HomeMy WebLinkAboutCC 03-17-2026 Oral CommunicationsCC 3-17-2026
Oral
Communications
Written Comments
From:Jennifer Griffin
To:City Clerk
Cc:grenna5000@yahoo.com; City Council
Subject:Fwd: Retail on West Side of Saich Included in Lost Retail from Panera SB 330?
Date:Wednesday, March 11, 2026 5:45:28 PM
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Dear City Clerk:
Please include the following as comments for the Cupertino City Council meeting on March
17, 2026.
Thank you.
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Retail on West Side of Saich Included in Lost Retail from Panera SB 330?
From: Jennifer Griffin <grenna5000@yahoo.com>
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2026, 5:42 PM
To: citycouncil@cupertino.org,cityclerk@cupertino.org
CC: grenna5000@yahoo.com
Dear City Council:
(Please include the following as public input for the March 17, 2026 Cupertino City Council
meeting).
I am concerned that the active, newer retail buildings fronting the west side of Saich Avenue
From Stevens Creek Blvd to Alves are going to be lost to the SB 330 housing complex
proposed
at Panera/Voyager Coffee.
There are about six new prime retail shops in this area and many are active with retail now.
The eyeglass store is active and considered in a class of vital services for seniors and children
and
indeed the general public. These buildings are attractive and new with good parking, and it
would
be a shame to lose them. The large corner store space at the NW corner of Stevens Creek Blvd
and
Saich is in a very prominent, highly visible location and is a prime retail site. It should be
saved
As well as the other retail locations.
There is also a large daycare site at the corner of Alves and Saich. Will this be closed also?
People
Need daycare etc. in the city.
Please make sure this retail on the West side of Saich is not lost. It is very important to keep
Retail like this in our city as we are losing so much valuable retail from the other seven SB
330s
On Stevens Creek Blvd., our traditional shopping corridor.
This is even more critical as the Big Target location on the east side of Saich, south side of
Alves
And West side of Bandley is up for sale and may wind up with no retail at all and just housing.
There has been a large box retailer in this site since Gemco was there from the 1950s on.
Thank you for being the Retail Champions City Council!
Best regards,
Jennifer Griffin
Third Generation Cupertino Retail Shopping Family
From:Rhoda Fry
To:Public Comments
Cc:City Council
Subject:Oral Communications 3/17/2026 City Council Meeting
Date:Sunday, March 15, 2026 3:04:12 PM
Attachments:3 - Exhibit 2 - Evacuation_Route_Capacity_Analysis_Oct_2025.pdf
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you
recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
Dear City Clerk,
Please include attachment in my oral comms.
Thanks, Rhoda Fry
Why did Cupertino not reveal its Evacuation Route Capacity Analysis?
I am very upset to learn that the City of Cupertino has been sitting on evacuation information
since last October without sharing it with the Council or us citizens until a week ago. Please
find the evacuation information attached that shows McClellan Road being at 2 to 4X capacity.
This is a Public Safety issue that should have been shared. Furthermore, this information could
have affected the Planning Commissioner’s vote on the housing project at Linda Vista. This is
so wrong.
Who put paint on City-owned fences on the Linda Vista trail and left a spray paint can?
Green paint was put on several parts of our city-owned fences. Who did it and when will it be
fixed? Furthermore, whoever did this painting, also left a spray-paint can out which posed a
public hazard to kids using the trail. I removed the can.
Cupertino
Evacuation Route
Capacity Assessment
Submitted to:
City of Cupertino
Submitted in:
October 2025
Cupertino
Evacuation Route
Capacity
Assessment
Prepared for: Submitted in:
City of Cupertino October 2025
P
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Study Purpose ......................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Study Context ........................................................................................................................................................ 1
1.3 Natural Hazards .................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.3.1 Flood and Inundation Hazards ............................................................................................................... 2
1.3.2 Seismic And Geologic Hazards ............................................................................................................ 3
1.3.3 Fire Hazards ............................................................................................................................................... 4
1.3.4 Hazardous Waste And Materials .......................................................................................................... 5
2. Background ................................................................................................................................ 6
2.1 Legislative Requirements .................................................................................................................................. 6
2.2 Emergency Planning in Cupertino ................................................................................................................. 6
3. Approach and Methods............................................................................................................. 8
3.1 Identify the Evacuation Scenarios .................................................................................................................. 8
3.2 Define the Evacuation Area ............................................................................................................................. 11
3.3 Define Evacuation Routes ................................................................................................................................ 11
3.4 Estimate Vehicle Trips ...................................................................................................................................... 11
3.5 Assign Vehicle Trips .........................................................................................................................................14
3.6 Evacuation Route Assessment ...................................................................................................................... 15
3.6.1 Assessing Evacuation Route Capacity .............................................................................................. 15
3.6.2 Distance to Evacuation Gateway ....................................................................................................... 17
4. Evacuation Route Assessment ................................................................................................ 18
4.1 Estimate Evacuation Vehicle Trips ................................................................................................................ 18
4.1.1 Resident and Employee Population .................................................................................................... 18
4.1.2 Student Population ................................................................................................................................. 19
4.1.3 Visitor Population .................................................................................................................................. 20
4.1.4 Total Estimated Evacuation Demand .............................................................................................. 20
4.2 Evaluating Evacuation Route Capacity ....................................................................................................... 21
4.2.1 Scenario A (Quantitative Analysis) ..................................................................................................... 21
4.2.2 Scenario B (Quantitative Analysis) ..................................................................................................23
4.2.3 Scenario C (Qualitative Analysis) ..................................................................................................... 27
4.3 Analyzing Distance to Evacuation Gateways ........................................................................................... 27
5. Recommendations................................................................................................................... 29
5.1 Supply-Side Strategies ....................................................................................................................................29
5.2 Demand-Side Strategies ............................................................................................................................... 30
P
5.3 Information-Side Strategies ......................................................................................................................... 30
5.4 Additional Considerations ............................................................................................................................ 30
Appendices
Appendix A: Socioeconomic Data
Appendix B: Trip Distribution
List of Figures
Figure 1: Fire Hazard Severity Zones ......................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 2: Evacuation Routes ......................................................................................................................................... 13
Figure 3: Trip Distribution for Scenario A ............................................................................................................... 22
Figure 4: Trip Distribution for Scenario B ............................................................................................................... 25
Figure 5: Distances to Evacuation Gateways ........................................................................................................ 28
Figure A-1: Census Block Group and Census Tract Locations ......................................................................... 34
Figure A-2: Genasys Protect Zone Locations (highlighted numbers in study area) ................................. 36
Figure A-3: Transportation Analysis Zone (TAZ) Locations (light blue indicates study area) ............... 38
List of Tables
Table 1: Scenario Definitions .......................................................................................................................................... 9
Table 2: Vehicle Demand Calculations in the Evacuation Area ......................................................................... 14
Table 3: Planning Level Roadway Capacity per Hour per Lane ......................................................................... 15
Table 4: Evacuation Route Capacity .......................................................................................................................... 16
Table 5: Composition of Evacuees by Scenario .................................................................................................... 18
Table 6: Resident Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area ................. 19
Table 7: Employee Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area ............... 19
Table 8: Student Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area ................. 20
Table 9: Visitor Land Use and Evacuation Demand of the Evacuation Area ................................................ 20
Table 10: Total Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips for the Evacuation Area ............................. 20
Table 11: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario A)...................................................................... 23
Table 12: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario B) .................................................................... 26
Table A-1: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Census1 .................................................................................... 33
P
Table A-2: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Genasys Protect1 .................................................................. 35
Table A-3: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Santa Clara County VMT Estimation Tool1 ....................37
Table A-4: School Enrollment Data .......................................................................................................................... 39
Table A-5: Estimated Student Evacuation Trips ................................................................................................... 39
Table A-6: Estimated Visitor Evacuation Trips ..................................................................................................... 40
Table B-1: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario A) ................................................ 42
Table B-2: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario B) ............................................... 43
Table B-3: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario C) .............................................. 44
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 1
1. Introduction
The City of Cupertino's comprehensive planning efforts make it appropriate to assess evacuation
route capacity while simultaneously updating the General Plan and Emergency Operations Plan .
This assessment provides the City of Cupertino with emergency evacuation event information and is
consistent with requirements outlined in Assembly Bill (AB) 747 (2019) and AB 1409 (2021), which
specifically require local agencies to evaluate evacuation routes capacity and identify evacuation
locations. This supplements the analysis that was prepared for the Draft Health and Safety Element
Update (March 2025) regarding residential street accessibility to identify parcels in hazard areas with
limited egress routes as required by Senate Bill (SB) 99.
1.1 Study Purpose
The following is a summary of the purpose of this evacuation study:
• Identify major evacuation routes and shelter locations/gateways;
• Inform development of evacuation strategies and conduct evacuation route capacity
assessment of wildfire evacuation scenarios with other hazards that could limit evacuation
route capacity;
• Identify bottlenecks on major evacuation routes based on the evacuation route capacity
assessment results;
• Identify evacuation strategies to improve performance of the road network during
evacuations; and
• Identify potential future/ongoing efforts for a detailed Evacuation Plan .
1.2 Study Context
This assessment evaluates roadway capacity under certain described scenarios and should not be
considered an evacuation plan. Emergency evacuations can be triggered by a number of events, and
natural and man-made disasters can be as unpredictable as individual behavior related to evacuation
events. As such, this assessment is intended to provide the City of Cupertino with a broad “planning
level” assessment of transportation system capacity during worst case evacuation scenarios; it does
not provide system adequacy guarantees, nor does it guarantee the findings are applicable to all
situations. This assessment will help the City develop policies to prioritize evacuation routes and
centers based on the findings of this analysis.
