury accommodations and services”; (3) “Propose a mix of resort, agriculture, and residential uses consistent with the Lake County General Plan policies, Zoning regulations, Middletown Area Plan, and economic development goals and policies”; (4) “Plan for long term growth of the County with a significant fiscal contribution toward the County’s community goals of new economic, employment, and housing opportunities.” After briefly discussing alternatives eliminated from consideration, the FEIR evaluated three potentially feasible alternatives to the project: no 31 project; a reduced density, similar development footprint; and a high density, compact development footprint (Alternative C). Under Alternative C, all 400 hotel units envisioned by the project would be combined into one large hotel, average lot size for the 1400 residential estates and 450 resort residential units would drop from 4.8 acres to 0.8 acres, and many of the resort amenities would be reduced. The FEIR concludes Alternative C would be environmentally superior to the project because it would result in fewer impacts. But due to the FEIR’s finding that “this alternative would not fully meet objectives related to the development of a luxury destination resort with sufficient amenities to attract a diverse range of guests and residents,” the County concluded in its Findings and Statement of Overriding Considerations that Alternative C was infeasible. This was based, in part, on information submitted by Lotusland “indicating that they would expect price reductions for residential lots of at least 35 [percent] if they are unable to offer larger estate lots, and resort amenities, which are in turn supported by the scale of homes and resort units within the community.” Petitioners argue that the FEIR “contained no substantial analysis as to Alternative C’s economic infeasibility.” Moreover, they contend the evidence submitted by Lotusland is too unreliable to constitute substantial evidence supporting the County’s conclusion that Alternative C would reduce the price of residential lots and threaten the “financial feasibility of this alternative.”14 14 This information came in the form of two letters from the founding partner of luxury real estate firm IMI Worldwide Partners that attest to self- reinforcing market forces behind luxury development — i.e., “larger estate- sized homesites” with luxury amenities command “luxury prices” which in turn “is critical to support the luxury amenities.” One letter claims 32 Even if we agreed, however, this flaw is not dispositive. (See Save Panoche Valley v. San Benito County (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 503, 523 [where an agency cites several independent reasons why an alternative is infeasible, the agency’s determination will be upheld if one reason is supported by substantial evidence].) Citing California Native Plant, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 1336, the County’s Findings and Statement of Overriding Considerations expressly states “Alternative [C] is overall less capable of achieving the full scope of project objectives.” The County’s finding therefore goes beyond the alternative’s economic feasibility. Indeed, the foremost justification the County states in rejecting Alternative C is that it “is less capable of achieving the full array of project objectives” and “would not meet the objective of achieving a balance in housing densities consistent with a luxury resort.” We find this carries significant weight because the project’s objectives make plain that creating a “luxury” resort defined by low density residences is fundamental to the project’s purpose. (Cf. Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 798.) The County’s conclusion reflects the FEIR’s evaluation of Alternative C’s inability to satisfy several of the project’s objectives. That Alternative C would cut the average lot sizes from 4.8 acres to 0.8 acres — an 83 percent reduction — and reduce the total number of luxury amenities is uncontested. The FEIR states the goal of “meet[ing] Middletown Area Plan objectives by incorporating smart growth principles and low-density development strategies” would not be met because the density of Alternative C “would not experience with “similar developments,” but the letters differ without explanation on Alternative C’s impact on revenues. The letters do not discuss costs, profits, or contain facts evaluating the project’s particular circumstances. (See Preservation Action Council, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1352 [fact showing an alternative is merely less profitable is insufficient to demonstrate it is financially infeasible].) 33 provide as many luxury accommodations.” The FEIR also determines Alternative C would only partially meet the project objective regarding “the County’s community goals of new economic, employment, and housing opportunities” due to Alternative C’s “reduced resort amenities.” And it would only partially meet the objective for “[p]ropos[ing] a mix of resort, agriculture, and residential uses consistent with the Lake County General Plan policies, Zoning regulations, Middletown Area Plan, and economic development goals and policies” because “density would be higher than encouraged under current policies.”15 The FEIR’s analysis that smaller and denser accommodations and reduced amenities would not meet these objectives is reasonable. (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 569; see also § 21082.2, subd. (c) [“reasonable assumptions predicated upon facts” constitutes substantial evidence].) Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the County’s discretionary judgment that the alternative would not meet key project objectives. Petitioners’ other allegation that the FEIR and the County’s findings are contradictory is meritless. It is true that the County’s Findings and Statement of Overriding Considerations states Alternative C “only marginally lessens the Proposed Project’s potentially significant and unavoidable impacts,” while the FEIR states that “future phases under Alternative C” would eliminate the potential for significant and unavoidable 15 Another objective that the FEIR claims Alternative C will not meet is “develop[ing] a luxury international destination resort that generates financial profit” because “Alternative C would not provide enough resort amenities or large enough lots . . . .” This argument relies, at least in part, on an argument about financial feasibility, which we do not address. But it also reinforces our view that the fundamental purpose of the project is to build a luxury resort. 34 impacts to scenic vistas.” Petitioners ignore, however, that the FEIR also concludes that Alternative C would still result in “significant and unavoidable aesthetic impacts in Phase 1 due to construction,” and “[a]ll significant and unavoidable impacts related to Important Farmlands, greenhouse gas emissions, noise, and traffic and transportation would still occur.” This is consistent with the County’s finding that Alternative C would only “marginally” reduce impacts compared to the project. Petitioners’ authority, California Clean Energy Committee v. City of Woodland (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 173, 205, where the lead agency made an “unexplained switch from a rationale of economic infeasibility to environmental inferiority as the basis for rejecting” an alternative, is therefore inapposite. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the FEIR’s conclusion to reject Alternative C. DISPOSITION For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the trial court’s decision that the FEIR adequately disclosed the project’s impact on increasing the area’s existing wildfire risks. Because the FEIR must be revised, Petitioners request that the FEIR be recirculated is moot. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the trial court, which shall issue an order granting the Petitioners’ petition for a writ of mandate vacating the County’s certification of the EIR and approval of the project. (§ 21168.9, subd. (a).) Pursuant to section 21168.9, subdivision (b), the trial court shall retain jurisdiction over this action to ensure compliance with the peremptory writ issued. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.278(a)(3), (5).) 35 HITE, J.* We concur: STREETER, Acting P. J. GOLDMAN, J. People ex rel. Rob Bonta v. County of Lake (A165677) * Judge of the Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 36 Trial Judge: Hon. J. David Markham Trial Court: Lake County Superior Court Attorneys: Peter J. Broderick and Aruna M. Prabhala for Center for Biological Diversity, for Petitioner and Appellant. Lozeau Drury LLP, Rebecca L. Davis and Brian B. Flynn, for Petitioner and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Andrew R. Contreiras, Aarti S. Kewalramani, and Nicole U. Rinke, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioner and Appellant. Anita L. Grant and Nicole Danielle Johnson, County Counsels, for Defendant and Respondent. Miller Starr Regalia, Arthur F. Coon and Matthew C. Henderson, for Defendant and Respondent. Coblentz Patch Duffy & Bass LLP, Jonathan R. Bass, Charmaine G. Yu, and Sarah E. Peterson, for Real Party in Interest. Farella Braun & Martel, Katherine Philippakis and Linda Sobczynski, for Real Party in Interest. From:David Yan To:City Council Cc:Public Comments Subject:Evulich Court -AB 130 Exemption: Fire Authority Signed Off on PRC 4290. Not PRC 4291. Date:Monday, March 30, 2026 7:16:16 PM Attachments:PRC 4291_Not Complied With_03.30.2026.pdf CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Please include this email and the attached letter to the public record for the April 1, 2026 City Council meeting - Agenda Item 3 re. 10857 - 10887 Linda Vista Dr City Councilmembers, AB 130’s CEQA exemption applies in a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone only if a project complies with all three required fire hazard mitigation standards: PRC 4290, PRC 4291, and Chapter 7A. The Santa Clara County Fire Department’s signoff is scoped only to an AMMR under PRC 4290. It does not address PRC 4291, and no other Fire Authority document in the record does either. The Applicant asserts PRC 4291 compliance, but the record contains no analysis, no findings, and no documentation supporting that assertion. Without evidence in the record demonstrating PRC 4291 compliance, the City cannot make the eligibility finding AB 130 requires. The attached letter provides the details. Regards, David Yan March 30, 2026 Mayor Moore, Vice Mayor Chao, City Councilmembers: The CEQA exemption under AB130 requires compliance with PRC 4291. The Santa Clara County Fire Authority signed off on PRC 4290. Not 4291. This letter addresses a separate and independent issue from the threshold eligibility argument I submitted on March 21 2026 10:51am PST. Each stands on its own. AB130 Existing Standards Framework AB 130's fire hazard mitigation criteria are conjunctive. Government Code Section 65913.4(6)(D) requires compliance with all of the following: PRC 4291, PRC 4290, and Chapter 7A. The statute uses the word "all." The Conflation Problem The applicant has treated PRC 4290 setback and PRC 4291 defensible space as the same requirement. They are not. PRC 4290 governs setback, the distance between structures or property lines. PRC 4291 governs defensible space, the clearance of vegetation around structures. They address different risks. In plain terms: setback is about how close buildings sit to each other. Defensible space is about whether there is enough cleared vegetation around those buildings for occupants to survive a wildfire. The David J. Powers AB 130 Qualification Memo, dated February 18, 2026 which is the City’s own qualifying document makes this conflation explicit. On page 12, under Condition 7, their entire fire hazard mitigation showing consists of: Chapter 7A compliance, noncombustible landscaping, fire sprinklers within 30 feet of the property line, enhanced exterior materials, and the AMMR reducing the required 30 foot setback. PRC 4291 is not mentioned once. Why the Setback Reduction Makes This More Urgent The AMMR reduced the required setback from 30 feet to 10 feet. PRC 4291 independently requires 100 feet of defensible space clearance around structures. These are not the same measurement addressing the same concern. The setback reduction compressed buildings together. Whether the resulting site configuration of buildings 10 feet apart on a 2.5 acre parcel in a VHFHSZ can support the required defensible space clearance is precisely the analysis that was required before the exemption was granted. A site with buildings separated by 10 feet must still provide up to 100 feet of defensible space around each structure. The record contains no analysis demonstrating that this is physically achievable on a 2.5 acre site. Without that showing, compliance with PRC 4291 is speculative. What the Record Actually Shows The David J. Powers memo states that the Santa Clara County Fire Department "has determined that appropriate fire hazard mitigation measures have been incorporated by the project." That determination was scoped to PRC 4290. Footnote 5 cites only the Fire Prevention Plan Review Comments dated January 27, 2026. Those comments do not mention PRC 4291. The Fire Authority reviewed setback. It did not review defensible space. Meanwhile, Jensen Hughes, the Applicant’s consultant scoped their review to structural hardening and defensible space requirements "as required by Public Resources Code 4290," alongside Chapter 7A. The Fire Authority's scope mirrors Jensen Hughes exactly. Both reviewed 4290. Neither reviewed 4291. This is not an oversight in the paperwork. It is the boundary of what was actually evaluated. Chapter 7A: Reviewed by Jensen Hughes. PRC 4290: Reviewed by Jensen Hughes via the AMMR. PRC 4291: No analysis by any