Moreover, because emergency evacuation assessment is an emerging field, there is no established
standard methodology. We have utilized existing methods in transportation planning that, in our
knowledge and experience, we believe offer the most appropriate planning level understanding of
roadway capacity for evacuation events. Nevertheless, such methods are limited by the budgetary
and time constraints in our scope of work, by the current state of the practice, and of our knowledge.
The City of Cupertino has requested this study to aid in planning and implementing potential
evacuation plans/scenarios. This assessment should help the city be better prepared for those events;
however, in no way can Fehr & Peers guarantee the efficacy of the information used in this
assessment, as such would be beyond our professional duty and capability .
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 2
1.3 Natural Hazards
The Health and Safety Element Background Report (July 23, 2025) described the following potential
natural hazards. For this assessment, we considered various natural hazards in the preparation of
evacuation scenarios. The natural hazards are described
1.3.1 Flood and Inundation Hazards
Flooding is the rising and overflowing of water onto normally dry land. Floods are one of the most
frequent natural hazards impacting Santa Clara County and among the costliest natural disasters in
terms of human hardship and economic loss nationwide, causing substantial damage to structures,
landscapes, and utilities, as well as life-safety issues. Flooding can be extremely dangerous; even six
inches of moving water can knock a person over. Floodwaters can transport large objects
downstream, damaging or removing stationary structures, such as dam spillways. Ground saturation
can result in instability, collapse, or other damage that breaks utility lines and interrupts services.
Objects can also be buried or destroyed through sediment deposition from heavy fl ooding. Standing
water can cause damage to roads, foundations, and electrical circuits, as well as spread vector-borne
illnesses. Other problems connected with flooding and stormwater runoff include erosion,
degradation of water quality, and losses of environmental resources.
Floods are usually caused by large amounts of stormwater, either from a period of very intense rainfall
or a long period of steady rain. Historically, Cupertino has been at risk of flooding primarily during the
winter and spring when stream systems swell with heavy rain. This type of flood results from
prolonged, heavy rainfall and typically occurs due to high peak flows of moderate duration and a large
volume of runoff. Flooding is more severe when prior rainfall has saturated the ground. The
watersheds in the Santa Cruz Mountains feed into four major streambeds that traverse the city,
Permanente Creek, Stevens Creek, Regnart Creek, and Calabazas Creek. These creeks collect
surface runoff and drain into channels leading to the San Francisco Bay. During heavy rainfall, these
creeks create a potential flooding risk in the city as water levels may exceed the top of the creekbank.
Occasionally, flash flooding from short-duration, high-intensity precipitation events (often during
atmospheric river events) may occur. Atmospheric rivers are a relatively common weather pattern
that brings southwest winds and heavy rain to California. Atmospheric rivers are long, narrow regions
in the atmosphere that transport water vapor carried away from the tropics. These columns of vapor
move with the weather, carrying large amounts of water vapor and strong winds. When the
atmospheric rivers make landfall, they often release this water vapor in the form of rain or snow, often
causing heavy rains that can lead to flooding and mudslide events. Flash floods can occur even
during a drought. Such events can tear out trees, undermine buildings and bridges, and scour creek
channels. In urban areas, flash flooding is an increasingly serious problem due to removing vegetation
and replacing groundcover with impermeable surfaces such as roads, driveways, and parking lots.
The greatest risk from flash floods is occurrence with little to no warning.
1.3.1.1 Dam and Pipeline Failure
A dam failure is an uncontrolled release of water from a reservoir through a dam because of structural
failures or deficiencies in the dam, usually associated with intense rainfall or prolonged flooding.
Water pipeline or aqueduct failures can create a similar sudden flood. Dam and pipeline failures can
range from minor to catastrophic, potentially harming human life and property downstream from the
failure. In addition, ecosystems and habitats can be destroyed by fast-moving floodwaters, debris,
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 3
and sedimentation from inundation. Although dam and pipeline failures are very rare, these events are
not unprecedented. There are four major causes of failures:
• Overtopping: These failures occur when a reservoir fills too high with water, especially in times of
heavy rainfall, leaving water to rush over the top of the dam. Other causes of this type of failure
include settling of the crest of the dam or spillway blockage.
• Foundation defects: These failures occur as a result of settling in the foundation of the dam,
instability of slopes surrounding the dam, uplift pressures, and seepage around the foundation. All
these failures result in structural instability and potential dam failure.
• Piping and seepage failures: These failures occur as a result of internal erosion caused by
seepage and erosion along hydraulic structures, such as the spillways of a dam, or failures in the
walls of a water pipeline. Animal burrows and cracks in the dam structure may also cause ero sion.
• Conduit and valve failure: These failures occur as a result of problems with valves and conduits in
a dam or pipeline’s systems.
Many dam and pipeline failures are also the secondary result of other natural disasters, such as
earthquakes, landslides, and extreme storms. Other causes include equipment malfunction, structural
damage, and sabotage. Dams are constructed with safety features known as “spillways” that allow
water to overtop the dam if the reservoir fills too quickly. Spillway overflow events, often referred to
as “design failures”, result in increased discharges downstream and increased flooding potential. In a
dam failure scenario, the greatest threat to life and property typically occurs in those areas
immediately below the dam since flood depths and discharges generally decrease as the flood wave
moves downstream. The primary danger associated with dam failure is the high-velocity flooding
downstream of the dam and limited warning times for evacuation.
1.3.2 Seismic And Geologic Hazards
Seismic and geologic hazards are risks caused by the movement of different parts of the earth’s crust
or surface. Seismic hazards include earthquakes and hazardous events caused by them. Geologic
hazards are other hazards involving land movements that are not linked to seismic activity and can
inflict harm to people or property. Additional information about seismic and geologic hazards i n
Cupertino, including development review coordination is in General Plan Appendix E, Geologic and
Seismic Hazards.
1.3.2.1 Seismic Hazards
Seismic activity occurs along boundaries in the earth’s crust, called faults. Pressure along the faults
builds over time and is ultimately released, resulting in ground shaking commonly referred to as an
earthquake. Earthquakes can also trigger other hazards, including surface rupture (cracks in the
ground surface), liquefaction (causing loose soil to lose its strength), landslides, and subsidence
(sinking of the ground surface). Earthquakes and other seismic hazards often damage or destroy
property and public infrastructure, including utility lines, and falling objects or structures pose a risk
of injury or death.
1.3.2.1.1 EARTHQUAKES
While Cupertino is at risk from many natural and human-caused hazards, the event with the greatest
potential for loss of life or property and economic damage is an earthquake. This risk is true for most
of the San Francisco Bay Area region since damaging earthquakes affect widespread areas and
trigger many secondary effects that can overwhelm the ability of local jurisdictions to respond.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 4
Earthquakes in the Bay Area result from strain energy constantly accumulating across the region
because of the motion of the Pacific Plate, relative to the North American Plate.
Earthquake risk is very high in Santa Clara County, including the City of Cupertino, due to the
presence of three major active faults1 in the region, the Hayward Fault, Calaveras Fault, and San
Andreas Fault. Both the San Andreas and the Hayward Faults have the potential for experiencing
major to great events.
1.3.2.1.2 OTHER SEISMIC HAZARDS
In addition to the direct physical damage that can result from the motion of an earthquake, damage
can result from liquefaction. Liquefaction occurs primarily in saturated, loose, fine - to medium-
grained soils in areas where the groundwater table is within approximately 50 feet of the surface.
Shaking causes the soils to lose strength and behave as a liquid. Excess water pressure is vented
upward through fissures and soil cracks and can result in a water -soil slurry flowing onto the ground
surface. This subsurface process can lead to near-surface or surface ground failure that can result in
property damage and structural failure. Groundwater that is less than 10 feet to the surface can cause
the highest liquefaction susceptibility, with lower groundwater levels causing lower liquefaction risks.
1.3.2.2 Geologic Hazards
Landslides and rock falls may occur in sloped areas, especially areas with steep slopes, and usually in
loose and fragmented soil areas. Slope stability depends on many factors and interrelationships,
including rock type, pore water pressure, slope steepness, and natural or human-made undercutting.
Landslides, rockfalls, and debris flows occur continuously on all slopes; some processes act very
slowly, while others occur very suddenly, often with disastrous results.
Landslides are often triggered by other natural hazards, such as heavy rain, floods, or wildfires, so
landslide frequency is often related to the frequency of these other hazards. In Santa Clara County,
landslides typically occur during and after severe he avy rainfall, so the risk of landslides often rises
during and after sequential severe storms that saturate steep, loose soils. Landslides and mudslides
are a common occurrence and have caused damage to homes, public facilities, roads, parks, and
sewer lines.
1.3.3 Fire Hazards
Fire hazards include both wildfires and urban fires. The combination of complex terrain, climate,
vegetation and development patterns contribute to an elevated risk of wildfire. The Community
Wildfire Protection Plan 2023 (CWPP) describes how each of these variables contributes to fire risk,
and describes how fire risk varies throughout the city. Historically, the fire season extended from early
summer through late fall of each year during the hotter, dryer months, although it is increasingly a
hazard that can occur year-round. Fire conditions arise from a combination of high temperatures, low
moisture content in the air and plant matter, an accumulation of vegetation, and high winds.
Three types of fires are of concern to Cupertino: (1) wildfires, (2) wildland-urban interface fires, and
(3) structural fires.
1 Active faults are defined by their current movement and deformation and their potential to cause earthquakes
or other types of ground deformation in the future.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 5
1.3.3.1 Wildfires
Wildfires occur on mountains, hillsides, and grasslands. Fuel, weather, and topography are primary
factors that affect how wildland fires spread. In and around Cupertino, grassland and woodland
habitat provide highly flammable fuel that is conducive to wildfires. These plant species are capable
of regeneration after a fire, making periodic wildfires a natural part of the ecology of these areas.
The climate of Cupertino and the surrounding area keeps the grass dry and more readily
combustible during fire season.
Wildfire potential for Santa Clara County is typically greatest in the months of August, September,
and October, when dry vegetation coexists with hot, dry winds. During these times, controlling a
fire becomes far more difficult. Areas adjacent to the city that are susceptible to wildfires are also of
concern as these conditions could exacerbate vulnerabilities within the city. Grassland fires are
easily ignited, particularly in dry seasons. These fires are relatively easily controlled if they can be
reached by fire equipment, although after a fire, the burned slopes are highly subject to erosion and
gullying. While brushlands are naturally adapted to frequent light fires, fire suppression in recent
decades has resulted in heavy fuel accumulation on the ground. Wildland fires, particularly near the
end of the dry season, tend to burn fast and very hot, threatening homes and leading to serious
destruction of vegetative cover. In woodland and forested areas, a wildland fire can generate a
destructive crown fire, which is a fire that burns materials at the top of trees, spreading from
treetop to treetop. They can be very intense and difficult to contain.
Because areas of the city with natural vegetation are extremely flammable during late summer and
fall, wildfire is a serious hazard in undeveloped hillside areas in the western portion of the city, as
well as open space areas adjacent to the city. These areas include State Responsibility Area (SRA)
lands west of the city, such as the Rancho San Antonio Open Space, Picchette Ranch Open Space,
Stevens Creek County Park, Saratoga Creek County Park, Sanborn County Park, Fremont Older
Open Space, as well as Local Responsibility Area (LRA) lands in the hillsides of Saratoga.
1.3.4 Hazardous Waste And Materials
Hazardous materials are materials that pose a significant risk to public safety, or human and
environmental health. These include toxic chemicals, flammable or corrosive materials, petroleum
products, and unstable or dangerously reactive materials. They can be released through human error,
malfunctioning or broken equipment, or as an indirect consequence of other emergencies (e.g., if a
flood damages a hazardous material storage tank). Hazardous materials can also be released
accidentally during transportation because of vehicle accidents.
The release or spill of bulk hazardous materials could result in fire, explosion, toxic cloud, or direct
contamination of water, people, and property. The effects may involve a local site or many square
miles. Health problems may be immediate, such as corrosive effects on the skin and lungs, or gradual,
such as the development of cancer from a carcinogen. Property damage could range from immediate
destruction by explosion to permanent contamination by a persistent hazardous material. Most
hazardous materials in the region are transported on truck routes along major roadways, such as I -
280 and SR-85 that pass through Cupertino. The most vulnerable areas along this route are
considered the on-/off-ramps and interchanges. Since 1970, one reported roadway hazardous
materials incident occurred in Cupertino.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 6
2. Background
2.1 Legislative Requirements
Assembly Bill (AB) 747 (2019) and AB 1409 (2021) both mandate local jurisdictions to update their
safety elements to include comprehensive evacuation planning.
• AB 747 (2019) adds California Government Code Section 65302.15, which requires the safety
element to be reviewed and updated, upon the next update of a local hazard mitigation plan
(LHMP) after January 1, 2022, to identify evacuation routes and their capacity, safety, and
viability under a range of emergency scenarios.2
• AB 1409 (2021) adds evacuation locations to Section 65302.15 of the California Government
Code and requires the safety element to be reviewed and updated to identify
evacuation locations.
Accordingly, this report considers:
• Identification of Evacuation Routes: The study identifies all evacuation routes and assesses
their capacity, safety, and viability under various emergency scenarios.
• Capacity Assessment: The study evaluates the capacity of evacuation routes to handle the
expected volume of traffic and evacuees during an emergency.
• Safety and Viability: The study considers the safety and viability of the identified routes and
centers for use during emergencies.
• Mapping Evacuation Gateways: This involves mapping evacuation centers and shelters
and/or shortest path to evacuation gateways to ensure they are accessible and adequately
equipped.
• Policy Development: Policies to prioritize evacuation routes and centers based on the
findings.
• Integration with Local Hazard Mitigation Plans (LHMP): Updates to the Health and Safety
Element should be coordinated with the existing LHMP or other relevant emergency planning
documents to ensure consistency and alignment.
2.2 Emergency Planning in Cupertino
This City of Cupertino maintains and publishes several emergency planning documents:3
The Emergency Operations Plan (2019)4 provides guidance on the City's response to the most
likely and demanding emergency conditions. It outlines the incident management structure, legal
compliance, whole community engagement, continuity of government, and other critical
components.
2 The City of Cupertino participated in the Santa Clara County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan which
was approved by FEMA in February 2024 which triggered compliance with this requirement.
3 https://www.cupertino.gov/files/assets/city/v/1/your-city/documents
4 https://www.cupertino.gov/files/assets/city/v/1/your-city/documents/cupertino-emergency-operations-plan.pdf.
Accessed August 28, 2025.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 7
The Health and Safety Element (last amended in 2005, with minor edits in 2015)5, a Chapter in
the General Plan, describes local hazards and mitigation measures. It identifies that people in the
foothills and mountains of Cupertino’s planning area, covering approximately 16 square miles, are
most at risk from fire. The City is currently updating the Health and Safety Element. The Health
and Safety Element Update lists the following policies to prepare for and respond to disasters and
emergencies:
• Policy HS-2.1: Building And Fire Code Compliance
• Policy HS-2.2: Promote Emergency Preparedness
• Policy HS-2.3: Emergency Operations And Training
• Policy HS-2.4: Volunteer Groups
• Policy HS-2.5: Emergency Public Information
• Policy HS-2.6: Fire Prevention And Emergency Preparedness
• Policy HS-2.7: Hazard Preparedness
• Policy HS-2.8: Educational And Outreach Materials
• Policy HS-2.9: Poor Air Quality Event Assistance
• Policy HS-2.10: Disaster Medical Response
• Policy HS-2.11: Evacuation Routes
• Policy HS-2.12: Evacuation Awareness
• Policy HS-2.13: Ingress And Egress
• Policy HS-2.14: Secondary Ingress And Egress.
• Policy HS-2.15: Emergency Access
The City’s Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) (February 21, 2024)6 is an annex to the Santa
Clara County Multijurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan. It assesses potential hazard risks as well
as mitigation measures to prevent loss of life, injury, and property damage. It identifies
earthquake, severe weather, flood, landslide, and wildfire as hazards of greatest concern. In the
LHMP, Table 17 lists the actions that comprise the City’s hazard mitigation action plan.
The Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) (2023)7 describes projects from the Santa
Clara County CWPP (2023). These plans are required to be updated every five years to remain
eligible for funding implementation projects through the Fire Safe Councils and CAL FIRE.
5 https://www.cupertino.gov/files/assets/city/v/1/your-city/documents/gp-chap-06-health.pdf. Accessed August
28, 2025.
6 https://oem.santaclaracounty.gov/multi-jurisdictional-hazard-mitigation-plan-mjhmp. Accessed October 24,
2025.
7 https://www.sccfd.org/santa-clara-county-community-wildfire-protection-plan/. Accessed October 24, 2025.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 8
3. Approach and Methods
This analysis focuses on the transportation system capacity during a wildfire evacuation event. The
following flow chart illustrates the steps in the process.
3.1 Identify the Evacuation Scenarios
Fehr & Peers, City of Cupertino staff, the Santa Clara County Fire Department, and the Santa Clara
County Sherriff’s Office worked together to identify the hazard of highest concern for this assessment
(wildfires in the Fire Hazard Severity Zone (FHSZ)) and three evacuation scenarios. In developing the
evacuation scenarios, all hazards identified in Section 1.3 were considered. The defined evacuation
scenarios represent hazards with the greatest potential to generate the largest number of vehicles
requiring evacuation. Consideration was given to wildfire vulnerability, as well as access limitations
that may occur due to compounding hazards such as a landslide or flood damage along an
evacuation route.
Table 1 defines the evacuation scenarios. Scenarios A to C reflect Existing Conditions in year 2025.
This assessment conducted baseline analysis using existing socioeconomic conditions to establish
current evacuation performance and identify potential constraints under present -day conditions. This
provides a foundation for evaluating how future growth could affect evacuation route capacities.
When considering cumulative conditions with projected buildout, increased evacuation population
would likely exacerbate bottlenecks identified in the baseline analysis.
These scenarios assume no evacuation population will “shelter in place” within the hazard area or
evacuation area. Instead, these scenarios evaluate evacuation from the evacuation area using the
shortest path.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 9
• Scenario A was assessed quantitatively. It assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation within the
evacuation area at 2 PM on a school day. All roadways are assumed to be accessible to
evacuees, which include residents, employees, students, and visitors.
• Scenario B was assessed quantitatively. It assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation following
an earthquake at 6 AM, during a time when schools are not in session. McClellan Road at Club
House Lane near the Deep Cliff Golf Course is assumed to be closed. Evacuees include
residents and a small portion of employees.