party. Absent from the record entirely. There is therefore no document in the record that supports a finding that the project complies with PRC 4291. See below from Jensen Hughes own memo: Distinguishing Conceptual Landscape Zoning From PRC 4291 Compliance PRC 4291 compliance is not a landscaping question. It is a feasibility question: can each proposed structure independently maintain the required clearance distances given the actual site configuration? A zone diagram showing Zone 0, Zone 1, and Zone 2 on a site plan does not answer that question. The record contains no analysis demonstrating that the required clearance conditions can be met for each building without overlap or conflict from adjacent structures placed 10 feet apart on a 2.5 acre parcel. That feasibility showing was required before the exemption was granted. It is absent. Absence of PRC 4291 Analysis Renders the "All" Requirement Unmet The anticipated response is that PRC 4291 carries an ongoing maintenance obligation rather than a preapproval signoff, and therefore its absence from the record is unremarkable. That argument misses the point. PRC 4291 does impose an ongoing maintenance obligation on property owners. But that obligation presupposes a site configuration capable of supporting compliance. An ongoing maintenance requirement does not fix a feasibility or geometry problem. This is precisely why PRC 4291 is signed off at both pre-approval as well as post build. AB 130 requires that fire hazard mitigation measures, including PRC 4291 be adopted as a condition of eligibility, not deferred to the permit stage. If the record contains no evidence addressing whether the configuration can meet those conditions, the Council has no basis to conclude that PRC 4291 is satisfied. The Council must be able to make a finding, based on the record before it, that the proposed site configuration can satisfy PRC 4291. No document in the record shows how the proposed layout satisfies PRC 4291 for each structure. Because the applicant may point to various diagrams as “defensible space,” Appendix 2 includes those exhibits and demonstrates why none of them satisfy PRC 4291 or establish the required feasibility finding. The Ask The record before this Council contains no PRC 4291 analysis. That is not a resident's interpretation. It is confirmed by the applicant's own consultant in their own words. The AB 130 exemption the City has allowed to stand was granted without the analysis the statute requires. Because AB 130 requires compliance with PRC 4291, the Council must be able to support that finding with evidence in the record. The record contains none. Any after the fact letter or conclusory signoff does not substitute for evidence already in the record supporting that finding. If the record does not contain such evidence, the Council cannot make the required eligibility determination and the exemption must be withdrawn. The two independent grounds for withdrawing the AB 130 exemption are in this letter and in my March 21st submission. Both stand on their own and either is sufficient. The City of Cupertino is better protected by getting this right before April 1 than by defending it afterward. Regards, David Yan Linda Vista Neighborhood Resident Appendix 1 Government Code Section 65913.4(6)(D) Conjunctive Fire Hazard Criteria The statute requires compliance with all of the following as a conjunctive set: Section 4291 of the Public Resources Code, Section 4290 of the Public Resources Code, and Chapter 7A of the California Building Code. The word "all" is in the statute itself. These are not alternative pathways. A project in a VHFHSZ must satisfy each one. Appendix 2 - Why the Applicant’s Exhibits Do Not Constitute PRC 4291 Compliance (from Fire PRA) The applicant may point to various diagrams and plan sheets as evidence of PRC 4291. For clarity and completeness, each of the four relevant exhibits is reproduced below, followed by a brief explanation of why none of them individually or collectively satisfy PRC 4291 or the AB 130 eligibility requirement to demonstrate defensible space feasibility before granting an exemption. Additionally, none of the applicant’s fire-related exhibits reference PRC 4291 or perform the defensible space feasibility analysis the statute requires. Continued on next page Exhibit 1 - Setback Site Plan (PRC 4290) Why Exhibit 1 is not PRC 4291: This sheet is a setback diagram, which falls under PRC 4290, not PRC 4291. Continued on next page Exhibit 2 - Conceptual Landscape Zoning – NOT SIGNED OFF BY FIRE This exhibit shows defensible space zones around the proposed buildings. PRC 4291 applies at the structure level, requiring clearance outward from each building. For interior buildings, that clearance is constrained by adjacent structures. The plan does not show how those buildings achieve the Zone 2 requirement under those conditions. Why this is not PRC 4291: This is a conceptual landscape architect zoning diagram, not a statutory feasibility analysis. It shows: • Zone 0 / Zone 1 / Zone 2 coloring • tree canopy spacing • generic CAL FIRE “guidelines and recommendations” PRC 4291 applies at the structure level and requires clearance outward from each building. For interior buildings, that clearance is constrained by adjacent structures. The exhibit shows Zone 2 generally across the site, but does not show how interior buildings achieve the required clearance where surrounding buildings limit outward space. In these areas, defensible space is effectively shared and is effectively restricted to Zones 0 and 1. The Zone 2 areas shown are primarily at the site edges. For example, between buildings 3 and 4, and along the interior areas north of buildings 1-5 and south of buildings 6-10, Zone 2 appears only in limited and fragmented areas. The plan does not show a clear Zone 2 area for each building in those locations. Lastly, this is a design intent exhibit, not evidence supporting a finding that the project complies with PRC 4291 or one that shows the Fire performed a detailed review or measurements. Continued on next page Exhibit 3 — Landscape Materials and Planting Guidance Sheet Why this is not PRC 4291: This sheet provides general materials and spacing guidance for vegetation. It defines Zone 2 as an area extending outward from each structure. Zone 2 is defined as an outward area from each structure. For interior buildings, that outward area is cut off by adjacent buildings and circulation space. The plan does not show where the Zone 2 area described in this sheet exists for those buildings. Continued on next page Exhibit 4 — Wildfire Construction Requirements (Chapter 7A / CRC R337) Why this is not PRC 4291: This sheet addresses structural hardening: • ember resistant vents • tempered glazing • noncombustible siding • ignition-resistant materials PRC 4291 is not about building materials. Aggregate Conclusion These exhibits show the site layout, defensible space zones, vegetation standards, and construction requirements. Exhibit 1 shows where the buildings are placed. This is a 4290 not 4291 requirement. Exhibit 2 shows defensible space zones across the site. Exhibit 3 defines how those zones are intended to function. Exhibit 4 addresses building materials. This is a 7A not 4291, requirement Exhibit 3 defines Zone 2 as an outward area from each structure. In the layout shown that outward area is limited for interior buildings by adjacent structures and circulation space. The plan does not show where the Zone 2 area exists for those. Based on the spacing between interior buildings, the outward area required by Zone 2 is not present for those structures. The plan does not show that PRC 4291 is satisfied. No document in the record shows that the Fire Authority evaluated or approved compliance with PRC 4291. From:Kitty Moore To:Lauren Sapudar; Kirsten Squarcia; Tina Kapoor; City Clerk Cc:Liang Chao Subject:Written Communications Item 3 Date:Monday, March 30, 2026 6:29:05 PM Attachments:evacuation_route_capacity_analysis_oct_2025.pdf Dear City Clerk, Please provide the attached Evacuation Study performed under the direction and expense of the City of Cupertino into the record for Item 3, Summerhill proposed project. I do not know if it has been included in the public record for the hearing yet. Thank you, Kitty Moore Kitty Moore Mayor City Council KMoore@cupertino.gov (408) 777-1389 Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment Submitted to: City of Cupertino Submitted in: October 2025 Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment Prepared for: Submitted in: City of Cupertino October 2025 P Table of Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Study Purpose ......................................................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Study Context ........................................................................................................................................................ 1 1.3 Natural Hazards .................................................................................................................................................... 2 1.3.1 Flood and Inundation Hazards ............................................................................................................... 2 1.3.2 Seismic And Geologic Hazards ............................................................................................................ 3 1.3.3 Fire Hazards ............................................................................................................................................... 4 1.3.4 Hazardous Waste And Materials .......................................................................................................... 5 2. Background ................................................................................................................................ 6 2.1 Legislative Requirements .................................................................................................................................. 6 2.2 Emergency Planning in Cupertino ................................................................................................................. 6 3. Approach and Methods............................................................................................................. 8 3.1 Identify the Evacuation Scenarios .................................................................................................................. 8 3.2 Define the Evacuation Area ............................................................................................................................. 11 3.3 Define Evacuation Routes ................................................................................................................................ 11 3.4 Estimate Vehicle Trips ...................................................................................................................................... 11 3.5 Assign Vehicle Trips .........................................................................................................................................14 3.6 Evacuation Route Assessment ...................................................................................................................... 15 3.6.1 Assessing Evacuation Route Capacity .............................................................................................. 15 3.6.2 Distance to Evacuation Gateway ....................................................................................................... 17 4. Evacuation Route Assessment ................................................................................................ 18 4.1 Estimate Evacuation Vehicle Trips ................................................................................................................ 18 4.1.1 Resident and Employee Population .................................................................................................... 18 4.1.2 Student Population ................................................................................................................................. 19 4.1.3 Visitor Population .................................................................................................................................. 20 4.1.4 Total Estimated Evacuation Demand .............................................................................................. 20 4.2 Evaluating Evacuation Route Capacity ....................................................................................................... 21 4.2.1 Scenario A (Quantitative Analysis) ..................................................................................................... 21 4.2.2 Scenario B (Quantitative Analysis) ..................................................................................................23 4.2.3 Scenario C (Qualitative Analysis) ..................................................................................................... 27 4.3 Analyzing Distance to Evacuation Gateways ........................................................................................... 27 5. Recommendations................................................................................................................... 29 5.1 Supply-Side Strategies ....................................................................................................................................29 5.2 Demand-Side Strategies ............................................................................................................................... 30 P 5.3 Information-Side Strategies ......................................................................................................................... 30 5.4 Additional Considerations ............................................................................................................................ 