• Scenario C was assessed qualitatively. It is based on Scenario A by assuming the same
evacuation demand, but with additional roadway closures on Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR-
85 and SR-85 Southbound Ramps at Stevens Creek Boulevard because of an earthquake
causing the wildfire.
Table 1: Scenario Definitions
Scenario A
(Quantitative)
Scenario B
(Quantitative)
Scenario C
(Qualitative)
Hazard Type(s) Wildfire Wildfire after
Earthquake
Wildfire after
Earthquake
Scale of Emergency Evacuation Area1 Evacuation Area1 Evacuation Area1
Time of Event Fall 2 PM
(School in session)
Summer 6 AM
(School not in session)
Fall 2 PM
(School in session)
Road Closures
due to Hazard All roadways open
McClellan Road at Club
House Lane near the
Deep Cliff Golf Course
due to earthquake
• Stevens Creek
Boulevard at SR-
85
• SR-85 Southbound
Ramps at Stevens
Creek Boulevard
Type of Evacuees Residents, employees,
students, visitors
Residents, small
portion of employees
Residents, employees,
students, visitors
Notes:
1. The boundary of evacuation area is defined as the Genasys Protect zones within the fire hazard severity
zone (FHSZ) lands in the western portions of the City and homes within the foothills of the Santa Cruz
Mountains, shown in Figure 1.
Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.
Fire Hazard Severity Zones
FIGURE 1
Page 32 Appendix H:Health and Safety Element Background Report | August 2024
Figure S-9 Fire Hazard Severity Zones
Data Source: Health and Safety Element Background Report, July 23, 2025
6%
25%
25%
6%
12%
19%
7%
31%
25%
2%
16%
6%
13%
7%
Cupertino City Boundary
Evacuation Routes
Screenline
East of the WUI Screenline
West of SR-85 Screenline
Trip Distribution
Scenario B
SR-85 Trip Distribution %
Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) %
0 1 2
Miles
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 11
3.2 Define the Evacuation Area
According to the Cupertino Municipal Code Chapter 16.74.020, “Wildland‐Urban Interface (WUI) or
Wildland‐Urban Interface Fire Area (WUIFA) mean a geographical area identified by the state as a
Fire Hazard Severity Zone in accordance with the Public Resources Code Sections 4201 through
4204 and Government Code Sections 51175 through 51189, or other areas desig nated by the
enforcing agency to be at a significant risk from wildfires”. The evacuation area is defined as the
Genasys Protect8 zones within the WUI, or the moderate to very high FHSZ in Cupertino. Figure 1
illustrates the fire hazard severity zones included in the Health and Safety Element Background
Report.
The safe area is established at SR-85 and I-280 and serves as the evacuation gateway, representing
the boundary beyond which evacuees are considered to have exited the evacuation area, and are
therefore no longer at immediate risk.
3.3 Define Evacuation Routes
This analysis uses the evacuation routes provided by the City of Cupertino in August 2025,
developed as part of the City’s ongoing effort to update its Health and Safety Element. The
evacuation routes for the City of Cupertino and surrounding unincorporated areas are used to
transport evacuees using their own vehicle and transit dependent evacuees to temporary shelter. This
analysis assumes that routes that provide the most direct path to evacuate the community with the
least exposure to risk will be used by evacuees. The major evacuation routes consider the location of
critical facilities (i.e., safety and security, health and medical, and communications) as well as
residential, employment, school, and recreational uses. Figure 2 shows the evacuation routes
provided by the City.
3.4 Estimate Vehicle Trips
The number of evacuation vehicle trips assigned to the roadway network are a combination of trips
generated by residential households, employee trips, student trips, and visitor trips at the time of the
evacuation. These trips include those generated by uses in the City as well as surrounding
unincorporated areas including PG&E Trailhead, McClellan Ranch Preserve, Stevens Creek County
Park, and Fremont Older Open Space Preserve.
Trips generated by residential households were informed by the most recent available data from the
US Census Bureau and the California Department of Finance. This includes data on population, the
number of households, persons per household, and vehicles per household. This data was cross-
referenced with data in the Genasys Protect platform’s designated evacuation zones. The household
data was then used to estimate evacuation vehicle trips based on the number of households, persons
per household, auto-ownership information, population, and other factors that could affect the
number of vehicles per household used during an evacuation event.
8 Genasys Protect is an evacuation management tool that helps communities and first responders plan,
communicate, and conduct evacuations. It provides communications, situational awareness, and cross -agency
coordination capabilities for emergency management. The platform delivers integrated hardware and software
for proactive preparedness and multi-channel communication.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 12
Table 2 describes data sources and equations used to estimate vehicle evacuation demand for
residents, employees, students, and visitors. Data sources reviewed for this assessment include the
2023 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year Estimates, Genasys Protect, Santa Clara
Countywide VMT Estimation Tool, and the adopted Housing Element. These sources provide
population, household, and employment estimates that are within a similar range.
Evacuation Routes
FIGURE 2
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FIGURE 2
0 1 2
Miles
Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation RoutesCupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes
Evacuation Route (outside of City Boundary)
Evacuation Route (in Cupertino)
Fire Hazard Severity Zones
FIGURE 1
Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes
Evacuation Routes (in Cupertino)
Evacuation Routes (outside of City Boundary)
Data Source: Draft Health and Safety Element, 2025
Rodrigues Ave
Torre Ave
85
85
280
280
280
A
B
C
D
E
F
1
2
3
4
5
6
0.9 miles
from Point F
to Gateway 6
1.1 miles
from Point F
to Gateway 5
1.3 miles
from Point B
to Gateway 1
1.4 miles
from Point E
to Gateway 4
1.6 miles
from Point E
to Gateway 5
1.6 miles
from Point B
to Gateway 2
1.9 miles
from Point A
to Gateway 1
2 miles
from Point D
to Gateway 3
2.2 miles
from Point D
to Gateway 4
2.4 miles
from Point C
to Gateway 3
2.5 miles
from Point C
to Gateway 1
Gateway
Start
Distance to Evacuation Gateway
0 - 0.5 Miles 0.5 - 1 Miles 1 - 1.5 Miles 1.5 - 2 Miles 2.5 - 3 Miles
0 1 2
Miles
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 14
Table 2: Vehicle Demand Calculations in the Evacuation Area
Evacuation Demand Variable Data Source Equation
1. Employment Santa Clara Countywide
VMT Estimation Tool Data source provided value.
2. Residential Population Genasys Protect* Data source provided value.
3. Household Genasys Protect* Population / Household size
4. Household Vehicle
Ownership Distribution Census Tract Number of households with 0, 1, 2, or 3+
vehicles / Total household
5. Household Vehicle
Ownership Steps 4 & 5 Household vehicle ownership
distribution * Household
6. Student Education Data
Partnership Data source provided value1
7. Visitor Parking Spaces Available
from Google Maps Portion of parking spaces occupied2
8. Estimated Vehicle
Evacuation Demand Steps 1 & 6
Residents:
1 * zero-vehicle household +
1 * one-vehicle household +
2 * two-vehicle household +
2.5 * three-or-more vehicle household
Employees:
0.99 * employment
Students:
1 * drive-alone student +
0.5 * carpooling student +
1 * student picked up/dropped off
Visitors:
0.5 * visitor
Notes: Raw data is presented in Appendix A.
1. Educational Data Partnership shows school enrollment data for the following schools considered in the
evacuation area: Abraham Lincoln Elementary School, Tessellations Elementary School, John F Kennedy
Middle School, and Monta Vista High School.
2. Visitor presence considered at recreational attractions located within the evacuation area: PG&E Trailhead
(50% of the Rancho San Antonio County Park parking spaces), Deep Cliff Golf Course (20% of the Linda
Vista Park parking spaces), Rim Trail (45% of the Stevens Creek County Park Chestnut and Villa Maria
parking lots), and Parker Ranch Trailhead (40% of the Fremont Older Open Space Preserve Prospect and
Saratoga Country Club parking spaces).
Source: 2023 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year Estimates; Genasys Protect; Santa Clara Countywide
VMT Estimation Tool; Educational Data Partnership; and Google Maps, Fehr & Peers, 2025.
3.5 Assign Vehicle Trips
The total resident, employee, student, and visitor evacuation trips are disaggregated into 14 different
geographically designated evacuation zones in the Genasys Protect platform. Trips are routed from
each zone to the nearest evacuation route. Once on a major evacuation route, trips are assigned to
the most efficient path toward either SR-85 or I-280. The city limit is used as the evacuation
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 15
gateways because it represents the boundary beyond which evacuees are considered to have exited
the hazard area and the evacuation area, and are therefore no longer at immediate risk.
3.6 Evacuation Route Assessment
An evacuation route assessment can be completed in a variety of ways to determine the capacity and
viability of key evacuation routes. An assessment, like this project, can use volume to capacity ratios
under typical non-congested conditions. Under more constrained and congested conditions, higher
effort studies may involve modeled analysis of evacuation scenarios using dynamic traffic assignment
to simulate traffic flow and evacuation times when street and freeway networks are at capacity. This
evacuation route capacity divides the vehicle demand volumes by the roadway evacuation capacity
to estimate the volume to capacity ratio during an evacuation event. Furthermore, the evacuation
route assessment measures the distance evacuees have to travel to reach evacuation gateways.
3.6.1 Assessing Evacuation Route Capacity
This analysis uses planning level roadway capacities based on the roadway cross section (e.g., two,
four, or six travel lanes) with adjustments for the hilly nature of the evacuation routes in the
evacuation area and anticipated lower visibility conditions present during an evacuation. These
planning level roadway capacities are consistent with the level of planning for this AB 747/AB 1409
evacuation capacity analysis where the desired outcome is a list of policies and programs to integrate
into the Health and Safety Element. Table 3 lists the peak one-hour planning capacity for each
roadway type. These evacuation capacities do not incorporate contraflow , as the opposing direction
is reserved for emergency responders.
Table 3: Planning Level Roadway Capacity per Hour per Lane
Roadway Type Planning Capacity1
(Typical Day)
Planning Capacity
(Low Visibility)
Freeway 2,020 1,780
Divided Arterial 940 830
Undivided Arterial 890 780
Collector/Local 650 570
Notes:
1. Roadway planning capacity from Highway Capacity Manual (2000).
Source: Highway Capacity Manual, 2000; Fehr & Peers, 2025.
Additionally, during a fire or other emergency event, roadways typically operate at lower capacities
due to changes in driver behavior and the presence of hazards such as low visibility due to smoke.
Baseline capacities for all evacuation roadways were reduced by 12 percent to account for these
hazards, based on recommended capacity reductions due to low visibility (due to weather) provided
by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Road Weather Management Program.9
9 How weather events impact roadways?
https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/weather/q1_roadimpact.htm#:~:text=Speed%20variance%20can%20fall%20by,12
%20percent%20in%20low%20visibility, accessed April 2025.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 16
Table 4 presents the roadway types and total evacuation route capacity at designated screenlines
and a few additional roadway segments. A screenline is an imaginary line on a map to evaluate the
evacuation route capacity (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). This analysis uses a screenline east of the
evacuation area, and another at SR-85 and I-280, which represent the defined evacuation gateways.
Table 4: Evacuation Route Capacity
Roadway Name Roadway
Type1
Outbound
Lanes
Evacuation
Route
Capacity
Adjusted
Evacuation
Route
Capacity2
1. East of the Evacuation Area Screenline
Cristo Rey Drive
west of Foothills Boulevard Collector 1 650 570
Foothill Boulevard
north of Alpine Drive Local 1 650 570
Stevens Creek Boulevard
east of Cupertino Road Collector 1 650 570
McClellan Road
east of Imperial Avenue Collector 1 650 570
Bubb Road
north of Hyannisport Drive Local 1 650 570
Rainbow Drive
west of Seven Springs Lane Local 1 650 570
Prospect Road
east of Parker Ranch Trailhead Local 1 650 570
2. West of SR 85 Screenline
Foothill Boulevard
south of I-280
Undivided
Arterial 2 1,780 1,560
Stevens Creek Boulevard
west of SR-85
Undivided
Arterial 2 1,780 1,560
Bubb Road
south of Stevens Creek Boulevard Collector 1 650 570
McClellan Road
east of Bubb Road Collector 1 650 570
Stelling Road
north of Orion Lane Collector 1 650 570
South De Anza Boulevard
north of SR-85
Divided
Arterial 3 2,820 2,490
Prospect Road
east of S De Anza Boulevard Collector 2 1,300 1,140
Notes:
1. Roadway type determined by City of Cupertino Circulation Element (2025).
2. Vehicles per hour. Rounded to nearest 10.
Source: Circulation Element, 2025; Fehr & Peers, 2025.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 17
3.6.2 Distance to Evacuation Gateway
For this analysis, evacuation population groups are considered to be evacuated when they have
either accessed gateways to the east of SR-85 or north of I-280. To assist with identifying potentially
vulnerable communities during an evacuation event it is also helpful to identify City neighborhoods
that need to travel the furthest and thus are potentially the most exposed in an evacuation event. This
analysis measures the distances from each point along the roadway network to designated
evacuation gateways. Up to two best routes from each point to the gateways are included in this
assessment.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 18
4. Evacuation Route Assessment
This chapter evaluates the evacuation route capacity during a wildfire evacuation event for the
evacuation area and routes identified in Chapter 3. This section also analyzes the distances from each
point along the roadway network to designated evacuation gateways to help identify City
neighborhoods that need to travel the furthest and thus are potentially the most exposed in an
evacuation event.
4.1 Estimate Evacuation Vehicle Trips
Based on the identified scenarios, the areas requiring evacuation include the FHSZ since these areas
are most vulnerable to wildfire hazards. The trips assigned to the transportation system are estimated
based on household and employer demographics along with student and visitor population and assist
with estimating evacuation demand during an evacuation event.
Table 5 lists the composition of evacuees for each quantitative scenario. Note that Scenario C is a
qualitative assessment, which builds on Scenario A and, therefore, has the same evacuation demand
as Scenario A.
Table 5: Composition of Evacuees by Scenario
Type of Evacuees Scenario A
(Quantitative)
Scenario B
(Quantitative)
Scenario C
(Qualitative)
Residents 46% 100% 46%
Employees 100% 2% 100%
Students 100% 0% 100%
Visitors 100% 0% 100%
Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.
4.1.1 Resident and Employee Population
A worst-case condition was estimated where all residents, and retail and restaurant (estimated to be
half of all employees in the area) in the evacuation area would need to be evacuated. The number of
residents, anticipated vehicle ownership per household, employees, students in schools, and visitors
in the evacuation area were used to estimate the number of evacuee vehicles. Because the raw data
for households, population, and employment cover geographic areas that differ from the evacuation
area, the data were adjusted to estimate land use and evacuation demand. Table A-1 to Table A-3
provide raw socioeconomic data.
Table 6 to Table 10 present the resident, employee, student, and visitor land uses and estimated
evacuation demand in the evacuation area. As shown in Table 6, approximately one percent of
households does not have access to a vehicle and would potentially confront mobility constraints
during an evacuation event.
This assessment uses zero-vehicle households as a proxy to provide an estimate of persons with
mobility constraints that may need evacuation assistance. These zero-vehicle households would
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 19
require outside assistance. Although outside the scope of this assessment, the City may want to
consider a program that ensures a more accurate accounting of households needing assistance and
programs to facilitate their evacuation. This estimate also assumes employment centers would
provide evacuation assistance to employees without access to a vehicle. Additionally, it was assumed
that some households with more than two vehicles likely would not be able to utilize all of their
vehicles during an evacuation event (e.g., homes with three or more vehicles but with only two
licensed drivers).
Table 6: Resident Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area
Population1 Households2
Household Vehicle
Ownership2 Estimated Evacuation Demand3,4,5
0 1 2 3+ Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
12,636 4,355 48 604 2,400 1,303 4,050 8,710 4,050 1% 14% 55% 30%
Notes:
1. The estimated population is obtained from Genasys Protect data provided by the City staff on July 25, 2025.
2. The estimated number of households and household vehicle ownership is derived from 2023 American
Community Survey (ACS) 5-Year Estimates and adjusted according to the estimated population.
3. Assumption of number of vehicles that will evacuate: zero-vehicle household: 1 vehicle; one-vehicle
household: 1 vehicle; two-vehicle household: 2 vehicles; three-or-more vehicle household: 2.5 vehicles.
4. Assume that daytime population from Genasys Protect consists of residents, employees, students, and
visitors. Calculated as (daytime population - employees - students - visitors) / residents * 100%, The
residents present in the evacuation area were estimated to be 46% and 100% of the population for Scenarios
A and B respectively.
5. It should be noted that this information does not constitute a specific analysis of households with mobility
challenges as it does not specifically account for people who have mobility impairments that preclude them
from using a vehicle; it also does not specifically account for households that own one or more vehicles, but
where not all members of the household may necessarily have access to them at all times (for example, a
household with one vehicle which a household member drives to work, leaving other members of the
household at home with no vehicle available).
Source: 2023 ACS 5-Year Estimates; Genasys Protect; Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool;
Fehr & Peers, 2025.
Table 7: Employee Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation
Area
Employment (A)1 Estimated Evacuation Demand2
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
556 550 10 550
Notes:
1. The estimated employment is obtained from the Santa Clara Countywide VMT Evaluation Tool, using 2025
as the baseline year.
2. Assumes that all the employees will evacuate with 0.99 vehicles per employee (one percent of evacuation
area households are zero-vehicle households).
Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.
4.1.2 Student Population
Within the designated evacuation area, several schools serve a substantial student population that
would require timely evacuation in the event of an emergency at working hours. Schools located
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 20
within the evacuation area include Abraham Lincoln Elementary School, Tessellations Elementary
School, John F. Kennedy Middle School, and Monta Vista High School. Table 8 presents the estimated
number of student evacuation trips during Scenario A. Table A-4 and Table A-5 show the school
enrollment data and estimated student evacuation trips, categorized by mode of travel, including
pick-up/drop-off by parents, carpooling, and individual student drivers.
Table 8: Student Population and Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips of the Evacuation Area
School Enrollment Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
3,560 3,120 0 3,120
Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.
4.1.3 Visitor Population
Table 9 presents the estimated number of visitor trips generated by recreational land uses that would
require evacuation during an emergency. Additional details on how these visitor trip estimates were
developed can be found in Table A-6.
Table 9: Visitor Land Use and Evacuation Demand of the Evacuation Area
Visitors Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
355 180 0 180
Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.
4.1.4 Total Estimated Evacuation Demand
Considering the estimated trips generated in the evacuation area from all employees, residents,
students and visitors, the total number of estimated trips during an evacuation event can be
estimated. The total evacuation demand is 7,900 and 8,720 during Scenario A and Scenario B
respectively, as shown in Table 10.