30 Appendices Appendix A: Socioeconomic Data Appendix B: Trip Distribution List of Figures Figure 1: Fire Hazard Severity Zones ......................................................................................................................... 10 Figure 2: Evacuation Routes ......................................................................................................................................... 13 Figure 3: Trip Distribution for Scenario A ............................................................................................................... 22 Figure 4: Trip Distribution for Scenario B ............................................................................................................... 25 Figure 5: Distances to Evacuation Gateways ........................................................................................................ 28 Figure A-1: Census Block Group and Census Tract Locations ......................................................................... 34 Figure A-2: Genasys Protect Zone Locations (highlighted numbers in study area) ................................. 36 Figure A-3: Transportation Analysis Zone (TAZ) Locations (light blue indicates study area) ............... 38 List of Tables Table 1: Scenario Definitions .......................................................................................................................................... 9 Table 2: Vehicle Demand Calculations in the Evacuation Area ......................................................................... 14 Table 3: Planning Level Roadway Capacity per Hour per Lane ......................................................................... 15 Table 4: Evacuation Route Capacity .......................................................................................................................... 16 Table 5: Composition of Evacuees by Scenario .................................................................................................... 18 Table 6: Resident Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area ................. 19 Table 7: Employee Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area ............... 19 Table 8: Student Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area ................. 20 Table 9: Visitor Land Use and Evacuation Demand of the Evacuation Area ................................................ 20 Table 10: Total Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips for the Evacuation Area ............................. 20 Table 11: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario A)...................................................................... 23 Table 12: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario B) .................................................................... 26 Table A-1: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Census1 .................................................................................... 33 P Table A-2: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Genasys Protect1 .................................................................. 35 Table A-3: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Santa Clara County VMT Estimation Tool1 ....................37 Table A-4: School Enrollment Data .......................................................................................................................... 39 Table A-5: Estimated Student Evacuation Trips ................................................................................................... 39 Table A-6: Estimated Visitor Evacuation Trips ..................................................................................................... 40 Table B-1: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario A) ................................................ 42 Table B-2: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario B) ............................................... 43 Table B-3: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario C) .............................................. 44 Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 1 1. Introduction The City of Cupertino's comprehensive planning efforts make it appropriate to assess evacuation route capacity while simultaneously updating the General Plan and Emergency Operations Plan . This assessment provides the City of Cupertino with emergency evacuation event information and is consistent with requirements outlined in Assembly Bill (AB) 747 (2019) and AB 1409 (2021), which specifically require local agencies to evaluate evacuation routes capacity and identify evacuation locations. This supplements the analysis that was prepared for the Draft Health and Safety Element Update (March 2025) regarding residential street accessibility to identify parcels in hazard areas with limited egress routes as required by Senate Bill (SB) 99. 1.1 Study Purpose The following is a summary of the purpose of this evacuation study: • Identify major evacuation routes and shelter locations/gateways; • Inform development of evacuation strategies and conduct evacuation route capacity assessment of wildfire evacuation scenarios with other hazards that could limit evacuation route capacity; • Identify bottlenecks on major evacuation routes based on the evacuation route capacity assessment results; • Identify evacuation strategies to improve performance of the road network during evacuations; and • Identify potential future/ongoing efforts for a detailed Evacuation Plan . 1.2 Study Context This assessment evaluates roadway capacity under certain described scenarios and should not be considered an evacuation plan. Emergency evacuations can be triggered by a number of events, and natural and man-made disasters can be as unpredictable as individual behavior related to evacuation events. As such, this assessment is intended to provide the City of Cupertino with a broad “planning level” assessment of transportation system capacity during worst case evacuation scenarios; it does not provide system adequacy guarantees, nor does it guarantee the findings are applicable to all situations. This assessment will help the City develop policies to prioritize evacuation routes and centers based on the findings of this analysis. Moreover, because emergency evacuation assessment is an emerging field, there is no established standard methodology. We have utilized existing methods in transportation planning that, in our knowledge and experience, we believe offer the most appropriate planning level understanding of roadway capacity for evacuation events. Nevertheless, such methods are limited by the budgetary and time constraints in our scope of work, by the current state of the practice, and of our knowledge. The City of Cupertino has requested this study to aid in planning and implementing potential evacuation plans/scenarios. This assessment should help the city be better prepared for those events; however, in no way can Fehr & Peers guarantee the efficacy of the information used in this assessment, as such would be beyond our professional duty and capability . Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 2 1.3 Natural Hazards The Health and Safety Element Background Report (July 23, 2025) described the following potential natural hazards. For this assessment, we considered various natural hazards in the preparation of evacuation scenarios. The natural hazards are described 1.3.1 Flood and Inundation Hazards Flooding is the rising and overflowing of water onto normally dry land. Floods are one of the most frequent natural hazards impacting Santa Clara County and among the costliest natural disasters in terms of human hardship and economic loss nationwide, causing substantial damage to structures, landscapes, and utilities, as well as life-safety issues. Flooding can be extremely dangerous; even six inches of moving water can knock a person over. Floodwaters can transport large objects downstream, damaging or removing stationary structures, such as dam spillways. Ground saturation can result in instability, collapse, or other damage that breaks utility lines and interrupts services. Objects can also be buried or destroyed through sediment deposition from heavy fl ooding. Standing water can cause damage to roads, foundations, and electrical circuits, as well as spread vector-borne illnesses. Other problems connected with flooding and stormwater runoff include erosion, degradation of water quality, and losses of environmental resources. Floods are usually caused by large amounts of stormwater, either from a period of very intense rainfall or a long period of steady rain. Historically, Cupertino has been at risk of flooding primarily during the winter and spring when stream systems swell with heavy rain. This type of flood results from prolonged, heavy rainfall and typically occurs due to high peak flows of moderate duration and a large volume of runoff. Flooding is more severe when prior rainfall has saturated the ground. The watersheds in the Santa Cruz Mountains feed into four major streambeds that traverse the city, Permanente Creek, Stevens Creek, Regnart Creek, and Calabazas Creek. These creeks collect surface runoff and drain into channels leading to the San Francisco Bay. During heavy rainfall, these creeks create a potential flooding risk in the city as water levels may exceed the top of the creekbank. Occasionally, flash flooding from short-duration, high-intensity precipitation events (often during atmospheric river events) may occur. Atmospheric rivers are a relatively common weather pattern that brings southwest winds and heavy rain to California. Atmospheric rivers are long, narrow regions in the atmosphere that transport water vapor carried away from the tropics. These columns of vapor move with the weather, carrying large amounts of water vapor and strong winds. When the atmospheric rivers make landfall, they often release this water vapor in the form of rain or snow, often causing heavy rains that can lead to flooding and mudslide events. Flash floods can occur even during a drought. Such events can tear out trees, undermine buildings and bridges, and scour creek channels. In urban areas, flash flooding is an increasingly serious problem due to removing vegetation and replacing groundcover with impermeable surfaces such as roads, driveways, and parking lots. The greatest risk from flash floods is occurrence with little to no warning. 1.3.1.1 Dam and Pipeline Failure A dam failure is an uncontrolled release of water from a reservoir through a dam because of structural failures or deficiencies in the dam, usually associated with intense rainfall or prolonged flooding. Water pipeline or aqueduct failures can create a similar sudden flood. Dam and pipeline failures can range from minor to catastrophic, potentially harming human life and property downstream from the failure. In addition, ecosystems and habitats can be destroyed by fast-moving floodwaters, debris, Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 3 and sedimentation from inundation. Although dam and pipeline failures are very rare, these events are not unprecedented. There are four major causes of failures: • Overtopping: These failures occur when a reservoir fills too high with water, especially in times of heavy rainfall, leaving water to rush over the top of the dam. Other causes of this type of failure include settling of the crest of the dam or spillway blockage. • Foundation defects: These failures occur as a result of settling in the foundation of the dam, instability of slopes surrounding the dam, uplift pressures, and seepage around the foundation. All these failures result in structural instability and potential dam failure. • Piping and seepage failures: These failures occur as a result of internal erosion caused by seepage and erosion along hydraulic structures, such as the spillways of a dam, or failures in the walls of a water pipeline. Animal burrows and cracks in the dam structure may also cause ero sion. • Conduit and valve failure: These failures occur as a result of problems with valves and conduits in a dam or pipeline’s systems. Many dam and pipeline failures are also the secondary result of other natural disasters, such as earthquakes, landslides, and extreme storms. Other causes include equipment malfunction, structural damage, and sabotage. Dams are constructed with safety features known as “spillways” that allow water to overtop the dam if the reservoir fills too quickly. Spillway overflow events, often referred to as “design failures”, result in increased discharges downstream and increased flooding potential. In a dam failure scenario, the greatest threat to life and property typically occurs in those areas immediately below the dam since flood depths and discharges generally decrease as the flood wave moves downstream. The primary danger associated with dam failure is the high-velocity flooding downstream of the dam and limited warning times for evacuation. 1.3.2 Seismic And Geologic Hazards Seismic and geologic hazards are risks caused by the movement of different parts of the earth’s crust or surface. Seismic hazards include earthquakes and hazardous events caused by them. Geologic hazards are other hazards involving land movements that are not linked to seismic activity and can inflict harm to people or property. Additional information about seismic and geologic hazards i n Cupertino, including development review coordination is in General Plan Appendix E, Geologic and Seismic Hazards. 1.3.2.1 Seismic Hazards Seismic activity occurs along boundaries in the earth’s crust, called faults. Pressure along the faults builds over time and is ultimately released, resulting in ground shaking commonly referred to as an earthquake. Earthquakes can also trigger other hazards, including surface rupture (cracks in the ground surface), liquefaction (causing loose soil to lose its strength), landslides, and subsidence (sinking of the ground surface). Earthquakes and other seismic hazards often damage or destroy property and public infrastructure, including utility lines, and falling objects or structures pose a risk of injury or death. 