Table 10: Total Estimated Evacuation Demand Vehicle Trips for the Evacuation Area
Type of Evacuees Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
Residents 4,050 8,710 4,050
Employees 550 10 550
Students 3,120 - 3,120
Visitors 180 - 180
Total 7,900 8,720 7,900
Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 21
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the evacuation demand across two screenlines. These screenlines
represent the edge of the hazard area (screenline 1) and the estimated evacuation edge
(screenline 2).
4.2 Evaluating Evacuation Route Capacity
4.2.1 Scenario A (Quantitative Analysis)
The total estimated evacuation demand was distributed across the roadway network in proportion to
the combined resident, employee, student, and visitor population data for each Genasys Protect
zone10 within the evacuation area. Detailed percent trips assigned for each roadway can be found in
Table B-1. The distance to evacuation gateways map (see Figure 5) was used to identify primary
routes likely to be used by evacuees.
Traffic volume data for the roadway segments on the evacuation area were collected in July 2025.
These counts, combined with estimated demand, were used to calculate the total evacuation vehicle
demand. StreetLight data from the same period in 2024 were collected and compared with data from
October 2024 to evaluate the impact of school sessions versus non-school periods. For Scenario A,
representing a typical Fall weekday at 2 PM, a factor of 1.2 was applied to account for the increased
traffic associated with schools being in session.
Evacuation route capacity was assessed by dividing vehicle demand volumes by roadway evacuation
capacity to calculate the volume-to-capacity (V/C) ratio. As shown in Table 11, the results of the
evacuation capacity assessment indicate that all evacuation routes have V/C ratios greater than 1 near
the evacuation area except for Prospect Road. This indicates that these roads would require more
than one hour to accommodate the evacuation demand from the hillside, making them bottlenecks
during an evacuation.
Foothill Boulevard, Stevens Creek Boulevard and McClellan Road are the most critical bottlenecks
with V/C ratio greater than 2. Prospect Road and Stelling Road have V/C ratios of 1, suggesting they
are at capacity and should be prioritized for evacuation demand and supply strategies.
It is also important to note that emergency scenarios are often unpredictable (as well as driver
behavior during the evacuation time period) and it is anticipated that evacuees would vacate at a rate
that more closely resembles a bell curve from the time the evacuation order is issued. These are
conditions which would affect the total estimated evacuation time in our assessment and are beyond
the scope and budget of our assessment. There is also general unpredictability in operational issues,
such as power issues that would trigger traffic signals to operate in “red flash mode” in which traffic
would need to proceed through intersections in an all -way stop configuration.
10 A Genasys Protect zone is a predefined geographic area used during emergencies to streamline response
efforts, reduce confusion, and optimize traffic flow.
Trip Distribution for Scenario A
FIGURE 3
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FIGURE 2
0 1 2
Miles
Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes
Data Source: Fehr & Peers
Cupertino City Boundary
Evacuation Routes
West of SR-85 Screenline
East of the WUI Screenline
Trip Distribution | Scenario A
Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) Trip Distribution %
SR-85 Trip Distribution %
Rodrigues Ave
Torre Ave
5%
18%
21%
14%
14%
22%
6%
23%
21%
4%
24%
5%
17%
6%
Cupertino City Boundary
Evacuation Routes
Screenline
East of the WUI Screenline
West of SR-85 Screenline
Trip Distribution
Scenario A
SR-85 Trip Distribution %
Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) %
0 1 2
Miles
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 23
Table 11: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario A)
Evacuation Route Link
Evacuation
Travel
Demand1
Existing
Hourly
Traffic
Total
Evacuation
Demand
Adjusted
Evacuation
Route
Capacity
V/C
Ratio2
1. East of the Evacuation Area Screenline
Cristo Rey Drive
west of Foothills Boulevard 400 239 639 570 1.1
Foothill Boulevard
north of Alpine Drive 1,420 883 2,303 570 4.0
Stevens Creek Boulevard
east of Cupertino Road 1,660 417 2,077 570 3.6
McClellan Road
east of Imperial Avenue 1,110 100 1,210 570 2.1
Bubb Road
north of Hyannisport Drive 1,110 234 1,344 570 2.4
Rainbow Drive
west of Seven Springs Lane 1,740 20 1,760 570 3.1
Prospect Road
east of Parker Ranch Trailhead 470 116 586 570 1.0
2. West of SR 85 Screenline
Foothill Boulevard
south of I-280 1,820 883 2,703 1,560 1.7
Stevens Creek Boulevard
west of SR-85 1,660 719 2,379 1,560 1.5
Bubb Road
south of Stevens Creek Boulevard 320 550 870 570 1.5
McClellan Road
east of Bubb Road 1,900 506 2,406 570 4.2
Stelling Road
north of Orion Lane 400 196 596 570 1.0
South De Anza Boulevard
north of SR-85 1,340 1,578 2,918 2,490 1.2
Prospect Road
east of S De Anza Boulevard 470 912 1,382 1,140 1.2
Note: Bolded text indicates roadways over one-hour evacuation capacity.
1. Rounded to nearest 10.
2. Total evacuation demand divided by adjusted outbound capacity.
Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.
4.2.2 Scenario B (Quantitative Analysis)
Scenario B assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation following an earthquake at 6 AM, during a time
when schools are not in session. The total estimated evacuation demand was distributed across the
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 24
roadway network in proportion to the combined population, and employment population data for
each Genasys Protect zone11 within the evacuation area. Detailed percent trips assigned for each
roadway can be found in Table B-2. The distance to evacuation gateways map (see Figure 5) was
used to identify primary routes likely to be used by evacuees.
The results of the evacuation capacity assessment in Table 11 indicate that all the roadways near the
evacuation area except for Cristo Rey Drive, McClellan Road and Prospect Road have V/C ratios
greater than 2. This indicates that these roads would require more than one hour to accommodate
the evacuation demand from the evacuation area, making them bottlenecks during an evacuation.
This scenario is evaluated with a road closure on McClellan Road at Club House Lane near the Deep
Cliff Golf Course, with schools not in session. When this segment of McClellan Road is closed,
evacuees located east of Club House Lane can only travel eastbound along McClellan Road, while
those west of the closure can only travel westbound. In other words, evacuees cannot cross the
closed segment, which results in separate evacuation routes for areas on either side of the closure.
Under these conditions, evacuation demand on McClellan Road would decrease, with some trips
shifted to Foothill Boulevard and Stevens Creek Boulevard. As a result, McClellan Road would
experience a lower V/C ratio.
Under Scenario B, evacuation demand is higher than under Scenario A, as summarized in Table 10.
However, because existing hourly traffic is lower at 6 AM under Scenario B, the total evacuation
demand (i.e., the sum of evacuation travel demand and existing hourly traffic) on some roadways is
lower under Scenario B than under Scenario A. A morning evacuation (6:00 AM) reflects conditions
when most residents are at home, resulting in higher residential evacuation demand but relatively low
existing traffic volumes on the roadways. In contrast, an afternoon evacuation (2:00 PM) occurs when
many residents are at work or school, leading to lower residential evacuation demand but higher
levels of existing traffic associated with general daytime travel activity. Scenario B has higher
evacuation travel demand but lower existing traffic, resulting in a lower total evacuation demand on
some roadways than Scenario A. As a result, these roadways show lower V/C ratios under Scenario B
despite the higher evacuation travel demand.
11 A Genasys Protect zone is a predefined geographic area used during emergencies to streamline response
efforts, reduce confusion, and optimize traffic flow.
Trip Distribution for Scenario B
FIGURE 4
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FIGURE 2
0 1 2
Miles
Cupertino City Boundary Evacuation Routes
Data Source: Fehr & Peers
Cupertino City Boundary
Evacuation Routes
West of SR-85 Screenline
East of the WUI Screenline
Trip Distribution | Scenario B
Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) Trip Distribution %
SR-85 Trip Distribution %
Rodrigues Ave
Torre Ave
6%
25%
25%
6%
12%
19%
7%
31%
25%
2%
16%
6%
13%
7%
Cupertino City Boundary
Evacuation Routes
Screenline
East of the WUI Screenline
West of SR-85 Screenline
Trip Distribution
Scenario B
SR-85 Trip Distribution %
Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) %
0 1 2
Miles
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 26
Table 12: Evacuation Route Link Capacity Analysis (Scenario B)
Evacuation Route Link
Evacuation
Travel
Demand1
Existing
Hourly
Traffic
Total
Evacuation
Demand
Adjusted
Evacuation
Route
Capacity
V/C
Ratio2
1. East of the Evacuation Area Screenline
Cristo Rey Drive
west of Foothills Boulevard 520 31 551 570 1.0
Foothill Boulevard
north of Alpine Drive 2,180 283 2,463 570 4.3
Stevens Creek Boulevard
east of Cupertino Road 2,180 31 2,211 570 3.9
McClellan Road
east of Imperial Avenue 520 13 533 570 0.9
Bubb Road
north of Hyannisport Drive 1,050 64 1,114 570 2.0
Rainbow Drive
west of Seven Springs Lane 1,660 85 1,745 570 3.1
Prospect Road
east of Parker Ranch Trailhead 610 23 633 570 1.1
2. West of SR 85 Screenline
Foothill Boulevard
south of I-280 2,700 283 2,983 1,560 1.9
Stevens Creek Boulevard
west of SR-85 2,180 142 2,322 1,560 1.5
Bubb Road
south of Stevens Creek Boulevard 170 86 256 570 0.4
McClellan Road
east of Bubb Road 1,400 31 1,431 570 2.5
Stelling Road
north of Orion Lane 520 28 548 570 1.0
South De Anza Boulevard
north of SR-85 1,130 362 1,492 2,490 0.6
Prospect Road
east of S De Anza Boulevard 610 144 754 1,140 0.7
Note: Bolded text indicates roadways over one-hour evacuation capacity.