1.3.2.1.1 EARTHQUAKES While Cupertino is at risk from many natural and human-caused hazards, the event with the greatest potential for loss of life or property and economic damage is an earthquake. This risk is true for most of the San Francisco Bay Area region since damaging earthquakes affect widespread areas and trigger many secondary effects that can overwhelm the ability of local jurisdictions to respond. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 4 Earthquakes in the Bay Area result from strain energy constantly accumulating across the region because of the motion of the Pacific Plate, relative to the North American Plate. Earthquake risk is very high in Santa Clara County, including the City of Cupertino, due to the presence of three major active faults1 in the region, the Hayward Fault, Calaveras Fault, and San Andreas Fault. Both the San Andreas and the Hayward Faults have the potential for experiencing major to great events. 1.3.2.1.2 OTHER SEISMIC HAZARDS In addition to the direct physical damage that can result from the motion of an earthquake, damage can result from liquefaction. Liquefaction occurs primarily in saturated, loose, fine - to medium- grained soils in areas where the groundwater table is within approximately 50 feet of the surface. Shaking causes the soils to lose strength and behave as a liquid. Excess water pressure is vented upward through fissures and soil cracks and can result in a water -soil slurry flowing onto the ground surface. This subsurface process can lead to near-surface or surface ground failure that can result in property damage and structural failure. Groundwater that is less than 10 feet to the surface can cause the highest liquefaction susceptibility, with lower groundwater levels causing lower liquefaction risks. 1.3.2.2 Geologic Hazards Landslides and rock falls may occur in sloped areas, especially areas with steep slopes, and usually in loose and fragmented soil areas. Slope stability depends on many factors and interrelationships, including rock type, pore water pressure, slope steepness, and natural or human-made undercutting. Landslides, rockfalls, and debris flows occur continuously on all slopes; some processes act very slowly, while others occur very suddenly, often with disastrous results. Landslides are often triggered by other natural hazards, such as heavy rain, floods, or wildfires, so landslide frequency is often related to the frequency of these other hazards. In Santa Clara County, landslides typically occur during and after severe he avy rainfall, so the risk of landslides often rises during and after sequential severe storms that saturate steep, loose soils. Landslides and mudslides are a common occurrence and have caused damage to homes, public facilities, roads, parks, and sewer lines. 1.3.3 Fire Hazards Fire hazards include both wildfires and urban fires. The combination of complex terrain, climate, vegetation and development patterns contribute to an elevated risk of wildfire. The Community Wildfire Protection Plan 2023 (CWPP) describes how each of these variables contributes to fire risk, and describes how fire risk varies throughout the city. Historically, the fire season extended from early summer through late fall of each year during the hotter, dryer months, although it is increasingly a hazard that can occur year-round. Fire conditions arise from a combination of high temperatures, low moisture content in the air and plant matter, an accumulation of vegetation, and high winds. Three types of fires are of concern to Cupertino: (1) wildfires, (2) wildland-urban interface fires, and (3) structural fires. 1 Active faults are defined by their current movement and deformation and their potential to cause earthquakes or other types of ground deformation in the future. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 5 1.3.3.1 Wildfires Wildfires occur on mountains, hillsides, and grasslands. Fuel, weather, and topography are primary factors that affect how wildland fires spread. In and around Cupertino, grassland and woodland habitat provide highly flammable fuel that is conducive to wildfires. These plant species are capable of regeneration after a fire, making periodic wildfires a natural part of the ecology of these areas. The climate of Cupertino and the surrounding area keeps the grass dry and more readily combustible during fire season. Wildfire potential for Santa Clara County is typically greatest in the months of August, September, and October, when dry vegetation coexists with hot, dry winds. During these times, controlling a fire becomes far more difficult. Areas adjacent to the city that are susceptible to wildfires are also of concern as these conditions could exacerbate vulnerabilities within the city. Grassland fires are easily ignited, particularly in dry seasons. These fires are relatively easily controlled if they can be reached by fire equipment, although after a fire, the burned slopes are highly subject to erosion and gullying. While brushlands are naturally adapted to frequent light fires, fire suppression in recent decades has resulted in heavy fuel accumulation on the ground. Wildland fires, particularly near the end of the dry season, tend to burn fast and very hot, threatening homes and leading to serious destruction of vegetative cover. In woodland and forested areas, a wildland fire can generate a destructive crown fire, which is a fire that burns materials at the top of trees, spreading from treetop to treetop. They can be very intense and difficult to contain. Because areas of the city with natural vegetation are extremely flammable during late summer and fall, wildfire is a serious hazard in undeveloped hillside areas in the western portion of the city, as well as open space areas adjacent to the city. These areas include State Responsibility Area (SRA) lands west of the city, such as the Rancho San Antonio Open Space, Picchette Ranch Open Space, Stevens Creek County Park, Saratoga Creek County Park, Sanborn County Park, Fremont Older Open Space, as well as Local Responsibility Area (LRA) lands in the hillsides of Saratoga. 1.3.4 Hazardous Waste And Materials Hazardous materials are materials that pose a significant risk to public safety, or human and environmental health. These include toxic chemicals, flammable or corrosive materials, petroleum products, and unstable or dangerously reactive materials. They can be released through human error, malfunctioning or broken equipment, or as an indirect consequence of other emergencies (e.g., if a flood damages a hazardous material storage tank). Hazardous materials can also be released accidentally during transportation because of vehicle accidents. The release or spill of bulk hazardous materials could result in fire, explosion, toxic cloud, or direct contamination of water, people, and property. The effects may involve a local site or many square miles. Health problems may be immediate, such as corrosive effects on the skin and lungs, or gradual, such as the development of cancer from a carcinogen. Property damage could range from immediate destruction by explosion to permanent contamination by a persistent hazardous material. Most hazardous materials in the region are transported on truck routes along major roadways, such as I - 280 and SR-85 that pass through Cupertino. The most vulnerable areas along this route are considered the on-/off-ramps and interchanges. Since 1970, one reported roadway hazardous materials incident occurred in Cupertino. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 6 2. Background 2.1 Legislative Requirements Assembly Bill (AB) 747 (2019) and AB 1409 (2021) both mandate local jurisdictions to update their safety elements to include comprehensive evacuation planning. • AB 747 (2019) adds California Government Code Section 65302.15, which requires the safety element to be reviewed and updated, upon the next update of a local hazard mitigation plan (LHMP) after January 1, 2022, to identify evacuation routes and their capacity, safety, and viability under a range of emergency scenarios.2 • AB 1409 (2021) adds evacuation locations to Section 65302.15 of the California Government Code and requires the safety element to be reviewed and updated to identify evacuation locations. Accordingly, this report considers: • Identification of Evacuation Routes: The study identifies all evacuation routes and assesses their capacity, safety, and viability under various emergency scenarios. • Capacity Assessment: The study evaluates the capacity of evacuation routes to handle the expected volume of traffic and evacuees during an emergency. • Safety and Viability: The study considers the safety and viability of the identified routes and centers for use during emergencies. • Mapping Evacuation Gateways: This involves mapping evacuation centers and shelters and/or shortest path to evacuation gateways to ensure they are accessible and adequately equipped. • Policy Development: Policies to prioritize evacuation routes and centers based on the findings. • Integration with Local Hazard Mitigation Plans (LHMP): Updates to the Health and Safety Element should be coordinated with the existing LHMP or other relevant emergency planning documents to ensure consistency and alignment. 2.2 Emergency Planning in Cupertino This City of Cupertino maintains and publishes several emergency planning documents:3 The Emergency Operations Plan (2019)4 provides guidance on the City's response to the most likely and demanding emergency conditions. It outlines the incident management structure, legal compliance, whole community engagement, continuity of government, and other critical components. 2 The City of Cupertino participated in the Santa Clara County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan which was approved by FEMA in February 2024 which triggered compliance with this requirement. 3 https://www.cupertino.gov/files/assets/city/v/1/your-city/documents 4 https://www.cupertino.gov/files/assets/city/v/1/your-city/documents/cupertino-emergency-operations-plan.pdf. Accessed August 28, 2025. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 7 The Health and Safety Element (last amended in 2005, with minor edits in 2015)5, a Chapter in the General Plan, describes local hazards and mitigation measures. It identifies that people in the foothills and mountains of Cupertino’s planning area, covering approximately 16 square miles, are most at risk from fire. The City is currently updating the Health and Safety Element. The Health and Safety Element Update lists the following policies to prepare for and respond to disasters and emergencies: • Policy HS-2.1: Building And Fire Code Compliance • Policy HS-2.2: Promote Emergency Preparedness • Policy HS-2.3: Emergency Operations And Training • Policy HS-2.4: Volunteer Groups • Policy HS-2.5: Emergency Public Information • Policy HS-2.6: Fire Prevention And Emergency Preparedness • Policy HS-2.7: Hazard Preparedness • Policy HS-2.8: Educational And Outreach Materials • Policy HS-2.9: Poor Air Quality Event Assistance • Policy HS-2.10: Disaster Medical Response • Policy HS-2.11: Evacuation Routes • Policy HS-2.12: Evacuation Awareness • Policy HS-2.13: Ingress And Egress • Policy HS-2.14: Secondary Ingress And Egress. • Policy HS-2.15: Emergency Access The City’s Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) (February 21, 2024)6 is an annex to the Santa Clara County Multijurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan. It assesses potential hazard risks as well as mitigation measures to prevent loss of life, injury, and property damage. It identifies earthquake, severe weather, flood, landslide, and wildfire as hazards of greatest concern. In the LHMP, Table 17 lists the actions that comprise the City’s hazard mitigation action plan. The Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) (2023)7 describes projects from the Santa Clara County CWPP (2023). These plans are required to be updated every five years to remain eligible for funding implementation projects through the Fire Safe Councils and CAL FIRE. 5 https://www.cupertino.gov/files/assets/city/v/1/your-city/documents/gp-chap-06-health.pdf. Accessed August 28, 2025. 6 https://oem.santaclaracounty.gov/multi-jurisdictional-hazard-mitigation-plan-mjhmp. Accessed October 24, 2025. 7 https://www.sccfd.org/santa-clara-county-community-wildfire-protection-plan/. Accessed October 24, 2025. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 8 3. Approach and Methods This analysis focuses on the transportation system capacity during a wildfire evacuation event. The following flow chart illustrates the steps in the process. 3.1 Identify the Evacuation Scenarios Fehr & Peers, City of Cupertino staff, the Santa Clara County Fire Department, and the Santa Clara County Sherriff’s Office worked together to identify the hazard of highest concern for this assessment (wildfires in the Fire Hazard Severity Zone (FHSZ)) and three evacuation scenarios. In developing the evacuation scenarios, all hazards identified in Section 1.3 were considered. The defined evacuation scenarios represent hazards with the greatest potential to generate the largest number of vehicles requiring evacuation. Consideration was given to wildfire vulnerability, as well as access limitations that may occur due to compounding hazards such as a landslide or flood damage along an evacuation route. Table 1 defines the evacuation scenarios. Scenarios A to C reflect Existing Conditions in year 2025. This assessment conducted baseline analysis using existing socioeconomic conditions to establish current evacuation performance and identify potential constraints under present -day conditions. This provides a foundation for evaluating how future growth could affect evacuation route capacities. When considering cumulative conditions with projected buildout, increased evacuation population would likely exacerbate bottlenecks identified in the baseline analysis. These scenarios assume no evacuation population will “shelter in place” within the hazard area or evacuation area. Instead, these scenarios evaluate evacuation from the evacuation area using the shortest path. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 9 • Scenario A was assessed quantitatively. It assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation within the evacuation area at 2 PM on a school day. All roadways are assumed to be accessible to evacuees, which include residents, employees, students, and visitors. • Scenario B was assessed quantitatively. It assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation following an earthquake at 6 AM, during a time when schools are not in session. McClellan Road at Club House Lane near the Deep Cliff Golf Course is assumed to be closed. Evacuees include residents and a small portion of employees. • Scenario C was assessed qualitatively. It is based on Scenario A by assuming the same evacuation demand, but with additional roadway closures on Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR- 85 and SR-85 Southbound Ramps at Stevens Creek Boulevard because of an earthquake causing the wildfire. Table 1: Scenario Definitions Scenario A (Quantitative) Scenario B (Quantitative) Scenario C (Qualitative) Hazard Type(s) Wildfire Wildfire after Earthquake Wildfire after Earthquake Scale of Emergency Evacuation Area1 Evacuation Area1 Evacuation Area1 Time of Event Fall 2 PM (School in session) Summer 6 AM (School not in session) Fall 2 PM (School in session) Road Closures due to Hazard All roadways open McClellan Road at Club House Lane near the Deep Cliff Golf Course due to earthquake • Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR- 85 • SR-85 Southbound Ramps at Stevens Creek Boulevard Type of Evacuees Residents, employees, students, visitors Residents, small portion of employees Residents, employees, students, visitors Notes: 1. The boundary of evacuation area is defined as the Genasys Protect zones within the fire hazard severity zone (FHSZ) lands in the western portions of the City and homes within the foothills of the Santa Cruz Mountains, shown in Figure 1. Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. Fire Hazard Severity Zones FIGURE 1 Page 32 Appendix H:Health and Safety Element Background Report | August 2024 Figure S-9 Fire Hazard Severity Zones Data Source: Health and Safety Element Background Report, July 23, 2025 6% 25% 25% 6% 12% 19% 7% 31% 25% 2% 16% 6% 13% 7% Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Screenline East of the WUI Screenline West of SR-85 Screenline Trip Distribution Scenario B SR-85 Trip Distribution % Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) % 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 11 3.2 Define the Evacuation Area According to the Cupertino Municipal Code Chapter 16.74.020, “Wildland‐Urban Interface (WUI) or Wildland‐Urban Interface Fire Area (WUIFA) mean a geographical area identified by the state as a Fire Hazard Severity Zone in accordance with the Public Resources Code Sections 4201 through 4204 and Government Code Sections 51175 through 51189, or other areas desig nated by the enforcing agency to be at a significant risk from wildfires”. The evacuation area is defined as the Genasys Protect8 zones within the WUI, or the moderate to very high FHSZ in Cupertino. Figure 1 illustrates the fire hazard severity zones included in the Health and Safety Element Background Report. The safe area is established at SR-85 and I-280 and serves as the evacuation gateway, representing the boundary beyond which evacuees are considered to have exited the evacuation area, and are therefore no longer at immediate risk. 3.3 Define Evacuation Routes This analysis uses the evacuation routes provided by the City of Cupertino in August 2025, developed as part of the City’s ongoing effort to update its Health and Safety Element. The evacuation routes for the City of Cupertino and surrounding unincorporated areas are used to transport evacuees using their own vehicle and transit dependent evacuees to temporary shelter. This analysis assumes that routes that provide the most direct path to evacuate the community with the least exposure to risk will be used by evacuees. The major evacuation routes consider the location of critical facilities (i.e., safety and security, health and medical, and communications) as well as residential, employment, school, and recreational uses. Figure 2 shows the evacuation routes provided by the City. 3.4 Estimate Vehicle Trips The number of evacuation vehicle trips assigned to the roadway network are a combination of trips generated by residential households, employee trips, student trips, and visitor trips at the time of the evacuation. These trips include those generated by uses in the City as well as surrounding unincorporated areas including PG&E Trailhead, McClellan Ranch Preserve, Stevens Creek County Park, and Fremont Older Open Space Preserve. Trips generated by residential households were informed by the most recent available data from the US Census Bureau and the California Department of Finance. This includes data on population, the number of households, persons per household, and vehicles per household. This data was cross- referenced with data in the Genasys Protect platform’s designated evacuation zones. The household data was then used to estimate evacuation vehicle trips based on the number of households, persons per household, auto-ownership information, population, and other factors that could affect the number of vehicles per household used during an evacuation event. 8 Genasys Protect is an evacuation management tool that helps communities and first responders plan, communicate, and conduct evacuations. It provides communications, situational awareness, and cross -agency coordination capabilities for emergency management. The platform delivers integrated hardware and software for proactive preparedness and multi-channel communication. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 12 Table 2 describes data sources and equations used to estimate vehicle evacuation demand for residents, employees, students, and visitors. Data sources reviewed for this assessment include the 2023 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year Estimates, Genasys Protect, Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool, and the adopted Housing Element. These sources provide population, household, and employment estimates that are within a similar range. Evacuation Routes FIGURE 2 280 280 280 85 85 yW e l l i v e l l e B S T a n t a u A v e ev A t h g i r W S S t e l l i n g R d Reg n a r t R d ev A h c n i F Prospect Rd Sara t o g a A v e dv l B a z n A e D N Doyle Rd dR b b u B S B l a n e y A v e Moorpark Ave Cox Ave McClellan Rd dR o t i u Q dv l B a z n A e D S S M a r y A v e ev A r e l l i M N T a n t a u A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F S Pruneridge Ave W Homestead Rd E Homestead Rd Jo h n s o n A v e N S t e l l i n g R d Ho l l e n b e c k A v e dR e f l o W S dR e l a v y n n u S - a g o t a r a S S Vallco Pk w y Rainbow Dr Bollinger Rd Stevens Creek Blvd W Ca m p b e l l A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F N N B l a n e y A v e dR e f l o W S t e v e n s C a n y o n R d Phil Ln ev A l i a u Q Mou n t E d e n R d Basemap FIGURE 2 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation RoutesCupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Evacuation Route (outside of City Boundary) Evacuation Route (in Cupertino) Fire Hazard Severity Zones FIGURE 1 Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Evacuation Routes (in Cupertino) Evacuation Routes (outside of City Boundary) Data Source: Draft Health and Safety Element, 2025 Rodrigues Ave Torre Ave 85 85 280 280 280 A B C D E F 1 2 3 4 5 6 0.9 miles from Point F to Gateway 6 1.1 miles from Point F to Gateway 5 1.3 miles from Point B to Gateway 1 1.4 miles from Point E to Gateway 4 1.6 miles from Point E to Gateway 5 1.6 miles from Point B to Gateway 2 1.9 miles from Point A to Gateway 1 2 miles from Point D to Gateway 3 2.2 miles from Point D to Gateway 4 2.4 miles from Point C to Gateway 3 2.5 miles from Point C to Gateway 1 Gateway Start Distance to Evacuation Gateway 0 - 0.5 Miles 0.5 - 1 Miles 1 - 1.5 Miles 1.5 - 2 Miles 2.5 - 3 Miles 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 14 Table 2: Vehicle Demand Calculations in the Evacuation Area Evacuation Demand Variable Data Source Equation 1. Employment Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool Data source provided value. 2. Residential Population Genasys Protect* Data source provided value. 3. Household Genasys Protect* Population / Household size 4. Household Vehicle Ownership Distribution Census Tract Number of households with 0, 1, 2, or 3+ vehicles / Total household 5. Household Vehicle Ownership Steps 4 & 5 Household vehicle ownership distribution * Household 6. Student Education Data Partnership Data source provided value1 7. Visitor Parking Spaces Available from Google Maps Portion of parking spaces occupied2 8. Estimated Vehicle Evacuation Demand Steps 1 & 6 Residents: 1 * zero-vehicle household + 1 * one-vehicle household + 2 * two-vehicle household + 2.5 * three-or-more vehicle household Employees: 0.99 * employment Students: 1 * drive-alone student + 0.5 * carpooling student + 1 * student picked up/dropped off Visitors: 0.5 * visitor Notes: Raw data is presented in Appendix A. 1. Educational Data Partnership shows school enrollment data for the following schools considered in the evacuation area: Abraham Lincoln Elementary School, Tessellations Elementary School, John F Kennedy Middle School, and Monta Vista High School. 2. Visitor presence considered at recreational attractions located within the evacuation area: PG&E Trailhead (50% of the Rancho San Antonio County Park parking spaces), Deep Cliff Golf Course (20% of the Linda Vista Park parking spaces), Rim Trail (45% of the Stevens Creek County Park Chestnut and Villa Maria parking lots), and Parker Ranch Trailhead (40% of the Fremont Older Open Space Preserve Prospect and Saratoga Country Club parking spaces). Source: 2023 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year Estimates; Genasys Protect; Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool; Educational Data Partnership; and Google Maps, Fehr & Peers, 2025. 3.5 Assign Vehicle Trips The total resident, employee, student, and visitor evacuation trips are disaggregated into 14 different geographically designated evacuation zones in the Genasys Protect platform. Trips are routed from each zone to the nearest evacuation route. Once on a major evacuation route, trips are assigned to the most efficient path toward either SR-85 or I-280. The city limit is used as the evacuation Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 15 gateways because it represents the boundary beyond which evacuees are considered to have exited the hazard area and the evacuation area, and are therefore no longer at immediate risk. 3.6 Evacuation Route Assessment An evacuation route assessment can be completed in a variety of ways to determine the capacity and viability of key evacuation routes. An assessment, like this project, can use volume to capacity ratios under typical non-congested conditions. Under more constrained and congested conditions, higher effort studies may involve modeled analysis of evacuation scenarios using dynamic traffic assignment to simulate traffic flow and evacuation times when street and freeway networks are at capacity. This evacuation route capacity divides the vehicle demand volumes by the roadway evacuation capacity to estimate the volume to capacity ratio during an evacuation event. Furthermore, the evacuation route assessment measures the distance evacuees have to travel to reach evacuation gateways. 3.6.1 Assessing Evacuation Route Capacity This analysis uses planning level roadway capacities based on the roadway cross section (e.g., two, four, or six travel lanes) with adjustments for the hilly nature of the evacuation routes in the evacuation area and anticipated lower visibility conditions present during an evacuation. These planning level roadway capacities are consistent with the level of planning for this AB 747/AB 1409 evacuation capacity analysis where the desired outcome is a list of policies and programs to integrate into the Health and Safety Element. Table 3 lists the peak one-hour planning capacity for each roadway type. These evacuation capacities do not incorporate contraflow , as the opposing direction is reserved for emergency responders. Table 3: Planning Level Roadway Capacity per Hour per Lane Roadway Type Planning Capacity1 (Typical Day) Planning Capacity (Low Visibility) Freeway 2,020 1,780 Divided Arterial 940 830 Undivided Arterial 890 780 Collector/Local 650 570 Notes: 1. Roadway planning capacity from Highway Capacity Manual (2000). Source: Highway Capacity Manual, 2000; Fehr & Peers, 2025. Additionally, during a fire or other emergency event, roadways typically operate at lower capacities due to changes in driver behavior and the presence of hazards such as low visibility due to smoke. Baseline capacities for all evacuation roadways were reduced by 12 percent to account for these hazards, based on recommended capacity reductions due to low visibility (due to weather) provided by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Road Weather Management Program.9 9 How weather events impact roadways? https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/weather/q1_roadimpact.htm#:~:text=Speed%20variance%20can%20fall%20by,12 %20percent%20in%20low%20visibility, accessed April 2025. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 16 Table 4 presents the roadway types and total evacuation route capacity at designated screenlines and a few additional roadway segments. A screenline is an imaginary line on a map to evaluate the evacuation route capacity (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). This analysis uses a screenline east of the evacuation area, and another at SR-85 and I-280, which represent the defined evacuation gateways. Table 4: Evacuation Route Capacity Roadway Name Roadway Type1 Outbound Lanes Evacuation Route Capacity Adjusted Evacuation Route Capacity2 1. East of the Evacuation Area Screenline Cristo Rey Drive west of Foothills Boulevard Collector 1 650 570 Foothill Boulevard north of Alpine Drive Local 1 650 570 Stevens Creek Boulevard east of Cupertino Road Collector 1 650 570 McClellan Road east of Imperial Avenue Collector 1 650 570 Bubb Road north of Hyannisport Drive Local 1 650 570 Rainbow Drive west of Seven Springs Lane Local 1 650 570 Prospect Road east of Parker Ranch Trailhead Local 1 650 570 2. West of SR 85 Screenline Foothill Boulevard south of I-280 Undivided Arterial 2 1,780 1,560 Stevens Creek Boulevard west of SR-85 Undivided Arterial 2 1,780 1,560 Bubb Road south of Stevens Creek Boulevard Collector 1 650 570 McClellan Road east of Bubb Road Collector 1 650 570 Stelling Road north of Orion Lane Collector 1 650 570 South De Anza Boulevard north of SR-85 Divided Arterial 3 2,820 2,490 Prospect Road east of S De Anza Boulevard Collector 2 1,300 1,140 Notes: 1. Roadway type determined by City of Cupertino Circulation Element (2025). 2. Vehicles per hour. Rounded to nearest 10. Source: Circulation Element, 2025; Fehr & Peers, 2025. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 17 3.6.2 Distance to Evacuation Gateway For this analysis, evacuation population groups are considered to be evacuated when they have either accessed gateways to the east of SR-85 or north of I-280. To assist with identifying potentially vulnerable communities during an evacuation event it is also helpful to identify City neighborhoods that need to travel the furthest and thus are potentially the most exposed in an evacuation event. This analysis measures the distances from each point along the roadway network to designated evacuation gateways. Up to two best routes from each point to the gateways are included in this assessment. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 18 4. Evacuation Route Assessment This chapter evaluates the evacuation route capacity during a wildfire evacuation event for the evacuation area and routes identified in Chapter 3. This section also analyzes the distances from each point along the roadway network to designated evacuation gateways to help identify City neighborhoods that need to travel the furthest and thus are potentially the most exposed in an evacuation event. 4.1 Estimate Evacuation Vehicle Trips Based on the identified scenarios, the areas requiring evacuation include the FHSZ since these areas are most vulnerable to wildfire hazards. The trips assigned to the transportation system are estimated based on household and employer demographics along with student and visitor population and assist with estimating evacuation demand during an evacuation event. Table 5 lists the composition of evacuees for each quantitative scenario. Note that Scenario C is a qualitative assessment, which builds on Scenario A and, therefore, has the same evacuation demand as Scenario A. Table 5: Composition of Evacuees by Scenario Type of Evacuees Scenario A (Quantitative) Scenario B (Quantitative) Scenario C (Qualitative) Residents 46% 100% 46% Employees 100% 2% 100% Students 100% 0% 100% Visitors 100% 0% 100% Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. 4.1.1 Resident and Employee Population A worst-case condition was estimated where all residents, and retail and restaurant (estimated to be half of all employees in the area) in the evacuation area would need to be evacuated. The number of residents, anticipated vehicle ownership per household, employees, students in schools, and visitors in the evacuation area were used to estimate the number of evacuee vehicles. Because the raw data for households, population, and employment cover geographic areas that differ from the evacuation area, the data were adjusted to estimate land use and evacuation demand. Table A-1 to Table A-3 provide raw socioeconomic data. Table 6 to Table 10 present the resident, employee, student, and visitor land uses and estimated evacuation demand in the evacuation area. As shown in Table 6, approximately one percent of households does not have access to a vehicle and would potentially confront mobility constraints during an evacuation event. This assessment uses zero-vehicle households as a proxy to provide an estimate of persons with mobility constraints that may need evacuation assistance. These zero-vehicle households would Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 19 require outside assistance. Although outside the scope of this assessment, the City may want to consider a program that ensures a more accurate accounting of households needing assistance and programs to facilitate their evacuation. This estimate also assumes employment centers would provide evacuation assistance to employees without access to a vehicle. Additionally, it was assumed that some households with more than two vehicles likely would not be able to utilize all of their vehicles during an evacuation event (e.g., homes with three or more vehicles but with only two licensed drivers). Table 6: Resident Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area Population1 Households2 Household Vehicle Ownership2 Estimated Evacuation Demand3,4,5 0 1 2 3+ Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 12,636 4,355 48 604 2,400 1,303 4,050 8,710 4,050 1% 14% 55% 30% Notes: 1. The estimated population is obtained from Genasys Protect data provided by the City staff on July 25, 2025. 2. The estimated number of households and household vehicle ownership is derived from 2023 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-Year Estimates and adjusted according to the estimated population. 3. Assumption of number of vehicles that will evacuate: zero-vehicle household: 1 vehicle; one-vehicle household: 1 vehicle; two-vehicle household: 2 vehicles; three-or-more vehicle household: 2.5 vehicles. 4. Assume that daytime population from Genasys Protect consists of residents, employees, students, and visitors. Calculated as (daytime population - employees - students - visitors) / residents * 100%, The residents present in the evacuation area were estimated to be 46% and 100% of the population for Scenarios A and B respectively. 5. It should be noted that this information does not constitute a specific analysis of households with mobility challenges as it does not specifically account for people who have mobility impairments that preclude them from using a vehicle; it also does not specifically account for households that own one or more vehicles, but where not all members of the household may necessarily have access to them at all times (for example, a household with one vehicle which a household member drives to work, leaving other members of the household at home with no vehicle available). Source: 2023 ACS 5-Year Estimates; Genasys Protect; Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool; Fehr & Peers, 2025. Table 7: Employee Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area Employment (A)1 Estimated Evacuation Demand2 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 556 550 10 550 Notes: 1. The estimated employment is obtained from the Santa Clara Countywide VMT Evaluation Tool, using 2025 as the baseline year. 2. Assumes that all the employees will evacuate with 0.99 vehicles per employee (one percent of evacuation area households are zero-vehicle households). Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. 4.1.2 Student Population Within the designated evacuation area, several schools serve a substantial student population that would require timely evacuation in the event of an emergency at working hours. Schools located Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 20 within the evacuation area include Abraham Lincoln Elementary School, Tessellations Elementary School, John F. Kennedy Middle School, and Monta Vista High School. Table 8 presents the estimated number of student evacuation trips during Scenario A. Table A-4 and Table A-5 show the school enrollment data and estimated student evacuation trips, categorized by mode of travel, including pick-up/drop-off by parents, carpooling, and individual student drivers. Table 8: Student Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area School Enrollment Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 3,560 3,120 0 3,120 Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. 4.1.3 Visitor Population Table 9 presents the estimated number of visitor trips generated by recreational land uses that would require evacuation during an emergency. Additional details on how these visitor trip estimates were developed can be found in Table A-6. Table 9: Visitor Land Use and Evacuation Demand of the Evacuation Area Visitors Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 355 180 0 180 Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. 4.1.4 Total Estimated Evacuation Demand Considering the estimated trips generated in the evacuation area from all employees, residents, students and visitors, the total number of estimated trips during an evacuation event can be estimated. The total evacuation demand is 7,900 and 8,720 during Scenario A and Scenario B respectively, as shown in Table 10. Table 10: Total Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips for the Evacuation Area Type of Evacuees Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Residents 4,050 8,710 4,050 Employees 550 10 550 Students 3,120 - 3,120 Visitors 180 - 180 Total 7,900 8,720 7,900 Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 21 Figure 3 shows the distribution of the evacuation demand across two screenlines. These screenlines represent the edge of the hazard area (screenline 1) and the estimated evacuation edge (screenline 2). 4.2 Evaluating Evacuation Route Capacity 4.2.1 Scenario A (Quantitative Analysis) The total estimated evacuation demand was distributed across the roadway network in proportion to the combined resident, employee, student, and visitor population data for each Genasys Protect zone10 within the evacuation area. Detailed percent trips assigned for each roadway can be found in Table B-1. The distance to evacuation gateways map (see Figure 5) was used to identify primary routes likely to be used by evacuees. Traffic volume data for the roadway segments on the evacuation area were collected in July 2025. These counts, combined with estimated demand, were used to calculate the total evacuation vehicle demand. StreetLight data from the same period in 2024 were collected and compared with data from October 2024 to evaluate the impact of school sessions versus non-school periods. For Scenario A, representing a typical Fall weekday at 2 PM, a factor of 1.2 was applied to account for the increased traffic associated with schools being in session. Evacuation route capacity was assessed by dividing vehicle demand volumes by roadway evacuation capacity to calculate the volume-to-capacity (V/C) ratio. As shown in Table 11, the results of the evacuation capacity assessment indicate that all evacuation routes have V/C ratios greater than 1 near the evacuation area except for Prospect Road. This indicates that these roads would require more than one hour to accommodate the evacuation demand from the hillside, making them bottlenecks during an evacuation. Foothill Boulevard, Stevens Creek Boulevard and McClellan Road are the most critical bottlenecks with V/C ratio greater than 2. Prospect Road and Stelling Road have V/C ratios of 1, suggesting they are at capacity and should be prioritized for evacuation demand and supply strategies. It is also important to note that emergency scenarios are often unpredictable (as well as driver behavior during the evacuation time period) and it is anticipated that evacuees would vacate at a rate that more closely resembles a bell curve from the time the evacuation order is issued. These are conditions which would affect the total estimated evacuation time in our assessment and are beyond the scope and budget of our assessment. There is also general unpredictability in operational issues, such as power issues that would trigger traffic signals to operate in “red flash mode” in which traffic would need to proceed through intersections in an all -way stop configuration. 