1. Rounded to nearest 10.
2. Total evacuation demand divided by adjusted outbound capacity.
Source: Fehr & Peers, 2025.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 27
4.2.3 Scenario C (Qualitative Analysis)
Scenario C assumes a wildfire-triggered evacuation following an earthquake at 2 PM on a school day.
Scenario C demonstrates the worst-case evacuation condition in which an earthquake initiates
wildfire. Scenario C builds on Scenario A by assuming the same evacuation demand, but with
additional roadway closures at the following roadways because of an earthquake causing wildfire:
• Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR-85
• SR-85 Southbound Ramps at Stevens Creek Boulevard
Due to the results of the baseline scenario, no further quantification was conducted for Scenario C.
However, in addition to the capacity constraints identified in Scenario A, the following evacuation
route capacity issues have been noted:
• The closure on Stevens Creek Boulevard and SR-85 Southbound Ramps would divert 2,378
evacuees assigned to Stevens Creek Boulevard (refer to Table 11) to the adjacent routes. The
updated trip distribution is shown in Table B-3. These alternative routes include Foothill
Boulevard, McClellan Road, and De Anza Boulevard. Since these routes are already bottlenecks in
Scenario A, the added volume would result in further congestion and increase the severity of the
bottleneck causing more delay and queuing.
• Stevens Creek Boulevard also serves the evacuees from the entire corridor east and west of the
FHSZ. A portion of the rerouted evacuation demand from Stevens Creek Boulevard is expected to
shift towards Rainbow Drive and to Stelling Road or De Anza Boulevard, which serve as one of
the key evacuation corridors to SR-85.
• Foothill Boulevard is already identified as a critical bottleneck with a V/C ratio exceeding 4 in
both the scenarios. The rerouted evacuation demand due to the roadway closures would further
exacerbate congestion and significantly affect evacuation efficiency.
4.3 Analyzing Distance to Evacuation Gateways
Distance to evacuation gateways is mapped in Figure 5. The map illustrates the primary evacuation
routes likely to be used by evacuees. The distance for all the evacuation routes ranges from 0.9 to 2.5
miles with most falling between 1.5 to 2 miles. From each start point, there is one or two best routes
to reach the gateways with similar distances.
Routes A, B, E, and F (via Cristo Rey Drive, Stevens Creek Boulevard, Rainbow Drive, and Prospect
Road, respectively) are within two miles of the nearest evacuation gateways. According to Table 11
and Table 12, Cristo Rey Drive and Prospect Road are not expected to experience capacity
constraints under Scenarios A and B. As a result, evacuees using these routes are expected to have
relatively short evacuation times.
In contrast, Route D (via Bubb Road) is located 2 miles to the nearest evacuation gateway (Gateway
3), while Route C (via Foothills Boulevard) exceeds 2 miles in distance to the nearest gateway
(Gateway 3). Given that Foothills Boulevard is projected to be over capacity (V/C > 4) under
Scenarios A and B, and Bubb Road is over capacity (V/C > 2) under both scenarios, evacuees using
these routes are likely to encounter significant traffic congestion and longer evacuation times.
Distances to Evacuation Gateways
FIGURE 5
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FIGURE 2
0 1 2
Miles
Cupertino City BoundaryCupertino City Boundary
Evacuation Routes
Distance to Evacuation Gateway
0 - 0.5 Miles 0.5 - 1 Miles 1 - 1.5 Miles 1.5 - 2 Miles 2.5 - 3 Miles
Gateway
Start
A
B
C
D
E
F
1
2
3
4
5
6
0.9 miles
from Point F
to Gateway 6
1.1 miles
from Point F
to Gateway 5
1.3 miles
from Point B
to Gateway 1
1.4 miles
from Point E
to Gateway 4
1.6 miles
from Point E
to Gateway 5
1.6 miles
from Point B
to Gateway 2
1.9 miles
from Point A
to Gateway 1
2 miles
from Point D
to Gateway 3
2.2 miles
from Point D
to Gateway 4
2.4 miles
from Point C
to Gateway 3
2.5 miles
from Point C
to Gateway 1
Gateway
Start
Distance to Evacuation Gateway
0 - 0.5 Miles 0.5 - 1 Miles 1 - 1.5 Miles 1.5 - 2 Miles 2.5 - 3 Miles
0 1 2
Miles
Rodrigues Ave
Torre Ave
Data Source: Fehr & Peers
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 29
5. Recommendations
The City of Cupertino has already implemented several key strategies that support evacuation
readiness and enhance emergency response capabilities. These existing measures provide a strong
foundation for coordinated and effective action during wildfire or other disaster events:
• Established multi-jurisdictional plans that enable Fire and Sheriff departments to operate
seamlessly under a unified command structure. This coordination ensures faster decision-
making, effective resource deployment, and a cohesive response across different agencies
and jurisdictions.
• Traffic signals within the evacuation network are equipped with battery backup systems,
allowing them to remain operational during power outages for up to eight hours. This
functionality helps maintain orderly traffic flow, reduces confusion at intersections, and
supports safer, more efficient evacuations.
• Strong coordination and communication among key agencies including Fire, Sheriff, and
Public Works—facilitate real-time updates and operational alignment. These communication
protocols enable swift sharing of situational information, ensuring a collaborative response
during rapidly evolving emergency situations.
In addition to the recommended policies (Policy HS-2.1 to Policy HS-2.15) included in the Safety
Element Update, the following recommendations are listed as potential measures that can enhance
the evacuation process through the supply side (increasing evacuation capacity), demand side
(managing evacuation volumes), and information side (improving awareness and communication).
These recommendations will be incorporated into future updates of the Emergency Operations Plan
(EOP), Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP), and Health and Safety Element Update to ensure
consistency and alignment. Some recommendations can be implemented more readily through the
EOP. Others may require additional coordination and formal adoption as part of the Safety Element
Update or LHMP.
5.1 Supply-Side Strategies
Supply-side strategies aim to temporarily increase evacuation capacity at key bottleneck locations
while balancing the everyday safety and function of the roadway system.
• Increasing capacity through the use of contraflow lanes or dual purpose shoulder
evacuation/protected bike lane widening by changing future roadway design, especially in
areas with less accessibility and located on key evacuation routes. These areas are primarily
located on I-280, Foothills Boulevard, Stevens Creek Boulevard, Bubb Road, and SR-85
corridors. These routes should consider incorporating design treatments such as painted
medians (instead of raised medians) or other treatments that could assist in creating
reversible lanes, or a dual-purpose shoulder to facilitate additional capacity in an evacuation
event scenario.
• Extending water service into evacuation corridors strengthens firefighting capacity and long-
term water investment ensures reliable resources that sustain evacuation operations under
emergency conditions.
• Managed traffic control during evacuation, including turn restrictions and route or ramp
closures, to maximize outflows from evacuation areas.
• Faster clearing of fire-induced road closures.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 30
• Plan for street parking management on high hazard days.
5.2 Demand-Side Strategies
• The City of Cupertino can support vehicle volume reduction during an evacuation by
encouraging carpooling and use of public transit;
• Encouraging a one car per household evacuation pledge (for households that must have
second vehicles, an alternative could involve early off-site placement of a second car when
advance wildfire warnings or other hazard requiring evacuation are available);
• Identifying shelter locations within the City limits and outside the FHSZ to reduce demand on
evacuation routes outside the FHSZ and plan/implement shelter facilities; and
5.3 Information-Side Strategies
The City of Cupertino can further support evacuation through the following measures:
• Enhance community evacuation programs to improve resident, employee, student, and
visitor preparedness and familiarity with evacuation routes and processes.
• Strengthen coordination of emergency response equipment and resources between
neighboring jurisdictions, allowing for shared use based on operational needs rather than
ownership.
• Enhance communication protocols between cities and elected officials to support unified
decision-making, real-time information sharing, and coordinated emergency response across
jurisdictional boundaries.
• Explore and deploy wildfire early detection systems (i.e., wildfire video surveillance cameras,
drones, etc.) especially for constrained access parcels.
• Use real-time traffic management tools to implement dynamic route guidance and
monitoring to guide evacuees away from congested routes and encourage the use of
secondary or tertiary routes to distribute traffic more evenly.
• Study a phased evacuation process where different groups or areas evacuate at different
times to prevent congestion on main evacuation routes. This can be based on factors like
proximity to danger, traffic volume, or priority of evacuation.
• Study and install vehicle monitoring devices and variable message signs to monitor
evacuation programs and provide notification of any changes in evacuation routes or plans
due to a change in the wildfire or incidents to motorists along the road.
5.4 Additional Considerations
This evacuation assessment includes trips generated by both employees and residents from the
evacuation area and assumes all residents and employees will be evacuated using vehicles. A critical
consideration for emergency personnel is to assist individual residents and employees who either do
not have access to a vehicle or cannot drive, to ensure that compete evacuation is provided. The
EOP includes provisions to coordinate with the VTA, Silicon Valley (SV) Hopper , and emergency
services. Further research into strategies for evacuating people who do not have access to a vehicle
is recommended. Options for assisting with evacuation in such situations could include, but not be
limited to, the following:
• Neighborhood “buddy” program to link people needing assistance with people willing to
assist.
Cupertino Evacuation Route Capacity Assessment | 31
• Partnership with transportation network companies (TNCs) like Uber and Lyft.