10 A Genasys Protect zone is a predefined geographic area used during emergencies to streamline response efforts, reduce confusion, and optimize traffic flow. Trip Distribution for Scenario A FIGURE 3 280 280 280 85 85 yW e l l i v e l l e B S T a n t a u A v e ev A t h g i r W S S t e l l i n g R d Reg n a r t R d ev A h c n i F Prospect Rd Sara t o g a A v e dv l B a z n A e D N Doyle Rd dR b b u B S B l a n e y A v e Moorpark Ave Cox Ave McClellan Rd dR o t i u Q dv l B a z n A e D S S M a r y A v e ev A r e l l i M N T a n t a u A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F S Pruneridge Ave W Homestead Rd E Homestead Rd Jo h n s o n A v e N S t e l l i n g R d Ho l l e n b e c k A v e dR e f l o W S dR e l a v y n n u S - a g o t a r a S S Vallco Pk w y Rainbow Dr Bollinger Rd Stevens Creek Blvd W Ca m p b e l l A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F N N B l a n e y A v e dR e f l o W S t e v e n s C a n y o n R d Phil Ln ev A l i a u Q Mou n t E d e n R d Basemap FIGURE 2 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Data Source: Fehr & Peers Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes West of SR-85 Screenline East of the WUI Screenline Trip Distribution | Scenario A Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) Trip Distribution % SR-85 Trip Distribution % Rodrigues Ave Torre Ave 5% 18% 21% 14% 14% 22% 6% 23% 21% 4% 24% 5% 17% 6% Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Screenline East of the WUI Screenline West of SR-85 Screenline Trip Distribution Scenario A SR-85 Trip Distribution % Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) % 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 23 Table 11: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario A) Evacuation Route Link Evacuation Travel Demand1 Existing Hourly Traffic Total Evacuation Demand Adjusted Evacuation Route Capacity V/C Ratio2 1. East of the Evacuation Area Screenline Cristo Rey Drive west of Foothills Boulevard 400 239 639 570 1.1 Foothill Boulevard north of Alpine Drive 1,420 883 2,303 570 4.0 Stevens Creek Boulevard east of Cupertino Road 1,660 417 2,077 570 3.6 McClellan Road east of Imperial Avenue 1,110 100 1,210 570 2.1 Bubb Road north of Hyannisport Drive 1,110 234 1,344 570 2.4 Rainbow Drive west of Seven Springs Lane 1,740 20 1,760 570 3.1 Prospect Road east of Parker Ranch Trailhead 470 116 586 570 1.0 2. West of SR 85 Screenline Foothill Boulevard south of I-280 1,820 883 2,703 1,560 1.7 Stevens Creek Boulevard west of SR-85 1,660 719 2,379 1,560 1.5 Bubb Road south of Stevens Creek Boulevard 320 550 870 570 1.5 McClellan Road east of Bubb Road 1,900 506 2,406 570 4.2 Stelling Road north of Orion Lane 400 196 596 570 1.0 South De Anza Boulevard north of SR-85 1,340 1,578 2,918 2,490 1.2 Prospect Road east of S De Anza Boulevard 470 912 1,382 1,140 1.2 Note: Bolded text indicates roadways over one-hour evacuation capacity. 1. Rounded to nearest 10. 2. Total evacuation demand divided by adjusted outbound capacity. Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. 4.2.2 Scenario B (Quantitative Analysis) Scenario B assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation following an earthquake at 6 AM, during a time when schools are not in session. The total estimated evacuation demand was distributed across the Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 24 roadway network in proportion to the combined population, and employment population data for each Genasys Protect zone11 within the evacuation area. Detailed percent trips assigned for each roadway can be found in Table B-2. The distance to evacuation gateways map (see Figure 5) was used to identify primary routes likely to be used by evacuees. The results of the evacuation capacity assessment in Table 11 indicate that all the roadways near the evacuation area except for Cristo Rey Drive, McClellan Road and Prospect Road have V/C ratios greater than 2. This indicates that these roads would require more than one hour to accommodate the evacuation demand from the evacuation area, making them bottlenecks during an evacuation. This scenario is evaluated with a road closure on McClellan Road at Club House Lane near the Deep Cliff Golf Course, with schools not in session. When this segment of McClellan Road is closed, evacuees located east of Club House Lane can only travel eastbound along McClellan Road, while those west of the closure can only travel westbound. In other words, evacuees cannot cross the closed segment, which results in separate evacuation routes for areas on either side of the closure. Under these conditions, evacuation demand on McClellan Road would decrease, with some trips shifted to Foothill Boulevard and Stevens Creek Boulevard. As a result, McClellan Road would experience a lower V/C ratio. Under Scenario B, evacuation demand is higher than under Scenario A, as summarized in Table 10. However, because existing hourly traffic is lower at 6 AM under Scenario B, the total evacuation demand (i.e., the sum of evacuation travel demand and existing hourly traffic) on some roadways is lower under Scenario B than under Scenario A. A morning evacuation (6:00 AM) reflects conditions when most residents are at home, resulting in higher residential evacuation demand but relatively low existing traffic volumes on the roadways. In contrast, an afternoon evacuation (2:00 PM) occurs when many residents are at work or school, leading to lower residential evacuation demand but higher levels of existing traffic associated with general daytime travel activity. Scenario B has higher evacuation travel demand but lower existing traffic, resulting in a lower total evacuation demand on some roadways than Scenario A. As a result, these roadways show lower V/C ratios under Scenario B despite the higher evacuation travel demand. 11 A Genasys Protect zone is a predefined geographic area used during emergencies to streamline response efforts, reduce confusion, and optimize traffic flow. Trip Distribution for Scenario B FIGURE 4 280 280 280 85 85 yW e l l i v e l l e B S T a n t a u A v e ev A t h g i r W S S t e l l i n g R d Reg n a r t R d ev A h c n i F Prospect Rd Sara t o g a A v e dv l B a z n A e D N Doyle Rd dR b b u B S B l a n e y A v e Moorpark Ave Cox Ave McClellan Rd dR o t i u Q dv l B a z n A e D S S M a r y A v e ev A r e l l i M N T a n t a u A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F S Pruneridge Ave W Homestead Rd E Homestead Rd Jo h n s o n A v e N S t e l l i n g R d Ho l l e n b e c k A v e dR e f l o W S dR e l a v y n n u S - a g o t a r a S S Vallco Pk w y Rainbow Dr Bollinger Rd Stevens Creek Blvd W Ca m p b e l l A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F N N B l a n e y A v e dR e f l o W S t e v e n s C a n y o n R d Phil Ln ev A l i a u Q Mou n t E d e n R d Basemap FIGURE 2 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Data Source: Fehr & Peers Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes West of SR-85 Screenline East of the WUI Screenline Trip Distribution | Scenario B Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) Trip Distribution % SR-85 Trip Distribution % Rodrigues Ave Torre Ave 6% 25% 25% 6% 12% 19% 7% 31% 25% 2% 16% 6% 13% 7% Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Screenline East of the WUI Screenline West of SR-85 Screenline Trip Distribution Scenario B SR-85 Trip Distribution % Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) % 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 26 Table 12: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario B) Evacuation Route Link Evacuation Travel Demand1 Existing Hourly Traffic Total Evacuation Demand Adjusted Evacuation Route Capacity V/C Ratio2 1. East of the Evacuation Area Screenline Cristo Rey Drive west of Foothills Boulevard 520 31 551 570 1.0 Foothill Boulevard north of Alpine Drive 2,180 283 2,463 570 4.3 Stevens Creek Boulevard east of Cupertino Road 2,180 31 2,211 570 3.9 McClellan Road east of Imperial Avenue 520 13 533 570 0.9 Bubb Road north of Hyannisport Drive 1,050 64 1,114 570 2.0 Rainbow Drive west of Seven Springs Lane 1,660 85 1,745 570 3.1 Prospect Road east of Parker Ranch Trailhead 610 23 633 570 1.1 2. West of SR 85 Screenline Foothill Boulevard south of I-280 2,700 283 2,983 1,560 1.9 Stevens Creek Boulevard west of SR-85 2,180 142 2,322 1,560 1.5 Bubb Road south of Stevens Creek Boulevard 170 86 256 570 0.4 McClellan Road east of Bubb Road 1,400 31 1,431 570 2.5 Stelling Road north of Orion Lane 520 28 548 570 1.0 South De Anza Boulevard north of SR-85 1,130 362 1,492 2,490 0.6 Prospect Road east of S De Anza Boulevard 610 144 754 1,140 0.7 Note: Bolded text indicates roadways over one-hour evacuation capacity. 1. Rounded to nearest 10. 2. Total evacuation demand divided by adjusted outbound capacity. Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 27 4.2.3 Scenario C (Qualitative Analysis) Scenario C assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation following an earthquake at 2 PM on a school day. Scenario C demonstrates the worst-case evacuation condition in which an earthquake initiates wildfire. Scenario C builds on Scenario A by assuming the same evacuation demand, but with additional roadway closures at the following roadways because of an earthquake causing wildfire: • Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR-85 • SR-85 Southbound Ramps at Stevens Creek Boulevard Due to the results of the baseline scenario, no further quantification was conducted for Scenario C. However, in addition to the capacity constraints identified in Scenario A, the following evacuation route capacity issues have been noted: • The closure on Stevens Creek Boulevard and SR-85 Southbound Ramps would divert 2,378 evacuees assigned to Stevens Creek Boulevard (refer to Table 11) to the adjacent routes. The updated trip distribution is shown in Table B-3. These alternative routes include Foothill Boulevard, McClellan Road, and De Anza Boulevard. Since these routes are already bottlenecks in Scenario A, the added volume would result in further congestion and increase the severity of the bottleneck causing more delay and queuing. • Stevens Creek Boulevard also serves the evacuees from the entire corridor east and west of the FHSZ. A portion of the rerouted evacuation demand from Stevens Creek Boulevard is expected to shift towards Rainbow Drive and to Stelling Road or De Anza Boulevard, which serve as one of the key evacuation corridors to SR-85. • Foothill Boulevard is already identified as a critical bottleneck with a V/C ratio exceeding 4 in both the scenarios. The rerouted evacuation demand due to the roadway closures would further exacerbate congestion and significantly affect evacuation efficiency. 4.3 Analyzing Distance to Evacuation Gateways Distance to evacuation gateways is mapped in Figure 5. The map illustrates the primary evacuation routes likely to be used by evacuees. The distance for all the evacuation routes ranges from 0.9 to 2.5 miles with most falling between 1.5 to 2 miles. From each start point, there is one or two best routes to reach the gateways with similar distances. Routes A, B, E, and F (via Cristo Rey Drive, Stevens Creek Boulevard, Rainbow Drive, and Prospect Road, respectively) are within two miles of the nearest evacuation gateways. According to Table 11 and Table 12, Cristo Rey Drive and Prospect Road are not expected to experience capacity constraints under Scenarios A and B. As a result, evacuees using these routes are expected to have relatively short evacuation times. In contrast, Route D (via Bubb Road) is located 2 miles to the nearest evacuation gateway (Gateway 3), while Route C (via Foothills Boulevard) exceeds 2 miles in distance to the nearest gateway (Gateway 3). Given that Foothills Boulevard is projected to be over capacity (V/C > 4) under Scenarios A and B, and Bubb Road is over capacity (V/C > 2) under both scenarios, evacuees using these routes are likely to encounter significant traffic congestion and longer evacuation times. Distances to Evacuation Gateways FIGURE 5 280 280 280 85 85 yW e l l i v e l l e B S T a n t a u A v e ev A t h g i r W S S t e l l i n g R d Reg n a r t R d ev A h c n i F Prospect Rd Sara t o g a A v e dv l B a z n A e D N Doyle Rd dR b b u B S B l a n e y A v e Moorpark Ave Cox Ave McClellan Rd dR o t i u Q dv l B a z n A e D S S M a r y A v e ev A r e l l i M N T a n t a u A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F S Pruneridge Ave W Homestead Rd E Homestead Rd Jo h n s o n A v e N S t e l l i n g R d Ho l l e n b e c k A v e dR e f l o W S dR e l a v y n n u S - a g o t a r a S S Vallco Pk w y Rainbow Dr Bollinger Rd Stevens Creek Blvd W Ca m p b e l l A v e dv l B l l i h t o o F N N B l a n e y A v e dR e f l o W S t e v e n s C a n y o n R d Phil Ln ev A l i a u Q Mou n t E d e n R d Basemap FIGURE 2 0 1 2 Miles Cupertino City BoundaryCupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes Distance to Evacuation Gateway 0 - 0.5 Miles 0.5 - 1 Miles 1 - 1.5 Miles 1.5 - 2 Miles 2.5 - 3 Miles Gateway Start A B C D E F 1 2 3 4 5 6 0.9 miles from Point F to Gateway 6 1.1 miles from Point F to Gateway 5 1.3 miles from Point B to Gateway 1 1.4 miles from Point E to Gateway 4 1.6 miles from Point E to Gateway 5 1.6 miles from Point B to Gateway 2 1.9 miles from Point A to Gateway 1 2 miles from Point D to Gateway 3 2.2 miles from Point D to Gateway 4 2.4 miles from Point C to Gateway 3 2.5 miles from Point C to Gateway 1 Gateway Start Distance to Evacuation Gateway 0 - 0.5 Miles 0.5 - 1 Miles 1 - 1.5 Miles 1.5 - 2 Miles 2.5 - 3 Miles 0 1 2 Miles Rodrigues Ave Torre Ave Data Source: Fehr & Peers Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 29 5. Recommendations The City of Cupertino has already implemented several key strategies that support evacuation readiness and enhance emergency response capabilities. These existing measures provide a strong foundation for coordinated and effective action during wildfire or other disaster events: • Established multi-jurisdictional plans that enable Fire and Sheriff departments to operate seamlessly under a unified command structure. This coordination ensures faster decision- making, effective resource deployment, and a cohesive response across different agencies and jurisdictions. • Traffic signals within the evacuation network are equipped with battery backup systems, allowing them to remain operational during power outages for up to eight hours. This functionality helps maintain orderly traffic flow, reduces confusion at intersections, and supports safer, more efficient evacuations. • Strong coordination and communication among key agencies including Fire, Sheriff, and Public Works—facilitate real-time updates and operational alignment. These communication protocols enable swift sharing of situational information, ensuring a collaborative response during rapidly evolving emergency situations. In addition to the recommended policies (Policy HS-2.1 to Policy HS-2.15) included in the Safety Element Update, the following recommendations are listed as potential measures that can enhance the evacuation process through the supply side (increasing evacuation capacity), demand side (managing evacuation volumes), and information side (improving awareness and communication). These recommendations will be incorporated into future updates of the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP), and Health and Safety Element Update to ensure consistency and alignment. Some recommendations can be implemented more readily through the EOP. Others may require additional coordination and formal adoption as part of the Safety Element Update or LHMP. 5.1 Supply-Side Strategies Supply-side strategies aim to temporarily increase evacuation capacity at key bottleneck locations while balancing the everyday safety and function of the roadway system. • Increasing capacity through the use of contraflow lanes or dual purpose shoulder evacuation/protected bike lane widening by changing future roadway design, especially in areas with less accessibility and located on key evacuation routes. These areas are primarily located on I-280, Foothills Boulevard, Stevens Creek Boulevard, Bubb Road, and SR-85 corridors. These routes should consider incorporating design treatments such as painted medians (instead of raised medians) or other treatments that could assist in creating reversible lanes, or a dual-purpose shoulder to facilitate additional capacity in an evacuation event scenario. • Extending water service into evacuation corridors strengthens firefighting capacity and long- term water investment ensures reliable resources that sustain evacuation operations under emergency conditions. • Managed traffic control during evacuation, including turn restrictions and route or ramp closures, to maximize outflows from evacuation areas. • Faster clearing of fire-induced road closures. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 30 • Plan for street parking management on high hazard days. 5.2 Demand-Side Strategies • The City of Cupertino can support vehicle volume reduction during an evacuation by encouraging carpooling and use of public transit; • Encouraging a one car per household evacuation pledge (for households that must have second vehicles, an alternative could involve early off-site placement of a second car when advance wildfire warnings or other hazard requiring evacuation are available); • Identifying shelter locations within the City limits and outside the FHSZ to reduce demand on evacuation routes outside the FHSZ and plan/implement shelter facilities; and 5.3 Information-Side Strategies The City of Cupertino can further support evacuation through the following measures: • Enhance community evacuation programs to improve resident, employee, student, and visitor preparedness and familiarity with evacuation routes and processes. • Strengthen coordination of emergency response equipment and resources between neighboring jurisdictions, allowing for shared use based on operational needs rather than ownership. • Enhance communication protocols between cities and elected officials to support unified decision-making, real-time information sharing, and coordinated emergency response across jurisdictional boundaries. • Explore and deploy wildfire early detection systems (i.e., wildfire video surveillance cameras, drones, etc.) especially for constrained access parcels. • Use real-time traffic management tools to implement dynamic route guidance and monitoring to guide evacuees away from congested routes and encourage the use of secondary or tertiary routes to distribute traffic more evenly. • Study a phased evacuation process where different groups or areas evacuate at different times to prevent congestion on main evacuation routes. This can be based on factors like proximity to danger, traffic volume, or priority of evacuation. • Study and install vehicle monitoring devices and variable message signs to monitor evacuation programs and provide notification of any changes in evacuation routes or plans due to a change in the wildfire or incidents to motorists along the road. 5.4 Additional Considerations This evacuation assessment includes trips generated by both employees and residents from the evacuation area and assumes all residents and employees will be evacuated using vehicles. A critical consideration for emergency personnel is to assist individual residents and employees who either do not have access to a vehicle or cannot drive, to ensure that compete evacuation is provided. The EOP includes provisions to coordinate with the VTA, Silicon Valley (SV) Hopper , and emergency services. Further research into strategies for evacuating people who do not have access to a vehicle is recommended. Options for assisting with evacuation in such situations could include, but not be limited to, the following: • Neighborhood “buddy” program to link people needing assistance with people willing to assist. Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 31 • Partnership with transportation network companies (TNCs) like Uber and Lyft. For individual students and visitors who do not have access to a vehicle, options for assisting with evacuation in such situations could include, but not be limited to, the following: • Designated pick-up zones for TNCs or buses to ensure orderly evacuation. • Provide dedicated shuttle, school vans, or charter bus service, if available. P Appendix A: Socioeconomic Data P Table A-1: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Census1 Geographic Area Households Population Employment Household Vehicle Ownership 0 1 2 3+ Census Tract 5077.01 1,216 4,092 1,526 90 217 515 394 Block Group 1; Census Tract 5077.01 N/A 878 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Block Group 2; Census Tract 5077.01 N/A 1,927 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Census Tract 5077.02 2,163 6,107 3,310 24 300 1,192 647 Block Group 1; Census Tract 5077.02 N/A 2,052 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Block Group 2; Census Tract 5077.02 N/A 1,704 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Block Group 3; Census Tract 5077.02 N/A 2,351 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Census Tract 5077.04 1,214 3,466 1,453 150 299 457 308 Block Group 1; Census Tract 5077.04 N/A 1,060 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Block Group 2; Census Tract 5077.04 N/A 2,406 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Census Tract 5077.05 1,385 4,560 1,753 19 255 671 440 Block Group 1; Census Tract 5077.05 N/A 1,952 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Block Group 2; Census Tract 5077.05 N/A 1,373 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Block Group 3; Census Tract 5077.05 N/A 1,235 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Total 5,978 35,613 8,042 283 1,071 2,835 1,789 Notes: 1. Census block group and census tract locations are illustrated in Figure A-1. Source: 2023 ACS 5-year Estimates; Fehr & Peers, 2025. P Figure A-1: Census Block Group and Census Tract Locations P Table A-2: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Genasys Protect1 Geographic Area Total Population Total Daytime Population Total Households SCC-005 0 0 0 SCC-006 0 3 0 SCC-008 198 270 82 SCC-010 12 52 2 SCC-011 13 41 4 SCC-020 67 37 21 CUP-007 784 1,057 376 CUP-008 1,294 931 418 CUP-016 10 124 3 CUP-017 3,188 2,523 1,042 CUP-018 1,339 1,245 461 CUP-029 2,841 2,046 953 CUP-032 654 470 248 CUP-033 2,236 1,546 745 Total 12,636 10,345 4,355 Notes: 1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2. Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025. P Figure A-2: Genasys Protect Zone Locations (highlighted numbers in study area) P Table A-3: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Santa Clara County VMT Estimation Tool1 Geographic Area Households Population Employment TAZ 132 955 2,702 94 TAZ 130 0 0 0 TAZ 127 204 614 14 TAZ 128 231 693 25 TAZ 126 647 2,038 647 TAZ 103 193 530 77 TAZ 133 325 920 66 TAZ 102 278 749 55 TAZ 116 305 910 64 TAZ 115 1 3 1,448 TAZ 129 996 2,995 150 TAZ 105 413 1,240 5 TAZ 136 22 62 135 TAZ 122 328 1,033 0 TAZ 125 238 751 2 TAZ 131 273 822 5 TAZ 1334 661 1,880 55 TAZ 135 640 1,825 31 TAZ 134 677 1,916 7 TAZ 117 582 1,741 1,448 TAZ 123 466 1,472 0 Total 8,435 24,896 4,328 Notes: 1. TAZ locations are illustrated in Figure A-3. Source: Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool; Fehr & Peers, 2025. P Figure A-3: Transportation Analysis Zone (TAZ) Locations (light blue indicates study area) P Table A-4: School Enrollment Data School Name School Enrollment Abraham Lincoln Elementary 700 John F Kennedy Middle 930 Tessellations Elementary School 270 Total (non-driving students) 1,9001 Monta Vista High School (can drive) 1,6602 Total Students 3,560 Notes: 1. Elementary and middle school students are assumed to evacuate either by carpooling with another student (20%) or by being picked up/dropped off individually (80%). 2. High school students are assumed to be able to drive and are therefore assigned the following evacuation mode shares: drive alone (20%), carpool (30%), and pick-up/drop-off (50%). Table A-5: Estimated Student Evacuation Trips Driving Condition Percent Estimates Number of Students Factor1 Estimated Student Evacuation Trips 1,900 Students (Non- Driving) 1,660 Students (Can Drive) Drive Alone 0% 20% 330 1.0 330 Carpool 20% 30% 880 0.5 440 Drop-Off 80% 50% 2,350 1.0 2,350 Total 3,560 3,120 Notes: 1. Drive Alone trips assume one person per vehicle; Carpool trips assume two passengers per vehicle, excluding the driver; and Drop-Off trips assume one passenger per vehicle, with the driver not counted. P Table A-6: Estimated Visitor Evacuation Trips Recreational Attractions Location Number of Visitors1 PG&E Trailhead East of Rancho San Antonio County Park 200 Deep Cliff Golf Course North of Linda Vista Park 20 Rim Trail North of Stevens Creek County Park 100 Parker Ranch Trailhead East of Fremont Older Open Space Preserve 35 Total Visitors 355 Estimated Visitor Evacuation Trips2 180 Notes: 1. The number of visitors is based on the percentage of parking spaces assumed during the study period. (Refer to Table 2 notes for the percentages assumed). 2. Visitors are assumed to carpool (two or more passengers per vehicle). P Appendix B: Trip Distribution P Table B-1: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario A) Genasys Protect Zones1 Population Population Distribution Connected Roadways Evacuation Trip Distribution SCC-0052 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-006 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-008 198 1% Foothills Boulevard 1% SCC-010 12 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-011 13 0% Prospect Road 0% SCC-020 67 0% Prospect Road 0% CUP-007 784 5% Cristo Rey Drive 5% CUP-008 1,294 8% Foothills Boulevard 5% Stevens Creek Boulevard 3% CUP-016 10 0% McClellan Road 0% CUP-017 3,188 20% Foothills Boulevard 9% Stevens Creek Boulevard 10% McClellan Road 1% CUP-008 1,339 8% Foothills Boulevard 5% Stevens Creek Boulevard 3% CUP-029 2,841 38% Stevens Creek Boulevard 4% McClellan Road 24% Rainbow Drive 10% CUP-032 654 4% McClellan Road 2% Rainbow Drive 2% CUP-033 2,236 16% Stelling Road 5% Rainbow Drive 5% Prospect Road 6% Notes: 1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2. 2. SCC coded zones are located in Santa Clara County’s FHSZ. Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025. P Table B-2: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario B) Genasys Protect Zones1 Population Population Distribution Connected Roadways Evacuation Trip Distribution SCC-005 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-006 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-008 198 2% Foothills Boulevard 2% SCC-010 12 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-011 13 0% Prospect Road 0% SCC-020 67 1% Prospect Road 1% CUP-007 784 6% Cristo Rey Drive 6% CUP-008 1,294 10% Foothills Boulevard 7% Stevens Creek Boulevard 3% CUP-016 10 0% McClellan Road 0% CUP-017 3,188 25% Foothills Boulevard 10% Stevens Creek Boulevard 13% McClellan Road 2% CUP-008 1,339 11% Foothills Boulevard 8% Stevens Creek Boulevard 3% CUP-029 2,841 22% Stevens Creek Boulevard 2% McClellan Road 15% Rainbow Drive 5% CUP-032 654 5% McClellan Road 3% Rainbow Drive 2% CUP-033 2,236 18% Stelling Road 6% Rainbow Drive 6% Prospect Road 6% Notes: 1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2. 2. SCC coded zones are located in Santa Clara County’s FHSZ. Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025. P Table B-3: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario C) Genasys Protect Zones1 Population Population Distribution Connected Roadways Evacuation Trip Distribution2 SCC-0053 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-006 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-008 198 1% Foothills Boulevard 1% SCC-010 12 0% Foothills Boulevard 0% SCC-011 13 0% Prospect Road 0% SCC-020 67 0% Prospect Road 0% CUP-007 784 5% Cristo Rey Drive 5% CUP-008 1,294 8% Foothills Boulevard 8% Stevens Creek Boulevard 0% CUP-016 10 0% McClellan Road 0% CUP-017 3,188 20% Foothills Boulevard 15% Stevens Creek Boulevard 0% McClellan Road 5% CUP-008 1,339 8% Foothills Boulevard 8% Stevens Creek Boulevard 0% CUP-029 2,841 38% Stevens Creek Boulevard 0% McClellan Road 26% Rainbow Drive 12% CUP-032 654 4% McClellan Road 2% Rainbow Drive 2% CUP-033 2,236 16% Stelling Road 5% Rainbow Drive 5% Prospect Road 6% Notes: 1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2. 2. For Scenario C, due to road closure at Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR-85, trips assigned to Stevens Creek Boulevard under Scenario A were shifted to alternative roadways. 3. SCC coded zones are located in Santa Clara County’s FHSZ. Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025.