For individual students and visitors who do not have access to a vehicle, options for assisting with
evacuation in such situations could include, but not be limited to, the following:
• Designated pick-up zones for TNCs or buses to ensure orderly evacuation.
• Provide dedicated shuttle, school vans, or charter bus service, if available.
P
Appendix A:
Socioeconomic Data
P
Table A-1: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Census1
Geographic Area Households Population Employment
Household Vehicle Ownership
0 1 2 3+
Census Tract 5077.01 1,216 4,092 1,526 90 217 515 394
Block Group 1; Census
Tract 5077.01 N/A 878 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Block Group 2;
Census Tract 5077.01 N/A 1,927 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Census Tract 5077.02 2,163 6,107 3,310 24 300 1,192 647
Block Group 1;
Census Tract 5077.02 N/A 2,052 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Block Group 2;
Census Tract 5077.02 N/A 1,704 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Block Group 3;
Census Tract 5077.02 N/A 2,351 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Census Tract 5077.04 1,214 3,466 1,453 150 299 457 308
Block Group 1;
Census Tract 5077.04 N/A 1,060 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Block Group 2;
Census Tract 5077.04 N/A 2,406 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Census Tract 5077.05 1,385 4,560 1,753 19 255 671 440
Block Group 1;
Census Tract 5077.05 N/A 1,952 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Block Group 2;
Census Tract 5077.05 N/A 1,373 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Block Group 3;
Census Tract 5077.05 N/A 1,235 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Total 5,978 35,613 8,042 283 1,071 2,835 1,789
Notes:
1. Census block group and census tract locations are illustrated in Figure A-1.
Source: 2023 ACS 5-year Estimates; Fehr & Peers, 2025.
P
Figure A-1: Census Block Group and Census Tract Locations
P
Table A-2: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Genasys Protect1
Geographic Area Total Population Total Daytime
Population Total Households
SCC-005 0 0 0
SCC-006 0 3 0
SCC-008 198 270 82
SCC-010 12 52 2
SCC-011 13 41 4
SCC-020 67 37 21
CUP-007 784 1,057 376
CUP-008 1,294 931 418
CUP-016 10 124 3
CUP-017 3,188 2,523 1,042
CUP-018 1,339 1,245 461
CUP-029 2,841 2,046 953
CUP-032 654 470 248
CUP-033 2,236 1,546 745
Total 12,636 10,345 4,355
Notes:
1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2.
Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025.
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Figure A-2: Genasys Protect Zone Locations (highlighted numbers in study area)
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Table A-3: Summary of Socioeconomic Data – Santa Clara County VMT Estimation Tool1
Geographic Area Households Population Employment
TAZ 132 955 2,702 94
TAZ 130 0 0 0
TAZ 127 204 614 14
TAZ 128 231 693 25
TAZ 126 647 2,038 647
TAZ 103 193 530 77
TAZ 133 325 920 66
TAZ 102 278 749 55
TAZ 116 305 910 64
TAZ 115 1 3 1,448
TAZ 129 996 2,995 150
TAZ 105 413 1,240 5
TAZ 136 22 62 135
TAZ 122 328 1,033 0
TAZ 125 238 751 2
TAZ 131 273 822 5
TAZ 1334 661 1,880 55
TAZ 135 640 1,825 31
TAZ 134 677 1,916 7
TAZ 117 582 1,741 1,448
TAZ 123 466 1,472 0
Total 8,435 24,896 4,328
Notes:
1. TAZ locations are illustrated in Figure A-3.
Source: Santa Clara Countywide VMT Estimation Tool; Fehr & Peers, 2025.
P
Figure A-3: Transportation Analysis Zone (TAZ) Locations (light blue indicates study area)
P
Table A-4: School Enrollment Data
School Name School Enrollment
Abraham Lincoln Elementary 700
John F Kennedy Middle 930
Tessellations Elementary School 270
Total (non-driving students) 1,9001
Monta Vista High School (can drive) 1,6602
Total Students 3,560
Notes:
1. Elementary and middle school students are assumed to evacuate either by carpooling with another student
(20%) or by being picked up/dropped off individually (80%).
2. High school students are assumed to be able to drive and are therefore assigned the following evacuation
mode shares: drive alone (20%), carpool (30%), and pick-up/drop-off (50%).
Table A-5: Estimated Student Evacuation Trips
Driving Condition
Percent Estimates
Number of
Students Factor1 Estimated Student
Evacuation Trips 1,900 Students
(Non- Driving)
1,660
Students
(Can Drive)
Drive Alone 0% 20% 330 1.0 330
Carpool 20% 30% 880 0.5 440
Drop-Off 80% 50% 2,350 1.0 2,350
Total 3,560 3,120
Notes:
1. Drive Alone trips assume one person per vehicle; Carpool trips assume two passengers per vehicle,
excluding the driver; and Drop-Off trips assume one passenger per vehicle, with the driver not counted.
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Table A-6: Estimated Visitor Evacuation Trips
Recreational Attractions Location Number of Visitors1
PG&E Trailhead East of Rancho San
Antonio County Park 200
Deep Cliff Golf Course North of Linda Vista Park 20
Rim Trail North of Stevens Creek
County Park 100
Parker Ranch Trailhead East of Fremont Older
Open Space Preserve 35
Total Visitors 355
Estimated Visitor Evacuation Trips2 180
Notes:
1. The number of visitors is based on the percentage of parking spaces assumed during the study period.
(Refer to Table 2 notes for the percentages assumed).
2. Visitors are assumed to carpool (two or more passengers per vehicle).
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Appendix B: Trip
Distribution
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Table B-1: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario A)
Genasys Protect
Zones1 Population Population
Distribution Connected Roadways Evacuation Trip
Distribution
SCC-0052 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0%
SCC-006 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0%
SCC-008 198 1% Foothills Boulevard 1%
SCC-010 12 0% Foothills Boulevard 0%
SCC-011 13 0% Prospect Road 0%
SCC-020 67 0% Prospect Road 0%
CUP-007 784 5% Cristo Rey Drive 5%
CUP-008 1,294 8%
Foothills Boulevard 5%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 3%
CUP-016 10 0% McClellan Road 0%
CUP-017 3,188 20%
Foothills Boulevard 9%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 10%
McClellan Road 1%
CUP-008 1,339 8%
Foothills Boulevard 5%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 3%
CUP-029 2,841 38%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 4%
McClellan Road 24%
Rainbow Drive 10%
CUP-032 654 4% McClellan Road 2%
Rainbow Drive 2%
CUP-033 2,236 16%
Stelling Road 5%
Rainbow Drive 5%
Prospect Road 6%
Notes:
1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2.
2. SCC coded zones are located in Santa Clara County’s FHSZ.
Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025.
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Table B-2: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario B)
Genasys Protect
Zones1 Population Population
Distribution
Connected
Roadways
Evacuation Trip
Distribution
SCC-005 0 0% Foothills
Boulevard 0%
SCC-006 0 0% Foothills
Boulevard 0%
SCC-008 198 2% Foothills
Boulevard 2%
SCC-010 12 0% Foothills
Boulevard 0%
SCC-011 13 0% Prospect Road 0%
SCC-020 67 1% Prospect Road 1%
CUP-007 784 6% Cristo Rey Drive 6%
CUP-008 1,294 10%
Foothills
Boulevard 7%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 3%
CUP-016 10 0% McClellan Road 0%
CUP-017 3,188 25%
Foothills
Boulevard 10%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 13%
McClellan Road 2%
CUP-008 1,339 11%
Foothills
Boulevard 8%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 3%
CUP-029 2,841 22%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 2%
McClellan Road 15%
Rainbow Drive 5%
CUP-032 654 5% McClellan Road 3%
Rainbow Drive 2%
CUP-033 2,236 18%
Stelling Road 6%
Rainbow Drive 6%
Prospect Road 6%
Notes:
1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2.
2. SCC coded zones are located in Santa Clara County’s FHSZ.
Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025.
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Table B-3: Trip Distribution Linked to Genasys Protect Zones (Scenario C)
Genasys Protect
Zones1 Population Population
Distribution Connected Roadways Evacuation Trip
Distribution2
SCC-0053 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0%
SCC-006 0 0% Foothills Boulevard 0%
SCC-008 198 1% Foothills Boulevard 1%
SCC-010 12 0% Foothills Boulevard 0%
SCC-011 13 0% Prospect Road 0%
SCC-020 67 0% Prospect Road 0%
CUP-007 784 5% Cristo Rey Drive 5%
CUP-008 1,294 8%
Foothills Boulevard 8%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 0%
CUP-016 10 0% McClellan Road 0%
CUP-017 3,188 20%
Foothills Boulevard 15%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 0%
McClellan Road 5%
CUP-008 1,339 8%
Foothills Boulevard 8%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 0%
CUP-029 2,841 38%
Stevens Creek
Boulevard 0%
McClellan Road 26%
Rainbow Drive 12%
CUP-032 654 4% McClellan Road 2%
Rainbow Drive 2%
CUP-033 2,236 16%
Stelling Road 5%
Rainbow Drive 5%
Prospect Road 6%
Notes:
1. Genasys Protect zone locations are illustrated in Figure A-2.
2. For Scenario C, due to road closure at Stevens Creek Boulevard at SR-85, trips assigned to Stevens Creek
Boulevard under Scenario A were shifted to alternative roadways.
3. SCC coded zones are located in Santa Clara County’s FHSZ.
Source: Genasys Protect; Fehr & Peers, 2025.